As I’ve blogged before, this week, the position paper I was contracted to write with two Greek academics was discussed at the UN HQ in New York during a side event. The position paper does not have me as a co-author, yet I’m acknowledged as the drafter of section 2.
Yet the last draft I presented (27 pages) was substantially more than what had been published, and that was fair enough… The position paper focuses more on the vicissitudes of the flag state than on a compendium of existing MPAs in ABNJ and the technologies that can be used to surveil them.
Yet, I think there is merit in presenting my findings, as while we discuss MPAs in ABNJ as a totally novel concept, they are not… What is novel is the framework in which they will exist under the BBNJ Agreement.
Over the following few blogs, I’ll present the part of my work that did not make it into the paper.
1 Present MPAs in ABNJ
FAO identifies six examples of high-seas MPAs with fisheries restrictions[1]. Yet overall, Boothroyd et all (2024)[2]identify twelve MPAs established in ABNJ by regional management bodies: 10 in the North East Atlantic under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic[3] (OSPAR Convention), and 2 in the Southern Ocean by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)[4] yet only the OSPAR ones have mandate beyond fisheries under the current legislative instrument regulating international cooperation on environmental protection.
1.1 OSPAR
The OSPAR Commission oversees the implementation of the convention; its members include EU representatives and officials from the fifteen member states that have signed on. This treaty revises and consolidates two previous conventions: the 1972 Oslo Convention on dumping at sea and the 1974 Paris Convention on land-based sources of marine pollution. Hence, OSPAR is a portmanteau of "Oslo" and "Paris." Therefore, OSPAR is a legal mechanism whereby the contracting parties (CP) that comprise the OSPAR Commission work together to safeguard the maritime environment from the negative impacts of human activities within their respective jurisdictions and to prevent and eliminate pollution.
The OSPAR Commission operates under its Rules of Procedure by evaluating and approving legally binding decisions, recommendations and agreements to advance the implementation of its objectives.
As ABNJ covers 40% of OSPAR's marine area, it designates ABNJ MPAs to create an ecologically coherent and well-managed network.
Source: https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/bdc/marine-protected-areas/mpas-in-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction
The OSPAR Commission may designate MPAs in ABNJ within the maritime region on the legal basis provided by OSPAR’s Regulatory Regime for establishing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) of the OSPAR Maritime Area.[5]
Based on their jurisdictional system, the 10 OSPAR ABNJ’s MPAs, fall into four groups:
1) Milne Seamount Complex MPA and Charlie-Gibbs South MPA
These are located in ABNJ, and all CPs provide collective protection for the water column, subsurface, and bottom.
2) Josephine Seamount High Seas MPA, Altair Seamount High Seas MPA, Antialtair High Seas MPA, and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge north of the Azores High Seas MPA
These four MPAs are located in an area subject to Portugal’s Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Portugal has stated its intention to take responsibility for taking action to protect the subsurface and seabed. The OSPAR Commission accepted Portugal's proposal to collaborate on safeguarding the water columns of these MPAs.
3) The North High Seas Charlie Gibbs MPA
This MPA is partially located in an area where Iceland submitted for an ECS to the UN CLCS. All of the CPs are committed to preserving the water column, while the subsurface and the seafloor are still unprotected
4) Hatton Rockall Basin, Hatton Bank SAC, and Rainbow Hydrothermal Vent Field
These MPAs are located in regions where a CP has submitted to the UN CLCS for an ECS. The corresponding CP protects the seabed and subsoil at these locations, but not the water column.
Bas (2020)[6] notes that the enforcement of measures in ABNJ is a complex task; at first glance, the UNCLOS structure appears to only allow for flag State enforcement, which has significant limits (by utilising 'flags of convenience') and as such the legislative framework governing OSPAR's MPAs lax enforcement mechanisms.
While the OSPAR MPA Management Guidelines (OSPAR 2003-18) recommend that CPs implement enforcement mechanisms, such as warnings, penalties, and fines, for MPAs under national jurisdiction, the ABNJ MPA establishment decisions and recommendations do not address enforcement. The lack of enforcement tools requires a substantial compliance procedure, which CPs have deemed insufficient.
Bas (ibid) also acknowledges that appropriate recognition should be warranted, as OSPAR’s high-seas MPA network represents a pioneering initiative that arguably sets a precedent for other regional organisations.
1.2 CCAMLR
CCAMLR is part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and governs marine living resources within the Antarctic Treaty Area. However, the Antarctic Treaty governs shipping, ship-based tourism, and other operations, not CCAMLR.
The Commission’s decisions are detailed in Conservation Measures (CM)[7]. Members have 180 days to opt out of any decision made at an annual Meeting of the Commission. Compliance with CMs and the provisions of the CCAMLR Convention is evaluated annually by the Commission, which relies on a Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) outlined in CM 10-10, as adopted in 2012
In 2002, the CCAMLR committed to establishing a representative MPA network as part of various management initiatives aimed at conserving Antarctic marine life resources. The Convention Area was divided into nine bioregional planning domains based on approximate bioregion boundaries. MPA planning has been implemented in eight domains, leading to the designation of MPAs in Domain 1 South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf (SOISS) and Domain 8 (Ross Sea) Region) under CM 91-03 and 91-05, respectively.
The Commission approved the UK-led SOISS MPA proposal, which did not interfere with existing fisheries interests and was designated a “no-take zone”. Following the establishment of the SOISS MPA, CCAMLR introduced CM91–04 to define MPA requirements (notwithstanding the omission of a definition of an MPA)[8]. After five years of negotiations, the Ross Sea Region (RSR) MPA proposal, led by New Zealand and the US, was approved by the Commission in 2016, making it the world's largest MPA; yet, unlike the SOISS MPA, the RSR MPA features two fishing zones incorporated later to secure agreement from CCAMLR members with fishing interests.
Other MPA proposals are still being negotiated (Fig. x)., including those for the East Antarctic (Domain 7, initially proposed by Australia and France in 2012), the Weddell Sea (Domains 3 and 4, initially proposed by Germany in 2016), and the Antarctic Peninsula region. These MPA recommendations remain unresolved.
CAMLR Convention Area, showing the MPA planning domains, the existing CCAMLR MPAs, National MPAs and the proposedMPAs. Source: Boothroyd et all. 2024
The scope of application of MPA conservation measures is limited to fishing vessels and vessels conducting scientific research on Antarctic marine living resources per CCAMLR conservation measures, even though the goals of MPA conservation measures as stated in paragraph 2 of CM 91-04 (2011) are expressed on broad conservation terms. The Commission must, however, endeavour to determine additional actions that other ATS components and other organisations, such as the IMO, may take to further the MPA's goals when it is created. Lastly, the Commission must make CCAMLR MPAs available to any relevant international or regional organisation or non-state party whose nationals or vessels may enter the Convention area, even if they are solely binding on CCAMLR members.
Following the CCAMLR System of Inspection set out in CM 10-02, members should conduct inspections within the MPAs to verify compliance with relevant CMs.
Under CMs 10-04 and 10-07, Flag States must notify the Secretariat before their fishing vessels enter the WSMPA to monitor vessel traffic within the MPAs. The Flag State may permit or direct that the vessel provide such notifications directly to the Secretariat. Except for those listed in CM 91-04 paragraph 7[9], other vessels are also encouraged to notify their entry into the MPA accordingly.
The CCAMLR System of Inspection has been established over three decades and has undergone enhancements. Numerous elements have been incorporated under several international fisheries agreements and domestic regulations governing fisheries. Article XXIV of the CAMLR Convention and several CMs constitute the legal foundation of the System of Inspection. To assess compliance by parties to CMs, the system comprises “At-sea inspection” and “Port inspection”. In conjunction with the yearly reports from CCAMLR meetings, the scheme has evolved into a comprehensive "Compliance Monitoring Mechanism" under the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure, with other monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) instruments.
Yet, as Denzil et al. 2019[10] note, it is the flag States-CP’s responsibility to ensure vessels comply with CMs in force (Convention Article XXI.1), with the expectation that CPs will pursue appropriate measures to achieve this. Furthermore, CPs are required to inform CCAMLR of such measures, ‘including the imposition of sanctions for violations’ (Article XXI.2), with Article XXIII.1 going on to require that CPs ensure that ‘no one engages in any activity contrary to the objective of the Convention’ in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter. Each CP is again required to ‘notify CCAMLR of any such activity which comes to its attention’ (Article XXIII.2).
As such, CPs play a crucial role in the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) by ensuring their vessels comply with the CMs in force. They are responsible for implementing these measures and informing CCAMLR of the actions taken, including the imposition of sanctions for violations. CPs must also notify CCAMLR of activities contrary to the Convention's objectives and take appropriate measures to address non-compliance. Additionally, CPs are expected to cooperate in joint enforcement actions and share monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) capabilities to optimise compliance enforcement.
However, the CCAMLR may collaborate to highlight non-compliance to the Commission and the relevant State(s) (Article XXI). If non-compliance persists, CPs are encouraged, in accordance with international law, to implement appropriate measures to tackle any perceived threats to the Convention’s objectives.
However, this process is not without its weaknesses. For instance, Scott[11] (2021) highlights that to comply with the CCAMLR general framework on MPAs, CM 91-04 mandates that members report on their activities concerning the Ross Sea region RMP every five years and share their data in a timely manner (though not explicitly defined). Additionally, the conservation measure itself will undergo review every ten years. Notably, CM 91-04 has a duration of 35 years; if the Commission fails to achieve a consensus to reaffirm, modify, or adopt a new MPA, CM 91-04 will lapse after the 2051/52 fishing season. It has been observed that 35 years is shorter than the life cycle of many Antarctic species it aims to protect[12], raising concerns regarding its alignment with the objectives of the MPA.
CCAMLR addresses non-compliance by Contracting Parties (CPs) through several mechanisms:
Compliance Evaluation: The CCEP systematically evaluates CPs' compliance with the CMs in force. This includes assessing fisheries monitoring information and compliance control actions.
Reporting and Sanctions: CPs must report on measures taken to ensure compliance, including imposition sanctions for violations. They must also inform CCAMLR of any non-compliant activities and take action to address them.
Annual Compliance Report: CCAMLR compiles a yearly Compliance Report that includes evaluations of non-compliance events. The Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) reviews this report, which the Commission then adopts.
Remedial Actions: CCAMLR may recommend or require specific remedial actions to address non-compliance, based on the results of compliance evaluations. This can include administrative sanctions, prosecution, and criminal convictions.
Transparency and Accountability: All discussions and decisions related to compliance are part of the public record, promoting transparency. Non-compliant vessels and CPs are identified, and their compliance status is made public.
Cooperation and Joint Enforcement: CPs are encouraged to cooperate in joint enforcement actions and share resources such as patrol aircraft or vessels to enhance compliance enforcement.
Follow-up and Monitoring: CCAMLR monitors the implementation of remedial actions and follows up on non-compliance issues to ensure they are effectively addressed.
These procedures collectively aim to promote compliance with CMs and safeguard the objectives of the CAMLR Convention. However, this procedure is limited to CPs and, in relation to this study, solely pertains to the two CMs that regulate Marine Protected Areas in the CCAMLR region and has yet to be tested for specific non-compliances.
1.3 Lessons Learned
Compliance with MPAs in ABNJ is more complex than that within national jurisdiction. This is primarily due to limited capacities for identifying contraventions, flag State performance and the limitations in the existing legal frameworks governing MPAs under RFMOs and, more crucially, outside them.
Furthermore, Klerk[13] presents recommendations based on OSPAR (yet applicable also to the CCAMLR examples) that are very useful for this paper, particularly those regarding the importance of flag State, enforcement mechanisms and the role of civil society/community organisations.
1.3.1 Flag State Performance
The function of flag states is fundamental to these problems; the rationale behind the principle of the freedom of the high seas (mare liberum) on ABNJ is the prohibition of interference by the ships of one nation against those of another. This prohibition has resulted in the principle of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction, which states that ships on the high seas are generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the State whose flag they lawfully carry. Consequently, the flag State possesses exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over its national vessels on the high seas.
UNDOC (2023)[14] recognises that, by necessary implication, means that to discharge its duties, the flag State would have, amongst others, to legislate accordingly and thus, effectively, assert its jurisdiction not only over the vessel itself but also over ‘everything on it, and every person involved or interested in its [the vessel’s] operations’.
In terms of criminal jurisdiction, this indicates that the flag State may extend its criminal authority to any individual, irrespective of nationality, on board its vessels, as well as to any other person involved in the associated criminal offence (for instance, depending on each State’s legislation, individuals who have committed inchoate offences, namely attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy, or those who are accessories—specifically, those who have aided, contributed to, or concealed the crime) question).
Furthermore, UNDOC[15] recognises that, given the extensive participation of States in UNCLOS, one would expect flag State jurisdiction to be a formidable tool in the battle against transnational organised crime at sea. Regrettably, this is not the case.
The reason is that flag States, even when they assert their legislative jurisdiction over crimes at sea, are not particularly keen on enforcing such jurisdiction by arresting alleged offenders and bringing them before their domestic courts. This is primarily due to the prevalence of ‘flags of convenience’ or ‘open registries’, which means that the flag States with the most significant ship registries are generally not even remotely associated with the vessels flying their flag, let alone with their owners, the master, or the crew members. Additionally, they cannot commonly ensure enforcement actions regarding criminal activities committed by or onboard their vessels.
In its Fisheries Advisory Opinion, ITLOS[16] in 2025 reasoned, based on Article 94 of UNCLOS, that a flag state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. This includes, particularly regarding fisheries, adopting the necessary administrative measures to ensure that such vessels are not engaged in activities that could undermine the flag state's responsibilities regarding conservation and management.
After concluding that UNCLOS imposes on flag states the responsibility 'to ensure' that no Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) occurs, the Tribunal interpreted this as an obligation of "conduct," which, according to the Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion, is an obligation of 'due diligence." This indicates that a flag state must maintain a certain standard of care rather than merely a responsibility to achieve a specific objective. The Tribunal also outlined the steps a flag state should take to fulfil its “due diligence” obligations to prevent IUU fishing, particularly in another state's EEZ.
Unfortunately, the ITLOS pronouncement only addressed IUU fishing and not, broadly speaking, all international illegal operations and serious environmental crimes at sea.
1.3.2 Enforcement Mechanisms
The limited to nil enforcement capacity in OSPAR’s ABNJ MPAs is not surprising since international treaties and conventions do not contain such mechanisms, and the possibilities within the UNCLOS framework are limited; thus, it will be similarly expected if negotiating parties in the ABNJ agreement decide not to include an enforcement mechanism (which currently seems to be the case) as part International Legally Binding Instrument (ILBI) (which currently appears to be the case). Although the ILBI will not drastically alter the legal regime in ABNJ, specific tools consistent with the current legal regime are already available.
Firstly, satellite technologies and software-driven “fusion platforms” are being used to monitor the position of vessels in ABNJ. These technologies in the broader context of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) are presented in section XX
Secondly, Port State Measures (PSM) type arrangements, based on Article 218 UNCLOS's comprehensive port State jurisdiction, have been used extensively regionally and internationally, especially in fisheries[17], labour[18], and vessel safety.[19]
The ABNJ ILBI may promote these instruments and is likely to adopt a ‘hybrid’ approach to implementation, with regional entities playing a crucial role. MDA tools can monitor MPA violations in ABNJ, and vessels can be inspected and prosecuted upon entering ports.
1.3.3 Civil Society Involvement
Civil society, particularly NGOs, plays a central role in identifying and establishing political pressure for OSPAR’s MPAs in ABNJ. Similarly, they could be involved in the compliance role; such an approach could create a better balance of interests between state and society, share the workloads with state organisations, and lead to more flexibility in the scope of compliance tools.
Involving civil society would be consistent with a trend in larger international law that allows different stakeholders to participate in law- and decision-making processes. Examples include the Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee[20], whose members can be nominated by NGOs, or the unprecedented involvement of NGOs in the negotiations before the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The BBNJ ILBI, as a contemporary environmental accord, should adhere to this trend rather than deviate from it.
References
[1] NEAFC, NAFO, SEAFO, CAAMLR and SIODFA. Source https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/topic/16204
[2] Boothroyd, A., Adams, V., Alexander, K.and Hill, N. 2024. Stakeholder perceptions of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Marine Protected Area planning process. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106381
[3] https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1169/ospar_convention.pdf
[5] https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/39751/annex06_jl_advice_on_abnj.doc
[6] Klerk, B, 2020. Lessons to be learned from OSPAR’s network of marine protected areas in areas beyond national jurisdiction, in light of the BBNJ negotiations. On-line: https://site.uit.no/nclos/2020/12/18/lessons-to-be-learned-from-ospars-network-of-marine-protected-areas-in-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction-in-light-of-the-bbnj-negotiations/
[7] https://cm.uat.ccamlr.org/index.php/en
[8] Scott, K. 2021. MPAs in the Southern Ocean under CCAMLR. The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law. https://brill.com/view/journals/kjic/9/1/article-p84_7.xml?language=en
[9]Warships, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.
[10] Denzil G. M. Miller & Elise Murray (2019) The CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure, Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 11:1, 1-36, DOI:10.1080/18366503.2018.1540168
[11] Scott , K. 2021. MPAs in the Southern Ocean under CCAMLR: Implementing SDG 14.5. The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2021) 84–107. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340147
[12] On average a toothfish will live for 50 years and most albatross species live for more than 50 years.
[13] Ibid 6
[14] UNDOC (2023). Flag State Jurisdiction and Transnational Organised Crime at Sea. Issue paper. Viena.https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC-GMCP_Flag_State_Jurisdiction_and_transnational_organized_crime_at_sea.pdf
[15] Ibid 10.
[16] ITLOS 2015, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-21/
[17] FAO, 2009 Port State Measures Agreement.
[18] ILO, 2006. Guidelines for port State control officers carrying out inspections under the Maritime Labour Convention.
[19] IMO Port State Control (PSC) through nine regional agreements on port State control - Memoranda of Understanding or MoUs - have been signed: Europe and the north Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU, while the USA Coast Guard maintain the tenth PSC regime
[20] https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC_Guidance/Guide_to_the_Aarhus_Convention_Compliance_Committee__2019.pdf