MCS in MPAs in ABNJ # 1: Present MPAs in ABNJ by Francisco Blaha

As I’ve blogged before, this week, the position paper I was contracted to write with two Greek academics was discussed at the UN HQ in New York during a side event. The position paper does not have me as a co-author, yet I’m acknowledged as the drafter of section 2.

Yet the last draft I presented (27 pages) was substantially more than what had been published, and that was fair enough… The position paper focuses more on the vicissitudes of the flag state than on a compendium of existing MPAs in ABNJ and the technologies that can be used to surveil them.

Yet, I think there is merit in presenting my findings, as while we discuss MPAs in ABNJ as a totally novel concept, they are not… What is novel is the framework in which they will exist under the BBNJ Agreement.

Over the following few blogs, I’ll present the part of my work that did not make it into the paper.

1        Present MPAs in ABNJ

FAO identifies six examples of high-seas MPAs with fisheries restrictions[1]. Yet overall, Boothroyd et all (2024)[2]identify twelve MPAs established in ABNJ by regional management bodies: 10 in the North East Atlantic under the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic[3]  (OSPAR Convention), and 2 in the Southern Ocean by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)[4] yet only the OSPAR ones have mandate beyond fisheries under the current legislative instrument regulating international cooperation on environmental protection.

1.1        OSPAR

The OSPAR Commission oversees the implementation of the convention; its members include EU representatives and officials from the fifteen member states that have signed on.  This treaty revises and consolidates two previous conventions: the 1972 Oslo Convention on dumping at sea and the 1974 Paris Convention on land-based sources of marine pollution. Hence, OSPAR is a portmanteau of "Oslo" and "Paris." Therefore, OSPAR is a legal mechanism whereby the contracting parties (CP) that comprise the OSPAR Commission work together to safeguard the maritime environment from the negative impacts of human activities within their respective jurisdictions and to prevent and eliminate pollution.

The OSPAR Commission operates under its Rules of Procedure by evaluating and approving legally binding decisions, recommendations and agreements to advance the implementation of its objectives.

As ABNJ covers 40% of OSPAR's marine area, it designates ABNJ MPAs to create an ecologically coherent and well-managed network.

Source: https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/bdc/marine-protected-areas/mpas-in-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction

The OSPAR Commission may designate MPAs in ABNJ within the maritime region on the legal basis provided by OSPAR’s Regulatory Regime for establishing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) of the OSPAR Maritime Area.[5]

Based on their jurisdictional system, the 10 OSPAR ABNJ’s MPAs, fall into four groups:

1) Milne Seamount Complex MPA and Charlie-Gibbs South MPA

These are located in ABNJ, and all CPs provide collective protection for the water column, subsurface, and bottom.

2) Josephine Seamount High Seas MPA, Altair Seamount High Seas MPA, Antialtair High Seas MPA, and the Mid-Atlantic Ridge north of the Azores High Seas MPA

These four MPAs are located in an area subject to Portugal’s Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Portugal has stated its intention to take responsibility for taking action to protect the subsurface and seabed. The OSPAR Commission accepted Portugal's proposal to collaborate on safeguarding the water columns of these MPAs.

3) The North High Seas Charlie Gibbs MPA

This MPA is partially located in an area where Iceland submitted for an ECS to the UN CLCS. All of the CPs are committed to preserving the water column, while the subsurface and the seafloor are still unprotected

4) Hatton Rockall Basin, Hatton Bank SAC, and Rainbow Hydrothermal Vent Field

These MPAs are located in regions where a CP has submitted to the UN CLCS for an ECS. The corresponding CP protects the seabed and subsoil at these locations, but not the water column.

Bas (2020)[6] notes that the enforcement of measures in ABNJ is a complex task; at first glance, the UNCLOS structure appears to only allow for flag State enforcement, which has significant limits (by utilising 'flags of convenience') and as such the legislative framework governing OSPAR's MPAs lax enforcement mechanisms.

While the OSPAR MPA Management Guidelines (OSPAR 2003-18) recommend that CPs implement enforcement mechanisms, such as warnings, penalties, and fines, for MPAs under national jurisdiction, the ABNJ MPA establishment decisions and recommendations do not address enforcement. The lack of enforcement tools requires a substantial compliance procedure, which CPs have deemed insufficient.

Bas (ibid) also acknowledges that appropriate recognition should be warranted, as OSPAR’s high-seas MPA network represents a pioneering initiative that arguably sets a precedent for other regional organisations.

1.2        CCAMLR

CCAMLR is part of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and governs marine living resources within the Antarctic Treaty Area. However, the Antarctic Treaty governs shipping, ship-based tourism, and other operations, not CCAMLR.

The Commission’s decisions are detailed in Conservation Measures (CM)[7]. Members have 180 days to opt out of any decision made at an annual Meeting of the Commission. Compliance with CMs and the provisions of the CCAMLR Convention is evaluated annually by the Commission, which relies on a Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) outlined in CM 10-10, as adopted in 2012

In 2002, the CCAMLR committed to establishing a representative MPA network as part of various management initiatives aimed at conserving Antarctic marine life resources. The Convention Area was divided into nine bioregional planning domains based on approximate bioregion boundaries. MPA planning has been implemented in eight domains, leading to the designation of MPAs in Domain 1 South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf (SOISS) and Domain 8 (Ross Sea) Region) under CM 91-03 and 91-05, respectively.

The Commission approved the UK-led SOISS MPA proposal, which did not interfere with existing fisheries interests and was designated a “no-take zone”. Following the establishment of the SOISS MPA, CCAMLR introduced CM91–04 to define MPA requirements (notwithstanding the omission of a definition of an MPA)[8]. After five years of negotiations, the Ross Sea Region (RSR) MPA proposal, led by New Zealand and the US, was approved by the Commission in 2016, making it the world's largest MPA; yet, unlike the SOISS MPA, the RSR MPA features two fishing zones incorporated later to secure agreement from CCAMLR members with fishing interests.

Other MPA proposals are still being negotiated (Fig. x)., including those for the East Antarctic (Domain 7, initially proposed by Australia and France in 2012), the Weddell Sea (Domains 3 and 4, initially proposed by Germany in 2016), and the Antarctic Peninsula region. These MPA recommendations remain unresolved.

CAMLR Convention Area, showing the MPA planning domains, the existing CCAMLR MPAs, National MPAs and the proposedMPAs. Source: Boothroyd et all. 2024

The scope of application of MPA conservation measures is limited to fishing vessels and vessels conducting scientific research on Antarctic marine living resources per CCAMLR conservation measures, even though the goals of MPA conservation measures as stated in paragraph 2 of CM 91-04 (2011) are expressed on broad conservation terms. The Commission must, however, endeavour to determine additional actions that other ATS components and other organisations, such as the IMO, may take to further the MPA's goals when it is created. Lastly, the Commission must make CCAMLR MPAs available to any relevant international or regional organisation or non-state party whose nationals or vessels may enter the Convention area, even if they are solely binding on CCAMLR members.

Following the CCAMLR System of Inspection set out in CM 10-02, members should conduct inspections within the MPAs to verify compliance with relevant CMs.

Under CMs 10-04 and 10-07, Flag States must notify the Secretariat before their fishing vessels enter the WSMPA to monitor vessel traffic within the MPAs. The Flag State may permit or direct that the vessel provide such notifications directly to the Secretariat. Except for those listed in CM 91-04 paragraph 7[9], other vessels are also encouraged to notify their entry into the MPA accordingly.

The CCAMLR System of Inspection has been established over three decades and has undergone enhancements. Numerous elements have been incorporated under several international fisheries agreements and domestic regulations governing fisheries. Article XXIV of the CAMLR Convention and several CMs constitute the legal foundation of the System of Inspection. To assess compliance by parties to CMs, the system comprises “At-sea inspection” and “Port inspection”. In conjunction with the yearly reports from CCAMLR meetings, the scheme has evolved into a comprehensive "Compliance Monitoring Mechanism" under the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure, with other monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) instruments.

Yet, as Denzil et al. 2019[10] note, it is the flag States-CP’s responsibility to ensure vessels comply with CMs in force (Convention Article XXI.1), with the expectation that CPs will pursue appropriate measures to achieve this. Furthermore, CPs are required to inform CCAMLR of such measures, ‘including the imposition of sanctions for violations’ (Article XXI.2), with Article XXIII.1 going on to require that CPs ensure that ‘no one engages in any activity contrary to the objective of the Convention’ in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter. Each CP is again required to ‘notify CCAMLR of any such activity which comes to its attention’ (Article XXIII.2).

As such, CPs play a crucial role in the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure (CCEP) by ensuring their vessels comply with the CMs in force.  They are responsible for implementing these measures and informing CCAMLR of the actions taken, including the imposition of sanctions for violations. CPs must also notify CCAMLR of activities contrary to the Convention's objectives and take appropriate measures to address non-compliance. Additionally, CPs are expected to cooperate in joint enforcement actions and share monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) capabilities to optimise compliance enforcement.

However, the CCAMLR may collaborate to highlight non-compliance to the Commission and the relevant State(s) (Article XXI). If non-compliance persists, CPs are encouraged, in accordance with international law, to implement appropriate measures to tackle any perceived threats to the Convention’s objectives.

However, this process is not without its weaknesses. For instance, Scott[11] (2021) highlights that to comply with the CCAMLR general framework on MPAs, CM 91-04 mandates that members report on their activities concerning the Ross Sea region RMP every five years and share their data in a timely manner (though not explicitly defined). Additionally, the conservation measure itself will undergo review every ten years. Notably, CM 91-04 has a duration of 35 years; if the Commission fails to achieve a consensus to reaffirm, modify, or adopt a new MPA, CM 91-04 will lapse after the 2051/52 fishing season. It has been observed that 35 years is shorter than the life cycle of many Antarctic species it aims to protect[12], raising concerns regarding its alignment with the objectives of the MPA.

CCAMLR addresses non-compliance by Contracting Parties (CPs) through several mechanisms:

  1. Compliance Evaluation: The CCEP systematically evaluates CPs' compliance with the CMs in force. This includes assessing fisheries monitoring information and compliance control actions.

  2. Reporting and Sanctions: CPs must report on measures taken to ensure compliance, including imposition sanctions for violations. They must also inform CCAMLR of any non-compliant activities and take action to address them.

  3. Annual Compliance Report: CCAMLR compiles a yearly Compliance Report that includes evaluations of non-compliance events.  The Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance (SCIC) reviews this report, which the Commission then adopts.

  4. Remedial Actions: CCAMLR may recommend or require specific remedial actions to address non-compliance, based on the results of compliance evaluations. This can include administrative sanctions, prosecution, and criminal convictions.

  5. Transparency and Accountability: All discussions and decisions related to compliance are part of the public record, promoting transparency.  Non-compliant vessels and CPs are identified, and their compliance status is made public.

  6. Cooperation and Joint Enforcement: CPs are encouraged to cooperate in joint enforcement actions and share resources such as patrol aircraft or vessels to enhance compliance enforcement.

  7. Follow-up and Monitoring: CCAMLR monitors the implementation of remedial actions and follows up on non-compliance issues to ensure they are effectively addressed.

These procedures collectively aim to promote compliance with CMs and safeguard the objectives of the CAMLR Convention. However, this procedure is limited to CPs and, in relation to this study, solely pertains to the two CMs that regulate Marine Protected Areas in the CCAMLR region and has yet to be tested for specific non-compliances.

1.3        Lessons Learned

Compliance with MPAs in ABNJ is more complex than that within national jurisdiction. This is primarily due to limited capacities for identifying contraventions, flag State performance and the limitations in the existing legal frameworks governing MPAs under RFMOs and, more crucially, outside them.

Furthermore, Klerk[13] presents recommendations based on OSPAR (yet applicable also to the CCAMLR examples) that are very useful for this paper, particularly those regarding the importance of flag State, enforcement mechanisms and the role of civil society/community organisations.

1.3.1       Flag State Performance

The function of flag states is fundamental to these problems; the rationale behind the principle of the freedom of the high seas (mare liberum) on ABNJ is the prohibition of interference by the ships of one nation against those of another. This prohibition has resulted in the principle of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction, which states that ships on the high seas are generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the State whose flag they lawfully carry. Consequently, the flag State possesses exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over its national vessels on the high seas.

UNDOC (2023)[14] recognises that, by necessary implication, means that to discharge its duties, the flag State would have, amongst others, to legislate accordingly and thus, effectively, assert its jurisdiction not only over the vessel itself but also over ‘everything on it, and every person involved or interested in its [the vessel’s] operations’.

In terms of criminal jurisdiction, this indicates that the flag State may extend its criminal authority to any individual, irrespective of nationality, on board its vessels, as well as to any other person involved in the associated criminal offence (for instance, depending on each State’s legislation, individuals who have committed inchoate offences, namely attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy, or those who are accessories—specifically, those who have aided, contributed to, or concealed the crime) question).

Furthermore, UNDOC[15] recognises that, given the extensive participation of States in UNCLOS, one would expect flag State jurisdiction to be a formidable tool in the battle against transnational organised crime at sea. Regrettably, this is not the case.

The reason is that flag States, even when they assert their legislative jurisdiction over crimes at sea, are not particularly keen on enforcing such jurisdiction by arresting alleged offenders and bringing them before their domestic courts. This is primarily due to the prevalence of ‘flags of convenience’ or ‘open registries’, which means that the flag States with the most significant ship registries are generally not even remotely associated with the vessels flying their flag, let alone with their owners, the master, or the crew members. Additionally, they cannot commonly ensure enforcement actions regarding criminal activities committed by or onboard their vessels.

In its Fisheries Advisory Opinion, ITLOS[16] in 2025 reasoned, based on Article 94 of UNCLOS, that a flag state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. This includes, particularly regarding fisheries, adopting the necessary administrative measures to ensure that such vessels are not engaged in activities that could undermine the flag state's responsibilities regarding conservation and management.

After concluding that UNCLOS imposes on flag states the responsibility 'to ensure' that no Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) occurs, the Tribunal interpreted this as an obligation of "conduct," which, according to the Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion, is an obligation of 'due diligence." This indicates that a flag state must maintain a certain standard of care rather than merely a responsibility to achieve a specific objective. The Tribunal also outlined the steps a flag state should take to fulfil its “due diligence” obligations to prevent IUU fishing, particularly in another state's EEZ.

Unfortunately, the ITLOS pronouncement only addressed IUU fishing and not, broadly speaking, all international illegal operations and serious environmental crimes at sea.

1.3.2       Enforcement Mechanisms

The limited to nil enforcement capacity in OSPAR’s ABNJ MPAs is not surprising since international treaties and conventions do not contain such mechanisms, and the possibilities within the UNCLOS framework are limited; thus, it will be similarly expected if negotiating parties in the ABNJ agreement decide not to include an enforcement mechanism (which currently seems to be the case) as part International Legally Binding Instrument (ILBI) (which currently appears to be the case). Although the ILBI will not drastically alter the legal regime in ABNJ, specific tools consistent with the current legal regime are already available.

Firstly, satellite technologies and software-driven “fusion platforms” are being used to monitor the position of vessels in ABNJ. These technologies in the broader context of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) are presented in section XX

Secondly, Port State Measures (PSM) type arrangements, based on Article 218 UNCLOS's comprehensive port State jurisdiction, have been used extensively regionally and internationally, especially in fisheries[17], labour[18], and vessel safety.[19]

The ABNJ ILBI may promote these instruments and is likely to adopt a ‘hybrid’ approach to implementation, with regional entities playing a crucial role. MDA tools can monitor MPA violations in ABNJ, and vessels can be inspected and prosecuted upon entering ports.

1.3.3       Civil Society Involvement

Civil society, particularly NGOs, plays a central role in identifying and establishing political pressure for OSPAR’s MPAs in ABNJ. Similarly, they could be involved in the compliance role; such an approach could create a better balance of interests between state and society, share the workloads with state organisations, and lead to more flexibility in the scope of compliance tools.

Involving civil society would be consistent with a trend in larger international law that allows different stakeholders to participate in law- and decision-making processes. Examples include the Aarhus Convention’s compliance committee[20], whose members can be nominated by NGOs, or the unprecedented involvement of NGOs in the negotiations before the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The BBNJ ILBI, as a contemporary environmental accord, should adhere to this trend rather than deviate from it.

References

[1] NEAFC, NAFO, SEAFO, CAAMLR and SIODFA. Source https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/topic/16204

[2] Boothroyd, A., Adams, V., Alexander, K.and Hill, N. 2024. Stakeholder perceptions of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Marine Protected Area planning process. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106381

[3] https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1169/ospar_convention.pdf

[4] https://www.ccamlr.org

[5] https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/39751/annex06_jl_advice_on_abnj.doc

[6] Klerk, B, 2020. Lessons to be learned from OSPAR’s network of marine protected areas in areas beyond national jurisdiction, in light of the BBNJ negotiations. On-line: https://site.uit.no/nclos/2020/12/18/lessons-to-be-learned-from-ospars-network-of-marine-protected-areas-in-areas-beyond-national-jurisdiction-in-light-of-the-bbnj-negotiations/

[7] https://cm.uat.ccamlr.org/index.php/en

[8] Scott, K. 2021. MPAs in the Southern Ocean under CCAMLR.  The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law. https://brill.com/view/journals/kjic/9/1/article-p84_7.xml?language=en

[9]Warships, naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.

[10] Denzil G. M. Miller & Elise Murray (2019) The CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure, Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 11:1, 1-36, DOI:10.1080/18366503.2018.1540168

[11] Scott , K. 2021. MPAs in the Southern Ocean under CCAMLR: Implementing SDG 14.5. The Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2021) 84–107. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134484-12340147

[12] On average a toothfish will live for 50 years and most albatross species live for more than 50 years. 

[13] Ibid 6

[14] UNDOC (2023). Flag State Jurisdiction and Transnational Organised Crime at Sea. Issue paper. Viena.https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC-GMCP_Flag_State_Jurisdiction_and_transnational_organized_crime_at_sea.pdf

[15] Ibid 10.

[16] ITLOS 2015, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC)  https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-21/

[17] FAO, 2009 Port State Measures Agreement.

[18] ILO, 2006. Guidelines for port State control officers carrying out inspections under the Maritime Labour Convention.

[19] IMO Port State Control (PSC) through nine regional agreements on port State control - Memoranda of Understanding or MoUs - have been signed: Europe and the north Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU, while the USA Coast Guard maintain the tenth PSC regime

[20] https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC_Guidance/Guide_to_the_Aarhus_Convention_Compliance_Committee__2019.pdf

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in Fisheries: Key Insights and Policy Directions by Francisco Blaha

I’m always stoked to see one of my pictures on the cover of a SPC publication, yet this one confronts a poignant reality in our industry and region. This comes on the heels of another major project I was also involved with, "Pictures and Words," a couple of years ago, the Pacific Handbook for human rights, gender equity, and social inclusion in tuna industries.

As usual, I'm very thankful to SPC not only for portraying one of my favourite pictures, but also for interviewing me for this research.

While capacity difficulties and constraints exist, the human impacts of fishing need to be confronted; long gone are the days when we could argue the legitimacy of our advances in the sustainability aspect of the Pacific tuna fishery while neglecting the human side. As James Baldwin once said: "Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced”.


As always, I recommend you read the original, and for the lazy among you, below is an AI-generated summary that surely does not do justice to the whole paper.

Introduction

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) is increasingly recognised as a serious human rights issue in the fisheries sector. While gender inequity in fisheries has long been documented, GBV remains underreported and poorly addressed in policy and practice. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of GBV risks, drivers, and responses in Pacific fisheries, aiming to inform policy frameworks, capacity-building, and integrated strategies.

Understanding GBV in Fisheries

What is GBV?

  • Definition: GBV refers to harmful acts directed at an individual based on their gender. It includes physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse.

  • Key forms in fisheries:

    • Sexual harassment and exploitation in workplaces (e.g., processing plants, vessels).

    • Intimate partner violence linked to economic stress or job insecurity.

    • Trafficking and forced labour in distant-water and industrial fleets.

    • Economic violence—withholding earnings or controlling access to income.

Why Fisheries Are High-Risk Environments

  • Isolation and mobility: Long fishing trips and remote work sites create environments with limited oversight.

  • Male-dominated workforce: Power imbalances and cultural norms perpetuate gender hierarchies.

  • Informal and precarious employment: Limited labour protections for women, migrant workers, and crew on foreign-flagged vessels.

  • Dependency relationships: For example, women fish vendors depending on male fishers for supply—creating vulnerabilities to coercion or exploitation.

Evidence from the Pacific

  • Data on GBV in fisheries is scarce, largely due to stigma, underreporting, and lack of sector-specific surveys.

  • National prevalence: GBV rates among women in Pacific Island Countries range from 37% to 68% (intimate partner violence), with indications that fisheries-related communities experience even higher risks.

  • Case reports highlight:

    • Sexual harassment of women in processing plants.

    • Exploitation of female traders during fish transactions.

    • Reports of forced labour and sexual abuse on some industrial vessels.

Drivers and Contributing Factors

Cultural and Social Norms

  • Gender stereotypes position women in low-status roles.

  • Patriarchal norms discourage reporting and prioritize male economic roles.

Economic Pressures

  • Income volatility in fisheries exacerbates domestic stress and violence.

  • Women’s economic dependency heightens vulnerability to abuse.

Regulatory Gaps

  • Labour standards in fisheries often exclude gender-specific protections.

  • Weak enforcement of ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188) and lack of national GBV policies for fisheries.

GBV in Fisheries Supply Chains

  • Small-scale fisheries: Women dominate post-harvest processing and marketing, facing harassment and coercion during transactions.

  • Industrial fleets:

    • Crew (including migrants) often lack grievance mechanisms.

    • Risk of trafficking, especially in distant-water fishing.

  • Processing sector: Reports of sexual exploitation tied to supervisory roles.

Intersection with Labour and Human Rights Frameworks

  • GBV is linked to labour rights, occupational safety, and human rights obligations.

  • International frameworks:

    • ILO C188: Work in Fishing Convention—sets minimum labour standards but limited adoption in the Pacific.

    • FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: Calls for gender equity but lacks enforcement mechanisms.

    • CEDAW & SDG 5: Commit to eliminating violence against women, yet sector-specific strategies remain weak.

Current Responses and Gaps

Responses in the Region

  • Some Pacific Island countries have national GBV strategies, but fisheries ministries are rarely integrated into these plans.

  • NGO-led initiatives provide community awareness and support services, but coverage is limited and not fisheries-specific.

  • Industry measures (e.g., codes of conduct) remain voluntary and lack robust monitoring.

Major Gaps

  • Policy integration: Fisheries management plans rarely reference GBV.

  • Capacity building: Fisheries officers lack training on GBV identification and referral.

  • Data systems: No systematic collection of GBV data in fisheries sectors.

Recommendations

The paper proposes multi-level interventions to address GBV risks in fisheries:

Policy and Governance

  • Integrate GBV prevention into fisheries policies, MCS frameworks, and licensing conditions.

  • Require codes of conduct for operators, covering sexual harassment and exploitation.

  • Include labour standards and GBV provisions in bilateral fishing agreements.

Industry Measures

  • Adopt zero-tolerance policies on GBV.

  • Establish onboard grievance mechanisms and hotlines for reporting.

  • Provide gender-sensitive training for vessel crews and supervisors.

Community and Social Interventions

  • Support community education campaigns targeting harmful gender norms.

  • Strengthen women’s economic empowerment through access to finance and value-chain participation.

Data and Research

  • Conduct sector-specific GBV prevalence studies.

  • Incorporate GBV indicators in fisheries monitoring and compliance tools.

Regional and International Action

  • Promote ratification and implementation of ILO C188.

  • Align GBV strategies with FFA, SPC, and regional MCS plans.

  • Collaborate with UN agencies and NGOs for technical and financial support.

Key Takeaways

  • GBV in fisheries is a hidden but critical issue that undermines human rights, social equity, and sector sustainability.

  • Addressing GBV requires a multi-stakeholder approach, integrating gender, labour, and human rights considerations into fisheries governance.

  • Enforcement and monitoring systems (e.g., Port State Measures, licensing) can play a role in identifying and addressing GBV cases.

  • Achieving SDG 5 (gender equality) and SDG 14 (life below water) requires urgent, coordinated action to eliminate GBV risks across fisheries supply chains.

Conclusion

Structural inequalities, economic dependency, and regulatory gaps drive the fisheries sector’s vulnerability to GBV. While awareness is growing, policy responses remain fragmented and under-resourced. A proactive strategy—anchored in governance reforms, industry accountability, and community empowerment—is essential to protect vulnerable groups and uphold human rights within fisheries.

Surveillance and Enforcement of High Seas Marine Protected Areas and Related Measures by Francisco Blaha

As I recently presented, my colleagues Efthymios Papastavridi and Antonios Tzanakopoulos (Oxford University) have completed the UNODC Issue Paper that discusses the surveillance and enforcement of marine protected areas in the high seas, highlighting the need for integrated management to conserve biodiversity amidst increasing human activities.

My contribution was drafting large parts of section II (Earth Observation Tools used to Monitor MPAs). I appreciate the specific acknowledgement of my role in the document by both academics. This Issue paper, as far as I know, is the deepest and most contemporary analysis of how MCS could work in Marine Protected Areas, in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.

As always, I recommend you read the original, and for the lazy among you, below is an AI-generated summary that surely does not do justice to the whole paper.

Introduction

High seas, covering 64% of the world’s oceans, lie beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state. These areas are ecologically significant yet highly vulnerable to human activities such as shipping, fishing, seabed mining, and waste dumping.

The paper focuses on the legal and practical challenges surrounding surveillance and enforcement of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the high seas, particularly under the newly adopted BBNJ Agreement (2023).

Global Conservation Targets

  • UN SDG 14.5 (2020 Target): Conserve 10% of oceans via MPAs—missed; only 2.9% protected as of 2025.

  • Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022): Protect 30% of marine and coastal areas by 2030.

Governance Challenge

  • Current governance is fragmented and sectoral, relying on:

    • RFMOs for fisheries closures.

    • IMO for shipping-based ABMTs (e.g., PSSAs).

    • ISA for seabed mining (APEIs).

  • Lack of cross-sectoral coordination and monitoring capacity undermines effectiveness.

The BBNJ Agreement: A Milestone with Gaps

Adopted in June 2023, the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) provides:

  • Legal definition of MPAs:
    “A geographically defined marine area designated and managed to achieve long-term biodiversity conservation objectives, potentially allowing sustainable use consistent with those objectives.”

  • Framework for ABMTs (Area-Based Management Tools):

    • Parties submit proposals.

    • Reviewed by Scientific and Technical Body.

    • Decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties (COP).

Key Limitations

  • No robust enforcement mechanism: Implementation relies on flag States.

  • No compulsory cooperative inspection schemes (unlike fisheries treaties).

  • Generic reporting obligations, lacking strong compliance tools.

Why Enforcement Matters

Without credible enforcement, the BBNJ objectives—particularly the 30% protection goal—risk remaining aspirational. Enforcement challenges arise from:

  • Jurisdictional complexity (multiple states and actors involved).

  • Freedom of navigation principle under UNCLOS.

  • Gaps in mandatory obligations for states to monitor or prosecute violations.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Cornerstone of Surveillance

The paper emphasises Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as fundamental for monitoring MPAs.

Definition

IMO:

“The effective understanding of maritime activities impacting security, safety, economy, or environment.”

Originating from post-9/11 security frameworks, MDA now underpins environmental governance at sea.

Surveillance Technologies for MPAs

Modern monitoring combines cooperative systems (dependent on vessel compliance) and non-cooperative systems(independent detection).

1. Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)

  • Satellite-based; mandatory for most commercial fishing vessels.

  • Provides periodic position data to regulators.

  • Limitations:

    • Can be disabled (“going dark”).

    • Data often not shared across jurisdictions.

2. Automatic Identification System (AIS)

  • Mandatory under SOLAS for ships >300 GT.

  • Broadcasts real-time navigational data.

  • Challenges:

    • Can be switched off or spoofed.

    • Small vessels exempt.

    • Complex datasets require AI-driven analytics.

3. Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

  • IMO system for ships >300 GT.

  • Offers secure position reporting but excludes small vessels and fishing boats.

  • Implementation costs questioned by some states.

4. Satellite Remote Sensing

  • Non-cooperative detection using:

    • Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): Operates in all weather, detects vessels without AIS.

    • Optical imaging, RF geolocation, night-light detection.

  • Strengths: Wide coverage, effective against dark vessels.

  • Weaknesses: Static snapshots are expensive, require expert interpretation and algorithmic support.

5. Artificial Intelligence and Data Fusion

  • Integrates AIS, VMS, and satellite data to:

    • Detect anomalous behaviour (e.g., loitering, transhipment).

    • Predict compliance risks.

  • Platforms like Skylight, Ocean Mind, Starboard, and Global Fishing Watch lead global initiatives, often partnering with governments and NGOs.

Legal Dimensions of Surveillance

Jurisdictional Framework

  • Flag State Jurisdiction (UNCLOS Art. 92): Exclusive over vessels on the high seas.

  • Freedom of Navigation: States cannot interfere with foreign vessels unless exceptions apply (e.g., piracy, slavery).

  • Surveillance legality:

    • Passive monitoring (e.g., satellites) does not breach international law if no physical interference occurs.

    • Rooted in the customary right of approach.

Enforcement Gaps

  • Flag State obligations: Primarily permissive, not mandatory—unless treaties impose duties.

  • Port State measures: Effective in fisheries but underutilised for MPAs.

  • Control over nationals: Possible tool for expanding accountability.

  • UNTOC: Could convert the optional jurisdiction into mandatory duties to prosecute environmental crimes.

Challenges to Effective Enforcement

  • Operational: Limited resources for large-area monitoring, especially for developing states.

  • Legal: Unclear obligations for enforcement under BBNJ.

  • Evidence: Satellite data admissibility, chain-of-custody concerns.

  • Cooperation: Fragmented data-sharing among states and agencies.

Key Recommendations

  1. Integrate Surveillance into MPA Planning

    • Make MDA an operational priority from the outset.

  2. Adopt Data-Fusion Platforms

    • Combine cooperative and non-cooperative tools for real-time analysis.

  3. Enhance Legal Framework

    • Expand port State jurisdiction for environmental enforcement.

    • Require flag State compliance beyond reporting.

    • Develop cooperative inspection models akin to UN Fish Stocks Agreement.

  4. Leverage Technology

    • Invest in AI-driven predictive analytics for proactive compliance.

    • Encourage partnerships with private tech providers (e.g., Skylight, Ocean Mind).

  5. Promote Global Cooperation

    • Establish shared surveillance databases and joint monitoring initiatives.

Conclusion

The BBNJ Agreement is a historic achievement, creating a global framework for high seas MPAs. Yet, without robust enforcement and surveillance, its goals—especially 30% ocean protection by 2030—remain in jeopardy.

Advanced technology—satellite remote sensing, AI-driven analytics, integrated MDA platforms—offers transformative potential. However, these tools must be paired with:

  • Clear legal obligations for states,

  • Stronger compliance mechanisms, and

  • International cooperation.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of high seas MPAs hinges not only on ambitious legal commitments but also on the political will to monitor, enforce, and share responsibility for ocean stewardship.

FSM Enhances Port State Measures to Strengthen Compliance by Francisco Blaha

Not one to shy away from challenges, so when Eugene (the boss) here asked me to write a press release for the work we have been doing here for the last 2 weeks, I gave it a go—a bit of reading of other press releases, some lessons from ChatGPT, and some Grammarly-based editing…. and voila… here we have it. ,

NZ MFAT-funded Fisheries Adviser assists NORMA officials in analysing the manoeuvring of an arriving vessel - to gather intelligence that will guide investigations when boarding.

————
The National Oceanic Resource Management Authority (NORMA), with the technical support of a fisheries advisor funded by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), is strengthening the Federated States of Micronesia’s (FSM) commitment to sustainable fisheries by implementing more rigorous Port State Measures (PSM) to combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. These initiatives align with FSM’s international fisheries obligations and highlight the nation’s leadership in promoting transparency and compliance in tuna fisheries management.

Operationally, the mandatory notification of a fishing vessel's arrival at any FSM fisheries ports through the Forum Fisheries Agency’s (FFA) electronic Port State Measures (ePSM) system triggers a sequence of events and requirements that must be understood, managed, and controlled until the vessel departs. This sequence is what NORMA refers to as PSM procedures.

As part of these improved procedures, every incoming fishing vessel—including FSM-flagged vessels—will undergo a risk assessment designed to identify potential non-compliance in three key areas.

  • Identity – Verifying the vessel is who it claims to be.

  • Manoeuvring – Assessing the vessel’s recent activities and ensuring operations were accurately reported.

  • Licensing – Confirming the vessel’s operations were authorised in the identified fishing locations.

NORMA officials conduct these risk analyses to evaluate the legality of catches and oversee carriers’ activities beyond transhipment and landing operations. These assessments utilise advanced tools and intelligence from FFA VMA, the Starboard Maritime Intelligence platform, FFA’s Regional Information Management Facility (RIMF), and FSM’s Integrated Fisheries Information Management System (iFIMS). Compliance officers review critical data, including Vessel of Interest (VoI) lists, risk indices, VMS tracks, licensing records, electronic forms, and observer reports.

Where concerns are identified, NORMA will decide whether to join the Border Control & Maritime Surveillance (BCMS) officers-led boarding team to carry out an investigation if needed, before granting the right to tranship or land fish. All decisions, including direct port use approvals, are communicated via the FFA ePSM system, guaranteeing a transparent and secure process.

“NORMA’s strengthened port state measures are a vital step in safeguarding FSM’s fisheries resources and upholding international commitments,” said Rocco Samuel, Assistant Director, Compliance Division. “By integrating advanced risk analysis and data-driven decision-making, we are reinforcing our ability to detect and deter IUU fishing activities before they enter our ports.

FSM’s improved PSM framework not only guarantees compliance but also backs international initiatives to promote responsible and sustainable fisheries management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

———————

In reality, it started in a more “Friday afternoon” way, when Prilin and Nathaniel finished setting up our operation whiteboard (I’m a fan of operations whiteboards). We decided to make a picture (below) and the following text: “A small step for man, a big step for PSM at NORMA here in FSM. All agents and all vessels in the ePSM management tool, and most importantly, in the internet- and power cut-resistant management tool! The mighty whiteboard ✊🏼”

How did it get from that, to the press release above? well thta is why I’m pretty selective with the press I trust :-)

My friends at Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) by Francisco Blaha

As I walk to my current assignment here in the Federated States of Micronesia each day to work with the team at NORMA (National Oceanic Resource Management Authority) on strengthening their PSM, I see the imposing headquarters of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) across Spanish Wall Park.

the top crew behind the scenes of the biggest fishery in the world.

While it feels as if it has always been there, I realise that I had been working in this fishery for over a decade before it came into force.

The WCPFC was established under the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, adopted in Honolulu in 2000 and came into force only in 2004.

Like most contemporary RFMOs, the establishment of the WCPFC was driven by the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and the necessity for a regional mechanism to oversee highly migratory fish stocks—particularly tunas—across the world’s largest and most productive ocean area. 

The Commission brings together Pacific Island countries, distant-water fishing nations, and territories within a collaborative governance framework aimed at ensuring the long-term sustainability of these resources and the marine ecosystems they rely on.

The WCPFC’s primary role is to conserve and manage highly migratory species such as tunas, billfish, and sharks within the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. It accomplishes this by developing and adopting Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs) based on the best available scientific advice, which are then incorporated into national legislation by its members. These measures cover a wide range of topics, including catch limits, bycatch mitigation requirements, observer programmes, vessel monitoring systems, compliance frameworks, labour standards, bycatch reduction, transhipments, the welfare of sharks and rays, just to name a few.

The Commission also coordinates scientific research and data collection to inform policy decisions and maintain ecosystem-based management principles.

Despite its vital role, the WCPFC (like most other RFMOs) faces limitations that hinder its effectiveness. One key challenge is its consensus-based decision-making process; although it is perhaps the only RFMO to include a voting option in its convention, this has never been utilised.

While consensus aims to promote broad participation and fairness, it often results in lengthy negotiations and compromises that weaken conservation measures. Consequently, strong measures are diluted to accommodate members with competing economic and political interests.

Enforcement poses a significant challenge. The WCPFC lacks direct policing powers at sea. Instead, it depends on member states to implement and enforce the measures adopted by the Commission within their jurisdictions and on their flagged vessels. This reliance introduces compliance risks, as national capacity for implementation and enforcement varies greatly. 

While tools like the Regional Observer Programme, Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), and the compliance monitoring scheme enhance oversight, these mechanisms rely on prompt reporting and good faith cooperation by members.

Furthermore, the WCPFC Secretariat operates with limited human and financial resources compared to the size of its mandate. The Secretariat is tasked with servicing Commission meetings, supporting scientific and compliance activities, maintaining extensive data systems, and coordinating among 26 members and participating territories. These resource limitations impair its ability to monitor compliance fully, analyse large datasets, and support innovative management initiatives.

However, these institutional limitations are somewhat offset by the quality and “mana” of their staff. I am incredibly honoured and proud to have known acquaintances and friends for many years who work there. Starting from the top, ED Rhea Moss-Christian whom I am honoured to count as a supporter of my work and a reference ever since we met over a decade ago, when she was working with NORMA, and later with nuclear issues in RMI, and I already felt her influence and stewardship from the moment I entered the building last week to say hello. At the same level of admiration and esteem is the long-term compliance manager, Lara Manarangi-Trott; her calmness even in the most heated moments and razor-sharp intellect have been staples at every meeting I have attended. Then there is Eidre Sharp, the Assistant Compliance Manager, who has decades of experience in all aspects of compliance and business management with fisheries in NZ. 

And now my friend Hilary Ayrton is the new Fisheries Management and Compliance Advisor, whom I have known for over a decade since her work at NZ MPI. She is like a work-related niece to me; she is brilliant and a great asset for the WCPFC, especially given her experience in the BBNJ Treaty and Strengthening Global Ocean Governance. She and her top bloke partner, John, are mad keen ocean people, and nothing stops them from heading out on the boat and catching some fish for dinner (which I love). They have also welcomed me as a guest in their home, and it feels like being with family… I’ll be eternally grateful for their hospitality.

So, when she asked me if I would be keen to give an informal presentation to the compliance staff on the PSM work I’ve been doing in the region, as well as how it interacts with fusion platforms like Starboard and other Marine Domain Awareness tools, and how it helps to understand the realities of transhipment in the high seas, I was delighted and honoured to accept.

It was terrific, and I enjoyed every moment of it… It now feels like I have even more friends there.

In summary, the WCPFC plays not only an essential role in the conservation and management of tuna and other highly migratory species in the region but also in my life… Most of my consultancy work is in this part of the world, guided by decisions made under its umbrella.

So I’m always game for whatever is needed to strengthen the Commission’s authority, enhance compliance mechanisms, and increase their resources, as it is vital for the long-term sustainability of the tuna fishery, its people, and the benefits it provides to this part of the world, which has hosted me for over half my life and is my home thanks to my friends’ blessings.

 

BBNJ in Practice: Enforcing and Managing MPAs in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction by Francisco Blaha

I wrote a few weeks ago about my involvement in a UNODC Issue Paper that was to be presented and discussed in 2 weeks in New York at the second meeting of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom II) for the Entry into Force of the Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and the Convening of the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Agreement.

Although I won't be there, the Issue Paper now has a discussion room allocated on the side events list. If you are attending the meeting, please note that your feedback is crucial.

The session, titled “BBNJ in Practice: Enforcing and Managing MPAs in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction,” will take place on August 27, 2025, from 13:15 to 14:30 (EST) in Conference Room 2 of the United Nations Headquarters Building in New York.

The premise of the study is straightforward: imagine a future where the first Marine Protected Area (MPA) on the High Seas has been established under the BBN Agreement, and several related protective measures have been adopted.

Now imagine the following hypothetical scenario: While steaming through the MPA, the GuriGuazu, a ship registered to Curuzu, a State not party to the BBNJ Agreement, violates the protective measures by dumping toxic waste. The GuriGuazu's operator is a corporation incorporated in a Member State of the KapitaMini Union, a regional bloc of countries that is a party to the BBNJ, and its master is a citizen of Itaibate, a BBNJ signatory State-party. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the GuriGuazu has been disabled, and it has no VMS as it is not a fishing vessel; hence, the vessel went “dark” shortly before entering the MPA. However, its activities have been detected by a Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite operated by Ace of Space, a private company registered in Sapukai, a BBNJ State-party.

When handling such complex situations, as well as other comparable situations that can occur in high seas MPAs, several practical questions arise. For example, which States have the authority to request and receive information on the vessel's questionable or suspicious activities? How can these States respond to implement the MPA's related measures? Most importantly, is it possible to claim that international law, including the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, may compel some of these States to do so? Precisely those and other related concerns are addressed in this UNODC Issue Paper.

My job was the easiest; I just had to deal with the “how”—how many Maritime Domain Awareness tools (MDAs) we have today that can handle the scenario, how they operate, how the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) work, and how evidence could be produced. Yet my co-authors (two renowned academics, Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Efthymios Papastavridi) had to handle the complex part—“who” can do something about that scenario, and “what” they can do. 

The study is divided into five parts, and i will share it once it has been released>

First, the Issue Paper outlines available methods and technology for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Essentially, concerning High Seas MPAs, it describes how information and data about activities in and around such MPAs can be collected, analysed, compiled, shared, and utilised to help States prevent, assess risks, and suppress such activities. MDA relies on both "co-operative” tools (such as AIS, Vessel Monitoring Systems – VMS, and Long Range Identification Systems – LRIT) and “non-co-operative” tools (including drones, satellites, and other earth observation systems), enhanced by Artificial Intelligence systems for data collection and analysis.

Secondly, this Issue Paper presents the concept of State jurisdiction at sea. Understanding the jurisdictional powers of States in various maritime zones is essential for determining their authority to regulate conduct within these zones and to enforce the regulations they establish. These are known as prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Importantly, the rules governing both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction under international law are generally permissive – they allow, rather than require, the assertion and exercise of jurisdiction. Moreover, prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction are not necessarily co-extensive, particularly in the maritime domain.

Third, since the Issue Paper discusses High Seas MPAs, the obvious first “port of call” is not actually a port. It is rather the State of nationality of the vessel (the flag State), which holds “exclusive” jurisdiction over the High Seas. This part of the Issue Paper outlines the jurisdictional powers and obligations of the flag State concerning its vessels and their behaviour in High Seas MPAs. It details a set of obligations arising from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other sources, which it combines to create a matrix of conduct (including intermediate steps for achieving results) that the flag State must follow to enforce High Seas MPAs. These include obligations to monitor the activities of its vessels, to take measures to regulate their conduct appropriately, to exercise vigilance, to report and share information, and to suppress unlawful activity, including through criminal sanctions.

Fourthly, ships cannot sail the High Seas indefinitely. Eventually, they must dock at a port. This raises the question of the jurisdictional powers of states other than the flag state. This section of the Issue Paper discusses the authority these states have over foreign-flagged vessels on the High Seas, within Territorial Seas, and in ports. It suggests that non-flag states can assert jurisdiction over foreign-flagged ships based on factors such as the nationality of the master, crew, or operator, and possibly also on the protective principle. It also presents an argument on how these jurisdictional powers might become obligations through internationally recognised standards developed from the practice of states exercising jurisdiction appropriately and the efforts of recognised international organisations.

Fifth, the Issue Paper examines how the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime might influence the typically permissive jurisdictional rules of international law by transforming permissions into obligations. This can be vital in requiring states to exercise their powers to enforce measures related to MPAs in the High Seas, including through the imposition of criminal sanctions, and to cooperate towards these goals.

The Issue Paper concludes by illustrating the scenario described above, along with other scenarios introduced at the beginning, based on the relevant rules of international law as explained and discussed in its various sections. The Issue Paper will assist States, including competent maritime, environmental, and law enforcement agencies, in understanding the legal framework and utilising their powers and all available technological tools to conduct effective surveillance and enforcement of High Seas MPAs.

As my first fishing captain told me: in life, either you should be making money or you are learning… on rare occasions, you get to do both! And this was one of them! I have learnt a great deal from writing this paper. Although my contribution is minimal, I am honoured to have collaborated with the co-authors, aiming to address, in what is (for me) currently the most complex challenge in MCS, MPAS in ABNJ, I hope it helps.

Where we aiming with wireless transhipment weight monitoring systems? by Francisco Blaha

 I find joy in seeing ideas and innovative thinking flourish, along with the development of new products or concepts, and here is a good example.

In 2019, after we upgraded our transhipment monitoring system, the idea of using hanging scales had been around for some time, but the ones I had seen were large and didn't account for motion. They were used in fishing but had notable drawbacks, especially if they needed to be taken on and off the PS and carriers.

We could adopt a motion-compensated weighting system similar to those used in the forestry industry in New Zealand, which relies on wired hanging crane scales. However, these systems are large and wired.

So, we at MIMRA established an area search project with SPC and FFA to identify the best appropriate scale for our needs—essentially something wireless, small, lightweight, accurate, with good battery life and ideally capable of being networked.

I began with an online search, but there was limited information about fisheries; however, one brand of dynamometers, load cells, and hanging scales, used for weighing during overload prevention procedures as well as for lifting, force, and load testing, caught my attention because it was used by NASA to move their satellites and by stage managers used it in large lighting rigs above the stage for some of the biggest festivals and concerts. 

It never crossed my mind that insurance companies for the world’s biggest bands would need precise and secure systems to regulate the weights and balance of thousands of kilograms of lighting above some of the biggest showbiz stars. So clearly, if they recommend them, they must be dependable.

Then, there were others used for forestry, some for construction, and some for more general purposes. I acquired one of four models that were tested against each other (using accuracy, weight, size, sturdiness, connectivity, battery life, and price as criteria) with SPC and FFA. We then reported the results (blogged about here) and submitted a paper to the WCPFC Scientific Commission.

We chose the Ron 2501, made by Eilon Engineering, the company that manufactures lighting rig equipment. I believe they became quite interested after receiving orders from small island nations, following orders from RMI, then Tuvalu, PNG, and Kiribati, who liked what we were doing.

Since then, they have been very interested in how we have used their products and have offered to adapt them for our specific needs, including unit protection, improved motion compensation, automatic weighing, error reduction, and cloud-based reporting accessible via an online dashboard. 

Their latest system includes the same robust wireless crane scale, portable receiver, and an Android-operated weighing station, with good UX and ease of use.

While we use it for compliance monitoring as part of our port state measures, the solution supports accurate catch assessment and reporting, improving operational processes as well as traceability and inventory solutions for the industry.

With MIMRA, we aim to implement a dashboard in our Port operation rooms, providing access to weighing reports from every transshipping event in real-time, with all data consolidated in one place for management, regulatory, and monitoring purposes.

While on board the carrier or purse seiner, we will have a monitor with a tablet connected to a Ron 2501 HF 5t wireless crane scale with an adapted impact shield and equipped with a portable receiver (PRR). This system allows for transhipment weighing without human intervention, as it automatically recognises when to enter the weight into the report; the monitor on board can assign weights to the species in each sling being transhipped.

With motion compensation capability, the scales enable accurate measurement even when the load is moving between vessels, resulting in faster transshipments. Previously, we had to wait around 10-15 seconds for stabilisation.

And again, this is not just for monitoring the reporting (the 1st U of IUU), but the fact that if we can do this in all PS ports, in all the Pacific (and all carriers involved in the mess that Longline is in the region), we could be much closer to make good of the move to Harvest Stategies and potentially no only manage the fishery on imputs but also on outputs.

I know that is “far-fetched” for now… but so was having small crane-based remote reading scales a decade ago.

My most rewarding role as a consultant, both professionally and personally. by Francisco Blaha

And yes... today marks my last day out of a total of 700, spanning over six and a half years, as my three-times-a-year work placement as the NZ MFAT-funded “Offshore Fisheries Advisor” Offshore Fisheries Advisor” with the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authorities (MIMRA) the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authorities (MIMRA) has now concluded.

Friends I work with

 As I have stated many times publicly, this has been my most rewarding role as a consultant, both professionally and personally.

I will forever be grateful to MIMRA and each member of the management and oceanic fisheries team for the support and friendship they have shown me since we began in the old building, with the setup of the first small whiteboard for port operations planning to today, where we have one of the best fisheries administration facilities in this part of the world.

 From day one, I have stated that I don’t carry the “gospel” of what works; I just have in my memory all the mistakes I’ve made and seen made, which gives me knowledge of what doesn’t work. What works is what we discovered together.

Today, every tuna passing through Majuro (historically the busiest tuna port in the world) has been assessed for its legality and properly recorded before leaving port, and this is not just a motto or policy goal… It is a reality that very few ports worldwide can claim. Moreover, your operations are entirely self-sufficient and efficient throughout the year.

It is my professional opinion that RMI is currently the most efficient, dedicated, thorough, and transparent port State in the Pacific and perhaps among the 55 countries I have worked with globally. For their efforts, MIMRA received the international Stop IUU Fishing award; FFA has based its PSM framework and e-PSM tool on what MIMRA implemented here. Homegrown technological innovations like hanging-scale-based monitoring (and there is more to come) are now being expanded into other Pacific ports. MIMRA is leading the regional push for transshipment reform, which is badly needed in the WCPFC, and I will continue to be involved as an advisor, regardless of any contract I may or may not have.

 While it is somewhat sad to be leaving RM, it has been a significant part of my life, and I have formed deep relationships here. As a fitting conclusion, with leadership from MIMRA and support from Conservation International, we conducted a workshop involving all stakeholders (MIMRA, CI, AGO, Labour, Immigration, IMO, and Industry), who agreed to incorporate the FFA labour standards HMTCs for licensing into RMI regulations. They also agreed to promote the adoption of new crewing rules and amendments to the Labour (Non-Resident Workers) Act, scheduled for 2026, to prepare for the incorporation of the WCPFC Labour Standards CMM in 2028. Additionally, the MIMRA board endorsed this on Friday, so progress is underway. Consequently, there will be a need to develop a crewing policy and crew contracts aligned with the requirements of ILO WFC 188 to enable vessels to fish within the EEZ. As a former migrant fisher myself, reaching this point has been personally meaningful.

 Now, the fact that I won't be visiting as often as before doesn't mean I'm no longer involved… (Not easy to get rid of me!) MIMRA is keen to continue having me on board as an advisor and has requested the NZ government to continue the bilateral support… so let’s see.

 In any case… I'm sure this is not goodbye… but see you later.

Komol tata, Gracias and Ngā mihi nui MIMRA

The "other" impacts of dFADS in the WCPO by Francisco Blaha

Building on my earlier post about effort creep (primarily driven by eFADs), I will focus on other aspects of FADs, including plastics, stranding, and entangling, as detailed in the papers presented to the WCPFC SC.

Now, I’m not assuming that most of you are as old as I am, or that you have been familiar with tuna purse seining before the eFAD era (i.e., with sonar and satellite connectivity). Believe me… It was a different world, as different as being good at drawing to being drawn by numbers. Finding tuna was part generational and learnt knowledge, part understanding of environmental variables (with limited technology) and a lot of luck… Today, most of it is informed by eFADs.

Scheme of the newly developed “cylinder jelly-FAD”.

While it is a fallacious thesis (since there is no going back to non-FADs fishing), I believe that if we don’t have them, half the fleet will be out of business.

Yet, this post focuses on what happens to FADs when they are no longer used, when they get lost, or when they go too far, you cannot pick them up… or literally is not worth retrieving them, since there is no cost to you for not doing it… and at 3 to 5000 USD per unit… just the fuel bill will be bigger.

So the 1st paper that interested me addresses the Regional database of stranded drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) in the Pacific Ocean: a 2024 update

The report provides an update on the stranding events of drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) in the Pacific Ocean, highlighting their environmental impacts and the collaborative data collection efforts across Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs). ​

  • A total of 3,591 stranding events recorded from 2006 to 2025. ​

  • 43.8% of events involved a buoy alone, 30.7% a FAD alone, and 21.6% a FAD with a buoy. ​

  • Most stranding events occurred on beaches (37.2%) and were previously collected by local communities (32.3%). ​

  • Environmental damage was noted, particularly coral damage (3.1% of all dFADs). ​

  • Stranded dFADs originated more from vessels in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) area (47.0%) than from the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) area (34.1%).

  • Most stranded objects were buoys (43.8%) and dFADs (30.7%). ​

  • The number of stranding events has increased over the years, with 1,075 reported in 2022. ​

  • The majority of buoys found were from three brands: Satlink (44.3%), Marine Instruments (28.7%), and Zunibal (14.3%). ​

  • Stranding events were concentrated in French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Tonga

  • 41.2% of FADs were found without submerged appendages, while 35.3% had them. ​

  • Most FADs were made from a mix of synthetic and natural materials (26.2%). ​

  • The condition of FADs varied, with 28.6% found fallen apart. ​

  • The most common materials for FAD structures were bamboo and plastic flotation(42%)

  • 37.2% of stranding events occurred on beaches, while 4.3% were found on coral reefs. ​

  • FADs with submerged appendages were more likely to cause environmental damage.

  • The data indicates that many stranded FADs were found in sensitive environments, posing risks to marine habitats.

The next one interests me in particular, since I contributed to the questionnaires on which it was based: Stakeholders view and economic and feasibility analysis on options to mitigate dFAD loss and abandonments and their impacts: preliminary results

The document discusses a project assessing the environmental impacts of drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) in the Pacific Islands and explores strategies for mitigating their loss and abandonment.

Assessment of dFAD Loss and Abandonment

The project aims to evaluate the impacts of drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) on the marine environment and propose mitigation strategies. ​

  • The project runs from 2024 to 2026, focusing on dFAD loss, abandonment, and environmental impacts. ​

  • Key tasks include monitoring dFAD drifts, reviewing regulatory frameworks, and evaluating economic viability of mitigation measures.

  • Preliminary findings suggest regulatory actions for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) to consider, such as clarifying ownership and establishing retrieval responsibilities.

Stakeholder Consultation Results

The stakeholder consultation gathered insights on dFAD use and potential mitigation strategies. ​

  • 72 stakeholders participated, including government representatives, industry members, and NGOs. ​

  • Most respondents estimated 20,000 to 60,000 dFAD deployments annually, aligning with previous estimates. ​

  • The feasibility ranking of options varied among stakeholders, with retrieval by purse seiners ranked highest by the industry and at-sea collection from non-purse seiners favored by others. ​

Options to Reduce dFAD Loss and Abandonment

The study identifies and ranks various strategies to decrease the loss and abandonment of drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) in the Pacific Ocean. ​

  • The most feasible and cost-effective options include:

    • At-sea collection from non-purse seine vessels (ranked 4th).

    • Greater emphasis on retrieval by purse seine vessels (ranked 2nd).

    • 'FAD watch' systems for community collection (ranked 5th).

    • Dedicated vessels for at-sea collection (ranked 3rd).

    • Modification of deployment areas (ranked 1st).

  • Dedicated cleaning vessels and modification of deployment areas were considered the least cost-effective. ​

  • Stakeholder perspectives varied, with government representatives and NGOs differing in their views on cost-effectiveness.

Stakeholder Perspectives on dFAD Recovery

Different stakeholders have varying opinions on the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of dFAD recovery programs. ​

  • Government representatives and purse seine industry stakeholders ranked at-sea collection by non-purse vessels as highly cost-effective. ​

  • Purse seine industry stakeholders viewed higher recoveries by purse seiners and modifying deployment areas as the second and third most cost-effective options. ​

  • FAD watch initiatives were ranked low by purse seine representatives but highly by scientists. ​

  • Main limitations for recovery programs include cost, logistical issues, and lack of industry collaboration. ​

Current dFAD Recovery Programs and Initiatives

The survey reveals existing dFAD recovery programs and the need for increased awareness and participation among stakeholders. ​

  • Over 40% of respondents were aware of recovery programs like TNC FAD watch and TUNACONS in the Pacific. ​

  • Many stakeholders are not aware of existing initiatives to reuse buoys recovered from dFADs. ​

  • The circular economy concept for reusing buoys is not widely implemented, despite existing projects by buoy companies. ​

Challenges in dFAD Recovery Implementation

The implementation of dFAD recovery programs faces several challenges that hinder their effectiveness. ​

  • Logistical issues, costs, and lack of coordination are the main barriers to higher recovery rates. ​

  • Regulations complicate dFAD recovery, particularly in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). ​

  • Stakeholders suggest that RFMOs should consider recovery requirements and regulations on buoy deactivation to enhance recovery efforts.

Future Steps and Recommendations

The project aims to further analyse dFAD loss and abandonment while engaging stakeholders in upcoming workshops.

  • Additional surveys and analyses are planned to gather more data on dFAD recovery options.

  • A regional workshop is scheduled for February 2026 to discuss findings and strategies for mitigating dFAD loss.

  • The project will develop recommendations for managing dFAD impacts in the Pacific Ocean, with a final report due in 2026.

Finally, Progress Report of Project 110 and 110a: Non-entangling and Biodegradable FAD Trial in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This one interests me, as it is the only viable option… Purse seiners discard enough plastic already (as we determined in this study), and it is great to see it is happening, and the results are similar to the non-biodegradable ones.

Non-entangling and Biodegradable dFAD Trials

The trials aim to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of non-entangling and biodegradable Fish Aggregation Devices (dFADs) in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). ​

  • Projects 110 and 110a focus on non-entangling and biodegradable dFADs to provide data for the WCPFC and the tuna fishing industry. ​

  • Collaboration involves five fleets with over 56 vessels testing 665 jelly-FADs. ​

  • A total of 645 jelly-FADs constructed, with 321 deployed to date. ​

  • The jelly-FAD design includes a 3D cubic structure and a new cylindrical design, using materials like bamboo, cotton, and a cellulose-based material called "Suncell." ​

  • Performance monitoring shows similar drift speeds and biomass aggregation patterns between jelly-FADs and conventional dFADs.

Performance Monitoring and Data Collection

The performance of jelly-FADs is monitored through direct observations and satellite buoy data, providing insights into their effectiveness and longevity. ​

  • Average monitoring duration for jelly-FADs is 269 days, similar to 260 days for conventional dFADs. ​

  • Drift speeds are comparable, with jelly-FADs averaging 1.15 knots and conventional dFADs at 1.11 knots. ​

  • Tuna aggregation patterns show maximum biomass at around 2 months for both types of dFADs

Performance Comparison of Jelly-FADs and Conventional FADs

The trial results indicate that jelly-FADs have a catch performance comparable to conventional dFADs, with some limitations in data robustness. ​

  • 20 sets performed on jelly-FADs with total catch ranging from 0 to 185 tons, average catch of 53.6 tons. ​

  • 50 sets on conventional FADs with catch ranging from 5 to 260 tons, average catch of 71.3 tons. ​

  • Jelly-FADs' average catch is higher than the WCPO 2023 average of 46.3 tons but lower than conventional FADs. ​

  • Limited sets may bias results; fishers may prefer conventional FADs over experimental ones. ​

Degradation of Jelly-FAD Materials Over Time

The condition of jelly-FAD materials after six months at sea shows varying levels of degradation, necessitating further observations.

  • Main rope of recycled cotton remained in good condition after 6 months. ​

  • Submerged raft and attractors required repairs or were missing after 6 months. ​

  • The cube structure was destroyed in a single observation after six months.

  • More data is needed to assess the lifespan and stressors affecting dFADs

Key Findings and Recommendations for Future Trials

The findings emphasise the importance of large-scale deployment and monitoring of biodegradable FADs for effective results.

  • Deploying a large number of jelly-FADs is crucial for meaningful results.

  • Drift speed and monitoring periods are similar for both jelly-FADs and conventional dFADs. ​

  • Aggregation patterns show a peak biomass at 2 months post-deployment.

  • Outreach and awareness are essential for encouraging broader fleet participation in biodegradable FAD initiatives.

 

An update on Effort Creep in the WCPO Purse Seine Fishery by Francisco Blaha

As the WCPFC Scientific Committee Meeting approaches, a barrage of fascinating papers that I wish I had the time to read becomes available on the webpage. As I cannot follow everything, I have some topics of personal interest, among them Effort Creep, which I have written about in the past.

I’ve spent more than a few hours talking to Paul Hamer (the lead author) about these fascinating aspects, and I’m always keen to know where we are in the region.

The summary of the paper follows, but as always, read the original if you have the time.

The paper examines indicators of effort creep in the Western Central Pacific Ocean purse-seine fishery, focusing on the impacts of management strategies and technological advancements on fishing efficiency and sustainability.

Evolution of the WCPO Purse Seine Fishery

The industrial tuna purse-seine fishery in the WCPO has undergone significant changes since its rapid development in the 1980s-1990s, particularly in management and technology. The implementation of the PNA VDS and advancements in fishing technology have influenced fishing efficiency and effectiveness.

Technologies like FAD buoys, sonar, and bird radar have enhanced fishing operations.

Understanding Effort Creep in Fisheries

Effort creep refers to the increase in fishing efficiency and effectiveness within an effort-managed fishery, which can undermine management objectives. Monitoring effort creep is crucial to ensure that fishing mortality remains within sustainable limits.

  • Effort creep can lead to increased fishing efficiency and effectiveness.

  • It poses risks to stock management by eroding the effectiveness of effort limits.

  • Monitoring is essential to adjust total allowable effort as needed.

Indicators of Effort Creep in the WCPO

This paper updates indicators of effort creep in the WCPO purse seine fishery, focusing on trends in catch and effort levels since the VDS implementation from 2007/2008 to 2023, with partial data for 2024.

The analysis aims to inform fishery managers about trends relevant to sustainable management.

Trends in Fishing Days and Sets

The analysis reveals that the number of sets per fishing day has remained stable, with no clear increasing trend since the VDS implementation. The use of Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) has provided more accurate estimates of fishing days.

  • The number of sets per fishing day is consistently below 1.0 for PNA waters.

  • No increasing trend in sets per day has been observed since the VDS was implemented.

  • VMS-derived fishing days are more representative than logbook estimates.

Catch Rates and Effectiveness of Purse Seine Sets

Catch rates per set have shown stability, indicating that the effectiveness of purse seine sets has not increased significantly since the VDS implementation. Associated sets have higher catch rates than unassociated sets, but overall trends remain consistent.

  • Catch rates per set have remained stable since the VDS implementation.

  • Associated sets consistently produce higher catch rates than unassociated sets.

  • No long-term trends in catch rates for either set type have been observed.

Implications of Management and Policy Changes

Management and policy changes introduced by the PNA and WCPFC have influenced fishing practices and effectiveness. The balance between FAD and free school fishing remains roughly equal, suggesting external disincentives to shifting towards FAD-dependent fishing.

  • Management changes have impacted fishing practices and effectiveness. ​

  • The purse seine catch remains approximately 50% FAD and 50% free school fishing. ​

  • External disincentives may prevent a shift to a majority FAD-dependent fishery. ​

Recommendations for Future Monitoring and Analysis

The paper emphasizes the need for ongoing monitoring of effort creep indicators and improving the accuracy of logbook reporting. ​ Future analyses should include additional metrics and refine methods for estimating fishing activities. ​

  • Continued monitoring of effort creep indicators is essential for management. ​

  • Improving logbook reporting accuracy is necessary to correct historical data biases. ​

  • Future reports should include indicators for FAD deployments and monitoring per vessel.

Overview of Fishing Effort and Trends

The analysis evaluates fishing effort and catch rates in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) area from 2007 to 2023, focusing on purse seine fishing dynamics. It highlights the impact of management strategies like the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) on fishing practices and efficiency. ​

Purse Seine Effort Inside and Outside PNA EEZs

The fishing days in the WCPO purse seine fishery are regulated by the PNA VDS, with associated sets targeting fish around floating objects and unassociated sets targeting free schools.

  • Total raised sets in PNA waters increased from 24,800 in 2007 to 44,200 in 2014, with a major rise from 27,800 in 2009 to 39,900 in 2010. ​

  • In 2023, the total raised sets were 31,726 in PNA waters and 6,119 in non-PNA waters. ​

  • Associated sets fluctuated between 9,200 (2010) and 15,630 (2015), with 11,917 in 2023.

  • Unassociated sets increased from 9,160 to 15,635 from 2009 to 2010, with 19,800 in 2023. ​

  • Non-PNA waters saw associated sets rise from 660 in 2010 to 2,641 in 2023, while unassociated sets remained stable. ​

Disaggregated Sets Per Day: Observer Data

Observer data indicates the behavior of individual vessels and their operational efficiency over time. ​

  • Approximately 20-25% of fishing days in PNA waters involved more than one set, while non-PNA waters had 5-15%.

  • Increases in multiple sets per day were noted in 2015 and 2019, possibly due to El Niño conditions. ​

  • The motivation for multiple sets is likely to increase harvest rather than compensate for lower catches. ​

Purse Seine CPUE Inside and Outside PNA EEZs

Catch per unit effort (CPUE) trends show variations in catch rates per set and per fishing day. ​

  • CPUE inside PNA waters has been lower than outside, with average catch rates per day being similar. ​

  • From 2020-21 to 2022-23, CPUE decreased by 2% for mt/set and increased by 4% for mt/day in PNA waters. ​

  • No long-term trends in catch rates per set were observed for both associated and unassociated sets. ​

FAD Dynamics and Implications

The use of FADs has evolved with technology, impacting fishing efficiency and strategies. ​

  • The reliance on manufactured FADs has increased, with drifting logs dominating associated sets before 2000. ​

  • Approximately 50% of the catch now comes from manufactured drifting FADs, despite 70% of sets being on free-swimming schools. ​

  • The effectiveness of FAD technology may not be fully realised due to management policies and accessibility issues.

Aggregate Purse Seine Catches Inside and Outside PNA Waters

Total tuna catch trends indicate fluctuations in catch rates and species composition. ​

  • In PNA waters, total tuna catch decreased by 1% while skipjack catch increased by 2% from 2020-21 to 2022-23. ​

  • Outside PNA waters, total tuna catch decreased by 5% and skipjack catch by 11%. ​

  • The catch composition remains dominated by skipjack, with FAD sets catching a higher proportion of bigeye tuna. ​

Changes in Vessel, Gear, and Technological Characteristics

Vessel characteristics and technological advancements are crucial indicators of fishing effort and efficiency. ​

  • Vessel metrics show changes of +1% to +11% from 2020-21 to 2022-23, with longer-term trends showing stability since 2007. ​

  • Technological advancements, such as FAD-mounted echo-sounders, are perceived as important for improving catch rates.

  • Increased reliance on information technology is noted, with a need for better data on technology use in fishing operations. ​

Understanding Effort Creep and Management Implications

Effort creep relates to changes in fishing effort and effectiveness, impacting management strategies like the VDS.

  • No clear long-term trends in catch rates per set suggest that nominal effort has not increased significantly since VDS implementation.

  • The analysis indicates that while efficiency may be stable, it does not necessarily imply increased fishing mortality. ​

  • Future research should focus on integrating vessel characteristics with catch rates to better assess effort creep and its implications for management. ​

 

Unraveling the networks of fishers in DWF by Francisco Blaha

One may think that the overlap between people from or who worked in Armenia (a landlocked country with a proud, complex, and at times tragic history) and the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) would be nonexistent.

Yet that is not the case: This paper by Dr Gohar Petrossian, Associate Professor at John Jay College (CUNY), Executive Officer (CRJ Doctoral Program- CUNY Graduate Centre, and two colleagues (Chi-Heng Tsai and MoSiao Fang), which acknowledges my involvement, proves the overlap.

I spent most of 2003 and 2004 working in Armenia on an EU-paid assignment. Almost one-third of the country is covered by Lake Sevan, home to a freshwater crayfish fishery—the narrow-clawed crayfish (Astacus leptodactylus)—which was introduced in the 1980s from the Baltic countries. With no predators, it has become a significant part of the lake's ecosystem. With Armenia's independence in the early 1990s and the decline of the narrow-clawed crayfish fishery in the Baltic and Scandinavia, the EU market began to become an attractive option for local fishing entrepreneurs. To access it, countries need to have a sanitary authorisation (see a booklet I wrote with an explanation here), as well as a fisheries management plan. And thankfully for me, there are not many people in the world who can do both at once… So yeah, there I went (and loved it), and I guess I must have done an ok job because Armenia is still exporting to the EU.

A flow map of hiring and labour supplying countries by modularity class

Anyway, anecdotes aside, when Gohar reached out with the idea of the paper, I was more than happy to help, if I could.

Her team's research questions for this paper are really solid:

  1. Which countries’ DWF vessels dominate operations on the high seas and within other countries’ EEZs?

  2. What is the social network structure between hiring and labour supply countries in the foreign labour market of this industry?

  3. Which countries predominantly hire foreign labour, and which countries provide the majority of this labour force in this industry?

  4. What distinct "communities" of actors (countries) emerge within the hiring-hired labour network? How significant are these communities in terms of network weight, and what does this signify?

And the exploratory research does a good job of diving deep into them. As usual, I recommend that you read the original in the Marine Policy Netting the global workforce: Unraveling the networks of laborers on distant water fishing fleets

I would do a disservice by posting a summary, as there is not much with which I disagree.

The paper examines the global employment networks within the distant water fishing (DWF) industry, with a focus on issues of forced labour and worker exploitation among labour-supplying countries.

Distant Water Fishing Industry Overview

The distant water fishing (DWF) industry is crucial for global seafood production and economic development, but faces significant issues related to forced labour and worker exploitation. This study examines the global employment networks within the DWF industry, focusing on the relationships between hiring and labour-supplying countries.

Global Employment Networks in DWF

The study identifies a concentrated distribution of DWF vessel ownership among a few countries, revealing the dynamics of labour sourcing.

  • 138 countries operate DWF fleets, with ownership concentrated in 23 countries.

  • China (44%), Taiwan (11%), Japan (5%), and the U.S. (3%) account for over 60% of global DWF vessels.

  • The Gini coefficient of 0.89 indicates extreme inequality in DWF vessel operations.

Labour Supply and Demand Dynamics

The research highlights the complex relationships between hiring countries and labour-supplying nations in the DWF industry.

  • Top hiring countries include Taiwan, Italy, Spain, France, and China. ​

  • Major labour-supplying countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, Madagascar, and Kiribati (Yet personally I have seen more Vietnamese crew than i-Kiribati in fishing vessels, yet on the cargo vessels, the reality is different).

  • 52 labour-supplying countries are identified, indicating a diverse labour market.

Social Network Analysis Methodology

Interestingly, social network analysis (SNA) is employed to visualise and understand the relationships between hiring and labour-supplying countries. (I used it for transhipping vessels here, and it is incredible what you can do!)

  • Directed network diagrams are created to represent hiring relationships.

  • In-degree and out-degree centrality scores are calculated to identify key countries in the network.

  • The average degree of the network is 2.125, with a density of 0.034.

Community Structures in DWF Networks

Modularity analysis reveals distinct communities within the global DWF labour market, indicating regional hiring patterns.

  • Four communities were identified: Purple (35.94%), Orange (23.44%), Blue (17.19%), and Green (15.62%). (The image at the top of the blog reflects this.)

  • The Purple community includes East Asian countries hiring from Southeast Asia.

  • The Orange community consists of European countries hiring from Africa, while the Blue community shows Italy hiring from various regions.

Urgent Need for Interventions

The findings underscore the necessity for targeted interventions to combat forced labour in the DWF industry.

  • Recommendations include stricter labour regulations and ethical recruitment practices in hiring countries.

  • Pre-departure training and enhanced protections for workers in labour-supplying nations are essential.

  • Improved international cooperation is needed to enhance transparency and accountability in labour practices.

Global Distant Water Fishing Industry Overview

This research investigates the networks of countries involved in the global Distant Water Fishing (DWF) industry, focusing on the primary hiring and labour-supplying nations. It highlights the complexities and vulnerabilities within these networks, particularly regarding labour exploitation.

Concentration of DWF Vessels and Labor Supply

  • As of 2018, 12,608 DWF vessels were registered across 138 countries. ​

  • The top 23 countries accounted for 90.43% of these vessels, indicating a highly concentrated distribution.

  • Eighteen countries dominate the hiring of foreign labour, sourcing workers from 52 labour-supplying nations.

  • Developed countries, such as Taiwan, Italy, Spain, France, and China, are the primary hiring nations, while economically vulnerable countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Madagascar, supply labour.

Labour Exploitation and Vulnerabilities

  • The globalisation of labour in the DWF industry creates vulnerabilities, which can lead to potential instances of forced labour and exploitation.

  • Asymmetrical power relations between hiring and labour-supplying countries contribute to structural vulnerabilities.

  • Historical cases of forced labour on DWF vessels illustrate the risks faced by migrant workers.

  • The concept of racial capitalism highlights the exploitation of marginalised racial groups within labour markets.

Community Analysis of Hiring and Labour-Supplying Countries

  • Modularity analysis identified five distinct communities in the DWF industry.

  • The largest community consists of East Asian hiring countries sourcing labour from Southeast Asia.

  • Other communities include Western European countries hiring from African nations, reflecting historical and economic ties.

  • Taiwan and China have shifted labour sourcing patterns due to domestic economic changes, leading to increased reliance on Southeast Asian migrants.

Study Limitations and Data Challenges

  • The study faced challenges due to the classification of countries as Flags of Convenience (FOCs), affecting the accuracy of network analyses.

  • Some hiring countries did not provide information on foreign labour practices, potentially underestimating the global DWF labour network.

  • Reliance on publicly available secondary data may not capture informal employment practices, leading to potential biases. ​

  • The research team employed triangulation of data sources to enhance the reliability and robustness of the findings.

Policy Recommendations for Crew Hiring Countries

  • Stricter regulatory frameworks are needed to monitor labour recruitment practices in hiring countries.

  • Compliance with international labour standards, such as the ILO’s Work in Fishing Convention (C188), is essential.

  • The adoption of emerging technologies, such as satellite data and EM, can enhance enforcement and transparency regarding working conditions.

  • Cooperation with labour-supplying countries is crucial for establishing ethical recruitment channels and enhancing transparency.

Policy Recommendations for Labour-Supplying Countries

  • Labour-supplying countries should develop comprehensive policies to protect their migrant workers abroad.

  • Pre-departure training programs should educate fishers about working conditions and their rights.

  • Strengthening bilateral agreements with hiring countries can ensure better labour protections and compliance with international standards.

  • Monitoring recruitment agencies is vital to prevent deceptive practices and protect workers from exploitation.

The International Community's Role in Fisher's Labour Rights

  • Coordinated, region-specific interventions are necessary to enhance the rights of foreign fishers.

  • Establishing a unified baseline for labour standards within communities can facilitate consistent compliance.

  • Multilateral cooperation between hiring and labour-supplying nations is essential for fair recruitment practices.

  • International institutions should provide support to labour-supplying countries to enhance their capacity to protect workers.

Importance of Ongoing Research and Data Transparency

  • Continuous research is vital to understanding the evolving dynamics of foreign fishers’ patterns in the DWF industry.

  • A global database tracking fishers’ labour practices can enhance transparency and worker safety.

  • Future studies should focus on identifying risk factors for labour exploitation and vulnerabilities in labour-supplying countries.

 And it would be hard to disagree with the conclusions at all, by anyone!

The importance and urgency of studies like this cannot be overstated, as they provide critical insights to support evidence-based policymaking for hiring and labour-supplying countries. This research represents the first global analysis of employment networks within the DWF industry, offering a foundational exploratory perspective. While this study sheds light on the complexities of the industry’s employment networks, it is important to recognise that the DWF sector is highly dynamic, with foreign labour patterns continuously evolving in response to national hiring policies and global economic circumstances. Therefore, it is crucial to continually update relevant data to accurately reflect the employment networks within the DWF industry. One such way would be the creation and maintenance of a global database that keeps track of these practices and creates the level of transparency needed for ensuring the safety of the workers at sea. Future research can focus on identifying the risk factors within these networks that predispose certain hiring countries to exploit foreign workers, as well as the vulnerabilities that make specific labour-supplying countries more susceptible to such abuses. Deepening our understanding of the intersection of transnational employment networks and labour rights, as well as fisheries governance practices, is essential for developing actionable policies that will aim to reduce the likelihood of potential illegal labour practices in the DWF industry”

 

A Regional Library of Annotated Images for AI in Fisheries EM? by Francisco Blaha

When I was fishing and at University, we had this concept of “sana envidia,” which translates to “healthy envy.” However, I think “wholesome envy” better defines it.

It’s basically when you wish you were as clever, charming, good-looking, or whatever as someone else, but not in a mean way—more in a complimentary manner… like saying, "Good on you, mate. You’ve got it sorted."

I have that feeling with a few colleagues/friends, mainly related to their writing skills and extensive policy-writing expertise; they seem to write good stuff (seemingly effortlessly), and I admire that; hence, when jobs that require that expertise come my way, I pass them immediately to them, because they will no doubt do a much better job than I ever will… ergo, “wholesome envy” Lars Olsen and Viv Fernandes are two of them, who, besides being great colleagues, are also friends.

A few weeks ago, I blogged about the Intellectual Property (IP) of the data feed into Machine Learning (ML) to be used in EM, which was well received… Then, when speaking with Viv Fernandes, it should not have come as a surprise that he wrote a comprehensive study on this topic, which can be downloaded from here.

Below is a summary of it (yet, as always, read the original)… and I agree with the conclusion!

Artificial intelligence (AI) models integrated into electronic monitoring (EM) systems present transformative opportunities for fisheries management, especially in the Pacific region. These models can automate tasks such as catch event detection, species identification, and activity recognition, thereby significantly enhancing the efficiency and scalability of EM programs. However, the success of AI models relies on access to high-quality, representative training datasets.

Viv”s report examines the feasibility of developing a regional annotated image library to support AI in EM systems, emphasising its benefits, challenges, and implementation requirements. 

Key Benefits of a Regional Annotated Image Library

A regional annotated image library would offer numerous benefits for members of the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA):

  1. Scalability: A large, diverse dataset would enable AI models to be trained effectively, supporting broader applications and larger datasets.

  2. Improved Accuracy: Diverse datasets from different vessels, environments, and conditions would enhance the reliability of AI models, particularly for rare events like bycatch detection.

  3. Accelerated AI Development: Shared resources would fast-track AI model development, reducing costs and time for individual members.

  4. Program Efficiencies: Automation would lower human resource costs and improve the speed of EM data analysis.

  5. Capacity Building: Developing AI, machine learning (ML) expertise, and data annotation would strengthen regional capabilities.

  6. Regional Collaboration: Pooling resources would create efficiencies in fisheries management, reducing individual member costs and fostering collective progress.

  7. Digital Upskilling: Transitioning roles from observers to validation officers would build a digital culture and workforce in the Pacific.

  8. Training Resources: The library could complement existing programs by providing valuable training for EM analysts and observers.

Implementation Requirements

To create a regional annotated image library, FFA members need to consider several key factors:

  1. Clear Objectives: Define EM program goals, such as compliance monitoring, catch monitoring, or protected species tracking, to guide AI model development.

  2. Data Annotation Standards: Ensure high-quality annotations through skilled personnel, appropriate tools, clear guidelines, and robust quality assurance processes.

  3. Representation and Diversity: Include diverse datasets to train AI models effectively, accounting for varying conditions, species, and vessel types.

  4. Funding: Ensure sustainable financing for initial setup and ongoing maintenance, including expenses for data storage, annotation tools, and human resources.

  5. Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Engage fisheries and IT specialists to ensure annotations are precise and meaningful.

  6. Data Governance: Create a suitable governance framework to oversee data across its lifecycle, ensuring security, ownership, and confidentiality. 

  7. Technological Infrastructure: Invest in IT infrastructure, including cloud-based solutions, to support data storage and processing needs.

Challenges and Issues

Despite the benefits, several challenges must be addressed:

  1. Cost: Setting up and running the library demands substantial investment in hardware, software, and personnel. 

  2. Technological Capability: Limited local capacity in AI and ML technologies requires partnerships with external providers or regional organisations.

  3. Data Storage: Managing large datasets requires scalable solutions, such as cloud-based storage, which may involve high costs and infrastructure upgrades.

  4. Legislative Barriers: Outdated national legislation can obstruct data sharing and the adoption of new technologies.

  5. Cultural Factors: Traditional mindsets and resistance to change may slow the adoption of new technologies.

  6. Common Language: A standardised technical vocabulary is essential to enable effective communication among fisheries managers, policymakers, and technology providers.

Privacy and Ownership Considerations

FFA members have highlighted the importance of data sovereignty, intellectual property protection, and privacy. National legislation must be reviewed to ensure it supports the governance and regulation of digital tools, including AI and ML systems. Intellectual property protections, such as patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, should be considered to safeguard proprietary interests. Additionally, privacy concerns related to EM footage, such as images of crew members, need to be addressed through anonymisation techniques like blurring or redaction.

Strategic Engagement with AI

To fully realise the benefits of AI and ML technologies, FFA members must adopt a strategic approach to their engagement with AI. This strategy should:

  1. Define the level of investment and ownership desired for AI adoption.

  2. Align AI initiatives with national and regional fisheries management objectives.

  3. Address regulatory components, including privacy, confidentiality, and intellectual property.

  4. Develop a standardised language for AI and ML engagement.

  5. Leverage existing national strategic plans and regional policies.

  6. Explore funding opportunities and partnerships for scalable solutions.

  7. Establish performance standards for AI and ML systems.

  8. Identify employment and socio-economic opportunities linked to AI adoption.

Recommendations

The report offers the following recommendations to assist FFA members in creating a regional annotated image library and interacting with AI technologies:

  1. Data Annotation: Focus on producing high-quality, reliable datasets through investment in skilled personnel, tools, and processes.

  2. EM Program Objectives: Clearly define EM program goals and the specific elements AI models should support.

  3. Strategic Partnerships: Explore funding and partnerships for cloud-based solutions and AI development.

  4. Regulatory Frameworks: Review and modernise national legislation to facilitate innovation and technology adoption.

  5. Common Language: Develop a standardised technical vocabulary to improve communication and engagement with technology providers.

  6. Legal Protections: Seek specialised legal advice to protect intellectual property and data sovereignty.

  7. Strategic Plan: Develop a regional strategic approach to AI engagement, considering investment, governance, and long-term objectives.

Conclusion

Establishing a regional annotated image library greatly benefits FFA members, improving EM programme efficiency, accuracy, and scalability. However, its success depends on addressing key challenges such as funding, technological capability, data governance, and legislative barriers.

A strategic approach to AI engagement will position the Pacific region to grasp short-term opportunities while preparing for long-term advancements in AI and ML technologies. By pooling resources and encouraging collaboration, FFA members can enhance regional efficiencies and reinforce their leadership in global fisheries management. 

 

MSC Tuna (Mushy Skipjack Canned?) and "Mushy Tuna Syndrome” in Free School tuna catch by Francisco Blaha

I love a good long story in fisheries when it is initiated by people on the factory floors and boats in the harvesting and processing countries instead of offices in the consumer countries.

It gets better for me as the story mixes various aspects of my professional career, interests, and positions… i.e. my qualifications in fishing vessel operations (2nd mate), Fisheries Science (MSc), and Food Science (a further MSc), my interest in learning from people on the floor (experience rules), and my profound distrust of all private certifications and ecolabels.

Soni is on the left of the picture

Back in 2016, in a blog post on FAD politics, I quoted my friend Fernando (ex-fisherman and factory manager), who said that for him, MSC-certified skipjack (only FAD-free at the time) stands for Mushy Skipjack Canned… as the high levels of Mushy Tuna Syndrome (MTS) found in the processing of free school-caught tuna.

We theorised how the “soft texture” may be related to a higher level of enzymatic reactions and the higher body temperature of fish caught while actively feeding in a school during the day, as opposed to fish caught while lazily circling a FAD in the very early mornings.

Free school fishing happens when tuna are feeding "out there". Skipjack feed predominantly on small pelagics, micro-crustaceans and some squid. Stomach contents show a huge variety, though, so it is a highly opportunistic feeder. (It would eat its juveniles as well.)

From the fishes in the Skipjack diet, Scombers and Thyrsitops are quite represented, and both have high enzymatic contents in the stomach. The high level of enzymes in Skipjacks' stomachs while feeding and the high temperature of the fish at death (as they are hunting and swimming fast when we capture them) seemed to me to be potentially associated with mushy and soft meat.

And this is not just on tuna; I hated it when trawling for Hake and Hoki in the South Atlantic (in my pre-tuna fishing life), since if the fish was feeding on sardines or anchoveta for the same reason, the fish became mush in no time.

So, if the level of rejections has increased, this means that the fish is sent to the fishmeal factory. Hence, more fish need to be caught to maintain production (usually demand-driven by contracts), so the situation goes against one of the aims of MSC, which is sustainability and such (one assumes) catching fewer fish and selling them for better money.

A couple of years later, in Noro, talking with my friend Soni Peter, who was at the time the QC Manager of Soltuna, we discussed the same, and she was keen to do some research on this and started talking about hopefully doing her PhD on this, and if I could help her! Which, of course, I did!

It was a long story to go ahead with it… As an Indian national and young mother, getting a placement at a good university was a big challenge… then visas and so on… But what I know from Soni and her husband is that they did not shy away from challenges.

She finally got a placement at the University of Queensland, and has recently completed her PhD thesis… which is undoubtedly the ultimate research on the Mushy Tuna Syndrome so far written! On top of that, she was incredibly kind in thanking me for the idea and support given in her acknowledgements section.

It is compulsory reading if you are a tuna processing nerd.

As per my musings on the origins of the issue, it seems that I was spot-on… On page 88 her thesis states:

These findings suggest that catch from school fish is associated with a significantly higher proportion of MTS rejects compared to FAD sets. This highlights the potential impact of fish behaviour and physiology at the time of catch on the occurrence of MTS.

In page 89:

It was observed that skipjack caught from FS (free school) and around seamounts had fuller stomachs than those associated with FADs and natural fish aggregation structures such as drifting logs (Machful et al., 2021). The proportion of empty stomachs was 85% in FAD’s compared to 25% in FS, which is associated with the high feeding activity in FS with tuna caught during daylight hours (Menard et al., 2000). Additionally, it has been reported that the relative condition factor in the developing and spawning phase of skipjack was higher in the FS than in the FADs.

Of course, the key issue on board that has the primary influence is the freezing capacity, which is highlighted in the study, yet the temperature and condition at which the fish comes in affects the freezing times and process… which gives space for the secondary reason for ATS, FAD of FS sets

Which gets me then to one of the many criticisms I have of the MCS ecolabelling schemes, which at the time only covered FS tuna (even if in the same trip you were doing FS and FADs), and while not naming the MSC, Soni’s thesis says:

While fishing on free-swimming schools is generally considered more sustainable than fishing on Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) due to lower bycatch and less impact on target species and the marine ecosystem, it is important to understand the potential implications of this method on the incidence of Mushy Tuna Syndrome (MTS). The association of free school tuna with the incidence of MTS in the study suggests that even seemingly sustainable fishing practices may have unintended consequences on seafood quality.

Furthermore:

By integrating considerations of seafood quality into sustainability assessments, fisheries managers and stakeholders can make more informed decisions that balance ecological, social, and economic priorities in managing marine resources.

This kind of rounds out my whole criticism of eco-labels: that standards written by people far from the sources, operations, and processing, and they can decide what is “sustainable.”

Everything has advantages and disadvantages. While MSC now also certifies FAD fishing (which used to be the non-sustainable way, but they had both on the same boat… so what is the point?), if it is only FS, then you have higher rejection levels, and more tuna goes to fish meal (to feed other fish or pigs). Therefore, you need to catch more tuna to fulfil your contracts. If you catch FAD fish, you have greater environmental impacts through bycatch and effort creep.

All these trade-offs (plus many of my other criticisms) confirm (to me) that there is no value in ecolabels, other than that of a “mafia-style” pay me or we tell everyone you are not sustainable. To the hypocrisy and neocolonialist approach that ecolabels mimic specific characteristics of the legal extraterritoriality observed during the colonial period, and how these neocolonial forms of extraterritoriality create disaggregated and variegated sovereignty scopes.

Their colonialist-type shared features include identifying subjects that need protection, a narrative depicting developing states as inadequate for providing these protections, and creating “private jurisdictions” where transnational private certifications provide these protections without the involvement of statutory bodies.

Beyong the MSC issues, this is an excellent work by Soni, whom I’m incredibly proud of knowing, and an example of someone who knows what she is talking about, not just because she wrote a thesis, but because she worked on the floor of factories and listened and learnt from people that may not be qualified or even educated… but knows from doing, yet we tend to ignore.

Effective Maritime Law Enforcement in Marine Protected Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction by Francisco Blaha

One of the few drawbacks of living in New Zealand at the far end of the world is that you are distant from everything.

Furthermore, considering I’m self-employed, I adhere to a self-imposed environmental rule of not flying anywhere for less than 10 days. Additionally, for flights over 12 hrs, I need (as a 60-year-old, almost 2 mt tall man) at least a premium economy seat (as I literally don’t fit in economy seats)…

The High Seas Meetings in Vienna… gotta love that

This means I usually can’t afford to attend meetings, congresses, workshops, and expert consultations, even those like the one in this case, where I’m a co-author of the draft.

Back in January, I was contracted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Maritime Crime Programme (via Giuseppe Sernia and Niels Peters Williams) along with two renowned academics, Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Efthymios Papastavridis, to write a draft for an expert group meeting on Effective Maritime Law Enforcement in Marine Protected Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction… needless to say, a complex and timely topic in light of the present status of the High Seas agreement (the BBNJ Agreement).

It was an unusual contract for me, yet one I dived in with gusto under the principle that my 1st skipper told me: “In life, either you learn or you make money; in rare chances, you do both… that is a bingo moment.”

And indeed it was “a bingo” assignment while I was in an awkward position on the drafting team… I was the “how” man, and my two colleagues are “who” specialists. The issue is not “how” to do monitoring and surveillance (technically and operationally, it is all possible today)… but “who” will take responsibility and fund the “how”.

In any case, an excellent expert group has met in Vienna for the last 2 days to discuss the study we produced. The fact that it was in Vienna is poignant… as I still have family there since my dad was born in Austria and has an Austrian passport… so I would have loved to have gone… Yet I also have a family compromise from my mother’s side.

The feedback has been excellent! It looks like my "how" part—on the technology and operations side—was received well and considered helpful. Yet, as expected, most of the discussions they have been having were more legal: regime interaction between BBNJ and other regimes, limits of jurisdiction, and limits of triggering criminal law.

As a non-lawyer, but an MCS practitioner and a UNCLOS geek, it all comes down to flag state responsibility… And I like to say: flag state responsibility is the biggest oxymoron in UNCLOS

I shall share the final version when it is done. For now, I sincerely thank all the people mentioned above for their patience and support over the writing process.

The High Seas Meetings in Vienna… gotta love that

 

Labour Regimes in Industrial Tuna Fisheries by Francisco Blaha

For years now, I have had a professional and personal interest in the issues of fishers’ labour conditions, and it has been refreshing and educational to see academia tackle it, besides just a list of the never-applied legal frameworks that are supposed to manage it.

Something that is struggled with and written about a few times, if that is, as in most things in fisheries, “one size does not fit all`: the conditions on PS are not the same as those of a longliner, nor those of a trawler. Furthermore, the conditions are not the same even in the same gear in different locations, nor if they have some form of processing on board, or the refrigeration used, the seasons, abundance, etc. However, there are cultural aspects of life on board for different nationalities and cultural biases by observers and academics over reality, which they don't know much about because they have never spent time working on fishing boats.

To an extent, I “blame” academics for not contacting fishers to discuss their issues and being totally “empirical” about it. This can lead to conclusions that are not reasoned or would not pass some bare ground truthing (see here a case I criticised in the past)

As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, I have always read Liam Campling's work with interest. I wish I had better academic credentials to have a job like his, but on the other hand, I like my job, and I could not be doing it without my years of practical experience. Yet having two Master's degrees and a post-grad diploma doesn’t get you academic jobs!

In this article, he and Hyunjung Kim explore labour exploitation in industrial tuna fisheries, focusing on two distinct fishing industries: purse-seiners catching tuna for canning and longliners catching tuna for sashimi. I like that already since they are two different worlds, which I have spent part of my life in and know well.

They analyse the differences in labour regimes on these vessels by examining the ecological, technological, and organisational factors that shape working conditions. The study contributes to labour regime analysis by highlighting the role of ecology in shaping labour exploitation.

The article is quite substantial (23 pages) and, as always, I recommend you read the original , just below i attempt a crude summary of the paper.

Introduction

Labour exploitation in marine fishing industries has gained global attention due to reports of forced and slave labour, particularly in fisheries that rely on migrant workers. Scholars have identified structural drivers of exploitation, such as immigration regulations, recruitment practices, and the confined nature of vessel workplaces. However, the article argues that global production network (GPN) structures and competitive dynamics are essential for understanding labour exploitation. It also examines the connection between environmental decline, labour productivity, and working conditions, focusing on tuna fisheries.

The study compares two industries targeting yellowfin tuna: purse-seiners for canned tuna and longliners for sashimi. Both industries involve distant-water fishing. The research draws on interviews and field notes collected over several years from various countries, including Madagascar, Seychelles, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia.

Conceptual Framework

The authors utilise labour regime analysis (LRA) to examine the workplace and its management while considering broader factors such as inter-firm relations and ecological dynamics. They incorporate three analytical spheres: production, circulation, and ecology. The sphere of production emphasises resource access and conservation measures, while the sphere of circulation investigates how GPN dynamics impact labour. The sphere of ecology considers how natural conditions and species dynamics influence labour processes. ​

The article emphasises the material aspects of commodities, workplaces, and GPNs. For example, tuna’s biological characteristics, such as migration patterns and reproduction rates, influence fishing technologies and labour regimes. The authors argue that understanding these material aspects is essential for analysing labour exploitation.

Comparing Canned and Sashimi Tuna GPNs

Tuna are highly migratory species, requiring vessels to follow them across vast oceanic areas. Purse seiners target surface-dwelling tuna using large nets, while longliners catch deeper-swimming tuna with baited hooks. These differences in fishing methods reflect the distinct biological characteristics of tuna species. For instance, skipjack tuna reproduce rapidly and are targeted for mass production, whereas bigeye tuna mature slowly and are less resilient to overfishing.

Purse seiners rely on technologies such as fish aggregating devices (FADs) and sonar to enhance productivity, while longliners concentrate on post-harvest handling to meet sashimi market standards. Longliners often operate in high-seas areas, circumventing regulatory controls, whereas purse seiners need access to exclusive economic zones (EEZS), which involve labour conditionalities. ​

Canned Tuna GPN ​

Canned tuna is a durable commodity with a global market, primarily in the EU, North America, and the Middle East. The GPN is buyer-driven, with a few firms dominating branding and retail. Processing is labour-intensive and fragmented, with many factories competing to supply low-cost products. This structure pressures vessel owners to fish harder and faster, driving investment in larger vessels and advanced technologies.

Sashimi Tuna GPN ​

Sashimi tuna is primarily consumed in Japan, with a smaller Western European market. Advances in ultra-low temperature (ULT) freezing technology have enabled the global trade of sashimi-grade tuna. However, the market has declined since the 1980s, leading to low investment in longlining technology. Longliners focus on extracting maximum surplus value by intensifying labour processes, such as increasing the number of hooks.

Labour Regimes on Vessels ​

Similarities

Fuel and labour are the two major costs for purse seiners and longliners. Vessel owners reduce labour costs through international recruitment, employing multinational crews from the Global South at lower wages. Flags of convenience facilitate this strategy, allowing vessels to bypass national regulations. Multinational crews can fragment social solidarity, making workers easier to manage.

Differences

  1. Labour Standards and Crew Composition: Purse-seiners are subject to labour conditionalities in EEZ access agreements, which require compliance with minimum wage standards and the employment of local crew. Longliners, operating in the high seas, have greater flexibility to source cheaper labour.

  2. Workplace Materialities: Purse-seiners are larger and more modern, offering better living conditions for the crew.  Longliners, with older and smaller vessels, provide cramped and shared accommodations.

  3. Labour Process and Working Hours: Purse-seiners have relatively stable working hours, operating mainly during daylight. Longliners work 24-hour shifts, with crews baiting hooks before dawn and handling post-harvest tasks throughout the day and night. Longliners also stay at sea for extended periods, sometimes up to two years.

  4. Wage Schemes: Purse seiners often pay overtime for hours worked beyond an eight-hour day, while longliners rely on discriminatory remuneration practices, such as catch shares for national crews.

Conclusion

The article demonstrates that the interplay of ecological, technological, and organisational factors shapes labour regimes in tuna fisheries. The profitability of canned tuna drives investment in newer technologies and the extraction of relative surplus value, while the stagnant sashimi market results in absolute surplus value extraction through labor intensification. Resource access arrangements and conservation measures also influence labor recruitment and working conditions. ​

The authors argue that understanding the materialities of commodities, workplaces, and GPNS is essential for analysing labour exploitation. They call for solidarity among workers across vessels and supply chains and consumer-facing activism to address exploitation. By incorporating social reproduction into labour regime analysis, future research can explore how materialities shape labour-supply chains and inform strategies for resistance. ​

This study highlights the importance of considering ecological dynamics in labour regime analysis, particularly during climate and biodiversity crises. It provides a framework for understanding how socioecological change affects work and offers insights for building alliances and organising resistance within fishing industries.

The IP of the data feed into ML for AI to be used in EM conundrum by Francisco Blaha

Besides being one of the most ridiculous blog titles I’ve ever written… I think we are in another one of those situations that we wish we had paid attention to earlier.

I’ve been writing about EM for a while now (2016), yet I've never paid much attention to the issue until a conversation with a friend brought it up.

What are we talking about?

Electronic monitoring (EM) is an increasingly important tool for enhancing the management of Pacific longline fisheries. Although it has costs and limitations, EM offers indisputable benefits, such as improved scientific coverage, transparency, and compliance.

As EM initiatives and trials progress in the Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs), one important but sometimes neglected question arises: Who gets to keep the IP from the data produced by these trials?

This is not a simple question. It is common practice for service providers to maintain ownership of critical intellectual property when EM systems are deployed, especially in the software used to analyse EM imagery, regardless of whether the deployment is part of a government-led program or an industry-driven pilot.

This category includes Machine Learning (ML) that feeds into the broader concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that can detect gear use, automatically identify species, or flag possible compliance problems. Like how an apprentice gains intelligence through experience, these tools get smarter with each dataset they consume.

The concern is this: if a service provider is improving their product using data and experience gained from operations in Pacific waters, without appropriate legal agreements, PICTs may unwittingly give away valuable IP (a non-tangible asset until needed) that feeds the proprietary software of the EM providers to enhance their systems, which the EM providers will then charge PICTs to use.

It is somewhat like a Mexican standoff… EM software providers need the dataset for their product to be helpful PICTs... And PICTs need the software to run the EM systems.

The EM service provider benefits immensely (from refined algorithms, better software and stronger commercial positioning). At the same time, the country receives limited long-term value beyond the initial project goals.

This is particularly true because in most EM trials in the region, costs and equipment are paid by NGOs with the support of willing industries, yet the final users (and payers) of the system will be the PICTS themselves and any other coastal states in the world that later get a subscription to the EM software.

The EM service provider benefits immensely (from refined algorithms, better software and stronger commercial positioning) while the coastal states receive limited long-term value beyond the initial project goals.

This has nothing to do with reversing advancement or questioning the worth of EM or the function of the private sector. It ensures Pacific nations get long-term advantages, equity, and sovereignty.

Pacific fisheries data and real-world conditions are becoming invaluable for training and refining AI as EM technology progresses. In the absence of appropriate agreements, PICTs are denying themselves a chance to claim ownership of the results of the data collected in their waters. In fact, UNCLOS Part XIII: Marine Scientific Research stipulates that any research in the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf shall be conducted with the coastal State's consent and delineates a series of conditions.

Regrettably, in EM, IP rights' contractual and legal components are frequently regarded as overly technical or ancillary. This is a mistake. Contracts with EM providers should contain provisions that safeguard national interests, particularly with data rights, benefit sharing, and intellectual property ownership.

Countries should proactively allocate legislative and legal resources to this end. Shared ownership of data-driven software enhancements, access to artificial intelligence models trained on regional fisheries, or even openness about how service providers use the data would be a good start.

 I’m sure this is a very complex area of negotiation, and involving lawyers would be expensive; however, ignoring this issue due to its complexity is counterproductive.

Potentially, a lot is at stake because EM is becoming more integrated into fisheries management; the older ones (like me) remember the lengthy negotiation process to get the PNA FIMS IP out of the developers.

Coastal States nations should be aware that letting ownership of critical technology slip away because of the unfamiliar legal terrain may be costly in the long term. Instead, they must see this as essential to safeguarding their sovereignty over natural resources and the digital tools underpinning their management structures.

As EM projects expand, coastal states must integrate the right legal frameworks and conditions on the EM trials contracts to ensure the benefits of any data-analysed innovation developed are shared fairly. Otherwise, coastal States risk being left behind. They may have to pay heavily for a revolutionary monitoring tool that they played a role in creating, but have no ownership or control over.

The risks of kicking the can in the rules based order of ocean resources management by Francisco Blaha

Deep-sea mining is a complex and polarising topic, and I have developed a keen interest in and knowledge of it. I devoted nearly two months of full-time study to reviewing the entire process, after being selected and completing ISA’s DIVE 3 qualification,

Yet I’m not writing in this blog about its potential benefits and problems (that will take a book!), but about the underlying rules-based order that governs prospecting and eventually mining there, as well as other activities in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ), such as fishing, and the risk of deviating from the already challenging and sometimes contentious rules-based order as the one it exists at the RFMO level.

The issue for me is that the recent USG executive order allows American companies to operate free from international constraints and extract polymetallic nodules rich in nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese, and other critical minerals from the ocean floor.

The order applies to America’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is understandable to some extent, but also to international waters, including the Clarion-Clipperton Zone in the North Pacific, which holds vast mineral reserves.

However, this zone has been carefully planned and stewarded by the United Nations’ International Seabed Authority (ISA) an autonomous international organisation established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS, has the mandate to look after the mineral resources of “the area”, meaning the seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (i.e. beyond the 200nm and, in very few cases, beyond the 350 nm of the extended continental shelf. In any case, the "The Area" concept is linked to the "common heritage of mankind", which means that all nations should benefit from its resources, not just those that can explore and extract them.

The ISA has worked for decades to establish a regulatory framework for deep-sea mining, which includes many layers of environmental safeguards, accessibility conditions, financial management, etc.

Under ISA, the Clarion-Clipperton Zone comprises nine Areas of Particular Environmental Interest (APEIs) designated as protected areas, spanning a total of 1.7 million square kilometres. These APEIs are specifically designed to safeguard biodiversity and habitats within the CCZ, including abyssal plains, abyssal hills, seamounts, and fracture zones.

The issue is that the USA’s unilateral move bypasses the ISA and UNCLOS. America has not ratified the latter (it is one of 15 countries not to do so) but generally considers it “customary law.” Thus, in principle, it does not consider itself bound to work under the ISA’s framework and perhaps does not even recognise the APEIs.

Ironically, the PrepComm on the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) is being worked out this week at the UN in New York to address MPAs in ABNJ above the seafloor. Yet, if bypassing ISA’s jurisdiction is the way forward, there is little hope for anything the BBNJ can achieve. Furthermore, what guarantees exist now for the Fish Stocks Agreement, the RFMOs, and the general rules-based order that we have progressively relied on since the 1970s?

This executive order undermines international compliance with maritime law and has provoked global outrage due to environmental concerns and legal implications.

The executive order mandates collaboration across government agencies to ensure national security, technological dominance, and support for exploration, extraction, and refining. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is tasked with issuing mining licenses (and i assume monitoring compliance?)

The Metals Company (TMC), a Canadian firm listed in America, has been a key beneficiary of the order. TMC has conducted prospecting missions in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, recovering thousands of tonnes of polymetallic nodules. The executive order boosted TMC’s share price by 47%, valuing the company at over $1 billion and facilitating its fundraising efforts. While TMC’s aggressive lobbying had previously drawn criticism, some American policymakers and mining executives now support the administration’s push for a comprehensive seabed mining policy, viewing it as an opportunity to shape international rules and regain initiative in the sector.

America’s unilateral move may provoke resistance from ISA members, who could impose sanctions on American mining companies and refuse to purchase their mineral output, potentially isolating the USA. Yet, it is more likely to disrupt the ISA’s already fragile consensus.

 Over two dozen countries, including Canada, Britain, and several EU members, have called for a moratorium on deep-sea mining until further research on its environmental impact and a regulatory framework with strong protections is established. However, in a classic example of the tragedy of the commons, some of these nations may enter the race to avoid being left behind.

Other countries that oppose a moratorium, such as China, Japan, India, and Russia, are likely to increase pressure on the ISA to approve deep-sea mining in international waters.

Interestingly, despite its technological disadvantage in deep-sea mining compared to America and Japan, China has funded much of the ISA’s activities and positioned itself as a global leader within the rules-based order. Of course, it criticises the USA’s actions as outside the law.

It has formed alliances with Pacific island states, such as the Cook Islands, which view seabed mining as an economic lifeline. America may counter China’s influence by offering seabed mining incentives to Pacific Island countries (PICs) outside the ISA framework. However, this approach may fracture PICs general unity regarding successful shared resource exploitation (which is the case with fisheries) and bring back concerns about exploitation reminiscent of colonial history.

I fear that this executive order has initiated a race to the bottom (pun intended), not only in seabed mining but potentially extending to other areas of the blue economy with significant geopolitical, environmental, and economic implications worldwide.

 

Pelagic Imperialism in the 21st Century by Francisco Blaha

I have interacted with Liam Campling over the years (usually, we are the two tallest people in the room), but I don’t claim to know him well. Yet I have always enjoyed reading his work in research or for FFA.

In the wake of my recent posts about tuna diplomacy and neo-colonialism, I read his article with interest. It focused on the “Geopolitical Economy of China's Distant Water Fishing Industry.As usual with his work, it is thorough and well-researched.

I agree with much of it, particularly as he diplomatically hints (and I have been openly calling) at the hypocrisy by which the West views China’s fisheries expansion today, while forgetting similar strategies employed by other DWFNs in the recent past (and perhaps the near future?).

He wrote in the conclusions something I have insisted on for years (and that I wish I could write as eloquently as he does).

I maintain that understanding industrial fisheries and DWF fleets in particular requires a geopolitical economy lens that moves beyond ‘fish’. This includes several explanatory factors to do with power, production, property and real competition that play out in DWF such as subsidies, geopolitics, access and modern landed property, other forms of spatial competition and dynamics of concentration and fragmentation.

I quote the abstract below and a bit of a summary of the paper, which I recommend reading in the original form.

ABSTRACT

China is the home of the world's largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet. Narratives of its expansion portray China as a voracious consumer of ocean resources, as a serial abuser of labour and as aggressively expanding into developing country waters in an 'extractivist’ drive that destroys small-scale fishers' livelihoods. Yet, what does taking a historical and relational view tell us about China's activities vis-à-vis other DWF nations? Is the relationship with coastal states an example of ‘neocolonialism’ or, as the Chinese party-state insists, ‘mutual benefit’? And should one read China's DWF fleet as a tool of ‘grand strategy’ directed from Beijing or as rational profit-seeking individual firms, opportunistically driven into new frontiers by the exhaustion of domestic resources? This article seeks to navigate these binaries to argue that China's DWF fleet is the most recent example in a long history of pelagic imperialism by advanced capitalist fishing interests, where fish are a raw material in a wider generative industrial strategy and fishing activity is a tool in geopolitics. It is argued that China's DWF fleet is best understood as a relatively coherent cluster of capitals in competition, set in a mosaic of variegated state-capital relations, in tension at different relational scales. The article also offers suggestions for future research on DWF industries.

China operates the world's largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet, a sector often criticised for overexploitation of marine resources, labour abuses, and its impact on small-scale fishers and biodiversity. ​ So the article examines China's DWF industry through historical and geopolitical lenses, comparing it to other DWF nations and exploring its role in global fisheries, industrial strategy, and geopolitics. ​

Historical Context and Comparative Analysis ​

China's DWF fleet emerged relatively recently compared to other DWF nations like Japan, USA, South Korea, TW and Spain. Historically, DWF industries have been driven by overfishing in domestic waters, prompting fleets to expand into distant waters. ​ This pattern, termed "pelagic imperialism," involves state-supported industrial fishing fleets appropriating marine resources globally. ​ China's DWF development mirrors earlier strategies by Japan and many Western nations, but with distinct differences:

  1. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs): Unlike Japan's imperialist approach in the early 20th century, China's DWF operates within the legal framework of EEZs established under UNCLOS in the 1980s. ​(unlike USA until 1985, see here)

  2. Economic Significance: China's seafood industry is proportionally smaller within its diversified economy than Japan's during its imperial era. ​

  3. Geopolitical Strategy: China's DWF fleet is not tied to direct colonialism but plays a role in challenging the USA-led maritime power. ​

China's DWF Development ​

China's DWF industry has evolved through three key turning points:

  1. 1985 Initial Foray: The fleet was state-owned, with SOEs like China National Fishing Corporation (CNFC) leading the charge. ​

  2. 1999 Going Global Policy: This strategy aimed to support national champions and secure natural resources abroad, leading to significant expansion. ​

  3. 2011 Acceleration: The 12th Five-Year Plan designated the marine economy as a strategic industry, doubling China's DWF catch between 2011 and 2018. ​

China's DWF fleet operates under state direction, with SOEs playing a central role alongside private firms. ​ Provincial governments, particularly Zhejiang, Shandong, and Fujian, have driven fleet expansion, creating tensions between central and local authorities. ​ Despite efforts to cap fleet size, the industry has grown significantly, reflecting contradictions within China's state-accumulation nexus.

Economic and Geopolitical Dimensions ​

China's DWF fleet is a generative industry, supporting related sectors like shipbuilding, seafood processing, and logistics. ​ It provides raw materials for China's export-oriented seafood processing industry, which supplies global markets. ​ The fleet also serves geopolitical purposes, such as asserting China's claims in the South China Sea and enhancing its influence in international ocean governance. ​

Access to fisheries in other countries' EEZs is mediated through complex arrangements, often involving state support, industry associations, and decoupled Official Development Assistance (ODA). ​ China's approach mirrors strategies used by other DWF nations, such as the EU, Japan, and the US. ​ By 2018, Chinese firms had access to 111 EEZs across 96 states, leveraging geopolitical and economic tools to secure fishing rights. ​

Fragmentation and Competition ​

China's DWF fleet is not a monolithic entity but a fragmented industry comprising diverse firms with varying strategies. ​ These firms differ in ownership (state-owned, private, or public), target species, fishing methods, and regulatory frameworks. Reflagging practices further complicate the fleet's composition, with vessels often adopting flags of convenience or complying with coastal state requirements. ​

The fleet's heterogeneity reflects broader dynamics of "real competition" among capitalist classes. ​ SOEs dominate the industry but compete with private firms, creating tensions within China's multiscalar state. ​ Future research should explore the differentiation among firms, their business strategies, and their integration into global seafood value chains. ​

Conclusion

China's DWF industry represents only the latest iteration of pelagic imperialism used by most DWEN, extending commodity frontiers globally and influencing geopolitics. ​ While the separation between state and capital is blurred, China's DWF fleet exhibits relative coherence due to the compulsion of capital accumulation and the political authority of the party-state. ​ However, internal contradictions and external geopolitical pressures are likely to intensify in the coming years.

The article calls for analysing DWF industries through a geopolitical economy lens, emphasising the need to move beyond "fish" to understand the broader power dynamics, production, and competition dynamics. ​Future research should focus on firm-level strategies, labour regimes, and the generative impacts of DWF industries on related sectors.

Acknowledgements and References The research benefited from discussions at various academic forums and from contributions made by multiple scholars. ​ The article cites an extensive range of references, including studies on fisheries management, geopolitical economy, and industrial development.

Korea has a plan for labour standards in its DWF Fleet by Francisco Blaha

Over the years, I've been harsh, but I like to think fairly about Korea. They are a big DWFN that tends to fly under the radar regarding IUU and labour standards. In some risk analysis work I did, evaluating serious non-compliances over the number of vessels in the fleet, they are ahead of CN and TW. My involvement with the Sun Flower 7, Oryong 721, and other lesser-known ones are proof of that.

Yet on the other hand, they put money into worthwhile initiatives. For example, they are a major donor to the FAO PSMA initiatives and training efforts I have been part of, and they bankroll the CAPFiSH program that WMU has in place, which I lecture on.

Their record regarding the treatment of migrant crew in their DWF fleet is quite patchy. They were the reason why NZ, for example, only allows NZ-flagged vessels to fish in NZ waters.

Interestingly, in the weeks since I wrote this blog, which was initiated by a Korean LL who came to Majuro after 361 days at sea, we had the other 7 in the space of 2 weeks… which is very unusual. So, I assumed there was more to it than coincidence.

Thankfully, I knew who to ask in Korea... And yes! there is a “plan”… the "Plan for Further Enhancement for Working Conditions of Migrant Fishers on Distant Water Fishing Vessels."

The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) of Korea, in collaboration with NGOs such as the Advocates for Public Interest Law (APIL) and the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) and the distant water fishing industry, has announced the establishment of this initiative that aims to address human rights violations and improve labour conditions for migrant fishers working in the challenging environment of distant water fishing. ​

tell me about your plan

The key blurb from the plan is below… If it is to happen and to what extent, it remains to be seen. Yet Korea is putting some cards on the table, and the vessels are coming to shore, something they have not done in the past. So yeah, good on them for starting this, but one year on board is a long time…. The next step should be six months.

Background and Need for the Plan

Distant water fishing involves long-term operations at sea, making it challenging to conduct on-site inspections and address human rights violations promptly. ​ Despite previous efforts in December 2020 to improve labour rights, including applying minimum wage standards and prohibiting recruitment fees, civil society organisations have highlighted ongoing human rights concerns. ​ In response, the MOF, NGOs, and industry stakeholders have jointly developed this comprehensive plan to enhance working conditions further and protect migrant fishers. ​

Key Measures in the Plan

The Plan focuses on preventing human rights violations, imposing substantial sanctions on violators, and strengthening victim protection. ​ It includes the following measures:

1. Improving Working Conditions ​

  • Wages: To upgrade the wage scheme for migrant fishers, a comparative study on wage standards and payment systems between Korea and other leading countries will be conducted. ​ This includes recognising career history, providing bonuses, and prohibiting illegal deductions or withholding of wages due to recruitment fees. ​

  • Voyage Length: Tuna longliners will be required to make port calls within one year of their initial departure to alleviate the distress of prolonged sea stays. ​ Starting in 2025, violators will face reduced catch quotas.

  • Rest Periods: Employment contracts will specify provisions for extra rest hours in return for excessive work. ​ Fishers will be entitled to a minimum of 10 rest hours per day, including six consecutive hours. ​

  • Equal Treatment: Migrant and Korean fishers will receive equal entitlements, such as food costs and access to drinking mineral water. ​

  • C188 Work in Fishing Convention: The phased application of the International Labour Organisation's Work in Fishing Convention 2007 will be considered in consultation with stakeholders. ​

2. Preventing Forced Labour ​

  • Passport Safekeeping: To prevent passports from being confiscated, personal lockers with individually allocated areas will be installed in public spaces like dining rooms or lounges. ​ Fishers will retain their locker keys. ​

  • Recruitment Process: Illegal charging of recruitment fees and guarantee deposits has been prohibited. ​ Foreign agencies violating these rules will face contract termination and blacklisting, with notifications sent to their governments. ​ Noncompliance will result in unfavourable dispositions for Korean agencies and reduced catch quotas for fishing companies. ​

3. Victim-Centred Monitoring

  • Online Platform: An anonymous bulletin board will allow fishers to report grievances and seek consultation. ​

  • Social Media Monitoring: To monitor working conditions, random inspections will be conducted using social media platforms. ​ Suspicious cases will undergo detailed examination. ​

  • Strengthening Investigations: Vessels with repeated human rights violations will be blacklisted, triggering random inspections by the MOF and NGOs. ​

  • Internet Accessibility: Fishers will be guaranteed designated timeslots for internet use, with vessels progressively upgraded to the latest network systems. ​

4. Strengthening Penalties and Implementation Monitoring ​

  • Sanctions: Violators of the Plan and the Seafarers' Act will face increased penalties. ​ Companies with repeated violations will be subject to reduced catch quotas. ​

  • Partnership with Civil Society: Regular meetings with NGOs and civil society will be held to review the implementation of the Plan. ​ An "Implementation Monitoring Council" will operate quarterly to ensure on-the-ground progress. ​

Conclusion

The "Plan" represents a significant step forward in addressing human rights concerns in the fishing industry. ​ By implementing measures to improve wages, rest periods, equal treatment, and monitoring systems, the Plan aims to create a safer and more equitable working environment for migrant fishers. ​ Collaboration between the government, NGOs, and industry stakeholders will ensure the Plan's success and foster continued progress in human rights protection. ​

Advancing Interoperability in Catch Documentation Schemes ​ by Francisco Blaha

My work goes through phases over various topics. Sometimes, I step away from certain areas of work due to other interests or to give space to the individuals in the region whom I have already trained, as they excel at what they do. My work on EU market access (sanitary and IUU) in the Pacific was one such case, so nine years ago, I decided to step back from it (I still update the book I wrote about that, though) to focus on CDS and PSM.

CDS is an area of genuine interest for me. I remember reading a fantastic report by Shelley Clarke in 2010. I was immediately sold on it since CDS serves as the “roof” under which many aspects of MCS and traceability come together, both fields where I have significant work experience and have invested considerable effort. I have engaged deeply in this area, from the FAO's CDS expert consultation and guidelines to our work with Gilles Hosch on several FAO publications (as a co-author or peer reviewer). Furthermore, I need to write more books on traceability and the technologies that support it.

Yet, very frustratingly, all my efforts have been theoretical, lacking practical applications so far. A few years ago, I focused on PSM, a key area for MCS and, consequently, any CDS deserving of that acronym. Yet, the basics of multilateralism and interoperability have been part of my CDS mantra since day one.

Therefore, when Gilles and Sheley published this new paper on the topic, I had to read and promote it.

I wish this was compulsory reading for any bureaucrat planning another unilateral CDS in any importing country.

Here is a summary of the article; however, I recommend reading the original.

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Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS) are systems designed to validate the legal provenance of seafood products, aiming to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing products from entering markets. ​ These schemes rely on validated documents, such as catch certificates, to track seafood supply chains from fishing grounds to consumer markets. ​ However, the proliferation of independent CDS has inadvertently created opportunities for fraud, such as "double-spend" fraud, where catch certificates are reused to import more fish than legally certified. ​ To address these challenges, interoperability between CDS is essential for effective cooperation, data exchange, and fraud prevention. ​

Types of CDS and Their Objectives

CDS can be categorised into two types: multilateral (fishery-based) and unilateral (market-based). ​ Multilateral CDS focus on protecting specific species, such as toothfish and bluefin tuna, regardless of market destination. ​ On the other hand, Unilateral CDS aims to protect markets from IUU fishing products and cover multiple species entering specific markets. The European Union's Catch Certification Scheme (EU CCS), operational since 2010, is the largest unilateral CDS. ​ Other major schemes include the United States' Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), which, while not a CDS, shares similar objectives by requiring importers to record legal provenance information. ​

Design Pillars of CDS ​

The effectiveness of a CDS depends on three core design pillars:

  1. Key Data Elements (KDEs): Information such as who caught the fish, where it was caught, and its transshipment and landing details. ​

  2. Architecture: The types of documentation required (e.g., catch certificates) and rules for handling them, including critical tracking events (CTEs) where KDEs are captured. ​

  3. Validation Procedures: Establishing responsibilities for producing, checking, and certifying CDS information. ​

If any of these pillars are weak, the CDS becomes vulnerable to fraud and fails to prevent IUU fishing products from infiltrating markets. ​

Challenges and Opportunities for Interoperability ​

Interoperability between CDS is crucial to prevent IUU fishing products from diverting to markets with weaker protections. ​ It can take several forms:

  1. Level 1: Passive emulation of other schemes' structures and information content without established procedures for alignment or data exchange. ​

  2. Level 2a: Harmonization of KDEs, document formats, and CTEs, enabling sporadic data exchange. ​

  3. Level 2b: Adoption of shared rules and systematic protocols for information exchange, including automated alerts and cross-checks. ​

  4. Level 3: A fully integrated "super CDS" operating as a centralised electronic platform for multiple markets, automating the reconciliation of catch certificates and traded amounts.

The EU and Japan have achieved Level 2a interoperability due to the similar architecture of their CDS, which facilitates data comparison. However, deeper interoperability at Level 2b or Level 3 requires digitisation, robust protocols, and strong working relationships between schemes. ​

Addressing Double-Spend Fraud ​

Double-spend fraud is a significant challenge for CDS, where catch certificates are reused to import more fish than are legally certified. ​ This fraud can occur between markets operating separate unilateral CDS or within later supply chain stages. ​ The EU's recent legislative overhaul of its CDS, set to take effect in 2026, introduces mechanisms to combat double-spend fraud. ​ These include electronic systems for data management and a quantity management mechanism to ensure that the weight of imported fish matches the weight validated on catch certificates. ​

Case Studies and Global Efforts

Japan implemented a unilateral CDS in 2022, covering species like squid, mackerel, and sardine, based on the EU CCS template. ​ Australia is considering developing a unilateral CDS, while South Korea has enacted a system that could evolve into a genuine CDS. ​ The proliferation of unilateral CDS increases opportunities for fraud, highlighting the need for interoperability. ​

The US SIMP poses challenges for interoperability due to mismatches in KDEs, CTEs, and validation procedures. ​ While achieving Level 1 interoperability is feasible, deeper integration would require significant adjustments to align the SIMP with CDS standards. ​

Lessons from Other Industries

The global automotive industry provides a model for interoperability, with traceability systems that track components back to their source to address safety, fraud, and efficiency. ​ Similar principles can be applied to seafood supply chains to prevent IUU fishing products from infiltrating markets. ​

Moving Forward

Interoperability is not a binary concept but a matter of gradients and functionality. ​ Electronic systems are essential for deeper interoperability, enabling systematic data exchange and fraud detection. ​ Robust interoperability between schemes can create unified barriers to deny entry of IUU fishing products, intensifying pressure on operators to comply with legal standards. ​

The EU's upcoming upgrades to its CDS provide opportunities for collaboration and strengthening unilateral initiatives. ​ Structured policy dialogues between experienced and new CDS operators are critical to addressing the challenges IUU fishing poses and ensuring these schemes' effectiveness. ​

In conclusion, interoperability between CDS is vital for reducing IUU fishing products in global supply chains. ​ By harmonising design elements, adopting electronic systems, and fostering cooperation, CDS can achieve measurable outcomes in combating illegal fishing and protecting seafood markets. ​