A bit over a month ago, I wrote about the potential impacts of the then-looming fuel crisis on the tuna industry. Unfortunately, things have not got better.
Source: https://shipandbunker.com/prices/apac/sea/sg-sin-singapore
What began as air strikes between Israel, the US, and Iran has become a maritime crisis involving Gulf attacks, Strait of Hormuz restrictions, and the Houthis' reemergence as a force capable of destabilising Red Sea shipping. Most people see war headlines. Pacific tuna businesses use them as fuel invoices.
The tuna fishing industry relies on fuel; it accounts for 40-65% of vessel operating costs, and any global energy market instability, but especially in the Persian Gulf, severely impacts fishing economies.
The Pacific's bunker fuel dependence on Singapore links Middle Eastern conflict to tuna economics in Majuro, Pohnpei, Tarawa, and Honiara. Singapore gets most of its Gulf crude through the Hormuz Strait, so its instability affects Pacific fisheries immediately.
End-February Singapore bunker fuel prices were USD709 per tonne. They reached USD1,630 by April 10. Fuel prices doubled in six weeks.
Fish prices have risen, but not enough to compensate for the rise in costs. Skipjack rose from $1,600 to $2,000 per tonne. That sounds big, but it doesn't offset this fuel shock. Vessel operators face severe margin pressure.
Tuna fishing cannot pass on its costs overnight, unlike many industries. Fishing effort changes first.
This discussion matters for Pacific Island nations.
Fleets were initially reported to tie up until prices normalised. Not immediately. Instead, some operators scheduled dry-docking and maintenance early. Port stays lengthened. However, contractions appeared in the third week of April. Philippine fleets slowed. Some Taiwanese ships stayed longer. For repairs, South Korean ships returned early.
In fisheries economics, changes rarely start big. These occur operationally: fewer trips, longer unloading intervals, and delayed departures. Maintenance suddenly becomes urgent, as ships await market signals. Crew rotations slow… and then the supply chain suddenly notices.
The Pacific tuna industry is particularly vulnerable because it operates on thin logistical margins across enormous distances. Fuel is not just a cost; it is the mechanism that enables geography to function. Once fuel economics become distorted, the entire system begins to rebalance itself.
The smallest actors feel it first. The discussion shifts from fleets to Pacific Islands economies.
Pacific Island domestic fleets tend to be less profitable than large distant-water operations, since they are smaller, less capitalised, and more exposed to local operating costs and financing constraints. That means they are also less resilient to external shocks.
The longer this conflict drags on, the first vessels likely to stop operating will not necessarily be the massive industrial fleets backed by states or conglomerates. It will be the marginal domestic operators.
And once domestic fleets stop fishing, the consequences quickly move ashore.
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea processing plants rely on local tuna. No fish, lower throughput. Throughput reductions lead to layoffs, export declines, foreign-exchange pressure, and operational suspensions.
Here, a Middle East war is no longer “foreign”. Since Pacific tuna is ingrained in global politics
Fisheries policy often overlooks a larger strategic lesson: global seafood systems are energy systems first. Fisheries are discussed in terms of sustainability, management, quotas, labour standards, traceability, and so on. All of it is definitely important… but fuel prices underlie it all.
No affordable fuel:
No movement of vessels.
Refrigeration chains increase in cost.
The cost of air freight explodes.
Refer logistics have tightened.
Access negotiations undergo a complete transformation.
That last point is crucial for Pacific Island governments. In several FFA countries, access fees and vessel day revenues constitute significant government income. Prepaid access arrangements mitigate the impact for now. If operators continue to pay high fuel prices, future negotiations may be different.
Nobody wants to pay yesterday's access fees with tomorrow's fuel.
This is where politics gets uncomfortable again… Distant-water fleets, often criticised for overcapacity and geopolitical influence, can withstand prolonged shocks financially. Small domestic industries may not.
In other words, the crisis may unintentionally reinforce dependence on large foreign fleets.
That is the paradox of global fisheries governance. External shocks rarely first weaken the most powerful actors. They usually weaken the most vulnerable first.
Pacific fisheries policy often treats external shocks as exceptional events. But increasingly they are becoming structural conditions of operating in a hyper-connected world: pandemics, wars, sanctions, climate impacts, freight disruptions, labour shortages, cyber risks.
The tuna sector is no longer just managing fish. It is managing volatility.
Tuna is still there… The vessels are still capable of catching them… The markets still want tuna. But between the fish and the plate sits a global system that is becoming progressively more fragile and more expensive to operate.