Lifetime Voices... Cook Islands elders talk about the changes in their fisheries

This documentary titled ‘A Lifetime of Change’ was part of the Rauti Para project carried out last year throughout most the Cook Islands, which was co-financed by the SPC EU Global Climate Change Alliance: Pacific Small Islands States project and the SRIC CC program.

The documentary is based on the changes in our marine resources that Cook Islands elders have noticed within their lifetime. 

The message of this documentary is clear and  resource managers, need to consider it before placing economical gains ahead of people's livelihood and culture

Damanzaihao (ex Lafayette) in the SPRFMO IUU Vessels List.

In late September las year I wrote about this Oil-tanker/Fishing Boat lingering in the south pacific under Peruvian flag. I'm happy to report that it has been included into the is on the final list of vessels marked as engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing drafted by the SPRFMO's (South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation) technical and compliance committee. Also on the list is Avrora, (Aurora), now  Russian-flagged trawler previously known as Pacific Conqueror under Peruvian flag, whose unlicensed activities I also mention in that post.

Length × Breadth: 228.61m × 32.24m... the smaller one is just a big fishing boat.

Last year Damanzaihao carried the name Lafayette, and was flying a Russian and then a Mongolian flag. It passed through New Zealand's exclusive economic zone. Later, in international waters east of the North Island, it met upwith four other fishing vessels and a fleet tanker. While the Aurora has been listed as an IUU vessel because of "fishing in the SPRFMO Convention Area without authorisation (air photographs from New Zealand and prolonged unauthorised presence in the SPRFMO Area (evidence from Chile)".

As I reported, the direct owner is listed as Sustainable Fishing Resources, with the email address belonging to the domain of the Peruvian fishmeal producer Copeinca, bought by China Fishery in late 2013).  China Fishery Group, is a Bermuda registered fishing company belonging to the Hong Kong-listed Pacific Andes International Holdings. And  Pacific Andes is a well know and extremely powerful mafia type Frozen Fish conglomerate with long time IUU allegations, as the linked OECD report from 2005 already shows.  

The owners said it was "disappointed" to be on the list. "We believe that inclusion on the IUU list is out of proportion with the minor nature of the allegation against the vessel" the company said, in a statement. "This support vessel has no capability to catch fish. The allegation made related only to the provision of food, water and fuel to authorized catcher vessels prior to the date on which the support vessel was authorized by the Peruvian government". Transshipment, however, is classified as a fishing activity by the SPRFMO.

Unfortunately Peru (a country I work with its medium size industry and like a lot- see here and here)  fought "very hard" to oppose the committee's decision. The country attended the meeting in Auckland with lawyers representing Pacific Andes and a minister.  However, until such time that acceptable sanctions have been put against the vessel, the ships should remain on the list, but surely what is "aceptable" for Peru may not be the same that aceptable for other countries... particularly in terms of the ingraining that these "players" seem to have in the Peruvian regulatory system, I reported these issues in early 2011 and 4 years later not much has changed.

The SPRFMO is a multinational fisheries management organization that came into force in 2012 in a bid to fend off a collapse of Pacific mackerel that has seen the stock fall from 30 million tonnes to just three million in two decades.

For a vessel to be removed from the IUU list, SPRRMO stipulates that the vessel's flag state needs to show it has adopted measures so that the vessel conforms with SPRFMO rules and that it will continue to effectively monitor and control the vessel's operations in the SPRFMO area. The flag state also needs to show it has "taken effective action in response to the IUU fishing activities in question including prosecution and/or imposition of sanctions of adequate severity". Alternatively to the sanctions, it can show that the vessel has changed owners, and that the previous owner "no longer has any legal, financial or real interests in the vessel or exercises control over it".

Under SPRFMO rules, members and cooperating non-contracting parties agree to take "all necessary non-discriminatory measures" available to them to sanction IUU vessels.
These should include removing the vessels' fishing permits for resources managed by the SPRFMO, to prevent them from fishing but also transshipping, refueling, carrying cargo or otherwise supporting fishing vessels. Sanctions should also seek to prohibit IUU vessels from entering to the country's port, "except in force majeure" or from being chartered.

Members should also refuse to grant their flag to vessels of the IUU list, except if there is sufficient evidence to determine this will not result in IUU fishing, while prohibiting imports, landings, transshipments, processing and purchasing of species covered by the convention from any IUU vessel. Finally, the rules say members agree to collect and exchange information to search for, control and prevent false import/export certificates for species covered by the SPRFMO from vessels on the list.

As I insist in many of my posts, IUU fishing is a really complex issue that goes from the the type of hook and the size of fish all the way to beneficial ownership, and implicating a variety of issues from illegal immigration, human trafficking, drug trafficking to tax evasion. And all this is just beyond the impact on fisheries management.

Sources here and here

The murkiness of Beneficial Ownership

Beneficial ownership is enjoyed by anyone who has the benefits of ownership of a Security (finance) or property, and yet does not nominally own the asset itself. In Fisheries it a more diffuse concept, but it comes down to who ultimate benefits of the profits of the fishing activities, because is the one that did the investment.

In November 2012 the EU's DG MARE published a list of selected third countries that the Commission considered as “possible of being identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to IUU Regulation” pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008. The Commission Decision identified Belize, Cambodia, Fiji, Guinea, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu as such potential non-cooperating third countries. 

At the time, Trygg Mat (a Norwegian NGO that unfortunately seems to have ceased operations) conducted a brief analysis of the fishing vessels flagged to these countries and what companies are involved as owners or operators of them.

Their results were quite revealing, as you can see:

Number of vessels where EU companies own or play an operational part 

Recently, Sri Lanka (the only one without EU players) was declared a non cooperating country (red carded) and exports embargoed. Vanuatu, Fiji, Togo and Panama went back to green. Belize went to red and then came back to green.

I would love to know what are the figures now.

IUU fishing is a really complex issue, and while the EU has its anti IUU regulations and the catch certification scheme, the finances behind it are way beyond the controls of the certification and how good are some countries in terms of their Flag State responsibilities.

Dodgy Fishing Vessels Stories (a perfect example)

It never ceases to amaze me the utter “dodgines” of some vessel operators… and it also saddens me to think how many of those are around and we don’t about them… here a sad example dug out by my colleagues at SIF (Stop Illegal Fishing) that operates in Southern Africa.

An Omani flagged tuna long-liner with the name NAHAM-4, with the call sign A4DK6, was detained in Cape Town in March 2013. The vessel's agent had been granted a permit to allow the vessel to undergo repairs and discharge fish in Cape Town. Once in port the South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) made a port inspection that revealed inconsistencies between the amount of fish held on-board and the supporting documentation.

This led to an investigation into the vessel by South African authorities that was supported by research from Triton Naval Architects. This research revealed that between 2010 and 2013 four different vessels had been operating with the name NAHAM-4 and that the vessel held in Cape Town was significantly larger than the NAHAM-4 that was authorised to fish in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Convention area.

As a result of the South African investigation, the Omani registered vessel owner Al-Naham and its representatives, Wu Hai Tao and Wu Hai Ping (unsurprisingly Taiwanese citizens), were charged and convicted on seven accounts relating to contraventions of the Marine Living Resources Act and IOTC's Conservation and Management Measures.

The fish that was on-board was forfeited to South Africa and auctioned, and it is anticipated that the vessel will also be auctioned in the near future. According to the Muscat Daily, the owners of the NAHAM-4, Al-Naham, have abandoned the vessel, leaving the South Africa agent Trade Ocean with debts amounting to USD 100,000. The agent is reportedly now taking legal action in Taiwan against the owners of Al-Naham who are Taiwanese citizens to recover their financial losses.

In parallel to the South African investigations, the regional FISH-i Africa Task Force, with the support of Stop Illegal Fishing, FACT and the Secretariat of the IOTC, were also investigating the NAHAM-4 during their routine crosschecking of vessels operating in the Western Indian Ocean. Comparisons of photographs of vessels bearing the name NAHAM-4, including photographs taken in late 2013 in Cape Town, showed significant differences in the structure of the vessels and inconsistencies between the call signs painted on the vessels.

In one example the name NAHAM-4 was marked on a vessel alongside the call sign A4DK5, this call sign is officially recorded with IOTC as the call sign for the fishing vessel NAHAM-3. This photographic analysis also supported the South African conclusion that the vessel arrested in Cape Town is not the vessel that is recorded in the IOTC authorised vessel list by Oman. However the NAHAM-3 was been hijacked in Somalia. 

Further analysis by FISH-i Africa disclosed that the previous name of the vessel held in Cape Town was DER HORNG 569, a fishing vessel owned by Der Wei Fishery Co. Ltd. of Taiwan. DER HORNG 569 was flagged to Belize and recent communication with the authorities in Belize revealed that the DER HORNG 569 and a sister vessel the DER WEI 686 had been reported as stolen (!?) by the owner Der Wei Fishery Co. Ltd. in early 2009. Following this, the DER HORNG 569 was de-flagged by Belize and since that time the flag State of this vessel has been unknown.  

FISH-i Africa has not been able to find any official records or documentation tracing the DER HORNG 569 since the vessel was removed from the Belize register, including no record of the re-naming of the DER HORNG 569 to the NAHAM-4. As the name NAHAM-4 is already in use by another vessel, it may suggest that the Taiwanese owned and Omani registered company Al-Naham re-named the vessel after it was reported stolen by the previous owners.

During the FISH-i Africa investigation it emerged that Al-Naham, the company owning the arrested NAHAM-4, use the same postal address as the Oman based company Seas Tawariq Co. LLC in the IOTC list of authorised vessels. Tawariq Co. LLC was the owner of the infamous IUU fishing vessel Tawariq 1 arrested and later confiscated by the United Republic of Tanzania in 2009. 

The case of NAHAM-4 is still ongoing but it already exemplifies the use of false identities to operate illegally. It demonstrates the complexity of illegal fishing and the daring and unethical behaviour that lies behind this crime. This case also shows that systematic information sharing and crosschecking, such as that taking place in the FISH-i Africa Task Force is greatly needed.

Stop Illegal Fishing urges the flag State of Oman to face the challenge of the NAHAM-4 and to act as a responsible and transparent flag State.

Original source and more here

The Fisheries Control Room

A lot of media coverage has been devoted in the last weeks to a new monitoring system developed by the Satellite Applications Catapult, a British government-backed innovation centre, in collaboration with Pew Charitable Trusts (an American research group) very active in the fisheries sector.

It just fell onto the truck....

In essence, it is a big-data project, pulling together and cross-checking information on tens of thousands of fishing boats operating around the world. At its heart is what its developers call a virtual watch room, which resembles the control centre for a space mission. A giant video wall displays a map of the world, showing clusters of lighted dots, each representing a fishing boat.

The data used to draw this map come from various sources, the most important of which are ships’ automatic identification systems (AIS). These are like the transponders carried by aircraft. They broadcast a vessel’s identity, position and other information to nearby ships and coastal stations, and also to satellites. An AIS is mandatory for all commercial vessels, fishing boats included, with a gross tonnage of more than 300 mt.

Such boats are also required, in many cases, to carry a second device, known as a VMS (vessel monitoring system). This transmits similar data directly to the authorities who control the waters in which the vessel is fishing, and carrying it is a condition of a boat’s licence to fish there. Enforcement of the AIS regime is patchy, and captains do sometimes have what they feel is a legitimate reason for turning it off, in order not to alert other boats in the area to profitable shoals. But the VMS transmits only to officialdom, so there can be no excuse for disabling it. Switching off either system will alert the watch room to potential shenanigans.

The watch room first filters vessels it believes are fishing from others that are not. It does this by looking at, for example, which boats are in areas where fish congregate. It then tracks these boats using a series of algorithms that trigger an alert if, say, a vessel enters a marine conservation area and slows to fishing speed, or goes “dark” by turning off its identification systems. Operators can then zoom in on the vessel and request further information to find out what is going on. Satellites armed with synthetic-aperture radar can detect a vessel’s position regardless of weather conditions. This means that even if a ship has gone dark, its fishing pattern can be logged. Zigzagging, for example, suggests it is long-lining for tuna. When the weather is set fair, this radar information can be supplemented by high-resolution satellite photographs. Such images mean, for instance, that what purports to be a merchant ship can be fingered as a transshipment vessel by watching fishing boats transfer their illicit catch to it.

As powerful as the watch room is, though, its success will depend on governments, fishing authorities and industry adopting the technology and working together. Those authorities need to make sure AIS and VMS systems are not just fitted, but are used correctly and not tampered with. This should get easier as the cost of the technology falls.

Enforcing the use of an IMO identification number that stays with a ship throughout its life, even if it changes hands or country of registration, is also necessary. An exemption for fishing boats ended in 2013, but the numbering is still not universally applied. Signatories to a treaty agreed in 2009, to make ports exert stricter controls on foreign-flagged fishing vessels, also need to act. Rogue Fishers seek out ports with lax regulations to land illegal catches.

One big problem is that technology can work both ways... Analyzing data from July 2012 to August 2014 Windward (a maritime analytics company)  found a mouldering culture of manipulation and deceit in the global maritime industry. They sorted the problems they uncovered into five categories all of which result in “distorting the maritime picture and with it the ability of decision makers to act on valid, reliable data.” The five major categories identified were:

1) Identity Fraud: They found that 1% of ships were transmitting false or stolen identifying marks (IMO numbers, unique numbers assigned to every vessel over a certain size). While this number might seem low, they drew the analogy to airport security, and that this was the equivalent to 1000 people travelling through an international airport using fake identification in a single day. This practice has increased by 30% in the past year.

2) Obscuring Destinations: 59% of vessels failed to report their next port of call.

3) ‘Going Dark’: This was the most common form of AI manipulation whereby a vessel simply turns off their AIS. Windward determined that over one quarter of the vessels worldwide are turning off their AIS at least 10% of the time. To ‘go dark’ operators must physically separate an AIS transmitter from its battery.

4) GPS Manipulation: Windward notes that “AIS transmitters do not provide GPS validation. Therefore, whatever positioning data is ‘fed’ into the device is transmitted as the vessel’s position, regardless of the ship’s actual position.” They recorded a dramatic 59% increase in GPS manipulation between mid- 2013 to mid-2014. Operators must physically manipulate the hardware of the AIS transmitter or physically connect the AIS to a computer and use special software to provide false GPS locations. One example given in an article in Wired noted how a vessels turned off its AIS off the south coast of Mexico, only to have its AIS signal reappear near Chile a short while later, and then in the middle of the Antarctic Continent.

5) Spoofing AIS: The AIS system can be hacked so that ‘ghost ships’ can be introduced where there are not vessels. The implications of all of these various manipulations of AIS are significant, and include threats to safety at sea, international security, undermining the ability to track vessels and monitor areas on the part of governments and other security and financial stakeholders in global maritime trade. IUU fishers are strongly incentivised to manipulate their AIS or to operate without AIS, either of which is illegal, frustrates the jobs of coast guards and law enforcements, and threatens maritime safety.

Hence, the technology to find out the "truth" has similar incentives for those not interested in the truth! As well as the issue that all this is quite costly.

The way to get clients!

One interesting idea for using the watch room is that major retailers and companies could employ its findings to protect their supply chains, and thus their reputations for not handling what are, in effect, stolen goods. Governments sometimes have reason to drag their feet about enforcing fisheries rules. Supermarkets, though, will generally want to be seen as playing by them. The watch room’s developers say they are already in discussions with a large European supermarket group to do just this.

The watch room will also allow the effective monitoring of marine reserves or no take zones around small island states that do not have the resources to do it for themselves. The first test of this approach could be to regulate a reserve of 836,000 square kilometres around the Pitcairn Islands group, a British territory in the middle of the South Pacific with only a few dozen inhabitants. The Pitcairn reserve, which may be set up later this year, will be one of the world’s largest marine sanctuaries. By proving that the watch room can keep an eye on such a remote site, its developers hope other places with similar requirements will be encouraged to get involved.

The watch-room system is, moreover, capable of enlargement as new information sources are developed. One such may be nanosats. These are satellites, a few centimetres across, that can be launched in swarms to increase the number of electronic eyes in the sky while simultaneously reducing costs. Closer to the surface, unmanned drones can do the same. The watch room, then, is a work in progress. But in the game of cat and mouse that enforcing fishing regulations has become, it will give the cat an important advantage.

Sources here and here

Not just illegal fishing

Not that i'm a assiduous reader of the Somali Agenda news site, but my friend Jorge Torrens has been working there with FAO for a while, and sent me this "jewel" that I quote below, in regards the potential ramifications of IUU fishing and Korea's ineptitude as a responsible Flag State, a plot from a movie develops including corruption, assassinations, British mercenaries and the lot, as you will read... 

Mogadishu, Somalia’s Auditor-General Nur Farah has spoken with the Voice of America’s Somali Service to explain the mystery surrounding the South Korean Fishing Trawler that was captured illegally fishing in Somalia waters last week.

Confirming much of the exclusive revelations, the Auditor General has for the first time publicly accused the country’s Attorney-General Ahmed Ali Dahir and the Banadir Regional Court Chief of being responsible for the release of the fishing trawler. More troubling however, the Auditor-General has for the first time revealed of a plot to assassinate him within the Mogadishu’s Presidential Palace compound.

Not the Poseidon... but surely not too different. 

In particular, the Auditor-General accused the President’s Chief of Staff Ali Omar more commonly known as Ali Balcad of personally threatening the Auditor-General and labeling him a “security threat,” shortly before the assassination attempt was made on the life of the Auditor-General.

The South Korean Fishing Vessel’s positions 

According to the Auditor-General, the South Korean Fishing Trawler Poseidon is currently in Ceel Macaan, just north of Mogadishu actively fishing illegally in Somali waters. Sources tell SOMALI AGENDA almost $1.5 million has been paid to secure the release of the fishing trawler and deposited in a bank in Kenya with unnamed presidential aides being tasked to collect the money.

Since the inception of the current administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, critics have accused the president of enabling corruption to take deep roots in his government. In December of last year, The Bloomberg BUSINESSWEEK has disclosed documents and shady deals signed by former Natural Resources Minister Abdirazak Omar Mohamed which gave two British ex-Servicemen fishing rights over Somali waters. Abdirazak Omar Mohamed is currently a senior adviser to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on Oil and Gas.

So as you see, IUU fishing is deeply ingrained in the murkiest deals in many countries... is not just about illegal fishing...

Source here

EU and US to decide on Korea's illegal fishing status in February

The European Union has said it will delay its final decision on Korea's illegal fishing status to the end of February. This will allow Vice Minister of Oceans and Fisheries and Acting Minister Kim Young-suk to fly to Brussels in a last-ditch effort to explain the government's progress.

Flag state responsibility antonym (photo by EJF)

Kim will visit EU headquarters between Jan. 21 and 24 to inform of the progress Korea has made and drum up support to lift the imposition of the temporary illegal fishing status.

Kim will meet MARE's Director-General Lowri Evans and Karmenu Vella, commissioner for the environment, maritime affairs and fisheries, Thursday, and International Maritime Organization officials, Friday. 

The EU in November 2013 designated Korea as a preliminary illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) nation, along with Ghana and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles

Korean fishing companies have been accused of repetitively engaging in illegal fishing in West African waters, while the fisheries ministry has been too lenient on the owners of those vessels.

In June last year, a group of EU officials came to Korea for an inspection before the economic block finalized its designation of Korea as an "illegal fishing nation," a decision that was expected to be handed down this month.

Once officially designated as an IUU country, the nation will face substantial disadvantages in trade. All fishery exports to EU nations, which amount to about $100 million a year, will be banned and Korean vessels' access to EU ports limited.

An EU delegation is slated to visit Korea between Feb. 24 and 25, prior to its final decision.

Meanwhile, the ministry is facing the final verdict about sanctions from the United States in February as well. The U.S. put Korea on its preliminary list of illegal fishing states in January 2013 and was expected to reach a final decision this month. But that was postponed for a month to conduct additional reviews.

The ministry will hold a briefing on the revised Ocean Industry Development Act, while the U.S. side will provide information on a presidential task force on combating illegal fishing.

Source: here

FAO Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes and other summer activities

Busy January I have to admit...

As I reported before, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) endorsed the usefulness of catch documentation schemes in combating IUU fishing and welcomed initiatives to harmonize current schemes. And requested that FAO elaborate guidelines and other relevant criteria relating to catch documentation schemes (CDS), including possible formats, based on the following principles: a) be in conformity with the provisions of relevant international law; b) not create unnecessary barriers to trade; c) equivalence; d) risk-based; e) reliable, simple, clear and transparent; and f) electronic if possible, aiming for adoption at the thirty-second session of the Committee of Fisheries. The assessment of schemes and formats shall include cost-benefit considerations and take into account catch documentation schemes already existing in certain Member States, Member Organizations and in the context of RFMOs. 

People having fun at a FAO fisheries meetings

I been honoured by FAO with the request to lead on this task… which is quite massive.  

I’m more an action person that a diplomat and a writer, so I said yes as long as I could work with people that know their stuff and could complement my many holes. So I’m working with my colleague Alastair Macfarlane, who has been a trade and market access pillar in the NZ Seafood Industry council for many years and has the trust of many people in the world.

Furthermore, my friend Gilles Hosch, is working on draft guidelines best practices on Catch Documentation Schemes for the Tuna Fisheries under the Common Oceans Initiative, and as we are in the same tune in regards these issues, a complementarity with his excellent work was a key condition for me to get involved, as we can move in parallel fronts. 

These developments run on parallel to the work I been doing with WWF US and the work planned this year with DevFishII/FFA and PNG’s NFA of a Pacific Region CDS to propose to the WCPFC.

So this is quite timely... but a major undertaken, I hope I can live up to the hopes and expectations these people and institutions have placed on me… 

If this wasn't enough, at the same time FAO requested me to be involved in one of their major projects “Fisheries management and marine conservation within a changing ecosystem context”, lading a review of 10 national case studies on traceability practices (Argentina, Barbados, Morocco, Peru, Senegal, Sri-Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda and Vietnam) as to identify critical points in the seafood value chain, national/regional practices for combatting IUU fishing and insuring food safety, and ways to reduce vulnerability to threats and crises especially for small scale sector.

The objective is to provide concrete recommendations to national policymakers on improved national/regional policies and provide FAO with recommendations on ways to assist national governments to improve their traceability practices, especially to combat IUU fishing.

This is one is a particularly difficult task, as our 1st big challenge was to find a method to compare “pears with oranges”, as a way to find common factors among the very eclectic mix of countries 

Hence I contacted the author of paper I read a while ago “framework for regulatory requirements related to data recording and traceability designed to IUU fishing” (Melanie Borit form NOFIMA in Norway) and not only she was very helpful, but offered to participate in the study, which is great news as no one better to evaluate the framework that the author! 

To complement the team and in order to deal with this challenge in comprehensive way, I also involved my friend and fellow Waiheke islander Kim Thomson whom I worked with in the frame of NZ fisheries, and now she is taking the bulk of the complexity of this task.

So the easy January spearfishing, surfing, sailing and doing beach life is off the window big time… but then I’m happy to stretch my brain and hopefully come up with some useful tools at the end. 

The joy of being in the ocean

I grow up in the swamps and farms near the Argentina-Paraguay border, so the ocean was a late but vital addition into my life. 

I owe to the ocean and its fisheries everything I have, and most importantly, it defined who I am.

I don't know if my kids would be in fisheries, but I would love for them to have the opportunity to do so if they are keen... However I'm painfully aware that it would be for them much harder, than it was for me, to make a living out of it. Perhaps that is one of the reasons that motivate my work, I don't want fisheries to collapse and thus, do not allow them (and others like me) to build their lives in a positive way.

In any case, I'm pleased that my kids love the ocean, are not afraid of it, while are always respectful of its dangers and wonders.

This picture taken last week in Okopu Bay - Aotea/Great Barrier Island (100 kilometres / 62 mi north-east of Auckland) really pleases me as it resumes that feeling of bewildering and joy my kids seems to share with me in regards the ocean... (plus the laughs when I explained the playfulness around the dolphin's belly to belly "frisky" behaviour!)

No matter what they will become, I know that the ocean will be a part of their lives, and that makes me proud and happy.

The Basics of complexity

When I started university, marine biology and fisheries where for me the logical options, and while I did Biology in High School, it was not too deep.

I remember vividly how biochemistry and cytology at Uni just blew my mind, and I could see how the challenges of complexity and incredible pathways that already exist at molecular level would extrapolate and amplify... so managing populations and ecosystems is from that angle a mammoth task.

Here is to biochemistry and cytology! 

End of the "fishing" year

Dear friends/readers/colleagues 

Just wanted to reiterate that I don't take your readership, the work opportunities you provided me and advice given over the year, as granted.

The place I call home at this time of the year with my family, Awana in Great Barrier Island (Aotea) in NZ

I'm always aware of the fact that surely you have better options than a partly dyslexic, grammatically challenged, barely understandable, weird humoured, half cast type mongrel Austrian/Argentinean fisherman pretending for already 17 years to be a consultant...

But by some obscure reason you still give me work, read my blog and call me a friend! 
 
So thank you again for your support over 2014 and hope the best in 2015. 
 
Hope you all had a good xmas and have a great new year.

Last job of the year

Last Saturday I had my planning meeting for 2015 with my colleagues (and friends at this stage!) form the EU funded DevFish II  project based in FFA, in the Solomon Islands.  

I mentioned this project before, as a lot of the work I do in the Pacific is under its auspices, and have I been involved in its operations for the last 3 years… I really love working with them.

The aim of the project is already clear in the logo “A fairer slice for Pacific People”, and that is what delivers… Pacific Island countries catch just $200 million worth of tuna from its fisheries while foreign nations fishing in the same waters catch over $2 billion. Meanwhile, estimates of lost potential earnings from illegal fishing range from the millions to over a billion. By focusing its efforts on increasing control of illegal fishing and maximising local opportunities for business and employment, DEVFISH is making a significant impact on Pacific Island economies.

The scope of the work I’m involved with them, includes 

• Transparency and stakeholder Involvement. We are working to find newer ways to strengthen industry associations and artisanal fishers' representation in decision making, and provide training and advice on fishing access agreements and licenses to national government staff.
• Strengthening the competency of the authorities. To export fish to the EU, countries need an EU-approved 'Competent Authority' to certify fish exports meet EU export standards. Support is been provided for meeting requirements associated with sanitary inspection and EU catch certification (which contain requirements to certify fish is not caught illegally).       
• Industry Strengthening. Training and expertise to expand exports within sustainable limits will be provided - such as training fishing companies to improve vessels and fish handling practices. The emphasis is on small and medium enterprises, where we provide training and technical assistance with a focus on strengthening management and filling skill shortages constraining growth and profitability, within sustainable limits.
• Standardisation of capacity building and training. Under Devfish, training for rhe Authorities officers has been standardized under the same curriculums for the personel of all FFA countries in terms of Seafood inspectors, Fisheries inspectors, Vessels inspectors IUU certification staff, as well as training on Leadership and conflict management
• New Technologies. Projects include from of cleaner technologies, replacement of 2-stroke with 4-stroke engines for artisanal fisheries to the development of fisheries management and control Software.

I reported before on examples of the most visible work I have done with them: here, here, here and here, among otheres

And while I can be quite critical of some aspects of the EU in terms of the disproportioned burden they put on pacific island countries, I always recognised that they do put a lot of money in terms of assistance… and in the case of DevFish II they do that in a flexible format, that allows for FFA (in response to the Pacific Islands needs) to organise the contracts and assistance independently, without being micromanaged from Brussels.

This approach allows for fast response to immediate problems, this flexibility was crucial in terms of assisting countries with the IUU “yellow cards”

Furthermore, from the "human side" is great too. I’m working with friends, meetings are smooth, egos contained… the Team Leader is “Uncle” Hugh Walton (NZ), a former Fisherman/guerrilla gardner/educator, etc... (and a real south Seas vagabond) that is well know and respected all trough the Pacific, and among my colleagues I love having two friends; Jope Tamani (from Fiji) and Timothy Numilengi (PNG) whom I met first time many years ago as their trainer. Beside being top professionals, they are just really nice people to work with, and with many values more aligned to my ones than my European colleages.

Working with your friends... awesome.

In fact, I wish all international assistance programmes were like Devfish.

Infographic on the new EU labelling and traceability requirements

As of 13 December 2014, the new EU food labelling rules, adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2011,  aim to ensure that consumers receive clearer, more comprehensive and accurate information on food content, and help them make informed choices about what they eat.

An explanation guide of the rules aimed to Pacific Islands Tuna producers we did with FFA in August, can be downloaded from here. 

The Illustrated "Pocket Guide" for fisheries products, published by the EU itself can be downloaded from here.

The EU issues Solomon Islands and Tuvalu "yellow cards"

Last february a delegation of the EU's DG MARE (like the EU ministry of fisheries) visited the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu in a "dialogue" mission, to assess how the countries comply with their vision of of how these countries implement their IUU regulation.

Just to put things in perspective, Tuvalu has less than 10000 inhabitants, does not process fish or trade fish with the EU. Has 5 fishing vessels under it flag, and the vessels don't land in the country because there is no where to land....

Tuvalu's fishing hub

I written intensively about the Solomons, and you all know I'm very fond of the place, so not going to abound too much on it.

Accessing the EU market comes at significant costs for the Solomons, as the EU request the highest level of compliance (rightly so, to protect their consumers) worldwide. These obligations for market access in terms of fisheries (and seafood safety) controls are quite complex for a country like the Solomon, as the need to prove they have systems in place that are equivalent to those of the EU member countries.

Implementing these systems to the required level would them around € 1.2 million. This is more than the budget that the government assigns for dengue or malaria, so allocating that kind of money for EU market access arises legitimate ethical questions. On the other side, these are the exports that  produce the income for the country that all other priorities may need. This rational, while valid, is hard to find even in established countries, more so in very young ones.

So... yes, things are not perfect... the EU singled out the lack of traceability and catch certification failures. I completely reject the 1st issue, as while fisheries may have not a traceability system in place, the authorities for health certification to the EU and the company have an excellent one, and in terms of catch certification (which is in itself a defective tool), mistakes were made on the paper work, mostly because no one ever trained them, we fixed that a in April (even the EU ambassador came to the training).

Catch Certification Training in Noro

The DG Mare delegation spent 3 days there, talking mostly to officials, not even went to Noro to see by themselves how things work there and now, 10 months later they drop this bomb, without even coming back to assess the advances... 

I'm the 1st one to recognise that they have problems and sometimes they are slow to fix them... but they are not negating them either...  So, is the best strategy for the EU to shame Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as with "yellow cards" as non-cooperative third countries in terms of IUU fishing?

Particularly when we all know the absolute mess that fisheries controls are in China (see here and here) and Taiwan for example, with huge fleets actively involved in IUU fishing in the Pacific

I acknowledge that the EU funds directly or indirectly a lot of my work... but surely there are better ways to achieve results than being perceived as a bully.

UNDP PRODUCED VIDEO "SAVING OUR TUNA"

I'm always kind of double sided on documentaries about commercial fishing... While I agree in principle with the message, they tend to go for an over-dramatization of issues, emotional low punches, western type paternalistic overtones "we know better what is better for you" and many times very weak technical background...

These issues, in my opinion, do more harm than good, because they dilute the credibility of the people making them and more important; the otherwise good message of better management. 

Fisheries "crisis" is just not a biological issue, but a complex mix of politics (both from the "receiving" countries and the Distant Water Fishing Nations), fuelled by subsidies, lack transparency, budgeting for fisheries controls, and yes: "pure greed", among other many things... Is not just plain "bad" people taking advantage of 'good" people

In any case, this is a segment of a much longer doco (that unfortunately is not fully up loaded in youtube), but that I like for its straitness and the people they talk too.... some of them my friends after being working with them for many years.

The "Landing Authorization Code" concept

One of the recommendations provided to the US Presidential Task Force on IUU fishing by the WWF conveyed "Expert Panel on Legal and Traceable Wild Fish Products" (I blogged about it here) included the  adoption of my "Landing Authorization Code" concept, which is quite flattering.

The concept originates from work I have done for the DevFISH II programme (a EU funded initiative embedded in the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency - FFA).  And it is based in the simple fact that “Fish does not become IUU during processing, but is either caught or landed illegally”.

The concepts “mixes” two basic elements; the requirements (in one way or another) of Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)  and a Key Data Element needed to follow a landing through the value chain.

Under PSMA, vessels have to seek advance approval to enter a port, sufficient to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the information provided. Hence the information required needs to be provided and assessed to facilitate a decision as to whether or not to deny or grant entry. If an “authorization” is given, either the master or the vessel’s representative can present the authorization to the authorities when the vessel arrives in port. 

This “authorization” will need to be “coded” (on some form or another) as to be recorded in one way or another as to be able to review and accounted and potentially crosschecked if it is deemed necessary. So why not simply use this Landing Authorization Code (LAC) as the tool for the initial Key Data Element required for any Catch Documentation Scheme or traceability analysis along the value chain from landing to consumer (or wherever it is needed or most cost effective). 

Furthermore, most fishing vessels operators (company own or independent) do maintain a trip or voyage coding systems in order to monitor logistics, fuel consumption, crewing rosters, general costs and more importantly “final payments”(which are in the form of a % of the catch volumes, species composition and values) are to the traced back to that landing, minus the fix costs. 

Therefore the concept already exists in the sector, so this “LAC” becomes a better and standardised use of an existing tool. The "Process" associated to the use design and use of the LAC is as follow:

Arrival notification

The “authorization” to land is assessed by the fisheries authorities in the port in a compliance response to a series of requirements that are decided by the authorities of the Port State in relationship to its own legislation and requirements or those of an RFMO, international agreements, etc. The scope of the requirements can be arranged in accordance to a pre determined risk index based on the characteristics of the vessels requiring port access. 

As an example: domestic flagged vessels fishing in the Port State EEZ with local VMS and observers may be at the lowest risk tier (i.e green). Foreign vessels with local licenses, foreign charter vessels, domestic vessels fishing in other EZZ or the High Seas, Fish Carriers, vessels with patchy observer coverage, indirect VMS access, etc. are in middle risk tier (yellow). Finally, foreign flagged vessels with no direct VMS access by the coastal or port state, or no observer coverage or vessels identified as a Vessels of Interest (VoI) by any country or RFMO are singled as high risk vessels (red).

As noted, the risk profile of the vessel defines the required time for arrival notification (12, 24, 48 hrs), plus the amount and depth of the information to be provided by the vessel intending to land. In considering the assessment an LAC can be provided and the vessel is allowed to dock with intention to unload. In instances where it is not provided the vessel may be allowed to dock for humanitarian or force majeure reasons but not to land. 

The structure and nature of the “LAC” is up to the Port State or RFMO to decide, but it is important that it is inclusive in the information it holds, and in principle is to be an integral part of relational database such as a Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS). 

The LAC “design” should include for elements such as:  country identification, trip and port traceability, fishing effort measurements, observer reporting, etc. and it should have inter-operability with the vessels operators trip/voyaging coding systems, and if needed with the maritime authorities.

Interestingly, this inter-operability of the vessels operators and authorities LAC can be beneficial to crews and captains in case of payment disputes or safety at sea issues arising from the maritime authorities.

Inspections

The risk profile and compliance level during the previous step defines the need for inspection of the landing and the expected % of yearly inspections decided by the port state, i.e. 25% of landings for green tier vessels, 50% for yellow and 100% for red.

The decision of whether an inspection should take place needs to be based on the risk profile of the vessel (if red) and the % of inspections that have already taken  place (yellow, green) or issues arising from the documentation presented.

If an inspection is performed, then the LAC is recorded in the inspection forms in order to provide for future verification if required and for compliance performance monitoring. Ideally the Inspection forms are digitalized on a tablet type device and the data enters the FIM is real time under the specific LAC of that operation.

If the results of the inspection shows inconsistencies or non compliances (and based on the extent of these) the landing may be authorized under bond or denied. Then the LAC associated to that landing is “flagged” into the FIMS in order to interrupt any further movements or transactions associated to that landing until the issues are resolved.

Unloading 

If it is decided that an inspection is necessary then the results, if compliant, will provide the permission to unload (or transship). This landing could be conditional, as explained before (under bond). If an inspection does not take place the LAC then becomes the “de facto” authorization for unloading.

In the case of transshipments, the LAC is attached to the catch estimates (from logsheets) or real (if hanging scales are used) and reflect the captains/mates receipt or any the document the volumes being transshipped. The LAC will then accompany the transshipping documentation (printed) and if the receiving country has an MoU with the port state or is part of the same RFMO, then they can potentially log-in on to a common FIMS to cross check the legality and estimated volumes of the landing and to add their own information.  If landing or transshipments are partial (and this practice should be discouraged by principle) then the LAC would need to be “partitioned” into lots associated to the original LAC with this retained as the main reference and the lots can be incorporated into FIMS. Any volumes not landed should be considered as a “lot” in the same manner as the landed ones.

Transport

If transport is required for the landing to coolstores or processing facilities then the documentation to be carried will reference the LAC in relation to the real (if fish is weighed prior) or estimated landing taken out of the documentation provided for the vessels arrival, or e-logsheets. 

Reception or weight in

At the coosltore or processing facility reception or anywhere where the official sorting and weight in of the fish is done the LAC “marks” the volumes in the FIMS and into the receiving operator’s inventory system. 

If the whole fish is loaded into containers for direct export then the weight in is to be recorded under the LAC on the FIMS and the volumes containerized discounted of the total volumes recorded that that landing. That exported lot would still be associated to the LAC as in the case of partial landings or transshipments.

The private operators receiving the fish could either load all the data on a FIMS portal or maintain their own inventory and traceability systems that could either be “absorbed” by FIMS or audited by fisheries authorities. In any case final volumes by species would be incorporated into FIMS for the LAC.

Companies normally use lot systems based on the species, size and vessel of origin. All these parameters can be linked to the LAC under FIMS or their own inventory and traceability management system.

Processing establishments and cool stores 

Most responsible MCS systems include Mass Balance evaluation (fish landed = fish in storage + fish processed or sold) on the establishments, by the fisheries authorities.   

These evaluations starts with the LAC of all fish received for a period of time and what is presently in the inventory. The officers for example may chose a minimum of 5 different pallets/boxes/bins to do a full traceability exercise and check that each of those pallets/boxes/bins (raw material as well as processed fish) are registered on company documentation and that can be traced to the LAC.

Volumes withdraw from storage for processing are “discounted” from the original landed volumes in relation to the LAC, hence each withdrawal would leave a smaller volume left from the original until the landing is exhausted. Obviously same principle applies to whole fish withdrawals.  Processed product volumes will be inventoried under the same LAC taking in to consideration the processing ratios (conversion factors) associated to that type of products.

Final product Sales and Exports - Catch Certificates

Prior to the product leaving the premises Catch Certificates (domestic or market specific) are prepared based on all the operations relating to the original LAC (or LACs in the case of mixed products).

The referencing and traceability to the specific LAC plus the fish volumes accountancy through the value chain becomes the basis and condition “sine qua non” for a catch certificate, either paper or electronic.

the LAC in action

The whole system is based on my view of what is practical from "reality" perspective and the technology tools we have available today. Many countries have already FIMS, or these can be easily adapted from banking software, as the principles are similar (Landing are deposits, and processing/sales are withdrawals).

I have no idea if the concept would be adopted in some way or another by countries or international organisations, but i'm quietly proud of it :-)

Training on the EU IUU Catch Certification Scheme in the Philippines

Philippines received a yellow card notification from the European Commission in June 2014 notifying it that it was failing to discharge its duties as a flag, port, and coastal state to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. 

Unloading in GenSan

The decision highlighted that the country (in the EU's view) was not doing enough to fight illegal fishing. It identifies concrete shortcomings, such as lack of system of sanctions to deter IUU activities or lack of actions to address deficiencies in monitoring, controlling and surveillance of fisheries.

The decision does not, at this stage, entail any measures affecting trade. Countries that are being given a 'yellow card' warning and a reasonable time to respond and take measures to rectify the situation. Should the situation not  improve, the EU could take further steps, which could entail trade sanctions on fisheries imports, as was done recently with Guinea, Belize and Cambodia (IP/14/304).

Philippines and PNG were notified at the same time (I wrote about it before) and they share some of the problems being identified, hence it make sense that the training being provided is standardised, so the understanding of the technical issues is the same on both sides.

However, the Catch Certificate is only the top of the iceberg, what we see from much deeper issues... and those are the hard ones to tackle, particularly in countries that have a lot of areas that requires a high level of attention and support at least equal to fisheries compliance.

Competition & Conflict Between Ecolabels In Tuna Fisheries

Further on my post on governance innovation networks in Tuna, I found interesting that the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands, went deeper into the conflict between the Dolphin Safe and the Marine Stewardship Council certification schemes in the West and Central Pacific.

In this video, they outline how key practices like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency, impartiality/independence and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the importance of authority in understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within global production networks.

They conclude that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in global production networks.

I wrote about Ecolabels (or Eco-certifications) and their role for seafood trade in a publication that the SIPPO Programme commission a few years ago (download from here or here)

In the Tuna conferences, normally the last session is in between Ecolabels... and  it tends to be an embarrassing cat fight, that at this stage is not even funny anymore, so I always walk out... feels like a ego contest (my one is better than yours) more than a anything else.

2014 UN General Assembly (Fisheries Resolution on CDS)

Catch Documentation Schemes

75bis. Notes with satisfaction in this regard that the Committee on Fisheries at its thirty-first session recognized that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations would undertake to elaborate guidelines and other relevant criteria relating to catch documentation schemes, including possible formats, based on the following principles: conformity with the provisions of international law, not creating unnecessary barriers to trade, equivalence, risk-based, reliable, simple, clear and transparent, and electronic if possible, with the aim of adoption at the thirty-second session of the Committee on Fisheries, and that the assessment of schemes and formats would include cost-benefit considerations and take into account catch documentation schemes already implemented by certain of its members, as well as regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements;

Just an example of the stuff we do now with the EU one

This is good news... a better system is possible and some very smart and "reality based" people are working on it!

Governance Innovation Networks for Sustainable Tuna

I have been reading with interest parts of Alice M.M. Miller's PhD thesis from October 2014, at University of Wageningen School of Social Sciences. I liked the fact that she tackles the issue from a Social Science perspective, which I find really refreshing.

There are two particular topics (so far) I have focused: 

1) The MSC (Marine Stewardship Council) vs the Dolphin Safe label conflict in the PNA fishery

She examine this case by asking what happens if two labels regulating the same fishery, with differing perceived levels of credibility, make conflicting sustainability claims? 

She looks at how key practices like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency/openness, impartiality/independence and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the importance of authority in understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within global production networks. Her results demonstrate that despite substantially different levels of credibility within these networks, the application of an environmental standard is more connected to the authority of the standard setter than the credibility of the label. The paper concludes that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in global production networks.

Loved her graphics

This is in line with my personal knowledge and appreciation of both schemes, where i see the MSC as "real" measure of sustainability (even if i have my reservations on other aspects of it), and the "Dolphin Safe" which may have started with some real values in the 80's but is now a money making scheme with little transparency.

2) The power asymmetry in the role that the EU's DG mare is taking in the Pacific fisheries

Like any other world power the EU is aiming to extend its regulatory reach beyond its territory.  Utilising its position as the world’s largest tuna market the EU has been able to exert regulatory authority by attaching compliance with their IUU Regulation to their trade agreements and conditions of market access.  ‘Market Power Europe’ is the main basis for the power asymmetry between the EU and Pacific Island countries in EU IUU Regulation uptake.

The result has been that where market access has been crucial for these external countries, they have sought to comply with the EU’s rules, albeit with varying degrees of success. In addition to market power the EU has also diffused the implementation of their IUU Regulation through normative power, for instance through interactions in the WCPFC.

Exerting normative power to promote their external regulatory agenda has been less successful for the EU and met with considerable, but differentiated, resistance by Pacific Island countries. The negative perception of the EU’s sustainable fisheries track record in the region and their self-interest based socialisation strategies has weakened the EU’s capacity to take a normative stance over sovereign resources of third countries.

The EU’s external regulatory strategy for fisheries has therefore ‘muddied the waters’ because the EU’s perceived behaviour undermines moral superiority it claims over the countries targeted by their IUU Regulation. In addition, in a region with strong sub-regional governance structures like the PNA, Pacific Island countries have been able to exploit their position in the WCPFC as a collective of resource owners, to openly criticise the EU’s normative stance and to ‘push back’ against EU demands. This has altered the power asymmetry in their favour. Pacific Island countries, which lack ‘traditional’ market power, have been able to promote their own regulatory agenda against traditionally more powerful bodies like the EU. 

These dynamic and differentiated power asymmetries generate in turn a differentiated geography of regulatory uptake. The power of the EU lies in its position as a market actor; one faced with minimal resistance in pushing its regulatory agenda. With a near global consensus on strong IUU fishing regulation, it appears any added value for the EU in investing in their normative power over the already resistant sovereign owners of fishery resources, is diminishing.

While the strategic importance of interacting in multilateral fora such as the WCPFC will continue to remain important for the EU, exercising normative power on IUU regulation appears better reserved for an increasingly sparse group of countries and regions not dependent on the EU export market; and when exercised, should focus on cooperation rather than ‘teaching’.