Last job of the year

Last Saturday I had my planning meeting for 2015 with my colleagues (and friends at this stage!) form the EU funded DevFish II  project based in FFA, in the Solomon Islands.  

I mentioned this project before, as a lot of the work I do in the Pacific is under its auspices, and have I been involved in its operations for the last 3 years… I really love working with them.

The aim of the project is already clear in the logo “A fairer slice for Pacific People”, and that is what delivers… Pacific Island countries catch just $200 million worth of tuna from its fisheries while foreign nations fishing in the same waters catch over $2 billion. Meanwhile, estimates of lost potential earnings from illegal fishing range from the millions to over a billion. By focusing its efforts on increasing control of illegal fishing and maximising local opportunities for business and employment, DEVFISH is making a significant impact on Pacific Island economies.

The scope of the work I’m involved with them, includes 

• Transparency and stakeholder Involvement. We are working to find newer ways to strengthen industry associations and artisanal fishers' representation in decision making, and provide training and advice on fishing access agreements and licenses to national government staff.
• Strengthening the competency of the authorities. To export fish to the EU, countries need an EU-approved 'Competent Authority' to certify fish exports meet EU export standards. Support is been provided for meeting requirements associated with sanitary inspection and EU catch certification (which contain requirements to certify fish is not caught illegally).       
• Industry Strengthening. Training and expertise to expand exports within sustainable limits will be provided - such as training fishing companies to improve vessels and fish handling practices. The emphasis is on small and medium enterprises, where we provide training and technical assistance with a focus on strengthening management and filling skill shortages constraining growth and profitability, within sustainable limits.
• Standardisation of capacity building and training. Under Devfish, training for rhe Authorities officers has been standardized under the same curriculums for the personel of all FFA countries in terms of Seafood inspectors, Fisheries inspectors, Vessels inspectors IUU certification staff, as well as training on Leadership and conflict management
• New Technologies. Projects include from of cleaner technologies, replacement of 2-stroke with 4-stroke engines for artisanal fisheries to the development of fisheries management and control Software.

I reported before on examples of the most visible work I have done with them: here, here, here and here, among otheres

And while I can be quite critical of some aspects of the EU in terms of the disproportioned burden they put on pacific island countries, I always recognised that they do put a lot of money in terms of assistance… and in the case of DevFish II they do that in a flexible format, that allows for FFA (in response to the Pacific Islands needs) to organise the contracts and assistance independently, without being micromanaged from Brussels.

This approach allows for fast response to immediate problems, this flexibility was crucial in terms of assisting countries with the IUU “yellow cards”

Furthermore, from the "human side" is great too. I’m working with friends, meetings are smooth, egos contained… the Team Leader is “Uncle” Hugh Walton (NZ), a former Fisherman/guerrilla gardner/educator, etc... (and a real south Seas vagabond) that is well know and respected all trough the Pacific, and among my colleagues I love having two friends; Jope Tamani (from Fiji) and Timothy Numilengi (PNG) whom I met first time many years ago as their trainer. Beside being top professionals, they are just really nice people to work with, and with many values more aligned to my ones than my European colleages.

Working with your friends... awesome.

In fact, I wish all international assistance programmes were like Devfish.

Infographic on the new EU labelling and traceability requirements

As of 13 December 2014, the new EU food labelling rules, adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2011,  aim to ensure that consumers receive clearer, more comprehensive and accurate information on food content, and help them make informed choices about what they eat.

An explanation guide of the rules aimed to Pacific Islands Tuna producers we did with FFA in August, can be downloaded from here. 

The Illustrated "Pocket Guide" for fisheries products, published by the EU itself can be downloaded from here.

The EU issues Solomon Islands and Tuvalu "yellow cards"

Last february a delegation of the EU's DG MARE (like the EU ministry of fisheries) visited the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu in a "dialogue" mission, to assess how the countries comply with their vision of of how these countries implement their IUU regulation.

Just to put things in perspective, Tuvalu has less than 10000 inhabitants, does not process fish or trade fish with the EU. Has 5 fishing vessels under it flag, and the vessels don't land in the country because there is no where to land....

Tuvalu's fishing hub

I written intensively about the Solomons, and you all know I'm very fond of the place, so not going to abound too much on it.

Accessing the EU market comes at significant costs for the Solomons, as the EU request the highest level of compliance (rightly so, to protect their consumers) worldwide. These obligations for market access in terms of fisheries (and seafood safety) controls are quite complex for a country like the Solomon, as the need to prove they have systems in place that are equivalent to those of the EU member countries.

Implementing these systems to the required level would them around € 1.2 million. This is more than the budget that the government assigns for dengue or malaria, so allocating that kind of money for EU market access arises legitimate ethical questions. On the other side, these are the exports that  produce the income for the country that all other priorities may need. This rational, while valid, is hard to find even in established countries, more so in very young ones.

So... yes, things are not perfect... the EU singled out the lack of traceability and catch certification failures. I completely reject the 1st issue, as while fisheries may have not a traceability system in place, the authorities for health certification to the EU and the company have an excellent one, and in terms of catch certification (which is in itself a defective tool), mistakes were made on the paper work, mostly because no one ever trained them, we fixed that a in April (even the EU ambassador came to the training).

Catch Certification Training in Noro

The DG Mare delegation spent 3 days there, talking mostly to officials, not even went to Noro to see by themselves how things work there and now, 10 months later they drop this bomb, without even coming back to assess the advances... 

I'm the 1st one to recognise that they have problems and sometimes they are slow to fix them... but they are not negating them either...  So, is the best strategy for the EU to shame Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as with "yellow cards" as non-cooperative third countries in terms of IUU fishing?

Particularly when we all know the absolute mess that fisheries controls are in China (see here and here) and Taiwan for example, with huge fleets actively involved in IUU fishing in the Pacific

I acknowledge that the EU funds directly or indirectly a lot of my work... but surely there are better ways to achieve results than being perceived as a bully.

UNDP PRODUCED VIDEO "SAVING OUR TUNA"

I'm always kind of double sided on documentaries about commercial fishing... While I agree in principle with the message, they tend to go for an over-dramatization of issues, emotional low punches, western type paternalistic overtones "we know better what is better for you" and many times very weak technical background...

These issues, in my opinion, do more harm than good, because they dilute the credibility of the people making them and more important; the otherwise good message of better management. 

Fisheries "crisis" is just not a biological issue, but a complex mix of politics (both from the "receiving" countries and the Distant Water Fishing Nations), fuelled by subsidies, lack transparency, budgeting for fisheries controls, and yes: "pure greed", among other many things... Is not just plain "bad" people taking advantage of 'good" people

In any case, this is a segment of a much longer doco (that unfortunately is not fully up loaded in youtube), but that I like for its straitness and the people they talk too.... some of them my friends after being working with them for many years.

The "Landing Authorization Code" concept

One of the recommendations provided to the US Presidential Task Force on IUU fishing by the WWF conveyed "Expert Panel on Legal and Traceable Wild Fish Products" (I blogged about it here) included the  adoption of my "Landing Authorization Code" concept, which is quite flattering.

The concept originates from work I have done for the DevFISH II programme (a EU funded initiative embedded in the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency - FFA).  And it is based in the simple fact that “Fish does not become IUU during processing, but is either caught or landed illegally”.

The concepts “mixes” two basic elements; the requirements (in one way or another) of Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)  and a Key Data Element needed to follow a landing through the value chain.

Under PSMA, vessels have to seek advance approval to enter a port, sufficient to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the information provided. Hence the information required needs to be provided and assessed to facilitate a decision as to whether or not to deny or grant entry. If an “authorization” is given, either the master or the vessel’s representative can present the authorization to the authorities when the vessel arrives in port. 

This “authorization” will need to be “coded” (on some form or another) as to be recorded in one way or another as to be able to review and accounted and potentially crosschecked if it is deemed necessary. So why not simply use this Landing Authorization Code (LAC) as the tool for the initial Key Data Element required for any Catch Documentation Scheme or traceability analysis along the value chain from landing to consumer (or wherever it is needed or most cost effective). 

Furthermore, most fishing vessels operators (company own or independent) do maintain a trip or voyage coding systems in order to monitor logistics, fuel consumption, crewing rosters, general costs and more importantly “final payments”(which are in the form of a % of the catch volumes, species composition and values) are to the traced back to that landing, minus the fix costs. 

Therefore the concept already exists in the sector, so this “LAC” becomes a better and standardised use of an existing tool. The "Process" associated to the use design and use of the LAC is as follow:

Arrival notification

The “authorization” to land is assessed by the fisheries authorities in the port in a compliance response to a series of requirements that are decided by the authorities of the Port State in relationship to its own legislation and requirements or those of an RFMO, international agreements, etc. The scope of the requirements can be arranged in accordance to a pre determined risk index based on the characteristics of the vessels requiring port access. 

As an example: domestic flagged vessels fishing in the Port State EEZ with local VMS and observers may be at the lowest risk tier (i.e green). Foreign vessels with local licenses, foreign charter vessels, domestic vessels fishing in other EZZ or the High Seas, Fish Carriers, vessels with patchy observer coverage, indirect VMS access, etc. are in middle risk tier (yellow). Finally, foreign flagged vessels with no direct VMS access by the coastal or port state, or no observer coverage or vessels identified as a Vessels of Interest (VoI) by any country or RFMO are singled as high risk vessels (red).

As noted, the risk profile of the vessel defines the required time for arrival notification (12, 24, 48 hrs), plus the amount and depth of the information to be provided by the vessel intending to land. In considering the assessment an LAC can be provided and the vessel is allowed to dock with intention to unload. In instances where it is not provided the vessel may be allowed to dock for humanitarian or force majeure reasons but not to land. 

The structure and nature of the “LAC” is up to the Port State or RFMO to decide, but it is important that it is inclusive in the information it holds, and in principle is to be an integral part of relational database such as a Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS). 

The LAC “design” should include for elements such as:  country identification, trip and port traceability, fishing effort measurements, observer reporting, etc. and it should have inter-operability with the vessels operators trip/voyaging coding systems, and if needed with the maritime authorities.

Interestingly, this inter-operability of the vessels operators and authorities LAC can be beneficial to crews and captains in case of payment disputes or safety at sea issues arising from the maritime authorities.

Inspections

The risk profile and compliance level during the previous step defines the need for inspection of the landing and the expected % of yearly inspections decided by the port state, i.e. 25% of landings for green tier vessels, 50% for yellow and 100% for red.

The decision of whether an inspection should take place needs to be based on the risk profile of the vessel (if red) and the % of inspections that have already taken  place (yellow, green) or issues arising from the documentation presented.

If an inspection is performed, then the LAC is recorded in the inspection forms in order to provide for future verification if required and for compliance performance monitoring. Ideally the Inspection forms are digitalized on a tablet type device and the data enters the FIM is real time under the specific LAC of that operation.

If the results of the inspection shows inconsistencies or non compliances (and based on the extent of these) the landing may be authorized under bond or denied. Then the LAC associated to that landing is “flagged” into the FIMS in order to interrupt any further movements or transactions associated to that landing until the issues are resolved.

Unloading 

If it is decided that an inspection is necessary then the results, if compliant, will provide the permission to unload (or transship). This landing could be conditional, as explained before (under bond). If an inspection does not take place the LAC then becomes the “de facto” authorization for unloading.

In the case of transshipments, the LAC is attached to the catch estimates (from logsheets) or real (if hanging scales are used) and reflect the captains/mates receipt or any the document the volumes being transshipped. The LAC will then accompany the transshipping documentation (printed) and if the receiving country has an MoU with the port state or is part of the same RFMO, then they can potentially log-in on to a common FIMS to cross check the legality and estimated volumes of the landing and to add their own information.  If landing or transshipments are partial (and this practice should be discouraged by principle) then the LAC would need to be “partitioned” into lots associated to the original LAC with this retained as the main reference and the lots can be incorporated into FIMS. Any volumes not landed should be considered as a “lot” in the same manner as the landed ones.

Transport

If transport is required for the landing to coolstores or processing facilities then the documentation to be carried will reference the LAC in relation to the real (if fish is weighed prior) or estimated landing taken out of the documentation provided for the vessels arrival, or e-logsheets. 

Reception or weight in

At the coosltore or processing facility reception or anywhere where the official sorting and weight in of the fish is done the LAC “marks” the volumes in the FIMS and into the receiving operator’s inventory system. 

If the whole fish is loaded into containers for direct export then the weight in is to be recorded under the LAC on the FIMS and the volumes containerized discounted of the total volumes recorded that that landing. That exported lot would still be associated to the LAC as in the case of partial landings or transshipments.

The private operators receiving the fish could either load all the data on a FIMS portal or maintain their own inventory and traceability systems that could either be “absorbed” by FIMS or audited by fisheries authorities. In any case final volumes by species would be incorporated into FIMS for the LAC.

Companies normally use lot systems based on the species, size and vessel of origin. All these parameters can be linked to the LAC under FIMS or their own inventory and traceability management system.

Processing establishments and cool stores 

Most responsible MCS systems include Mass Balance evaluation (fish landed = fish in storage + fish processed or sold) on the establishments, by the fisheries authorities.   

These evaluations starts with the LAC of all fish received for a period of time and what is presently in the inventory. The officers for example may chose a minimum of 5 different pallets/boxes/bins to do a full traceability exercise and check that each of those pallets/boxes/bins (raw material as well as processed fish) are registered on company documentation and that can be traced to the LAC.

Volumes withdraw from storage for processing are “discounted” from the original landed volumes in relation to the LAC, hence each withdrawal would leave a smaller volume left from the original until the landing is exhausted. Obviously same principle applies to whole fish withdrawals.  Processed product volumes will be inventoried under the same LAC taking in to consideration the processing ratios (conversion factors) associated to that type of products.

Final product Sales and Exports - Catch Certificates

Prior to the product leaving the premises Catch Certificates (domestic or market specific) are prepared based on all the operations relating to the original LAC (or LACs in the case of mixed products).

The referencing and traceability to the specific LAC plus the fish volumes accountancy through the value chain becomes the basis and condition “sine qua non” for a catch certificate, either paper or electronic.

the LAC in action

The whole system is based on my view of what is practical from "reality" perspective and the technology tools we have available today. Many countries have already FIMS, or these can be easily adapted from banking software, as the principles are similar (Landing are deposits, and processing/sales are withdrawals).

I have no idea if the concept would be adopted in some way or another by countries or international organisations, but i'm quietly proud of it :-)

Training on the EU IUU Catch Certification Scheme in the Philippines

Philippines received a yellow card notification from the European Commission in June 2014 notifying it that it was failing to discharge its duties as a flag, port, and coastal state to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. 

Unloading in GenSan

The decision highlighted that the country (in the EU's view) was not doing enough to fight illegal fishing. It identifies concrete shortcomings, such as lack of system of sanctions to deter IUU activities or lack of actions to address deficiencies in monitoring, controlling and surveillance of fisheries.

The decision does not, at this stage, entail any measures affecting trade. Countries that are being given a 'yellow card' warning and a reasonable time to respond and take measures to rectify the situation. Should the situation not  improve, the EU could take further steps, which could entail trade sanctions on fisheries imports, as was done recently with Guinea, Belize and Cambodia (IP/14/304).

Philippines and PNG were notified at the same time (I wrote about it before) and they share some of the problems being identified, hence it make sense that the training being provided is standardised, so the understanding of the technical issues is the same on both sides.

However, the Catch Certificate is only the top of the iceberg, what we see from much deeper issues... and those are the hard ones to tackle, particularly in countries that have a lot of areas that requires a high level of attention and support at least equal to fisheries compliance.

Competition & Conflict Between Ecolabels In Tuna Fisheries

Further on my post on governance innovation networks in Tuna, I found interesting that the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands, went deeper into the conflict between the Dolphin Safe and the Marine Stewardship Council certification schemes in the West and Central Pacific.

In this video, they outline how key practices like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency, impartiality/independence and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the importance of authority in understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within global production networks.

They conclude that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in global production networks.

I wrote about Ecolabels (or Eco-certifications) and their role for seafood trade in a publication that the SIPPO Programme commission a few years ago (download from here or here)

In the Tuna conferences, normally the last session is in between Ecolabels... and  it tends to be an embarrassing cat fight, that at this stage is not even funny anymore, so I always walk out... feels like a ego contest (my one is better than yours) more than a anything else.

2014 UN General Assembly (Fisheries Resolution on CDS)

Catch Documentation Schemes

75bis. Notes with satisfaction in this regard that the Committee on Fisheries at its thirty-first session recognized that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations would undertake to elaborate guidelines and other relevant criteria relating to catch documentation schemes, including possible formats, based on the following principles: conformity with the provisions of international law, not creating unnecessary barriers to trade, equivalence, risk-based, reliable, simple, clear and transparent, and electronic if possible, with the aim of adoption at the thirty-second session of the Committee on Fisheries, and that the assessment of schemes and formats would include cost-benefit considerations and take into account catch documentation schemes already implemented by certain of its members, as well as regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements;

Just an example of the stuff we do now with the EU one

This is good news... a better system is possible and some very smart and "reality based" people are working on it!

Governance Innovation Networks for Sustainable Tuna

I have been reading with interest parts of Alice M.M. Miller's PhD thesis from October 2014, at University of Wageningen School of Social Sciences. I liked the fact that she tackles the issue from a Social Science perspective, which I find really refreshing.

There are two particular topics (so far) I have focused: 

1) The MSC (Marine Stewardship Council) vs the Dolphin Safe label conflict in the PNA fishery

She examine this case by asking what happens if two labels regulating the same fishery, with differing perceived levels of credibility, make conflicting sustainability claims? 

She looks at how key practices like scientific rigour, inclusiveness, transparency/openness, impartiality/independence and impact contribute to label credibility and explains the importance of authority in understanding how certification schemes maintain influence within global production networks. Her results demonstrate that despite substantially different levels of credibility within these networks, the application of an environmental standard is more connected to the authority of the standard setter than the credibility of the label. The paper concludes that understanding the more nuanced role of authority, both with and without credibility, offers new insights into the wider dynamics that shape environmental regulation in global production networks.

Loved her graphics

This is in line with my personal knowledge and appreciation of both schemes, where i see the MSC as "real" measure of sustainability (even if i have my reservations on other aspects of it), and the "Dolphin Safe" which may have started with some real values in the 80's but is now a money making scheme with little transparency.

2) The power asymmetry in the role that the EU's DG mare is taking in the Pacific fisheries

Like any other world power the EU is aiming to extend its regulatory reach beyond its territory.  Utilising its position as the world’s largest tuna market the EU has been able to exert regulatory authority by attaching compliance with their IUU Regulation to their trade agreements and conditions of market access.  ‘Market Power Europe’ is the main basis for the power asymmetry between the EU and Pacific Island countries in EU IUU Regulation uptake.

The result has been that where market access has been crucial for these external countries, they have sought to comply with the EU’s rules, albeit with varying degrees of success. In addition to market power the EU has also diffused the implementation of their IUU Regulation through normative power, for instance through interactions in the WCPFC.

Exerting normative power to promote their external regulatory agenda has been less successful for the EU and met with considerable, but differentiated, resistance by Pacific Island countries. The negative perception of the EU’s sustainable fisheries track record in the region and their self-interest based socialisation strategies has weakened the EU’s capacity to take a normative stance over sovereign resources of third countries.

The EU’s external regulatory strategy for fisheries has therefore ‘muddied the waters’ because the EU’s perceived behaviour undermines moral superiority it claims over the countries targeted by their IUU Regulation. In addition, in a region with strong sub-regional governance structures like the PNA, Pacific Island countries have been able to exploit their position in the WCPFC as a collective of resource owners, to openly criticise the EU’s normative stance and to ‘push back’ against EU demands. This has altered the power asymmetry in their favour. Pacific Island countries, which lack ‘traditional’ market power, have been able to promote their own regulatory agenda against traditionally more powerful bodies like the EU. 

These dynamic and differentiated power asymmetries generate in turn a differentiated geography of regulatory uptake. The power of the EU lies in its position as a market actor; one faced with minimal resistance in pushing its regulatory agenda. With a near global consensus on strong IUU fishing regulation, it appears any added value for the EU in investing in their normative power over the already resistant sovereign owners of fishery resources, is diminishing.

While the strategic importance of interacting in multilateral fora such as the WCPFC will continue to remain important for the EU, exercising normative power on IUU regulation appears better reserved for an increasingly sparse group of countries and regions not dependent on the EU export market; and when exercised, should focus on cooperation rather than ‘teaching’. 

Back from Noro, Solomon Islands

Back from my favourite fishing port in the Pacific: Noro, in the Solomon Islands.

The science and craft of net assemblage 

I write a lot about this place (see here and here) because I think the place represents "What fisheries in the Pacific should be". I treasure the place, there are not many good stories in fisheries in the Pacific (or worldwide!), but here is one. 

Local boys learning the ropes (literally)

If only the government was to support it in way to maintain the international obligations they assumed, it would be fantastic. 

The real networking!

Advances are slow, but forthcoming... the fisheries regulatory presence is strengthening, and a new guard of committed fisheries officers is rolling in.  

I'm very proud to have been involved with the place for the last 15 years in various roles... I have friends there now, and in many ways feels a bit like my 2nd home in the Pacific. (In fact the seeds for the "Noro Pizza & Espresso" are been planted :-)

Some of the crew I been working with

While there the elections took place (never an easy time there), but so far so good. The fact that the Present primer minister was ousted from his electorate by a teacher may mean lot. Here are some images:

the courthouse in Munda

Welcome to vote

Ink your finger please

Mhhh... you don't look like a voter my friend.

Visualising fishing effort

Global Fishing Watch is the product of a technology partnership between SkyTruth, Oceana, and Google that is designed to show all of the trackable fishing activity in the ocean.

This interactive web tool – currently in prototype stage – is being built to enable anyone to visualise the global fishing fleet in space and time. Global Fishing Watch will reveal the intensity of fishing effort around the world, one of the stressors contributing to the precipitous decline of our fisheries.

The tool uses a global feed of vessel locations extracted from Automatic Identification System (AIS) tracking data collected by satellite, revealing the movement of vessels over time. The system automatically classifies the observed patterns of movement as either “fishing” or “non-fishing” activity.

The prototype visualisation contains 300 million AIS data points covering over 25,000 unique vessels. For the initial fishing activity map, the data is limited to 35 million detections from 3,125 vessels that we were able to independently verify were fishing vessels. Global Fishing Watch then displays fishing effort in terms of the number of hours each vessel spent engaged in fishing behaviour, and puts it all on a map that anyone with a web browser will be able to explore.

However, it may seems that the scale of each vessel image projected on the maps significantly overstates the spatial presence of each vessel and is therefore misleading. For example round the NZ EEZ the EEZ appears to be lit up most of the time. The actual number of vessels fishing with AIS (or VMS) deployed would be fewer than 70 and that in the fourth largest EEZ in the world with a physical area larger than Australia.

The implied scale of each vessel position must be several tens of square kilometres and is visually misleading.  Australia appears to lack much fishing inside its EEZ simply because most Australian vessels are small and don't operate AIS (only vessels 24 mt plus are required to have it), hence the system may not provide information on the true scale of globall fishing as most of it is within EEZs and coastal waters and done by small vessels without any electronic monitoring.

Would be good to see the real size of the vessel position and the tracks, which i'm sure will be equally impacting, but technically more correct

See more at http://www.globalfishingwatch.org

Recommendations for a Global Framework to Ensure the Legality and Traceability of Wild-Caught Fish Products

In 2013, WWF set up a Expert Panel on Legal and Traceable Wild Fish Products, a multi-disciplinary expert group (that by some obscure reason included me) conveyed to promote a global framework for ensuring the legality and traceability of all wild-caught fish products. 

The goal was to generate solutions to common challenges to establishing such a framework through complementary regulatory and private sector mechanisms.

In our view, a global framework for legal and traceable fish products would provide a powerful lever for encouraging sustainable fishing and combating IUU practices, thus generating substantial benefits to fishers, businesses, consumers, and governments.

We took note of increasing consumer demand for information about the origins of the seafood they eat, and of increasing movement among governments towards more robust regulations to strengthen traceability and to prevent trade in illegal seafood products.

These twin factors, along with other business concerns such as food safety and supply chain management, underlie a growing wave of activities that are expanding traceability within the seafood sector. Industry is moving in this direction voluntarily because traceability is increasingly recognized as good for business – reducing financial, regulatory, and reputational risk, increasing consumer confidence, allowing access to profitable markets, decreasing spoilage, and generally increasing operational efficiency

To help address these challenges, the Panel envisions a global framework (i.e., a combination of standardized commercial practices and adequately harmonised governmental regulations) that includes the following key elements:

1. A shared definition of key data elements about the “who, what, where, when, and how” of fishing that should be associated with wild seafood products;
2. Common nomenclatures and data standards so that this information can be easily shared and universally interpreted;
3. A shared approach to recognizing authoritative sources of information and mechanisms that generate this information reliably;
4. A shared approach to government mechanisms for proactively and authoritatively establishing the legality of fish products entering market chains, creating formal judgments on which market actors can rely;
5. Auditing and verification mechanisms at each critical step in the supply chain that ensure the integrity and strength of the information and infrastructure that support production and trade of legal seafood globally;
6. A vision for achieving fully electronic seafood traceability within five years;
7. A shared approach to a global IT architecture that enables the interoperability of data and traceability platforms, and that provides data access and information sharing in accordance with a standardised system of appropriate access rights;
8. Financial and technical support for those producers who will need help with this transition, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and commercial fishers in developing countries; and
9. A shared vision for the role of supportive and “adequately harmonised” government regulations, including for appropriate export and import controls.

In order to achieve this vision for fully traceable and demonstrably legal fish products, we issued the following recommendations:

1. Minimum information standards for wild caught fish products should be adopted
2. Authoritative data sources, including a global record of fishing vessels, should be established or identified as soon as possible
3. A harmonised system of “landing authorizations” should be established to provide primary assurances of the legal origin of fish products (this is my "baby", as I'm developing that concept here in the Pacific)
4. Multiple points of verification should be added throughout seafood supply chains
5. A transition to fully electronic traceability systems should be accomplished for all commercial fish products within the next five years
6. Support and capacity building must be provided to those producers who will need help with the transition to electronic traceability systems, particularly SMEs and commercial fishers in developing countries
7. A global architecture for interoperable seafood traceability systems should be developed
8. Where applicable, non-discriminatory border measures setting minimum standards for seafood traceability and proof of legal origin should combat trade in IUU products while facilitating legitimate commerce through a “risk based, tiered, and targeted” approach

These recommendations were delivered to the recently appointed US Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (I wrote about it here)

This document will be followed by a supplemental and more technically detailed report, expected to be released in early 2015, in the meantime you can read about the panel and download the report here

And while is great to recommend, doing is the challenge ahead... hope this give us all some leverage.

Leakage of fish in ports

Not easy this days

The trade in discards of target species and non-target species between crew onboard unloading/transshipping vessels and segments of the local populace in ports has been occurring since purse seine transshipment began in PIC ports nearly 20 years ago. These activities are termed “leakage” and has been reported in the literature since at least 1995, but has generally not been contained nor have the issues it may generate been addressed

“Leakage” of frozen tuna from industrial operations into the domestic food system has always been significant at canneries and more recently, transshipment points. The emergence of medium-scale tuna longline operations in most Pacific Island countries has resulted in damaged tuna, under-sized tuna, and by-catch being sold on the domestic markets.

Business in port

In many cases the leakage is brought ashore for sale by people engaged in the trade as a full or part-time occupation. In limited situations some of the fish is said to be bartered for sexual or other services onboard.

In the ports where leakage does occur, usually women in small canoes exchange vegetables and other items for sacks of fish alongside the transshipping purse seiners. The fish enters commerce not just in the port surroundings but is also first smoked or cooked in traditional earth ovens and distributed to villages distant from the commercial center.

Direct community involvement in resource allocation?

The trade seem welcome in the port by those in the community directly involved as an income-generating opportunity from purse seine transshipping. But not always... local fishermen in particular are often concerned about the problems caused by large amounts of fish brought into local markets that can disrupt their own marketing efforts, particularly when that fish is sold at prices below that which they are asking for their own catch.

On balance leakage seems to be considered a benefit to PIC economies, albeit one that requires constant monitoring and sometimes control to minimize adverse impacts.

Since activities surrounding leakage take place in the informal sector, the amounts and value of leakage in some of the PIC ports can only be guessed. Quantifying the pros and cons of leakage is one of the many studies I would not mind doing!

Accessing the market with a great  smile

A good analysis of leakage in the key transhipment ports is in a FFA's 2012 report (A Survey of Tuna Transshipment in Pacific Island Countries) by Mike A. McCoy, that besides being a person that knows the pacific as no other, is a great guy!

5 illegal boats arrested in PNG waters

Five boats illegally fishing in PNG waters were captured by the PNG Defence force (PNGDF) and are awaiting prosecution.

A maritime surveillance involving Pacific island counties exercise known as Exercise Kurukuru nabbed the boats around the Dogleg area of the Western Province.

An officer with the PNGDF navy told PNG Loop the boats along with their crew were all from Thailand.

The officer said after they were caught, the fisherman tried to bribe the PNGDF navy officers to let them go.

He explained that all the boats did not have a vessel monitoring system (VMS) which meant any activity they carried out in PNG waters were illegal.

The boats and fisherman are now docked at Lanchron base in Port Moresby awaiting charges by the National Fisheries Authority (NFA) who has the power to prosecute them.

Source here

We may owe the people in the small boats better management of the people in the large boats.

Always a sad time when a fisheries observer is lost at sea.

Beyond the fact that they are the cornerstone of fisheries monitoring, science and sometimes compliance. Most of the accomplished people that I know in Fisheries today, have been at some stage in their careers, Fisheries Observers.

In the Pacific, many times they tend to be the pride of their families, the 1st to finish high school, the 1st one to be abroad, and so on... also they tend to be a principal earner in their households. Their passing brings massive grief to the family/whanau and community, the fact that there is not a body to bury, nor a particular place to bring closure to their pain, makes the loss even harder to accept.

Roger learned many of the realities of fishing as an observer for 4 years, and he applies that today as a Compliance Officer in PNG.

On top of that, there are complex legal difficulties arising when the disappearance occurs in coastal waters of one country, on a vessel flagged in a Distant Water Fishing Nation, and in most cases, the observer is a contractor to a fisheries body based in yet another different country. Worryingly, it always seems, that for some reason or another, their disappearances never come to any form of legal or emotional closure.

Today I was part of the group that had to communicate the disappearance to the direct relatives of an Observer, the anguish in the mother's eyes will be with me forever.  My condolences to the family and my respect to all fisheries observers.

Here is brief of what observers do in the Pacific Fisheries

When island nations drown, who owns their seas?

The Boston Globe, published a interesting article by Latif Nasser on this subject and quotes Blaise Kuemlangan a friend from PNG whom we worked together in Rome. Here I quote the parts I found more interesting from the original.

So far, the world’s attention has rightly focused on how much these places have to lose: their homes, their communities, their cultures, their vistas. But these countries have another, less visible set of assets at stake as they consider their survival—assets that won’t necessarily be lost, but which raise substantial questions. These are their large and valuable maritime zones.

Countries like Kiribati gained control over their surrounding oceans under the UN Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, back when the prospect of a drowning nation seemed far-fetched. The law granted every country with a coastline economic domain over water 200 nautical miles (230 miles) off its shore, a descendant of the 17th-century “cannon-shot rule,” which gave nations authority over as much water as they could defend with coastal artillery.

These substantial economic rights belong to inhabitable islands, but generally not to—to use the technical term—rocks. The UN has strict criteria to tell one from the other. An island must be “naturally formed” and higher than high tide; part or whole of a nation recognized by other nations; and a place that can “sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own.” If it doesn’t meet those criteria, it is a rock, and doesn’t merit territorial rights.

When it comes to nations like Kiribati and Tuvalu, however, the patch of ocean largely is the country. Tuvalu’s ocean-to-land ratio is 34,600 to 1. It would be more accurate to think of them not as small island states with a claim on the ocean, but rather as gigantic ocean states with a patch of land in the middle.

In the decades to come, many low-lying nations will start to look more like uninhabitable rocks. Wave “over-wash” will degrade the fragile lens of fresh groundwater, leaving residents dependent on rain or imported bottled water. The warming ocean will result in degradation and bleaching of reef ecosystems that protect the islands from erosion. The elevating sea level—rising as much as a meter by 2100, according to last year’s IPCC report—may inundate the lowest-lying islands of archipelagos such as the Maldives (average elevation 1.6 meters), Tuvalu (1.83 meters), Kiribati (1.98 meters), and the Marshall Islands (2.13 meters).

If these islands do become rocks, the question of their maritime holdings is complex, as they’re inhabited and have their own seats at the United Nations; they also draw a significant portion of their gross domestic product from those ocean rights. According to the UN’s International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, “In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”

As long ago as 1990, a scattering of international law scholars began to imagine approaches to the problem, including ones that might even help threatened nations with their resettlement efforts.

One early proposal from Fred Soons of the Utrecht University School of Law is a solution that is part physical and part legal. Soons assumes that the islands’ adaptation efforts will include man-made barriers, and perhaps in the long run, even more ambitious efforts that amount to artificial islets. In that case, he suggests broadening the legal definition of “naturally formed” islands to include such land-preservation efforts. In other words, so long as an island was initially natural, Soons believes it ought to count as an island, even if it later becomes enhanced—and even potentially supplanted—by artificial components. (Soons points to the example of Okinotorishima, a remote atoll that Japan has spent more than $700 million to protect with steel blocks and concrete embankments, though its claim to islandhood—and the surrounding ocean—remains contested by neighbors.) Even Soons himself doesn’t see this as a permanent solution, however: Artificial barriers simply delay the inevitable, and the price tags for buttressed or artificial islands are, to use the IPCC’s words from 2007, “well beyond the financial means of most small island states.”

Other legal scholars have focused on ways that the maritime territory can be preserved as a national asset even if the people leave. Several, including UC Berkeley School of Law’s David Caron, have observed that changing sea boundaries aren’t just a problem for islands: The rising ocean promises to redraw every coastline on the map. Instead of constantly updating maps every time a beach is submerged, they suggest, why not freeze the boundaries in place? For low-lying islands, this would mean that the sea as currently measured around Kiribati would become the permanent patrimony of its people—and wherever in exile they end up, the population would continue to receive royalties from its former coastal waters.

Rosemary Rayfuse of the University of New South Wales in Australia takes a different route to a similar outcome. “An equitable and fair solution,” she writes in a 2013 anthology documenting a Columbia University conference on Threatened Island Nations, “would be the recognition in international law of a new category of State, ‘the deterritorialized state.’” Rayfuse argues that the creation of such a category would enable island nations—even if they lost their land—to keep both their nationhood and their maritime zones, despite not having a piece of land to call home. Remarkably, such a landless state does exist today. The Knights of Malta (not to be confused with the country of Malta) are a 900-year-old lay Catholic order who today have no land, but do have a nonvoting seat at the United Nations. Their example, Rayfuse suggests, provides a seamless way to incorporate submerged nations into the international community.

The main hitch to both of these plans—frozen baselines and deterritorialized states—is that they depend on international legislation, which is notoriously slow and unwieldy. The UN Law of the Sea’s amendment procedure, for instance, has never been used. Nor does it help that the island nations have little geopolitical clout. Rayfuse noted in 2013 that “freezing baselines does not appear to be high on the international agenda at the moment.”

There’s a final strategy for these island nations to be able to keep their maritime zones, a strategy that doesn’t depend on sea walls or international legislation. Rayfuse called it “the most straightforward and appealing solution” to the maritime zone dilemma. If each island nation can find a friendly neighboring nation willing to sell it some territory, it can move to that territory and continue to operate its preexisting maritime zones, so long as any part of the island is still above water. Kiribati’s president announced earlier this year that at Fiji’s invitation, his country had purchased land from the Anglican Church on Fiji’s second-largest island as part of an effort to migrate with dignity.

A major catch with this strategy is that few countries are willing to swallow whole another country, and those that are often want something for themselves out of the deal. In 2001, when Tuvalu approached Australia and New Zealand for some land, Australia rejected the deal out of hand. New Zealand agreed to host only those Tuvaluans who were under 45, spoke English, and had a job offer in New Zealand—requirements that excluded approximately 9,000 of the 11,000-person country. Even Kiribati’s recent land deal has come under suspicion; Atlantic reporter Christopher Pala visited the plot of Fijian land that Kiribati bought for $8.7 million, and found that the land was too small to feed or house Kiribati’s population, and that in fact, the land was already inhabited.

If they cannot find deals on better terms, these island nations may have to merge with neighboring nations, using their valuable maritime rights as a bargaining chip. In effect, it would be a flat-out trade: asylum for control of the maritime zones.

These strategies—redefining “natural,” freezing maritime zones, creating deterritorialized states—amounts to a kind of thought experiment, a radical tweak to our idea of how fixed nations are and should be.

It’s not clear when islanders will need to turn these thought experiments into real-world legal strategies. Some geoscientists project that coral reefs supporting atoll islands will grow along with rising seas, meaning that only those living close to shore will lose their homes; parts of the atolls may actually rise as other parts sink. Other researchers claim that regular flooding, food insecurity, and lack of fresh water will render the islands uninhabitable sooner rather than later. Whatever the timeline, as Rayfuse put it in an e-mail, “there is a presumption of the continuity of states, and the international community will deal with the issue of disappearance if and when it happens.”

At the moment, the value of their maritime assets seems to be going up: The United States recently purchased its 2015 tuna fishing rights from a collective of Pacific island nations for $90 million dollars, up from the $21 million it paid in 2009. There’s also more than money at stake—by law, islands can use their control of the zones to enact environmental standards, though they are too small and resource-strapped to enforce them without help.

For now, the island nations face the first and most basic step to securing their maritime zones: mapping them. To chart out existing ocean borders now would shore up their claims as their outlying islands become uninhabitable and their zones begin to shrink. Even this is far from trivial: An exact surveying effort involves extrapolating outer limits from base-point coordinates on shore, negotiating any overlaps with neighboring countries, and then formally depositing them with the United Nations in New York, a project beyond the technological and financial capacities of most island countries.

Blaise Kuemlangan, who works for the FAO and encourages Pacific Island nations to map their boundaries, expects that—unless the countries themselves or the international community make a special effort now—mapping will not be completed for at least another 20 years. By then, these islands will most likely still be inhabited. But they’ll need, even more urgently, to understand exactly what they have to trade for their future.

The EU "greencards" Fiji and Vanuatu, but red for Sri Lanka.

The European Commission has today proposed to ban imports of fisheries products from Sri Lanka to tackle the commercial benefits stemming from illegal fishing. The move comes after four years of intense dialogue with the country after which it could not demonstrate that it sufficiently addressed illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

In contrast, the Commission today confirmed that Belize, Fiji, Panama, Togo and Vanuatu, which had received warnings at the same time as Sri Lanka, have successfully taken measures to tackle illegal fishing. Consequently, the Commission proposes to lift the trade measures imposed in March this year against Belize.

According to the Commission's assessment, Sri Lanka has not sufficiently addressed the shortcomings in its fisheries control system identified in November 2012. The main weaknesses include shortcomings in the implementation of control measures, a lack of deterrent sanctions for the high seas fleet, as well as lacking compliance with international and regional fisheries rules.

As a result, the Commission tables a ban on fisheries products caught by Sri Lankan vessels being imported into the EU. In order to avoid disrupting ongoing commercial contracts, the full trade measures will only come into force in mid-January 2015, which is three months after the decision is published in the EU's Official Journal.

Shark-apocalypsis now in Beruwella

The Commission has today also proposed to remove Belize from the list of non-cooperating third countries in the fight against illegal fishing and to end the trade measures imposed against the country in March 2014. Belize has demonstrated its commitment to reforming its legal framework and adopting a new set of rules for inspection, control and monitoring of vessel. The Council will take a decision in this respect.

In a similar vein, the Commission also announced the termination of steps against Belize, Fiji, Panama, Togo and Vanuatu who all received a formal warning in November 2012. The countries have taken concrete measures in addressing established shortcomings and shown commitment to complete structural reforms in order to address illegal fishing.

The Commission has prolonged the cooperation with Korea, Curacao and Ghana until January 2015. Despite some progress achieved in these countries, which have received formal warnings in November 2013, more time is needed in these countries to make changes.

source here

Fish for Nutrition and Food Security

More than 2 billion people worldwide suffer from micronutrient deficiencies. Fish is rich in essential fatty acids and micronutrients like vitamin A, iron and zinc, and as part of a balanced diet can improve the health and wellbeing for millions of women, men and children across the globe.

Nice Infographic by WorldFish 

Back in Papua New Guinea at a time of substantial changes

Back to work in Papua New Guinea (PNG) at a really interesting time in the fisheries management and politics of the country. PNG is the “big pella” of tuna fisheries in the Pacific, (I wrote about them before here) and a couple of weeks ago NFA (the National Fisheries Authority) communicated trough a Public Notice in the main newspapers there a change in their stands in regards Tuna Industry development policy and their foreign access conditions. The Notice cover various issues, but is motivated by something I wrote about before (here), mainly is seeing little domestic return on contributing fishing days to the foreign fleets.

As most fisheries issues isn’t simple… PNG is part of the FSMA (Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access) Agreement, wich was put in place to fulfill socio-economic objectives prior to the VDS (Vessel Day Scheme). This resulted in a “new class” of fishing licenses, requiring vessels to undertake economic activities in the PNA region, such as offloading, provisioning, infrastructure investments and employment, in exchange for access to all eight PNA countries' waters. The FSMA is highly attractive to purse seiners since it allows vessel owners to use the fishing days in the zones which are most attractive to fish within the entire PNA, throughout the year.

PNG contributes fishing days to the FSMA to fulfill the social and economic objectives, but the nations does not seems to get the expected results, as many PNG domestic and LBFV (locally based foreign fishing vessels) have had FSMA endorsement to fish/source tuna regionally. However, the NFA (PNG fisheries authority) has not seen a single fish transshipped outside PNG being returned for processing in PNG-based plants. 

Most of it is seen moving to canneries in Thailand and Philippines where processing is cheaper… however is a egg or chicken dilemma… are PNG high production cost not caused by the fact that processing companies with generous fishing concessions are simply not landing fish in the country? Instead, they are offloading in other destinations, and creating a shortage in PNG plants, lessening efficiencies of the operators, and driving local costs of production up further. Hence NFA hopes that a cut in generous concessions will change the current situation, and increase the volume of raw material being processed domestically.

NFA plans for 2015 a drastic shake up of the division of tuna fishing days in PNG waters. Starting next year, it would work on the removal of unassociated (not associated with a PNG-based tuna processing plant) foreign effort, access to Archipelagic Waters (AW -aka the Bismarck Sea) reducing effort from 9,000 to 5,500 days and Domestic industry will also have priority over fishing days in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters.

For the vessels linked to onshore processors, the 5,500 days shall be allocated based upon actual processing tonnage that is being achieved, or cans or loins processed, This will be a considerable change from the current system, where it notes that days are "merely allocated based on declared proposed processing capacity or the number of associated boats". And warns that "Where domestic AW and EEZ catches are not reflected in increased tuna processed in 2015, the concessional days afforded to the domestic vessels under each processing ventures will be reviewed".

most PNG coastal citizens version of a "fishing day"

Foreing companies, which have been fishing in PNG waters, can no longer count on automatic renewal of usual privileges. The abolishment of these concessions by the NFA is because "all foreign access agreements had been required to land 10% of their catch for processing onshore, yet not one fish has even been landed for processing."

Consequently NFA will require that each foreign company or foreign flagged vessel that has had access in 2013 shall receive only 20 % of what it had in 2013 individual usage and this will be at the regionally agreed benchmark price of USD 8,000 a day for next year's licensing period. Previously, fishing days had been awarded at very low prices or even for free.

Now the NFA says it will invite those fishing companies to tender for up to 70 % of their previous years usage. Risks for those vessel owners bidding too low is that they will not be able to secure any additional days and only remain with the base of 20 %. With more than 40 new seiners coming into the global tuna fisheries, the competition between fleets to secure these days is expected to become fiercer. 

NFA said that, "each player in the fishery can make a conscious decision on the value to them, to get additional days to fish and have a day's 'right' to use during the year, to fish whenever they want it, with no race to fish," which is usually the case when a maximum quota is applied and closed upon exhaustion.

And while this all sounds good, is to be seen if will conduct to a stabilization of effort and catches (last year was the biggest catch ever), beyond better economic returns for PNG and the region.

What would I be doing?

Thankfully my job is much simpler that answering working ion the political side of these decisions!.  But rather deal with the basics... Any change in policy needs to be “controlled” during operations under a structure called MCS (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) and I will be training people on some specific aspects of that and in regards the Catch Certification that provides the official guarantees that all these MCS elements have been complied with prior the fish entering the world market.

Pacific Island nations secure $90m tuna deal with United States

Pacific Island countries and the United States have reached a $90 million tuna deal, which is believed to be the world's most lucrative fishing access agreement. The deal was secured in the final minutes of a three-day negotiating session in Hawaii.

US - South Pacific Tuna Treaty Boundary

Interestingly, in August, the  U.S. State Department proposed more than $20 million in its fiscal year 2015 budget for the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, also known as the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries, which in July during the New Zealand negotiations finished in a ‘no deal’ leaving the United States tuna fleet without fishing access to the Pacific Ocean in 2015 

But obviously, tuna is worth more and the money came out at the end

Under the agreement, the 17 member countries of the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries will receive $US90 million from the US government and its tuna industry in return for 8,300 fishing days in 2015.

"We have been renegotiating this treaty since 2009, when its total value was in the order of $21 million," said James Movick, director general of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). "During that time, the Pacific Island parties were able to secure an increase to $42 million in 2011, and then again to $63 million in 2012."

As tuna stocks in the rest of the world dwindle, the Pacific has become the global epicentre for the industry. More than 60 % of the world's tuna is caught in the Pacific by vessels from powerful distant water fishing nations such as China, Japan, Taiwan South Korea, Spain and more from North and South America. For many Pacific Island nations, tuna licence fees are a budget mainstay.

The region's negotiating success down to collective bargaining and to the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), introduced by the eight Pacific nations that are parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA). The VDS sets a region-wide quota for fishing days and a minimum price per day. It aims to reduce the number of days on offer and ratchet up the price. Since it began in 2005, it has been successful in improving economic returns for Pacific Island nations but not in halting the decline in fish stocks.

Scientists say stocks of Bigeye tuna are now down to 16%of their original numbers and are calling for tougher conservation measures. Pacific countries are due to meet with the distant water fishing nations in December to agree on a long-awaited new conservation measure.
In the past 12 months, Japan has indicated a new willingness to support stronger conservation action but other nations remain unconvinced.

The new deal with the US sends a strong signal to the other distant water fishing nations the seriousness with which the Pacific countries take both conservation and the economic maximisation of their tuna resource.

Despite its success this may be the last such deal with the US. "In my view we will have to seriously reconsider the structure of the US treaty," Mr Movick said. All Pacific Island members of the Forum Fisheries Agency, including those with no tuna, benefit from the current arrangements with the US. That does not sit well with some of the tuna-rich nations, which have to forgo income to help their neighbours.

Talks to decide on allocating revenue from the US deal are difficult and time-consuming. "These internal negotiations among ourselves place a lot of stress on the regional co-operative mechanisms and relationships and I don't think that is necessary or beneficial, so I am asking the [Pacific fisheries] ministers to consider recommending to [Pacific] leaders that a different approach be taken.

"I recognise the treaty has been an important diplomatic tool between the Pacific Island governments and the United States, so [a new kind of arrangement] has political dimension which also has to be addressed."

source here