Another yellow card in the pacific

Much has been on the news on another Yellow Card for the Pacific, this time Kiribati. And this is significant.

2014 figures

The EU press releases says:

The EU's warning to Kiribati is based on concerns about the country's capacity to control fishing activities by foreign fleets. There are serious risks that illegally caught fish could be laundered through the ports of Kiribati, as they do not have robust traceability systems in place for fisheries products. Kiribati's unwillingness to share important information on third country vessels operating in their waters undermines the Commission's work to improve transparency and sustainability of tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific.

A couple of DG MARE officers were there earlier this year and did an assessment of the situation, and their results (and the yellow) did not come as a surprise to many people in the game.

And while a red would only impact a few foreign DWFN vessels that are flagged there, the significance for me comes from two non-related factors:

1) In 2014 (and similarly in 2015 I assume) more Tuna was caught in the Kiribati EEZ than in the Whole Eastern Pacific ocean and a bit less than in the whole Indian Ocean. No country has more tuna in its waters than Kiribati and Tarawa is (allegedly) the busiest Tuna transshipping port in the Pacific.

2) Kiribati is one of two countries in the Pacific (the other one is the Cooks) that actually has/had a "Fisheries Partnership Agreement" with the EU. This brings an interesting twist to the fact that the EU is in a fisheries agreement with a country that seems (in the own views) a non-totally cooperating country in terms of IUU fishing.

From the personal perspective, it looks like i may be spending more time there... since helping countries out of yellow seems to have become part of my staple workload (Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG so far, and allegedly Solomons quite soon) :-)

Woman in Fisheries

From the South Pacific to the Caribbean small-scale fisherwomen and processing operators are be the bedrock of food security in many communities, bringing home dependable income and healthy protein when other sources fail.

The best of fisheries  

 Their work nurtures their families and can dramatically impact conservation efforts — yet they have been all but ignored by researchers and policymakers.

These are the conclusions of this Oceana report/study that you should read from here please.

Is a sobering reading and I agree (based on my own personal experience) to most of it.  

Furthermore, while in my line of work most of my colleagues and bosses are male, the few where I had woman colleagues and specially bosses have been the best in terms of the working relationships and the results achieved. Somehow the ego/testosterone driven issues placate and everyone looks into results. I wish this was to happen more often.

You know things get done when Charlyn and Soni are involved :-) 

Is 1 In 4 Fish Stolen In Africa?

My friend Gilles recommended me this blog post, and it raises many valid questions and point, so I think is worth sharing.

The original is by André Standing (here), and has an awesome cover picture.

IUU fishing has become one of the main concerns for a number of organisations working on fisheries, including in developing countries. At the end of last year, the Norwegian government co-hosted the first expert meeting on fisheries crime, held in Cape Town. The report of this “fisheries crime symposium” described IUU fishing in Africa costs 1 billion a year, meaning “1 in 4 fish is stolen”. And it is highly organised groups that cause the most harmful forms of fisheries crime, often with links to other organised crime. Fisheries crime was described as:

Highly organised, well-financed transnational criminal activities…linked to a wider black-economy, a parallel economic system…frequently linked to complex webs of organised crime. Countries are being deprived of taxes, citizens of jobs, food and income, and fisheries and environments are being destroyed. In addition, certain networks within the fisheries sector associate with other crime such as drugs, trafficking, wildlife smuggling and fraud.
There are now demands for drastically strengthening law enforcement, for which more resources and development aid is needed. The required effort to defeat the criminals is increasingly depicted as a war, just as we have heard the need for launching a war against drugs, people smuggling or terrorism. Yet is the information being used to understand the extent, nature and impact of IUU fishing reliable and pertinent?

A recent study in the Pacific, published by MRAG, casts some doubt. It was not quite so alarming about the impact of IUU fishing, and it found no evidence of a conspiracy of criminal groups. The study estimated that IUU fishing for tuna, shark and billfish amounted to about $600 million a year. Almost all illegal fishing was caused by licensed vessels, and seemed quite widespread in the sector. And while the figure of $600 million seems a lot, the author’s of the report explain the economic implications of IUU for Pacific Island States are ambiguous.

Based on the most recent estimates of profitability in the WCPO purse seine and longline sectors, we estimate the rent associated with IUU is around $152.67m. Nevertheless, because of the nature of access arrangements in Pacific tuna fisheries, it is possible that much of the rent associated with IUU activity is captured anyway, and this estimate either overstates or is at least at the upper end of, actual impacts on the real economy.

Indeed, the report reveals that significant forms of IUU fishing, such as misreporting data on catches, cause no loss of income to the coastal state, and other forms of crime can contribute positively to government wealth. Certainly it would be a mistake to imagine eliminating IUU would simply result in increasing the potential wealth from fisheries by $600 million. But this error in thinking is evident in the way statistics are used to describe IUU in Africa. The implications for fisheries policy debates are important.

Hopefully, a new study being undertaken now by the African Union, with funding by the EU, can further our understanding of the problem. According to the terms of reference for the consultants, the study will produce a comprehensive document on the economic, social and environmental impacts of IUU on the continent. This is tremendously important as reliable information about the impacts of IUU are needed to support policy making and guide the allocation of scarce funds. However, the prospects of this new study to deepen our knowledge look slim. The consultants have chosen to gather information by using a basic questionnaire (with multiple answers) sent out to a random group of people working on fisheries. How they expect this data will be useful, other than confirming perceptions about crime, is difficult to know. One hopes the questionnaire is not given too much focus in their study, and the authors can provide us with a more reliable insight using other methods.

Why Africa does not lose 1 billion from IUU fishing

The most influential study on IUU fishing in Africa was commissioned by the UK government and also authored by MRAG. It was published in 2005 and claimed IUU was valued at $0.9 billion dollars (although nearly always rounded up to 1 billion when referenced by others). The method to arrive at this figure relied on estimates of illegal fishing in 8 countries (including one that was not even in Africa - Papua New Guinea). The data was provided by just one anonymous source in each country. There was no explanation of how these people would have such a reliable insight into rates of crime among vessels at sea, many of which are not visible from shore and are subject to minimal state monitoring.

This estimate of the scale of IUU fishing from the 8 countries was then extrapolated for all African coastal countries based on the finding that rates of illegal fishing in the 8 countries closely correlated with their scores on international good governance indexes. So a formula was created, using the World Bank’s governance scores, to predict the amount of IUU fishing in countries where MRAG didn’t commission case study work.

The strength of their data for the 8 country case studies was far too weak to form a reliable prediction on IUU in other countries. But also the theory for this relationship between a country’s score on good governance was not established in any detail. There may well be a relationship, but it will be complex, and an alternative hypothesis is that very weak states probably license too many vessels and they might provide lax license arrangements. States with weak governance may have less illegal fishing but more harmful legal fishing.

While we can ponder the relationships between governance and illegal fishing, a more serious problem is that the single scores produced by these governance indexes are not only criticised for being unreliable and meaningless, but much of the data used for these governance indexes derive from rank ordering countries. This makes the scores unsuitable to predict economic data, for the simple reason that a country that scores 2 on a governance index does not have governance that is twice as good as a country that scores 1. An anomaly of using this method was that 4 countries in Africa returned results that indicated they had no illegal fishing, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Mauritius and Cape Verde.

The problem with the 2005 study was not just with its method of estimating the scale of IUU fishing. The study was extremely confusing when it came to understanding the costs. The authors regularly referred to the value of illegal fishing as a loss to African states, and ever since people have referred to the report as providing evidence that African states lose $1 billion a year from these crimes. As the authors explained:

The most obvious impact [of IUU] is direct loss of the value of the catches that could be taken by the coastal state if the IUU fishing was not taking place. Aside from the loss to GNP, actual revenue can accrue to the coastal state in the form of landings fees, licence fees, taxes and other levies which are payable by legal fishing operators. We have estimated…that at a minimum $0.9bn of IUU catch is taken from EEZs of various countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region, the majority of which are developing countries.

But the recent study from the Pacific describes well why measuring the value of fish obtained through illegal means and measuring the resulting economic costs for coastal states are two quite different things. In the case of the Pacific, the most valuable forms of crime were misreporting catches and fishing with prohibited methods (there was very little unlicensed fishing). These crimes can result in extra catches for the vessels, but because vessels do not pay per fish caught, reducing these offences would not increase government income.

So, reducing many forms of IUU fishing would not result in producing economic gains for the state (commensurate with the value of IUU fishing). For the most part it would mean lower profits for fishing companies, which in turn may lower the available rents for governments, assuming that fees charged by governments are influenced by what companies can afford to pay. In the short term, at least, reducing certain types of IUU fishing could have negative economic consequences for coastal states, as well as being a very costly endeavour.

To better understand the economic impacts of illegal fishing we must also appreciate that profits derived from illegal fishing are not simply being removed from the legal economy. Of course, some fish caught illegally may be exported to non-African consumer markets, thereby denying national companies and markets fish supplies, to the benefit of foreign companies and countries. But such tendencies have long been concern about the way the legal sector works, which makes distinguishing the relative costs of crime quite tricky. There are also numerous examples where illegally caught fish are processed and consumed in African markets. Illegal fishing in Africa does not simply involve stealing fish from the continent; it can also contribute to the productive sector, providing income, jobs and fish to eat. But this is rarely factored into the analysis of the costs of IUU fishing.

In South Africa, WWF published a study in 2014 on the value of illegal poaching of lobsters and abalone, which claimed the country was losing 4 million Rand a year. There are legitimate concerns about the ecological impact of this, but as the poachers are mostly South Africans from poor coastal communities, the economic impact of poaching is to add 4 million Rand to the economy every year, as well as provide income for many poor people. Illegal fishing, like many other economic crimes (such as the drugs trade), should be accounted for as part of a country’s GDP (or GNP), not discounted from it. Of course, some profits from illegal fishing may not end up being taxed (although some will be), and the lion’s share of the profits may be realised in foreign jurisdictions, or off-shore. But these problems also happen to profits derived from the legal sector as well.

Is 1 in 4 fish stolen?

Another influential finding from the 2005 study is that IUU fishing accounts for a surprising amount of the total fish caught in Africa. To estimate the scale of this, the study compared the figure of $0.9 billion to official catches reported to the FAO. This method revealed the value of IUU fishing equated to about 19% of the value of legal fish products. This may be why some fisheries experts claim 1 in 4 fish is stolen in Africa?

However, the 2005 study was valuing fish caught illegally among many industrial fishing fleets operating in Africa who don’t land their catches locally, so their catch data is reported as being from their flag state. FAO country data doesn’t reflect what is being caught in African waters. Indeed, for many African countries, given that industrial fisheries are not able or willing to land locally, data submitted to the FAO by coastal states comprises mostly estimates about the small-scale sector and inland fisheries, which are two sectors the MRAG study did not include in their research. Using official country data to contrast with their data on IUU has grossly distorted the picture about the scale of illegal fishing on the continent. We do not know if the outcome is to exaggerate or to underestimate. But certainly there is no robust data that shows 1 in 4 fish is stolen from Africa.

And the statement that 1 in 4 fish is stolen perpetuates a simplistic distinction between the impacts of legal and illegal fishing. The idea that a quarter of fish are stolen suggests all is OK with the other three quarters. We can return to the study of IUU fishing in the Pacific to see why this is problematic. Here the largest single source of illegal fishing by value was purse seine boats fishing with Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) during the 4 months of the year when these are banned. However the Deputy Director of the Forum Fisheries Agency, Wez Norris, explained why these bans can be ineffective.

During those months you have very little bigeye being caught but one of the responses of the industry has been to fish heavily on FADs in the other eight months of the year so that’s reduced the effectiveness of the measure.

So, following the logic of much writing on IUU we can see that the fish caught with FADs during the 8 months would be seen as contributing to the legitimate wealth of the Pacific Islands - forming part of the economic value of the ocean - but the fish caught with FADs during the 4 months would be considered stolen; a loss to the economy. It is muddled thinking, particularly if the level of fishing and by-catch during the 8 months is far more than is desirable for sustainable fishing.   

How can the African Union’s study improve our thinking?

Although empirical claims on the economic costs of IUU fishing are unreliable, and in some ways we can see that they may exaggerate economic costs to African states, there are of course legitimate concerns about criminality in the sector. Perhaps most important of all is the potential for illegal fishing to lead to overfishing and undermine food security. We need to understand the extent of all these threats very carefully, bearing in mind that overfishing and unfair trade have been concerns about the nature of legal fishing in Africa for decades.   

But clearly research on IUU that relies heavily on ‘perceptions’ is not sufficient. That the AU is using a questionnaire to update information on IUU is therefore worrying. The Pacific Island study represented a much more rigorous attempt to collate information, but even there the authors relied on best estimates from the fishing authorities to fill in the gaps. There were no investigations or in-depth case study work, including interviews with those best placed to know about crime – the fishers themselves (as well as their lawyers, agents and insurance companies).

This type of research, based on spending time speaking with people close to and involved in crime has been crucial to some of the most insightful studies on corporate or organised crime, and it regularly reveals how perceptions held by law enforcement agencies or the public about crime are often unreliable. No source of information is sufficient in isolation, yet we seem to rely almost exclusively on data about IUU fishing produced by those with a vested interest in fighting it: NGOs campaigning against IUU fishing, consultancy firms (such as MRAG) who provide services to governments to improve monitoring and compliance, and law enforcement agencies.

Getting a more balanced insight into the nature and impact of illegal fishing is very important. Flawed data will distort policy making – potentially convincing governments and donor agencies to put a great deal of time and resources into something that may not be the most important to prioritise (why is there not more interest in addressing corruption, for example?). For the time being, because of the flawed data, we have no idea on the real costs of fisheries crime in Africa. Perhaps it is far more widespread than existing studies suggest (including in the small-scale sector) meaning a law enforcement approach is hardly likely to work. But equally it may not be, and the obsession with IUU fishing may be shifting blame, ultimately dumbing down our understanding about overfishing and unfair fisheries arrangements. And with escalating calls for harsher treatment for the criminals, it seems important to think about the implications for workers and small-scale fishers.

Every other international war on crime tends to be an abject failure that causes a great deal of suffering for those who were never intended to be the target. A tough law enforcement approach may not be the best solution, particularly in countries that score poorly on the World Bank's governance indexes. But can the new study by the African Union consider this, or will it end up simply repeating the call for strengthening policing and punishments based on perceptions by fisheries crime experts? 

Wiki-fishing in Alaska

Came across this interesting article on a project by Alaskan small scale longliners. I would loved to have done something like that when I was fishing snapper here in NZ as to increase the selectivity. Wonder if we could apply this in the Pacific. Perhaps with long tail snapper?

Back in the days when I fished snapper

The original is from the Economist.

Stephen Road, a commercial longline fisherman in Alaska’s verdant south-east panhandle, fishes by two rules. One is: stay married. Mr Rhoads has seen countless marriages of fellow fishermen sink under the weight of so many days at sea. The second rule is: use fewer hooks. (Love both rules!)

Mr Rhoads works the Pacific halibut fishery, which opened for business on March 19th, using baited hooks strung off lines as long as three miles. Using as few hooks as possible and carefully targeting the desired species, Mr Rhoads explains, helps keep fish stocks healthy and smaller businesses afloat. To do so, he relies on a crowdsourced compendium of fishermen’s tales.

A war between small family fishing operations and Seattle-based companies pushed Alaska to statehood in 1959. The state’s $6 billion commercial fishing industry still suffers from a David-and-Goliath complex. Over the years, Alaskan halibut fishermen have faced big reductions in their harvest limits while factory trawlers dump millions of pounds of dead halibut overboard as by-catch. Quotas are becoming consolidated into fewer hands, and fishing permits are leaving Alaska’s small coastal communities and heading out of state. The average age of a fisherman in Alaska is 50, an increase of a decade since 1980.

Mr Rhoads is a member of a network started by the Alaska Longline Fishermen’s Association (ALFA), which aims to do something about this and to reduce by-catch of sensitive species such as rockfish at the same time. Network fishermen, who numbered only 20 at the project’s start, agreed to share data on where and what they were catching in order to create maps that highlighted areas of high by-catch. Within two years they had reduced accidental rockfish harvest by as much as 20%.

Once a young and skinny longliner crew (1996)

The rockfish mapping project expanded to create detailed maps of the sea floor, pooling data gathered by transducers fixed to the bottoms of boats. By combining thousands of data points as vessels traverse the fishing grounds, these “wikimaps”—created and updated through crowdsourcing—show gravel beds where bottom-dwelling halibut are likely to linger, craggy terrain where rockfish tend to lurk, and outcrops that could snag gear.

Public charts are imprecise, and equipment with the capability to sense this level of detail could cost a fisherman more than $70,000. Skippers join ALFA for as little as $250, invest a couple of thousand dollars in computers and software and enter into an agreement to turn over fishing data and not to share the information outside the network, which now includes 85 fishermen.

Skippers say the project makes them more efficient, better able to find the sort of fish they want and avoid squandering time on lost or tangled gear. It also means fewer hooks in the water and fewer hours at sea to catch the same amount of fish. A healthy fleet benefits welders and boatwrights in turn. “If the entire fleet comes up from Seattle,” says Mr Rhoads, “we become just a trailer park and a bar.”

China in IUU Fishing

Pretty much on a weekly basis we hear something on the news on Chinese-flagged fishing vessels involved in IUU activities worldwide or working in some disputed waters in the South China Sea. So what is the deal? Why are they not punish in some way or another?

The Chinese Fishing boat sunk in Argentina

I have been going on China’s massive Distant Water Fleet and Subsidies for a while now (see here, here, here, here, here or read this from the BBC or just do Google search). It has signed (but not ratified): the 1995 Compliance Agreement (flag states to license high seas fishing vessels). And has not signed: the 2009 Port State Measures Agreement (port states to inspect fishing vessels).

We talked with friend Pramod Ganapathiraju about this, and he is clear:

Chinese fishing vessels are engaged in both unregulated and illegal fishing activities for squids in the South Atlantic off Uruguay and Argentina, sharks and tuna in Latin America, the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and in many fisheries in West Africa. Chinese vessels also have a high level of illegal fishing activity off South Korea, and many islands of the South China Sea.

To give you a small sample: For the past five years, 5 Chinese squid jiggers were detained off Argentina while one Chinese squid jigger escaped into Uruguay after illegal fishing during the hot pursuit by Argentina coast guard and was never arrested. (at least one was sunk a few weeks ago)

Off South Korea in 2015, more than 43 Chinese vessels were arrested while the actual number that was detected illegally fishing and never detained is ten times higher than the arrested ones. China has a different policy with each country to get their vessels released sometimes even without fine for example off West Africa. Some countries in the South China Sea don't even arrest them even when they see them illegally fishing within the EEZ, as they don't want a trade war with China. China is often seen as a bully by navies and coast guards in this region.

We can also track IUU activities using AIS data. But, recently I came to know across information with the Chinese asking their vessels to switch off AIS transponders as several NGOs have blown their cover by publicizing detection of illegal fishing through media for their interests. The same thing happened with Fu Yuna Yu fleet that I was tracking this year. This year a source from Burma forwarded information showing illegal Chinese and Taiwanese longliners fishing in the Bay of Bengal, but not even one of them was visible on the AIS. Tracking illegal vessels is a surveillance activity and should not be publicized until the vessel is arrested or seized through courts as every time a cover for one illegal vessel is exposed, ten to twenty others become invisible.

Registration of fishing vessels in China is handled by regional offices responsible for fisheries management such as the Port Supervisory Authority under the Bureau of Fisheries. The system is highly decentralised as the harbour master of the vessel’s home port is responsible for the registration of the fishing vessel. Existing data on vessel registration and authorisation to fish a is not readily available, and it appears to be fragmented and not entirely consistent. Allegedly 50% of the over 2000 Chinese fishing vessels operating in other countries are over 24m.

I never have seen a Chinese fisheries inspector in the field, and the few bureaucrats I meet at international meetings, never give any straight answers to any questions in regards the IUU activities of their fleet.

All Chinese EU IUU catch certificates I've seen look very dodgy... Chinese operators in the Pacific are using their “own" version of the EU CCS and allege that is for their own legislation (that they never provide) saying that it has different requirements (i.e. transhipment – Section 7 - includes landing and sorting into containers), but when you see the form they send it refers to the EU legislation… is soo dodgy… (and they out incredible pressure on the lower ranks of officers in the Pacific). Many countries went into yellow for less than this. See below small snippets of one:

Seems the Chinese IUU Catch Certificate still refers to the EU legislation :-)

So the IUU fishing involvement seems clear to everyone. Furthermore, there is also the 13% rebate that the government gives to the exporters so one would think that would also be against WTO rules as the government subsidies but again, no one seems to be tackling them on that either.

Hence, the question on everyone’s mind is why does the EU dot out a yellow card on them? I guess the question should be if the EU can pick up a fight with a bigger bully?

Morally I’m happy to admit that the EU has changed its ways big time, particularly the Spanish fleet in regards IUU, and as I always say the amount of support they give smaller countries regarding development assistance is commendable, particularly becomes with not (or minimal) strings attached. Something that China does not do at all.

The reality is that the EU unilateral model of trade embargoes (like to one it has now with Sri Lanka) has never been legally contested the WTO level… and China has big pockets and massive trade leverage, try to tackle them there requires guts and good lawyers.

In a recent and interesting article M.A. Young, International trade law compatibility of market-related measures to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, Mar. Policy(2016),  she writes:

Bearing in mind that approaches to address IUU fishing must be developed in accordance with international law, and particularly the trade law agreements such as the WTO and RTAs, this article concludes with the following recommendations:

First, the unilateral trade measures identified in this article, such as the EU catch documentation and import prohibition scheme, appear to have been designed to ensure that they are fair, transparent, and non-discriminatory. The aim to combat IUU fishing conforms to legitimate objectives expressly recognized in trade law, such as national security requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, and the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. The implementation of these measures will need to continue in this mode, and it is important to note that the import prohibitions are preceded by the use of less trade-restrictive measures so that more restrictive measures are only used in case of need. As such the measures can provide solid models of WTO-compatible regulation.

Secondly, while the prohibition of imports and other trade measures are currently most often developed on a unilateral basis, the effectiveness of these approaches would be strengthened by a more collective or regional approach, so that the products of IUU fishing are not merely traded in other markets. While some efforts
Have already been made by RFMOs, such as CCAMLR, this could be extended. This would involve cooperation by states, the FAO and/ or RFMOs, and possibly even private bodies, in the following: more widespread compilation and sharing of lists of IUU vessels; the harmonisation of catch documentation schemes and traceability requirements; and the prohibition of fish products being imported, landed, or transshipped by states who have failed to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance by their vessels. The current work of the FAO in elaborating voluntary guidelines on catch documentation schemes is of particular relevance (I worked on it…. But is not going well… topic for another post)

Thirdly, current negotiations on regional trade agreements (RTAs) are important avenues for trade-related IUU measures to be developed through consultation. There is scope, for example, for the inclusion of IUU obligations in the agreements or associated side-agreements and environmental chapters. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),a ‘mega- regional' trade agreement recently concluded between 12 countries Including major fish consuming or producing ones and now awaiting ratification, includes significant provisions on marine capture fisheries. These provisions call upon states to combat IUU fishing practices and help deter trade in products from species harvested from those practices. While such provisions are not yet in force, and remain to be assessed alongside other TPP rules (such as investor protection and investor state dispute settlement) before the TPP's overall environmental credentials are evaluated, they provide a strong signal of the trade law compatibility of market-related measures to combat IUU fishing.

Fourthly, the cooperation on the use of trade-related measures should be open and transparent whether the relevant trade measures are principally state based – such as a joint import ban or whether they involve private initiatives – such as purchase control documentation with in a supply chain. Industry groups and other private actors should maintain good practices in designing and implementing their initiatives, including in consulting with affected stakeholders and proceeding with transparency, openness and impartiality. As far as possible, there should be mutual supportiveness of the trade, environment, and law of these a regimes (including between the FAO, CITES, WTO and other bodies) as well as policy coordination within states.

So potentially yes… But then, would they test it?  

Nevertheless, they could start with a “Yellow Card” and see… I think the fear there, is that the Chinese may don't give a toss and just continue as usual.

So the EU would be in a situation where they either: lose face and credibility against all the other countries … or lock themselves in a potentially very costly battle with a giant… tough decision.

The VDS vs. QMS saga

Has been a lot of talk on the media about NZ pushing a QMS (Quota Management System) type system in the management side of the Purse Seine Fisheries in the Pacific, as a replacement of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme. So various people asked me my opinion

Already in September 2015 I was asked about this, as I worked in compliance with the NZ QMS (I worked for Sanford and Simunovich before getting into overseas work) and I also know about the PNA VDS from the compliance side.

My opinions still the same: I'm an operational guy. I like to think about new systems but always based on the operational side. For me (my opinion only) the QMS (as operating in NZ) is impossible in the Purse Seine Fisheries for various reasons... but the biggest one is how and where would be the "Licensed Fish Receivers" established and how would they be controlled? (Imagine Thailand, Vietnam, Ecuador and increasingly China as processing states playing ball with the Pacific, yeah right).

Purse Seine Fishery is highly mobile, situations where the flag state, the coastal state, the port state and the processing state are all different, are more the norm than an exemption. So while in principle, something like the QMS could be possible, from the reality perspective as the industry is now, no way. If all the tuna captured in the Pacific was to be landed/transhipped in the Pacific Islands and all of the countries were to be operating under one standardised system… then maybe. But we are a loooong way from that.

Another area where people could see potential is the biological principles of the determinations of the biomass for sustainable harvest under an Ecosystem Based Management approach, but this is what is what SPC does and to a very good level! In fact, many of the fisheries scientists that are and were in charge of stock assessment are New Zealanders that worked for NIWA or MPI.

That biological assessment in the NZ QMS case, becomes the basis for the determination of the status of fish stocks, so they are maintained at or above a level that can produce the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).  MSY reflects the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while maintaining a stock's productive capacity, having regard to the population dynamics of the stock and any environmental factors that influence the stock.  Controls are set so that the biomass level can support the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY).  This provides the conditions to maximise the yield of the fishery without compromising sustainability.  Once the BMSY is identified, the TAC of a stock at that time can be determined.

Let's set aside that I already have a BIG problem with MSY… A quantity that has been shown by biologists not to exist, and by economists to be misleading if it did exist ( Dr. John Allan Gulland)

MSY was designed as a political construct more than a fisheries management tool. Is a theoretical construction known as maximum sustained yield (MSY) exists in three realms: as science, as policy, and as a legal concept. Despite substantial criticism by scientists and economists, MSY still remains at the heart of fisheries science and fisheries management (read Carmel Finley, 2009. The Social Construction of Fishing, 1949) and Maximum Sustainable Yield: The Worst Idea in Fisheries Management by Dr. Sidney Holt

Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) would be a much better idea! But I'm getting off point here!

Anyhow… once that TAC (or whatever name you want to put on it) is determined it becomes the basis of the allocation of quota. This is not too dissimilar in principle as to become the basis of the total amount of vessels days (under the assumption of how much a vessel of x size can catch in day), this vessels days are then allocated to the countries (as if it was a quota).

That allocation process is where I believe synergisms are possible.  Hence from my perspective the potential synergies are at the biological and allocation basis, but not at the operational ones.

In fact, the VDS can work under a precautionary principle and keep “buffer days” in the bag. Let me explain, trough iFIMS the fishing days under the VDS scheme are administered, and we are working hard on the integration of all vessel data for CDS purposes; this includes the e-forms (e-logsheet) that the vessel provides electronically in "near real time."  Hence, the accumulative estimated catch volumes can be compared to the so-called ‘reference points’, to see how the fishery is performing and if things are right those buffer days could be sold or kept if the catches are to close to the reference targets.

Anyway… my take and ranting on this!

People in fisheries tend to be larger than life and with a lot of mana and pride, so they tend to react accordingly when they feel someone else is pushing into their house. I see here where the tradition of an "offering" and a soft approach to exchanging ways is the way to go. I never have seen this issue as an "either/or" but as a "let's learn from each other" opportunity.

No fisheries management tool is perfect… they are all perfectible.

Taiwan in Fisheries

Taiwan is a substantial player in world fisheries, and really big in the Pacific. Their complex relationship with China has an impact on the way they conduct their fisheries and their responsibilities as flag state.

In no way I’m and expert on this topic (nor in any really!) but I’m interested in their fishing sector, since I have to deal with their vessels very often, as many of the countries that actually have diplomatic ties with them are in the Pacific and license them to fish. And as I like reading, this is what I found.

Despite being home to one of the largest fishing industries in the world, Taiwan cannot participate fully in international fisheries management and conservation efforts due to its ambiguous political status and restricted “international space:, but has used its fisheries diplomacy as political leverage to expand its participation in bilateral, regional, and international fisheries-related agreements.

Taiwan's official diplomatic relations are few and its participation in international organizations limited as a result of the “One China” principle. Concerned about the perception of elevating Taiwan’s international status, China is reluctant to cede “international space” to Taiwan and objects to Taiwan’s expanded participation in international organizations. China displaced Taiwan at the UN in 1971 and its growing international clout since then has further constrained Taiwan’s ability to participate in the UN and its specialized agencies, including the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Labor Organization—all agencies that address fisheries-related issues.

Taiwan began developing its fishing industry in the 1950s, and by the 1960s turned to distant water fishing to compensate for overfished coastal waters. This shift led Taiwan to be a global player in high seas fisheries, particularly tuna and squid. According to 2013 statistics from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which I doubt are really accurate), Taiwan fishing vessels bring in 1.2 million metric tons of catch annually worth U$D 3.5 billion; around 50% percent of this value comes from high seas fishing mostly in the Pacific, but also the Indian, and Atlantic oceans.

Image from this source

The UNFSA (United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement) crystallized the concept of “fishing entities” for the first time in a binding UN instrument. The text of the agreement never explicitly mentions Taiwan; however, the term “fishing entities” is generally understood to include Taiwan. Although the international community does not treat Taiwan as a sovereign state for purposes of membership in international governmental organizations that require statehood for membership, Taiwan’s status as a “fishing entity” in the UN enables it to circumvent challenges related to its political status while participating in RFMOs.

Taiwan’s first full RFMO membership in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) in 2002 marked a turning point for Taiwan in terms of its historically limited participation in RFMOs. Despite Taiwan’s designation as “Chinese Taipei,” the WCPFC Convention afforded Taiwan rights and duties similar to those of states with Contracting Party status.

As a non-Contracting Party Member, Taiwan has a slightly abbreviated range of rights: it is ineligible to serve in the chairmanship or vice chairmanship, to determine the Commission headquarters, or to appoint the executive director. Otherwise, it participates fully in the WCPFC’s chief business of managing and sustaining highly migratory fish stocks in the Pacific Ocean. Because the WCPFC was the first effort to implement the UNFSA at a regional level, Taiwan’s membership set the tone and served as a model for its subsequent inclusion in RFMOs.

In the Pacific, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Palau—all of whom officially recognize Taiwan and are WCPFC members, hence supported Taiwan’s participation in the organization.

While in principle the “regulatory gaps” arising from or exacerbated by its limited international space challenge Taiwan’s fisheries and fishing industry in two key areas: in (1) illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and (2) labor conditions aboard long-haul fishing vessels. I think that Taiwan also takes advantage of them too, they pushing the envelope while playing the victim game.

On the labor side, other than the skipper and the chief engineer, I think I never have seen a Taiwanese crew member… all the crew are Indonesians, Cambodians, Philippines, Myanmarians and Vietnamese. And while the conditions on board are really harsh (therefore we have problems finding observers keen to be placed there) obviously the conditions at the home for many of the crew must be worst, because rarely I have seen a crew member jumping boat in Pacific ports… but a personal observation and is not always the case, as reported by media

Issues on/with Taiwanese vessels

On the IUU side, they never been transparent, most of the logsheets I have seen were very dodgy at best, very active with underreporting sharks catches and concealing fins, they are always been involved in allegation of corruption, and so on.

Furthermore, Taiwan could do more at the domestic level to address its industry’s use of “flags of convenience” to evade scrutiny in fishing activities (most of the Vanuatu flagged longliners are Taiwanese), and the list is long

The Taiwanese Industry receive an estimated 330 million USD in subsidies every year (R. Sumalia pers.com) which surely helps to buy sufficient VDS days to their Purse Seiner Fleet (see here for details on their Purse Seiners) and now to the Long Line (see here for details on their LL).

They have also played a political game with Tuvalu and Marshalls by not allowing them to get vessels flagged on their flag as a pressure to get more and cheaper vessels days under the VDS. However, this seems to have been arranged, in November last year Tuvalu has been given the green light to export its newly built purse seine vessel Tautaloa from Taiwan to Tuvalu (bringing its fleet strength to two vessels)

Tautaloa was built in March 2012 by Taiwan’s shipbuilding company Ching Fu but, due to its national laws on the construction of new purse seine boats, stating that the equivalent tonnage of old purse seine boats needed to be scrapped, work on the boat and subsequent delivery to Tuvalu was stalled. Tuvalu raised the issue in PNA, FFA, and WCPFC meetings, as well as negotiations with Taiwan, and had even called for the reduction of fishing days to the distant water fishing nation as a result of its stalling of the new vessel.

Nevertheless, Taiwan’s fishing industry has been going around the limitation on vessels in other countries where they have diplomatic leverage, by flagging them there (most recently the Solomons)

Also, I find interesting that in some of the Micronesian countries were the Taiwanese fleet has charters, the company in charge is Luen Tai, a Hong Kong based company with strong backing from mainland China capitals. So, obviously, politics is not a hindrance for business…

I wasn’t impressed with yellow cards by the EU to the smaller Pacific countries, but on insight they did catalyze a lot of changes that were in the pipeline.

Nevertheless, I was “happy” when they put Taiwan on yellow (Taiwanese fishing companies aren’t happy and criticize their govt as weak and the EU as racist).

Was good that yellowed also Tailand because most of the Taiwanese caught tuna went to Thailand with Taiwanese Catch Certificates, and Taiwan Fisheries Agency must had truly not idea what the vessels were doing (and Thailand did not ask either)... but they want to work in unison now.

Again, the stick works, to my surprise, since then Taiwanese longliners operating in the Pacific are required to report their position daily to Taiwan Fisheries Agency, and yesterday I saw for fist time 2 Taiwanese fisheries officers (acting as Observers) in a Pacific country! They were controlling weights of the part the catch unloaded to be exported. However, they had no idea that their fleet was operating in the port I was until they came (vessels have been unloading here for the last 5 years!)

So obviously they tighten up their game (Finally!) Which is good, but perhaps a bit late since their massive fleet is, directly and indirectly, encysted in the Pacific and bad habits change slowly.

But what irks me massively, is that Taiwan and China are the biggest DWFN in the region, and support their industry with some obscene amount of subsidies. Said so, in 15 years working with the institutional side of Fisheries in the Pacific, I have yet to see a fisheries capacity building or an institutional strengthening project financed by any of them. I find that quite despicable.

UN Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) is all go!

With Gambia's ratification yesterday, the required 25 nations have now signed. Hence, the treaty will enter into force in 30 days from yesterday. Only a few months ago I wrote about the fast pace ratification was taking.

A ray of light in the dark skies

This is big news. Fish does not become illegal trough processing but is rather caught illegally and then landed illegally. Stronger port controls will leave IUU fishers with fewer places to land and sell their catch. This, in consequence, will greatly reduce illegal fishing around the world.

Now for the difficult challenge of implementation on a global scale, most of the ratifiers are minnows, with a few honorable exemptions.

Only when countries with big import markets such as Japan, Taiwan, and China also become a party, then meaningful change and improved traceability would be achieved. (Taiwan can't reality... because is not a UN member)

In any case is a big step... in a very long road.

My friend and colleague Pramod Ganapathiraju explains here where we are at with the PSMA

Traceability and IUU fishing

Last week I was in Kochi (India) as FAO in cooperation with INFOFISH and the Government of India, with financial support from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), convened a capacity-building workshop on “National and regional good practices in seafood traceability in Asia to combat IUU fishing”.

Cool illustration on the complexities of traceability in seafood, by fishwise.org

Besides presenting a research study, I was asked last year to do (more below). It was a good opportunity to catch up with friends/colleagues I have collaborated a lot over the years: Gilles Hosch, Vincent Andre and Heiner Lehr

Besides being a resource "expert" contracted by FAO to facilitate the workshop, I was asked to present a study they commissioned last year (I wrote about it here), and I have no shame to admit it was big challenge.

This was a comparative study of 10 country cases under the framework of the FAO lead programme called “Fisheries Management and Marine Conservation within a Changing Ecosystem Context.” I tackled this study with the help of other two great people; Melania Borit, Ph. Postdoctoral fellow,  University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of Norway and Kim Thompson, Independent Consultant, Member of the New Zealand Seafood Standards Council

The main objectives of the study were “to review the 10 national traceability case studies, taking into account their relevance for combatting IUU fishing” and “to provide recommendations on ways to improve their traceability practices, especially to combat IUU fishing”.

Furthermore, it was requested that we the food safety component associated to traceability. Hence, and due to the limitations of the analysis, we focused only on sanitary eligibility involving the traceability system associated to the unique identification in terms of control of sanitary and operational conditions that the production chain of seafood in a country is required to comply with, and is therefore controlled and verified by a suitable Competent Authority (CA).

Based on the provided secondary sources (i.e. the 10 reports), we assessed the following aspects:

1. if the state has a functional traceability system;
2. if this system is suitable for fish products traceability;
3. if this traceability system is designed as to optimize combatting IUU fishing, under two components:
   1. if the data captured by the system are relevant for identification of IUU fishing.
   2. if the traceability system covers all the points in the distribution chain relevant for IUU fishing.
4. if this traceability system is designed as to optimize official sanitary eligibility of all the value chain from harvest onwards.

For Point 1, recommendations found in scientific literature for assessment of effective traceability systems were followed.

For Point 2, the recommendations of the ISO standard 12875:2011 Traceability of finfish products - Specification on the information to be recorded in captured finfish distribution chains were followed. As the name indicates, this one refers only to finfish, so shellfish are not included, but it is assumed that the results can be extrapolated to shellfish as well.

For Point 3, there is no standard addressing this issue yet and only one scholarly article could be found on the topic (Borit & Olsen, 2012). Thus, the argument in this article for both point’s 3.1 and 3.2. were followed by making a simplified version of the referenced decision matrix.

Based on this analysis, the authors evaluated the country reports traceability systems regarding there:

1. Inclusivity - the extent to which the system is designed to provide guarantees for all legally-caught and sanitary controlled fish in the value chain of the species/fishery in question;
2. Impermeability - the extent to which the system is designed to exclude illegal catches, and potential non-controlled processing practices; and
3. Verifiability- the extent to which the system is audited by an independent body or person (i.e. by those other than the parties directly responsible for following the requirements).

Before the country analysis, we considered important to standardize the understanding of traceability and other concepts relevant to the present study based on the relevant bibliography known to them, as this would be the only way to evaluate all the country studies, under the same methodology.

After the analysis of the individual reports, it was found that none of the sources provided enough information to assess whether the principles of effective traceability were met by the traceability systems of the 10 respective countries.

Common issues identified throughout some of the reports were in regards the expectations of ToR’s; the relevance for combating IUU Fishing, ensuring Food Safety and Sanitary Eligibility, reducing vulnerability to threats and crisis (especially for small scale sector), and the importance of the role’s held by RFMO’s and other organizations

Considering the results of each country analysis, we discussed the need for standardization of the methodology and tools required to assess traceability systems, the need for coordination in between the different authorities, the roles of external and internal traceability, the incorporation of information management systems and the need for standardization in the domain language of traceability.

The study concludes that the systematic review of the 10 country reports shows that there is a lot of confusion and inconsistencies in the meaning, scope, legal status, implementation capacity and control of traceability systems.

We believe that FAO, as in other aspects of fisheries and seafood production, it is in a unique position to lead this efforts, by expanding on the work initiated by the “Best Practice Guidelines on Traceability” (COFI:FT, 2014)

We support the proposition that FAO should convene an expert consultation, which would benefit from the findings of this present study, and include international experts on traceability from all geographical regions, as well as representatives of the various stakeholders along the seafood supply chain, to provide not only a set of guidelines on how to implement traceability systems, but equally importantly, how to evaluate them.

The report concludes with a set of overarching recommendations to FAO, and to the group of countries whose reports were evaluated.

The conclusion of the study are:

• Most of the countries analysed have not legislated and standardised traceability as a requirement.
• There seems to be little interaction in between the Seafood Safety CA and the Fisheries CA in terms of its assessment.
• There is no standardized to evaluate traceability systems in the practices along the production chain and legislation.
• It seems that efforts towards the implementation of traceability systems in the analysed countries and across countries have not been supported in an interdisciplinary and standardised way.
• Traceability Systems per se are difficult to achieve with little money, little human resources and lack of political will.

The recommendations to the countries can be summarised as:

• Define within legislation and institutionalize traceability as integral part of their fisheries regulatory framework from a catch legality and sanitary controls perspective, including standardized best practices, definitions and internationally recognized standards.
• Re-evaluate the meaning, scope, legal status, implementation capacity and control of their respective traceability systems, focusing on maximizing their Inclusivity, Impermeability and Verifiability.
• Include cross-countries traceability linkages along the strengthening of their national systems.
• Harmonize the actions and policies of the different official bodies (i.e. Health, Customs, Fisheries, etc.) having responsibilities regarding seafood traceability systems.
• Liaise with Regional Organizations (ROs), International Organizations (IOs) and Bilateral Organizations (BOs) to provide institutional strengthening and capacity building in fisheries and traceability related issues under a FAO harmonised action umbrella.
• Draw on the existent academic body of knowledge when improving existent traceability systems

The recommendations to FAO are:

• Further support the work initiated by the “Draft Best Practice Guidelines on Traceability” as requested by the 13th of the Sub-Committee on Fish Trade (COFI:FT)
• Convene an expert consultation to provide not only a set of guidelines on how to implement traceability systems, but equally importantly, how to evaluate them
• Produce a set of guidelines and analytical tools (i.e. matrixes and parameters) to identify exactly what kind of data should authors of traceability evaluation reports look for in the practices along the production chain and legislation
• Provide and /or facilitate capacity building and institutional strengthening opportunities for those responsible for developing, integrating, implementing and/or evaluating traceability systems
• Provide and /or facilitate capacity building and institutional strengthening in terms of the legislative ability to prosecute when based on evidence originating from analysing data recorded by traceability systems.
• Support country and regional organizations efforts aimed to better data collection and analysis by government agencies along the domestic production chain as to strengthen the overall efficiency of their traceability systems.

I have a huge respect to those that make the study and analysis of traceability their area of expertise... after leading this study I'm happy to just stay on "knowledgeable user" rank :-)

I wonder what he thinks of traceability while working on the guts of a -50C Taiwanese longliner...

The Quantification of IUU in the Pacific Region in a table

Further to my post on the publication last week of the FFA IUU quantification report and some of the worst case scenario figures presented by the press, I thought of presenting the results in a table way to make it easier to understand and identify the key problem areas.

You can download the report from here

Electronic monitoring on fishing vessels

I meant to write a post on Electronic Monitoring (EM) for a while, since it is a topic I'm deeply interested in. I believe it holds the answers to some crucial problems we face in fisheries, but is to be tackle quite purposely and holistically, so based on various publications by friends and colleagues over the last few weeks, here it is.

At its basics, Electronic Monitoring (EM) largely consists of a "closed" video or photographic system integrated with a sensor system that can be used to view changes in fishing activity and to trigger or coordinate detailed viewing. Both (the recording and viewing) are "closed systems". The camera and sensor systems do not allow external or manual inputs nor manipulation of data.

My 1st contact with this technology was in Uruguay actually in 2011, where a progressive little company there (UREXPORT) installed an onboard video surveillance system for their vessels. A lot of positive results came from this technology, including better safety at sea, an enhanced vessel production, training need analysis and a better verification of operations, both at sea and at the harbor. One of the key interest was to avoid the skippers selling/offloading fish at sea to smaller vessels. So it didn't have much to do with regulations, but for own interest.

Interestingly my 1st employer in NZ (Sanford) is also working with this technology by own decision, but includes a regulatory component as well, footage of the system is linked below:

A couple of years ago, the a EM system was installed as a trial in a couple of Taiwanese longliners in the Solomons (blogged here and here about it) by my friend Malo. The aim here was to check their feasibility as a system for extending the observer coverage from the present pathetic less than 5% to a more representative number that could help us with the longline fishery, which we know now is the largest source of IUU fishing in our region.

A recent WWF funded study by Richard Banks (Banks R, Muldoon G and Fernandes V) dealt in depth with the cost benefit of the Fisheries Information Management Systems in FFA, so I quote some the introductory parts here.

The EM system consists of a control center, connected to an array of peripheral components including: 3-4 CCTV cameras, Vessel AIS or GPS receiver, winch and engine sensors and a communications transceiver. Videos are recorded at, recording day and night. Some of the systems also include sensors that transmit real-time positions, in much the same way as VMS, but additionally, record when there is a change in fishing behavior when the fishing gear is used. The application focuses on identifying a number of activities. Geo-referenced images allow vessel tracking and streaming sensor data. Sensor data transmission requirements are equivalent to VMS needs.

Schematic of an Electronic Monitoring System

Cameras may identify interactions with bycatch species, and are especially useful when recording bycatches of protected species. The viewed data can also provide a secondary source of data, for example, to validate catch and bycatch logsheets. Cameras can substitute for the observer requirements, largely where it may be impractical to deploy observers, or where there may be a threat to the security of the observers-on-board.

An EM can provide views of critical vessel areas e.g., gear deployment and retrieval, catch aboard, sorting, processing, storage and can potentially be used to replace or compliment the use of human observers (who are expensive, logistically complex and possibly bribable).

The current providers in the Pacific include:

• Archipelago Asia Pacific video (4 cameras) and sensor recording system, currently applied by AFMA for use in the Australian Eastern Tuna and Billfish longline fishery (ETBF) and other Australian Commonwealth fisheries.
• Satlink Sea Tube Lite, Spain, using a 3 video cameras EM system trialed by SPC/FFA in the Solomon Islands and presently under trial in Fiji in a wider program financed by the GEF and managed by FAO
• Trident's camera system deployed on 3 domestic vessels, under a specific arrangement with two Fijian based companies, and with Sanford and mentioned before.  
• One other provider, but not presently deployed in the Pacific tuna fisheries, is Marine Instruments, who provide the Electronic Eye (Spain).

Both the application by AFMA and the trials undertaken with Satlink in the Solomon Islands demonstrate the view of the project proponents that the system may meet the majority of the minimum data standards of the WCPFC Regional Observer Programme (ROP).

The exception is an on screen-measuring tool to calculate fish length. Measuring the length of the fish on deck was problematic, but a couple of ways are available, software tools (under the Satlink system) like in the image below.

Or, some markers are set at standard distances in the deck of the vessels and fish has to pass trough them, given by proxy the length of the fish

Live video footage through satellite transmission is not cost-effective at present, so footage is stored on a hard drive and sent monthly, or after each trip, to the provider for analysis. The Marine Instruments e-eye system does provide for an integrated Iridium modem, which allows for real-time data transfer. This also allows for less HD space needed for photos and longer periods at sea (6 month in position - linked to HD capacity).

The NZ Trident system is 3G based and data can be uploaded when the vessel is within cellphone range.

While there is provision for this facility in most systems, the cost of transmitting still frames, as opposed to live footage is still prohibitively expensive, and quite impractical because of the high volume required for transmission. That said, health and safety issues may warrant such a facility to be available

Due to the size requirements of video footage, large on-board data storage facilities are required. Cameras film at 5 frames per second (24-30fps is movie standard), and use between 60 and 100 MB per hour of footage. A four-camera setup requires 240 to 400 MB per hour , which results in around 6 to 10 GB for each full day of recording. 1280x720 @ 24FPS on board (HD quality) and minimum recording capacity of the system is 13-14 weeks.

big brother is watching you

Due to these dataset sizes, video surveillance footage cannot feasibly be sent in real-time via a satellite feed. Instead, it is usually transferred directly from the hard drive after retrieval. The HDDs are changed very easily on board and can be examined at the control centre. Videos are stored onboard and encrypted. Videos are extracted locally from the encrypted HDD for analysis ashore by the owner or the Observer Program.

The process of hard drive data retrieval and footage review and analysis is currently relatively slow, taking a few days for dispatch, forensic recording, and then data viewing (~ 3-6 hours) depending on the recording requirements. Rapid shooter (every 3-5 seconds) still cameras may be a better solution for EM as this system use less memory space while offering a far better image resolution, and allows for real-time data transmission. Instruments e-eye system does provide for an integrated Iridium modem that allows for real-time data transfer, but in reality, is rarely used.

The EM application focuses on identifying many activities. Cameras may identify interactions with bycatch species, and are especially useful when recording bycatches of protected species. The viewed data can also provide a secondary source of data, for example, to validate catch and bycatch logsheets. (And this is good news for sharks, when the camera is there most sharks go back to the water)

The interest from the regulatory perspective, cameras can substitute for the observer requirements, largely where it may be impractical to deploy observers, or where there may be a threat to the security of the observers on board.

Within the WCPFC context, there have been dedicated meetings held over the last two years which have considered the application of ER and EM in the WCPO and noted the developments made by both Pacific Island countries and other WCPFC members. A formal working group was established in December 2014, and a meeting held in July 2015. The key risk for WCPFC, as is noted in the Terms of Reference for the working group, is the lack of documented policies and standards for these technologies, resulting in poor data coordination, increased data storage and transmission complexities, higher data security risk and increased long-term costs for the WCPFC.

The adoption by WCPFC of ER and EM standards is expected to support and accommodate those CCMs that have commenced implementation of a range of EM and ER technologies in their fisheries and will ensure that the Commission's databases and systems are ready to exchange electronic data in an orderly and efficient manner. The working group is expected to continue work in 2016 in the development and review of draft ER standards, as well as commence work on the proposed EM standards. Presently, a decision by the Commission to develop data standards will be separated from a decision by the Commission to require certain data/information to be submitted electronically. A notable omission, however, is the inability to sex and sometimes measure fish.

The goal of EM is to provide a cost-effective monitoring solution capable of collecting data for scientific, management, and compliance purposes. Surveillance cameras installed on vessels have proven to be effective at recording crew and fishing activities, which can be checked for compliance with fisheries regulations. As such, camera monitoring that is integrated with Electronic fisheries information solutions (EFIS) can provide a useful means of validating vessel catch and gear reporting (hook numbers, use of wire tracers on longliners or FAD deployment and setting on FADs during the prohibition period).

cameras and sensors

The sensor data is especially useful in identifying steaming, setting and hauling. Sensors may also be inserted into hooks, or added to brails to weigh the fish on transshipment.

Cameras can also be an effective tool to monitor Health and Safety issues. A skipper can monitor crew activity from the deck. It may also be possible to detect any possible threat to observers, noting the loss of life of three PNG observers in the past four years.

EM has certain limitations, and cannot replace the roles of other data gathering techniques entirely. For example, current camera technology does not offer an affordable and reliable means of identifying the sex, age and species composition of a catch sample. Some observations are difficult to make from camera footage/images, even with human input and specialist knowledge. Furthermore, camera setups (unless extremely elaborate) will generally have ‘blind-spots,' where crew could discard bycatch, hide interactions with TEP species, or perform other IUU activities which could then go unreported.

As a result, while some see camera monitoring as a viable alternative to onboard human observers, others feel that on-board observers will remain necessary for the foreseeable future, at minimum to perform biological sampling and compliance monitoring where cameras are insufficient. The reality is that EM systems can compliment the role of human observers and enhance overall observer coverage most particularly in the longline fishery.

My friend Malo spend a lot of his time running a study comparing the data obtained from the cameras with the data from traditional observers working in the same boat, and the results are very encouraging, in one of his presentations he quotes that:

Very few differences were noted between the overall species composition of the main tuna species between the two observer types indicating that the E-Monitoring footage is providing sufficient information for identification to the species level. There are several examples described above where it is evident that the species identification and catch coverage from the E-Monitoring video analysis is better than the on-board observer data.

One benefit of E-Monitoring is that it provides a means of reviewing footage of the video repetitively and by a number of people (e.g. including experts in species identification). With more time, further review of the data compiled from these trials could be undertaken to resolve differences between the on-board observer's record and the original E-Monitoring video analysis record to determine where the problem lies.

Without going into deep details,  the table below show how the EM and the human observer compare side by side in one of the trials.

Furthermore, substantial advances are being made at the present regarding software tools (like the one below from the University of Washington)that cannot only identify length but as well species, opening the door for fully automated analysis of video data. In these cases, the human observer analyzing the footage comes only to resolve the events that the software hasn't. This technology has the potential of speeding up the analysis massively, allowing verified to enter the databases in near real-time at some stage.

As said before, there are a lot of positive prospects for e-monitoring: the technology is mature, cost can be recovered, it can be made a condition of licensing and country, region or RFMO level, vessels owners could try to get insurance cost discounts for having it on board, shark retention go rock bottom if the camera is there, the use of wire tracers gets documented, it expands the coverage to the high seas where no observer can/ want to go, and so on.

So the excuses are not there anymore, is a matter of making it happen... and people is working on that.

Towards the Quantification of IUU Fishing in the Pacific Islands Region

FFA presented a big study (almost 2 years in the making) yesterday in Auckland. Is in many aspects a landmark work. I tender for that same study with a team when it was advertised, obviously we weren't successful, but noblesse oblige I have no issues to admit it is a solid piece of work by MRAG.

On one side it does not tell us nothing we didn't knew or suspect already, but it provides two solid tools: a methodology to follow in future studies and a specific quantification for the tuna fisheries in the pacific.

The study set a baseline for the scale, composition and quantified value on IUU fishing and what it is costing this region, against which future success can be measured. It will also help to provide a clearer basis to assess what is working and what needs reworking to ensure that collective regional efforts are targeted toward the most prevalent and costly forms of IUU in the evolving Pacific tuna fishery.

In many ways is a positive report, that provides a clearer sense of what the main IUU risks are, what is working, and what needs additional priority. So I was dismay for the complete negative twist that most news organizations put on it.

All estimations where presented in a lower end, upper end and best estimate, and of course this guys quoted the upper (worst case scenario) end. The risk scenarios that were presented for evaluation where quotedas the prevalent scenarios. Very disappointing coverage… No one ever says that there are no problems, but there are positive steps being made… and now we have well studied grounds to know where the limited resources we have need to go.

The biggest area of IUU activity is the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) longliners operating in the high seas (international waters) this fishery is “administered” by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) but because is in international waters, the vessels fishing there are only under the “control” of the respective flag states (read China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan) which in principle don't give a shit for regulatory compliance.  And due to the structure of the WCPFC, is not much anyone else can do.

My friend and former boss Hugh Walton (uncle Hugh to my kids), FFA’s project manager for the EU-funded DEVFISH II programme, which coordinated the study, is on the spot when he points out that the study will allow discussion on mitigation measures “because we already know what they are but we don’t have the ammunition for them”.

“We’re hoping that this report will give us the ammunition, say management measures in the WCPFC sense, then for us at the regional level in terms on how we focus our MCS activities and then at the national level, in terms of our national level MCS activities, how they are focused.”

He cited as an example one of the MCS tools currently being discussed, e-monitoring and e-reporting in terms of the “U” for unreported. “When you look at the e-monitoring and e-reporting tools in terms of the unreported, the camera doesn’t lie. In the trials we’ve done, we have done enough to know that the camera doesn’t lie”

But still, is very hard to do much unless China and Taiwan play their part, and as we see from the news today, Chinese vessels are not always cooperating.

In any case, I quote here the executive summary of the report, and hopefully over time will be going over it with some more detail. And here is the link to download it.

This is the first attempt made to quantify the volume, species composition and value of IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries specifically.  We used a ‘bottom up’ approach which aimed to quantify the level of IUU fishing associated with 11 main risks across four risk categories:

(i) unlicensed/unauthorised fishing, (ii) misreporting, (iii) non-compliance with other license conditions (e.g. FAD fishing during the purse seine closure period) and (iv) post-harvest risks (e.g. illegal transshipping).  Estimates of IUU volume and value were developed for each of the three main fishing sectors - purse seine (PS), tropical longline (TLL) and southern longline (SLL) – and then aggregated to produce an overall estimate for Pacific Islands region tuna fisheries.  Data was used for the period 2010 to 2015.

The approach took account of all of the available information to generate ‘best estimate’ values of IUU activity for each risk in each sector, as well as minimum and maximum range values.  We then used Monte Carlo simulation to account for uncertainty in the underlying information and produce probabilistic estimates of IUU activity.  The level of information available to support estimates of different IUU risks varied considerably between sectors and between risks.  For a small number of risks good quantitative information was available. However, for the majority of risks the level of information available was very limited, reflecting the secretive nature of IUU fishing.  

A key output of the project has been the development of a framework for the quantification of IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries and the design of a basic model that can be refined and updated over time as IUU risks change and better information becomes available. Given the limitations in the information available to quantify many of the risks, the outputs of this work should be seen as a ‘first cut’.  Recommendations to strengthen the availability of information have been made and we would encourage the exercise to be repeated on a regular basis to track trends in IUU fishing activity and help target MCS efforts.

Our simulations suggest the best estimate total volume of product either harvested or transhipped involving IUU activity in Pacific tuna fisheries is 306,440t, with 90% confidence that the actual figure lies within a range of 276,546t to 338,475t.  Based on the expected species composition and markets, the ex-vessel value of the best estimate figure is $616.11m.  The 90% confidence range is between $517.91m and $740.17m.  That is, there is a 95% chance the figure is greater than $517.91m and a 5% chance the figure is greater than $740.17m.

Of the three main sectors assessed, estimated volume of IUU product was highest in the purse seine fishery, accounting for 70% of overall volume.  Estimated IUU volumes in this sector were largely driven by reporting violations and illegal FAD fishing during the closure period.  The TLL and SLL sectors accounted for 19% and 11% of the overall volume respectively.  In the TLL sector, IUU volumes were largely driven by misreporting (49% of total TLL volume) and post-harvest risks (39%), principally illegal transhipping.  Estimates of both misreporting and illegal transhipping were, in turn, influenced by high levels of uncertainty.  Similar results were achieved in the SLL sector, with misreporting and post-harvest risks accounting for 57% and 36% of overall estimated IUU volume respectively.

By contrast, the TLL sector accounted for the highest ex-vessel value of IUU product ($272.55m) given the higher market value of its target species.    This sector accounted for around 44% of overall estimated IUU value, while the purse seine sector accounted for 37%.  The SLL sector had the lowest overall estimates of IUU product value (19%).

Of the four main IUU risk categories assessed, reporting violations and non-compliance with other license conditions (e.g. illegal FAD fishing; use of non-prescribed gear) accounted for 54% and 29% of the total estimated IUU volume respectively.  Post-harvest risks (mainly illegal transhipping) accounted for 13% of the estimated volume but 27% of the estimated value.  This was driven by higher estimates of illegal transhipping in the longline sectors which receive proportionally higher prices for product.  Unlicensed fishing accounted for only 4% of the estimated overall volume.

Among the main target species, skipjack accounted for the largest proportion of total estimated IUU volume (33%), but a lesser proportion of the total estimated ex-vessel value (18%).  The total estimated IUU volume of SKJ (100,730t) equated to around 5.1% of estimated total SKJ catch in the WCP-CA in 2014.   Yellowfin accounted for the next highest volume (96,126t), making up 31% of the total estimated IUU volume, and 27% of the ex-vessel value.   The total estimated IUU volume of YFT equated to around 15.8% of the estimated total catch of YFT in the WCP-CA during 2014.  Much of this is driven by estimates of misreporting in the purse seine fishery which is subject to 100% observer coverage, and therefore may result in little unaccounted for catch.  Bigeye also accounted for 19% of the overall estimated IUU volume, but 28% of the ex-vessel value.  The total estimated IUU volume of BET equates to around 35% of the estimated total catch of BET in the WCP-CA in 2014.  Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that 35% of additional BET have been taken in addition to reported figures.  For example, a substantial proportion of the overall IUU BET estimates come from estimates of illegal transhipping, the product for which may still be reported in logsheets.  ALB accounted for 4% of the overall estimated IUU volume and 6% of the total ex-vessel IUU value.  The total estimated ALB IUU volume equates to around 9.4% of the estimated total ALB catch in the WCP-CA in 2014, although a substantial proportion of this related to post-harvest offences for which information was uncertain.

Apart from the headline volume and value figures, there are a number of key messages arising from the analysis:

• The estimates of IUU volume and value generated here are lower than most commonly quoted estimate of IUU fishing in the WCPO region ($707m – $1.557b), although these studies are not ‘apples Vs apples’ comparisons.  The previous study (Agnew et al, 2009) used a ‘top down’ approach that looked at IUU fishing across a suite of species wider than tuna (e.g. demersal fish, shrimp) as well as including parts of Indonesia and the Philippines (across FAO Area 71). Relatively high levels of IUU fishing in coastal states on the western Pacific seaboard influenced the overall results; 
• Estimates of IUU are dominated by the licensed fleet - assuming catch transhipped illegally is taken by licensed vessels, IUU fishing by the licensed fleet accounts for over 95% of the total volume and value of IUU activity estimated here. This proportion rises to 97% if unlicensed fishing by vessels that are otherwise authorised to fish in the Pacific Islands region (i.e. they are on the FFA RR or WCPFC RFV) are considered part of the ‘licensed’ fleet.  This is consistent with previous studies and has important implications for MCS planning and investment;
•  Ex-vessel value is not a good indicator of actual loss to FFA members – this is because the full value of the catch is not returned to coastal states under normal circumstances (only a proportion of total revenue is, typically through access fees) and because of their nature, some risks may not necessarily result in direct losses.  In general, a better measure of the actual impact on coastal states is likely to be the economic rent lost as a result of IUU activity.  Based on the most recent estimates of profitability in the WCPO purse seine and longline sectors, we estimate the rent associated with IUU product estimated here is around $152.67m.  Nevertheless, because of the nature of access arrangements in Pacific tuna fisheries, it is possible that much of the rent associated with IUU activity is captured anyway, and this estimate either overstates, or is at least at the upper end of, actual impacts on the real economy.  For example, in the purse seine fishery, there is a good argument that the competitive nature of the bidding process under the VDS means that rents generated through IUU activity would be captured in the prices that fishing companies are prepared to pay for fishing days and are therefore not lost to Pacific Island countries.  This is perhaps less the case for the longline sectors where current access arrangements are probably less efficient at capturing rent;
• Stronger catch monitoring arrangements are required in the longline sector – mechanisms to independently verify catch in the longline sectors are limited for many fleets.  Additional measures are required to strengthen confidence in catch reporting and compliance with catch-based CMMs and generate better estimates of IUU activity;
• "IUU’ is not straightforward – while the IPOA-IUU definition of IUU is clear in theory, applying it for the purposes of quantification is not always straightforward.  Interpretations on what is, and is not, considered IUU for the purposes of quantification can substantially influence results;
• More accurate estimates of IUU activity require stronger monitoring and coordination of relevant statistics – the information available to support quantification of many risks was relatively limited and largely confined to expert judgement.  Achieving more accurate estimates of IUU activity will require stronger monitoring and analysis, and the coordination of relevant statistics.  While in some cases, this may require ‘new’ initiatives, in many cases it will simply require more effective use of existing facilities;  
• Strong in zone MCS arrangements must be mirrored on the high seas – the outcomes of this study argue for stronger monitoring of catch and transhipment activity across all sectors, and in particular the longline sectors.  Given the shared nature of stocks in the region, stronger MCS arrangements in zone should be mirrored on the high seas;
• Future IUU risks – the nature of IUU fishing is dynamic and influenced by the mix of incentives and disincentives, as well as changes in the regulatory environment.  Future iterations of the IUU model developed here will need to take changes in the nature of IUU fishing into account.  

Considerable efforts have been taken at the national, sub-regional (FFA/SPC/PNA) and regional levels (WCPFC) to mitigate IUU fishing in Pacific tuna fisheries.  Many of these are likely to have been highly effective at achieving their intended purpose (e.g. the FFA and WCPFC VMS, the FFA Regional Register, the FFA Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Access, the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, Niue Treaty, 100% observer coverage on the PS fleet) and will have contributed to the relatively low estimates of IUU fishing across a number of sector/categories.  Nevertheless, the results of this study indicate that substantial uncertainty still exists in relation to IUU activity across a range of key risks, and additional measures are required to strengthen incentives for voluntary compliance, reinforce deterrents to non-compliance and improve monitoring throughout the supply chain.

Ultimately the most practical mix of MCS arrangements to deal with IUU fishing will be a function of the balance between the likely effectiveness of the measure in treating priority risks, practicality of implementation and overall costs.   An outline and discussion of possible additional MCS measures that can be taken to further mitigate IUU fishing in WCPO tuna fisheries is provided, taking into account risks targeted, costs and practicality.  Key priorities identified in the longline sectors are to:

• Strengthen mechanisms for independent monitoring of catch through the supply chain;
• Strengthen transhipment monitoring and control;
• Strengthen on-board monitoring of fishing activity through improved observer coverage and the introduction of electronic monitoring technology.

In the purse seine sector, MCS arrangements are generally stronger than the longline sector, though based on the current management of the fishery priorities include:

• Strengthening mechanisms to verify fishing activity (e.g. to assess non-fishing day claims; FAD fishing during the closure);
• Catch verification through the use of cannery data;
• Better monitoring and management of FAD usage.

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And above all this, a solid Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) for the WCPFC, could help tie all the loose ends and hopefully disincentive the buying of fish that has not been officially certified as legal. and that CDS is what I'm working over the next years.

Rescues of Pacific Islanders drifting at sea by tuna vessels

In my last post I quoted a story form the FFA Trade Bulletin, so here is other that I liked, as I'm working at the moment on a safety at sea chapter, for an illustrated manual for small scale fisherman.

more than fish sometimes

An integral part of the life of many Pacific islanders has for years included offshore fishing expeditions and inter-island voyages. In recent years, these trips are usually undertaken on outboard-powered skiffs. For a variety of reasons - engine failure, lack of tools or spare parts, unanticipated bad weather, or poor planning and boating skills, these activities sometimes result in the participants adrift with no ability to return to land on their own.

Over the years, the international tuna fishing fleet in the WCPO has rescued numerous islanders that otherwise would likely never have been found. Occasionally the rescues are publicized in the media, but it is believed that many more may go unpublicized. This may be especially true for those islands with poor communication with the outside world, or countries without an active news media.

A review of 38 news stories published during the period 1998-2014 describing incidents in just six countries: PNG, FSM, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Solomon Islands, shows that a total of 148 Pacific islanders from those countries were rescued by tuna vessels in the WCPO. Others, but not nearly as many, were identified as rescued by tankers, freighters and the like.

Some stories do not identify the name or type of fishing vessel, while others are very specific and sometimes include interviews with the drifters and/or fishing vessel captains. One US purse seine captain whose vessel had rescued three fishermen from Kiribati undertook extensive interviews with those rescued to learn their survival story and eventually published a book in 2012 describing their 87-day experience.21

Purse seiners are more likely to come across drifters, mainly as a result of their use of helicopters, high powered binoculars and other tools in their search for fish. During the period surveyed just 11 drifters (0.8 percent) were identified as rescued by longliners while 69 (47 percent) were found by purse seiners. But if drifters are not in the areas generally fished by purse seiners their chance of discovery by those vessels is likely diminished. The increased use of FADs could enhance survival chances of those who find these devices during their drift, although there is no guarantee.

There have also been some survivors’ accounts of being ignored by fishing vessels while drifting. In one case, a politician from Chuuk lost with his wife on an inter-island voyage encountered a freighter that came very close to their vessel and then ignored their plight. He had the presence of mind to memorize the call sign on the side of the vessel and report to authorities after his rescue 29 days later. FSM officials identified the vessel (a Chinese fish carrier involved in transshipment) and it was subsequently arrested by an FSM patrol boat and taken to Pohnpei for prosecution under FSM law that requires the rendering of assistance to persons in distress within the FSM EEZ.

The efforts of all tuna fishermen who rescue drifters are commendable, but one in particular deserves special mention. Taiwanese Captain Ming-Chuan Lu serving on the US-flag American Victory rescued drifters in 2012 and returned them to Majuro. This was the third group of I-Kiribati drifters that Captain Lu had rescued since 2007.

Thailand awaits verdict from EU on red card for IUU fishing

Every two months, FFA publishes its Trade and Industry news, a bulletin prepared for the FFA Fisheries Development Division by Dr Liam Campling , Dr Elizabeth Havice, and Mike McCoy, all Consultants Fisheries Trade and Market Intelligence Analysts and they are at the top of their game. You should download it if you have any interest in the tuna world.

From anywhere in the pacific (and by anyone) to Thailand

I get asked about Thailand yellow card a lot, so in this post I would quote one of their articles “Thailand awaits verdict from EU on red card for IUU fishing”, as it resumes (in a 1000 times better English than my one!) what is the rather unique situation of Thailand… that even if it gets a red card, the EU cant do nothing under the present system to stop the tuna trade into their market (even if Ecuador would love for them to do that!)

On 18-22 January 2016, EU delegates conducted a final inspection before DG MARE delivers a verdict on whether Thailand’s yellow card warning received in April 2015 for shortcomings in implementation of the EU-IUU Fishing Regulation would be lifted. If the inspectors are not satisfied that the Thai Government has adequately addressed these shortcomings, a red card will instead be issued, resulting in an import ban into EU markets of fisheries products sourced from Thai fishing fleets.

The Thai Government has reportedly been working hard to tighten measures against IUU fishing, including the adoption of a revised Fisheries Act and extensive supporting legislation, significantly increased vessel and factory inspections, closure of factories in violation of regulations, improved vessel licensing and monitoring systems and enhanced on-board observer coverage. While outside the purview of the IUU Fishing Regulation, extensive investigations into human trafficking cases are also being conducted.

While issues identified by the EU relate more so to Thailand’s shrimp and other fishing industries, rather than tuna (since Thailand does not have a sizeable domestic tuna fishing fleet), the Department of Fisheries (DOF) has implemented a number of measures in line with the EU’s requirements under the IUU Fishing Regulation which impact Thai tuna packers and traders.

DOF has significantly increased the number of fisheries inspectors which are now on-site at wharves and processing plants to monitor every single tuna delivery into Thailand, via either carrier or containers. Processing plants have been warned that they will be fined for misreported species and/or volumes in commercial documentation for imported raw material.

In February, the Thai Department of Fisheries notified WCPFC of six vessels listed on their IUU register. DOF has also advised Thai processors and tuna traders that EU catch certificates must be transmitted to them no later than 30 days after imported raw material has been delivered to processors. While not explicitly related to the IUU Fishing Regulation, DOF will also be closely monitoring whether carriers delivering fish to Thailand for EU production have EU sanitary numbers. 

Although the Thai Government is confident a red card will be avoided, if this does not end up being the case it will be interesting to see how tuna imports from Thailand are handled under a market sanction, since the IUU Regulation is a flag state measure. This means that for the purposes of imported foreign-caught raw materials, Thailand is considered a market state rather than flag state and the regulation is not explicit about market state responsibilities in terms of addressing IUU fishing (besides the completion of an annex to EU catch certificates regarding processing).

EU market sanctions should only apply to products processed from catches sourced from Thai fishing vessels, not products manufactured from imported tuna from foreign flagged vessels, provided the flag state of the fishing vessels has not received a red card under the IUU Regulation.

Nicely explained the quirkiness of all this. The biggest tuna canner in the world does not catches Tuna hence a red card will in principle not affect the tuna flow to the EU.

I know from good sources that if a tuna consignment arrived to a Thai cannery without a EU Catch Certificate (CC), one was made on the spot by cannery staff. And as there is no e-registry of CC validated by flag state or received by the EU member countries, and is all photocopy based, chances to stop the trade of IUU fish are almost nil.

Furthermore, unless the Thai DOF creates its own registry that accounts for all the individual CC numbers, as well as species and volumes received from all the countries notified (listed) under the EU IUU reg, and on top of that has a system to cross check the authenticity of CC with the validating flag state, I don't see how can they really tackle that mammoth task.

Taiwan's fishing industry cry 'faul'... Really?

Once in while you come trough stories that make you go "wt*!". Here is one: "Leaders in Taiwan's fishing industry on Tuesday called on the government to stand up to the people who make the international fishing rules, which they said are usually unfair to the local industry".

Taiwanese Logsheets qualify mostly as works of fiction

The news was in a Taiwanese News article that caught my attention out of a mention by Michael Crispino of PEW trust. It is soo wrong at so many levels... so here I quote some "nuggets" of it.

The heads of Taiwan's tuna and squid fishing associations said that if the government goes ahead with its plan to impose fines of up to NT$30 million (US$915,000) on their members, it will bankrupt them and they will stage a protest at the Legislature.

After four rounds of meeting with the European Commission, the Council of Agriculture (COA) has drafted new legislation that includes a provision for hefty fines, and plans to send the bill to the Legislative Yuan in late March. The COA bill drafted was in response to the EU's warning to Taiwan last October that it risked being listed as uncooperative in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The EU's decision to issue a "yellow card" to Taiwan was based on serious shortcomings in the country's fisheries legal framework, a system of sanctions that does not deter IUU fishing, and lack of effective monitoring, control and surveillance of long-distance fishing fleets, according to an EU press release.

And this is all true... in 12 year of doing boardings to Taiwanese longliners (directly flagged or via Vanuatu) I have only recently starting to see logsheets that make any sense. Only since 2015 they are requested to radio their position daily to Taiwan. And I truly doubt anyone in the Taiwan Fisheries Authority has a full idea where the Taiwanese vessels are and what and how much are they catching. Furthermore the authority in charge of giving IUU Catch Certificates is the Food Safety Authority... so obviously they have no idea.

Furthermore (and I could not have made this up!) see what happens when you click on the Combating IUU tab of the Fisheries Policy section of the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan website.  Obviously they don't come to meetings like the one I been involved all of this week.

The EU also said Taiwan had failed systematically to meet the obligations of the Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO).

True... their record of compliance is bad, and the fact that they have not endorsed any UN treaty (because they are not members of the UN due to Chinese pressure) does not make easier

But Taiwan Tuna Association President Hsieh Wen-jung (謝文榮) said Taiwanese fishing vessels are being singled out for penalties. "Japan is a deep-sea fishing country like us," he said. "Doesn't it still kill dolphins and catch whales in international waters?"

Aahhhh? Mr Weng-Jung should know better... Tuna Fisheries and Whaling/Cetaceans capture are rather different topics and covered by different rules. And in comparison, japan has a much better grasp on their fisheries that Taiwan ever had.

Hsieh said he and other fishery associations will call a press conference at the Legislature and protest the "double standards," which he said are "unfair" to Taiwan. His views were echoed by Taiwan Squid Fishery Association President Lei Tzu-kang (雷祖綱), who said he will join the protest because a NT$30,000 fine was "way too high."

The Philippines was also issued a warning by the EU but responded by hiring over 1,000 observers to monitor their fishing boats in international waters, Lei said.

Mhhh... not sure about that Mr Lei... in fact many of us wonder about how come Philippines got the yellow card lifted, their MCS system is better that yours.... but that is not a very high mark. At least they come to the MCS forums.

He said he suspected the COA had adopted the strategy used by South Korea, which increased its fines on its fishermen in exchange for removal from the EU's warning list. "The government should be able to communicate with foreign institutions and fight for the interests of Taiwan's fishing industry, instead of following the South Korean government," Lei said. "Show some backbone, please."

Hsieh of the tuna association said he understood the pressure the government was facing, because he himself had participated annually in five or six international meetings on fishing regulations.

I didn't know there was s many meetings on fishing regulations! I've been missing them... and that is my job!

"Still, I must point out that organizations like the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and Inter-America Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) are dominated by white people who do not see any conservation problems with catching fish that are their favorites, like skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna, but have a lot to say about the favorites of the yellow people," he said. "It's a classic case of double standards, which is very unfair to us," Hsieh added.

Whoaaa... lets drop some racism into it. For starters the fact you don't even acknowledge the Pacific Island nations role in WCPFC (the place where you boats fish) is kind of racist from your side. Furthermore the EU (Spain) has like 4 vessels in the Pacific... you have 110 (22PS and the rest LL) with permits in PICs (China has 119) and who knows how many more in the International waters. Don't you remember what happened last year when Greenpeace got one of yours?

Lei, meanwhile, said another "unfair rule" is that Americans, who invented the purse seine, are granted much bigger fishing quotas than small countries like Taiwan.

There we go again... there are no quotas in Purse Seiners (you have 22 btw) fact that Taiwan is fishing here is already a product of subsidies... The US (that has 44, of which a substantial chunk are of Taiwanese beneficial ownership) are struggling already (and they invented Purse Seiners!)

So... Maybe they should follow Mr Lei's own advice: get some backbone, put your shit together and stop messing around with your dodgy fleet.

I said in private many times that if the EU wants to do a crucial tackle of the trade on IUU fish in a fundamental way, red carding Taiwan would be an awesome move. . And by doing that, they will indirectly help a lot of the Pacific Islands... as they (for many non fisheries reasons) cannot take such a strong stand by them selves.

The net closes slowlly on IUU fishing

Is not news to most people my deep disgust with fisheries subsidies, based on many reasons.  But my main grief is because the biggest culprits here are the bigger Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN).

Would that hold be full without subsidies?

This week I'm attending and presenting a paper at the 5th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (GFETW) in Auckland. Sharing with people of over 60 countries many of the advances we have achieved in the Pacific.

I'm happy to see that many of the systems we deploy are at world class level, which more than admirable since many of the PICs are classified as Least Developed Countries and services that are guaranteed in the rest of the world (like Internet and electricity) are still irregular features. Even so, and based on a mixture of determination, lateral thinking and stubbornness we have a unique "state of the art" system that is getting stronger and stronger by the day... And all this without subsidies.

However, with the honorable exemption of EU, the rest of the DWFN are completely absent of the picture. Nor China or Taiwan have representatives. Korea sent 3 people that have not yet make them selves heard at all.

These are not small countries, in fact Taiwan and China have the biggest fleets in the Pacific, and the biggest subsidies.

China
World’s largest subsidizers of commercial fishing, estimated US$4 billion annually.
China operates in over 90 countries, and all oceans and regions of the world, except in the Caribbean, the North Atlantic and the Arctic. China has 50% of all of the fishing vessels larger than 24 meters.  By way of comparison, no other country has more than 10%.  of this industrial fleet.

Taiwan
€400 million on the distant water fishing industry in the period 2002 to 2010.Of the total, about 75% was used to increase the capacity of the fleet, including subsidization of diesel for vessels and vessels buy- back programs.

Against this picture, I feel very disheartened... We are expecting the Fisheries Authorities of Small Developing Islands coastal and port states, to take on the burden of controlling the vessels of rich Distant Waters Fishing Nations that subsidise their fleet with amounts that far exceed the global estimates of IUU fishing.

If Pacific Island Countries can take positive steps to control their own and the DWFN vessels operating in their waters... there is absolutely no reason why China, Taiwan and Korea cannot do the same, when they are way more developed and spend obnoxious amounts of money subsidising their fleets.

And while the EU also subsidizes their fleet (not to Chinese levels tho), its main beneficiary, Spain, is doing incredibly well in terms of closing the net on IUU operators.

While have yet to see the news published in English,  4 members of Antonio Vidal's family have been detained in Galicia for their involvement in the illegal fishing operations for tootfish in the southern seas that finished with the detention of 4 vessels, the sinking of 1 while 1 still at large. And while the tackling of family members seems to relate more to a mafia operation than to IUU fishing... but reality is that there is no much difference.

Many if us in the fisheries compliance world have been skeptic of the EU's anti IUU fisheries drive in foreign countries, when some of their own members where active participants and financiers of those operations... but this is changing rapidly, and I applaud Spain's new law enforcement.

"Fairness to United States Distant Water Fishermen Act of 2016”

Many times I discussed that the root of fisheries problems, are not really in fisheries itself but in geopolitics, subsidies and transparency... and in many cases vindictiveness and ego fighting.

fisheries and politics (illustration from the Economist)

I paste here a direct copy of a bill presented on the 1st of February to the US Congress by two Republican members. Is a truly vindictive piece of legislation... a real "lowlight" of foreign policy and geopolitics in my opinion.

It explicitly says "PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY CONVENTION".... all this of course comes out as consequence of the recent collapse of the US Tuna treaty with the Pacific Islands.

Very shameful I think... and it basically opens the door wider to the Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans Distant Water Fleets... as my friend Pam says: "they are shooting themselves in the foot"

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114th CONGRESS 2d Session
H. R. 4413

To prohibit the use of funds to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 1, 2016
Mr. Hunter (for himself and Mr. Vargas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL
To prohibit the use of funds to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Fairness to United States Distant Water Fishermen Act of 2016”.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY UNDER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY.

(a) Prohibition.—Funds made available to carry out chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.; relating to Economic Support Fund) may not be used to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency.

(b) Effective Date.—This section takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to funds made available for any fiscal year—

(1) in which a notice of intent to withdraw from the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America, done at Port Moresby on April 2, 1987, is submitted by the United States in accordance with Article 12.6 of such Treaty; or

(2) in which such Treaty is not in effect with respect to the United States for any part of such fiscal year.

SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM FISHERIES AGENCY CONVENTION.

Funds made available to carry out chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to International Military Education and Training) or any other provision of law for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 may not be used to provide assistance to any foreign country that is a party to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, signed at Honiara on July 10, 1979.

The promises of technology in Fisheries and MCS

A reporter asked me a couple of days ago: "Some of what we've heard about the technologies to fight IUU fishing has had an element of fantasy and Starwars about it - are we now moving into a new era where real technological advance is going to change things completely?" and then "There has been a lot of gloomy thoughts about the fate of the world's fish stock - is technology now offering us a real hope for the future?"

"we are stuck with technology when what we really want is just stuff that works" D. Adams

He was referring to the two big MCS (Monitoring, Control and Surveillance) meetings happening in Auckland over the next couple of weeks.

The question, made me think about how I see the role of technologies in this area...

So I wrote back this:

Douglas Adams wrote "we are stuck with technology when what we really want is just stuff that works".... So I don't think that these workshops are being held/sold as miracle panaceas providers. Technology provides tools that help with solutions.

the crap I do....

The problems in fisheries (in my opinion) do not relate to the lack of technology, they relate to politics and management. I have been vocal in my opinion that if we were to find solutions around subsidies and transparency, a big chunk of the issues would be gone. Rich nations spend more in subsidizing fisheries that the estimates losses of revenue from illegal fishing... Yes, the global cost of fisheries subsidies is greater than the cost of IUU fishing.

Deal with this, the rest will follow...

Fisheries sustainability relates to many things, but at its basics, we could abstract it to: "how much is being fished in one area, over a period of time". The technologies we are talking in these conferences, help us to know who is fishing legally and who is not, and to ID those fishing legally, knowing how much, where and for how long...

But these technologies do not infer on why countries expand fleets or other expand their fishing permits numbers. These technologies help in fine-tuning what we know is been fished, and identifying and providing evidence on those that are not playing by the rules... But technologies are not a solution for the fisheries geopolitics.

A more profound mistake is at work here, and it concerns technology in general. It is the expectation that technology can and will solve all problems, that the future will be better because technology will have made it so... But technology does not make policy decisions, in the best case scenario can only help and guide those making them

There are also some problems that technology cannot solve. Not because it is too sluggish, fragile, or clumsy, but because not all problems are instrumental, most problems in fisheries (in my opinion) are political.  

I start many of my talks with a quote of B.F. Skinner “The real problem is not whether machines think but whether men do.”  

As far as I read, in regards the topics and the presenters, this is a technical meeting where people present the advances in their fields and what they are working on the MCS spectrum.

Some are purely technical (how this software/tool works and what it does) other are more conceptual like my one:  in the Pacific, we have this problem and this is what we are doing to help working it out, and we are using the following established technologies for this.

If you are, let's say, an oncologist you don't go to an oncology conference expecting to hear that the "cure" for cancer has been found... you go learn and hopefully pick up tools and knowledge from other people in other parts of the world, that may help you in helping your patients. I don't see these Auckland events as any different nor of less merit itself. (In fact, we have only one of these a year worldwide while you have hundreds around other topics)

Finally, there is not really "one world stock that will collapse" and will wipe out fisheries of the planet. There are thousands of fisheries that are at different levels of exploitation and there are many (an estimated 30% that are over exploited) but also many that have to stop declining and/or are recovering thanks to better management, transparency, better science and technology...

Plus, we need to remember that while fishing is old, its management is new... people was rocketing off to the moon at the time that we started getting serious about fisheries statistical models.

There is clearly a role for science and technology in fisheries sustainability. Science can determine if the management of a fishery will lead to long-term sustainability. Technology around MCS can help capture the data needed to support science determinations.

However, it would be very difficult for science and technology at present to tell you what environmental impacts are low or high enough – that is a question of individual choice or public policy.

The US makes a move on its anti IUU fishing system

The US has been slow burning is anti IUU system and policy, and it looks like they started their game with a consultation, which is already a good thing.

The US imports seafood from over 100 countries with thirty countries each providing over $100 million of fisheries products

We all knew that something was coming (I wrote about it here, here , and here).  So a cpuple of weeks ago the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) unveiled the "new" requirements for imported seafood. The regulations are the product of a presidential task force I blogged before.

NOAA Fisheries spokesmen said that the “U.S. seafood traceability program” will require seafood importers to document the “catch” to first “landfall” in the United States for certain species. The regulated species were chosen based on:

•                         principals of enforcement capability;
•                         species misrepresentation;
•                         catch documents;
•                         complexity of the chain of custody and processing;
•                         mislabeling or other misrepresentation; and
•                         human health risks

On the “at risk” species list are: abalone, Atlantic cod, blue crab, mahi-mahi, grouper, red king crab, Pacific cod, red snapper, sea cucumber, sharks, shrimp, swordfish, albacore tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna.

The criteria and the list were chosen by the presidential task force known as the National Ocean Committee to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud.  It was the task force that last year recommended a “harvest to entry in the U.S.” approach to traceability

The at risk list represents about 40 percent of the seafood that enters the U.S. when measured by value. NOAA eventually wants to include all seafood species imported into the U.S.

The Seafood Import Monitoring Program, as it is officially known, is in the Federal Register for a 60-day comment period.

Some of the most interesting areas I rescue are:

Summary:

Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), this proposed rule would establish filing and recordkeeping procedures relating to the importation of certain fish and fish products, in order to implement the MSA's prohibition on the import and trade, in interstate or foreign commerce, of fish taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any foreign law or regulation. The information to be filed is proposed to be collected at the time of entry, and makes use of an electronic single window consistent with the Safety and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 and other applicable statutes. Specifically, NMFS proposes to integrate collection of catch and landing documentation for certain fish and fish products within the government-wide International Trade Data System (ITDS) and require electronic information collection through the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) maintained by the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Under these procedures, NMFS would require an annually renewable International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP) and specific data for certain fish and fish products to be filed and retained as a condition of import to enable the United States to exclude the entry into commerce of products of illegal fishing activities. The information to be collected and retained will help authorities verify that the fish or fish products were lawfully acquired by providing information that traces each import shipment from point of harvest to entry-into commerce. The rule will also decrease the incidence of seafood fraud by collecting information at import and requiring retention of documentation so that the information reported (e.g., regarding species and harvest location) can be verified. This proposed rule stipulates the catch and landing data for imports of certain fish and fish products which would be required to be submitted electronically to NMFS through ACE and the requirements for recordkeeping concerning such imports.

So it introduces the concept of a “catch certificate scheme” of sorts via a International Trade Data System (ITDS) and the it would require an annually renewable International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP) and specific data for certain fish and fish products to be filed and retained as a condition of import to enable the United States to exclude the entry into commerce of products of illegal fishing activities.

The ITDS would be the electronic means of collecting NMFS-required catch and trade data at the point of entry for imports subject to existing trade monitoring programs. They anticipates that would require entry filers, when importing at-risk species, to submit data elements at the point of entry into U.S. commerce and use the CBP ACE portal for submission of import data and/or document images (as applicable for HTS codes covered under multiple programs).

This proposed rule would also require the importer of record to obtain a permit to import a designated at-risk species (the International Fisheries Trade Permit) At-risk species, and some products derived from such species, would be identified by Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes (in combination with other codes where applicable), and entries filed under these codes would be subject to the additional data requirements set forth in this proposed rule. While some HTS codes will have a direct correspondence to the at-risk species, other applicable HTS codes, particularly for processed products, may be broader (i.e., potentially including species other than those designated at-risk.)

Entry Into U.S. Commerce

This proposed rule addresses only the collection of information on imported fish and fish products at the point of entry into U.S. commerce. For imported fish and fish products, entry into commerce is the landing on, bringing into, or introduction into, or attempted landing on, bringing into, or introduction into, any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, whether or not such landing, bringing, or introduction constitutes an importation within the meaning of the customs laws of the United States.

At-Risk Species

A working group including representatives from NMFS and other Federal agency partners solicited comment on principles to be applied in the identification of fish species likely to be most at risk of IUU fishing or seafood fraud.

Taking into consideration public comment received, the working group evaluated the strength and utility of various indicators of IUU fishing or seafood fraud as well as their measurability and the robustness of data available to assess them. The working group endeavored to minimize overlap of principles to ensure that alignment with multiple principles did not overstate associated risk, and also to distinguish between risk of IUU fishing and risk of seafood fraud.

The working group identified the following draft principles:

Enforcement capability, existence of a catch documentation scheme, complexity of the supply chain, known species substitution, history of mislabeling (other than misidentification of species), and history of fisheries violations.

Applying those principles to a base list of species, thirteen fish species/species groups were identified as likely to be most at risk of IUU fishing or seafood fraud. Under this proposed rule, importers would therefore be subject to the permitting, reporting and recording keeping requirements, which are described below, with respect to imports of the species and species groups as proposed, subject to revision at the time of issuance of the final rule. Entries of the fish and fish product of species covered by this rule filed under the following HTS codes would be designated in ACE as requiring the additional data in order to obtain release of the inbound shipment: (go to the original for the list).

Regulatory requirements for reporting and recordkeeping already exist for certain products subject to this rule. In particular, tuna products would be subject to this proposed rule and are now subject to the Tuna Tracking and Verification Program (TTVP) (See http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/dolphinsafe/tunaHTScodes.htm), which monitors compliance under the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).

They argue that:

Furthermore, in light of the similarity in underlying reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the IUU fishing seafood fraud traceability program and the TTVP program, which verifies whether tuna product marketed as “dolphin safe” meets the eligibility conditions for the dolphin safe label, NMFS intends to ensure that any future changes to the IUU fishing and risk of seafood fraud requirements such as converting certain recordkeeping requirements to a reporting requirement, as discussed below, will be replicated in the TTVP program (through the inclusion of appropriate HTS codes) so that entities serving the U.S. tuna product market will not be subject to conflicting reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

In my experience there substantial differences in between the level of verification that declaring something IUU free and dolphin safe entitles… but lets see what it comes out.

Data for Reporting and Recordkeeping

The working group considered the minimum types of information that should be reported in order to determine that imports of at-risk species are not products of illegal fishing or are fraudulently represented. The area of harvest or the location of the aquaculture facility, and the time at which the harvest took place, represents the initial “link” in the supply chain. At-risk species entering U.S. commerce will be traced to their harvest and its authorization. Information on each point of transshipment and processing throughout the fish or fish product's chain of custody culminating at the point of entry into U.S. commerce can also be used to trace product back to point of harvest.

NMFS proposes that, at the point of entry for species covered by this rule, importers of record would be required to report the following information for each entry in addition to other information that CBP and other agencies, including NMFS, currently require:

• Information on the entity(ies) harvesting or producing the fish (as applicable): Name and flag state of harvesting vessel(s) and evidence of authorization; Unique vessel identifier(s) (if available); Type(s) of fishing gear; Name(s) of farm or aquaculture facility.

• Information on the fish that was harvested and processed, including: Species of fish (scientific name, acceptable market name, and ASFIS number); Product description(s); Name(s) of product; Quantity and/or weight of the product(s).

• Information on where and when the fish were harvested and landed: Area(s) of wild-capture or aquaculture harvest; Harvest date(s); Location(s) of aquaculture facility; Point of first landing; Date of first landing; Name of entity(ies) (processor, dealer, vessel) to which fish was landed. Such information may be contained, for example, in catch certificates, landing reports, and port inspection reports. Entries may comprise products from more than one harvest event and each event relevant to entry must be reported.

• The NMFS IFTP number issued to the importer of record for the entry.

Additional information on each point in the chain of custody regarding the shipment of the fish or fish product to point of entry into U.S. commerce would be established as a recordkeeping requirement on the part of the importer of record to ensure that information is readily available to NMFS to allow it to trace the fish or fish product from the point of entry into U.S. commerce back to the point of harvest to verify the information that is reported upon entry. Such information would include records regarding each custodian of the fish and fish product, including, as applicable, transshippers, processors, storage facilities, and distributors. The information contained in the records must be provided to NMFS upon request and be sufficient for NMFS to conduct a trace back to verify the veracity of the information that is reported on entry. NMFS expects that typical supply chain records that are kept in the normal course of businesses, including declarations by harvesting/carrier vessels, bills of lading and forms voluntarily used or required under foreign government or international monitoring programs which include such information as the identity of the custodian, the type of processing, and the weight of the product, would provide sufficient information for NMFS to conduct a trace back. In addition to relying on such records, the trade may choose to use model forms that NMFS has developed to track and document chain of custody information through the supply chain.

Due to technological limitations of automated data processing for imaged documents and requirements associated with the phase-in of ITDS, this proposed rule requires that chain of custody information be retained by the importer of record and made available to NMFS upon request. However, NMFS recognizes the conservation value of requiring reporting of key chain of custody data elements for the purpose of real-time verification and compliance risk assessment if those data can be accessed and analyzed using automated processes.

In developing software for assembling and transferring the additional data to ACE, importers may wish to consider inter-operability with existing traceability systems that are prevalent in the private sector supply chain or which may exist for certain commodities subject to catch/trade documentation schemes under the auspices of a regional fishery management organization (RFMO). While NMFS does not endorse any particular private sector traceability system, use of such systems may facilitate the collection of the required information along the supply chain in order to report this information through ACE. However, importers of record are still responsible for the accuracy of the information in their import transactions, irrespective of whether integration software or other automated supply chain solutions are utilized.

Where RFMO catch/documentation schemes apply to the affected at-risk species, including those that have been implemented by NMFS through regulation (e.g., the swordfish statistical document of the ICCAT, it is anticipated that compliance with the entry data collection requirements of these schemes would for the most part meet the data reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the traceability program proposed here. However, ITDS provides sufficient flexibility to collect additional data in cases where the data requirements of the seafood traceability program proposed by this rule would exceed those of an RFMO scheme applicable to the same species. NMFS will work with CBP to avoid duplication of reporting requirement in cases where more than one reporting program applies to a particular fish or fish product, and to ensure that all the data are reported to meet the requirements of each applicable reporting program.

International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP)

 The ITDS proposed rule would establish the IFTP to consolidate existing permits under the highly migratory species international trade program (HMS ITP) and Antarctic marine living resources (AMLR) program, and would require a permit for the TTVP.

This proposed rule would extend the IFTP requirement in the ITDS proposed rule to include importers of record identified in CBP entry filings for shipments containing the designated at-risk species covered by this rule. Requiring the IFTP would allow NMFS to identify, and have current contact information for, importers of the at-risk species covered by this rule. This will enable NMFS to provide information about data reporting and recordkeeping requirements applicable to at-risk species; alert permit holders in advance of any pending changes to data reporting and recordkeeping requirements, including additional data elements or at-risk species; and minimize the potential for disruptions in trade and costly delays in release of shipments.

To obtain the IFTP, U.S. importers of record for designated at-risk species covered by this rule and seafood products derived from such species would electronically submit their application and fee for the IFTP via the National Permitting System Web site designated by NMFS.

Reporting and Recordkeeping

This proposed rule would require that an IFTP holder (i.e., importer of record as identified on CBP entry/entry summary) report certain data for entries of at-risk species covered by this rule. NMFS would provide detailed information to permit holders regarding submission of such data, as well as on recordkeeping, in a compliance guide for industry that will be prepared in advance of NMFS' implementation of a final rule. (The guide may include information on electronic filing through ITDS.) The IFTP holder/importer of record would be required to maintain or have access to, and make available for inspection, electronic or paper versions of records associated with an entry for at-risk species at their place of business for a period of five years after the date of entry.

Verification of Entries

To implement this proposed regulation, business rules would be programmed into ACE to automatically validate that the importer of record has satisfied all of the NMFS Message Set and document image requirements as applicable to HTS codes subject to multiple programs (e.g., all data fields are populated and conform to format and coding specifications, required image files are attached). Absent validation of the NMFS requirements in ACE, the entry filed would be rejected and the entry filer would be notified of the deficiencies that must be addressed in order for the entry to be certified by ACE prior to release by NMFS and CBP. In addition to automated validation of the data submitted, entries may be subject to verification by NMFS that the supplied data elements are true and can be corroborated via auditing procedures (e.g., vessel was authorized by the flag state, legal catch was landed to an authorized entity, processor receipts correspond to outputs). For shipments selected for verification, if verification of the data cannot be completed by NMFS pre-release, NMFS may request that CBP place a hold on a shipment pending verification by NMFS or allow conditional release, contingent upon timely provision of records by the importer of record to allow data verification. Entries for which timely provision of records is not provided to NMFS or that cannot be verified as lawfully acquired and non-fraudulent by NMFS, will be subject to enforcement or other appropriate action by NMFS in coordination with CBP. Such responses could include a re-delivery order for the shipment, exclusion from entry into commerce of the shipment, or enforcement action against the entry filer or importer of record.

To select entries for verification, NMFS would work with CBP to develop a specific program within ITDS to screen information for the covered commodities based on risk criteria. For example, risk-based screening and targeting procedures can be programmed to categorize entries by volume and certain attributes (e.g., ocean area of catch, vessel type or gear), and then randomly select entries for verification on a percentage basis within groups of entries defined by the associated attributes. In applying these procedures, NMFS would implement a verification scheme, including levels of inspection sufficient to assure that imports of the at-risk species are not products of illegal fisheries and are not fraudulently represented. Given the volume of imports, and the perishable nature of seafood, it would not likely be cost-effective for most verifications to be conducted on a pre-release basis. However, the verification scheme may involve targeted operations on a pre-release basis that are focused on particular products or ports of concern.

Voluntary Third Party Certifications and Trusted Trader Program

NMFS is considering how voluntary third party seafood certification programs could simplify entry filing for designated at-risk species or could be used to meet reporting requirements under this proposed rule. NMFS requests comment on how interoperability of third party data systems could be applied to meet the data reporting requirements on a pre-arrival basis or at the point of entry. Such interoperable systems would have to provide the information necessary for NMFS to trace product to the harvest event and therefore be sufficient to identify product that is the result of IUU fishing or is misrepresented.

Additionally, NMFS is considering how a Trusted Trader program might be used to streamline entry processing for designated at-risk species. The Trusted Trader Program is intended to streamline entry processing consistent with ensuring that all traders in the supply chain comply with applicable U.S. regulations. Participants in the Trusted Trader Program would collect or have access to the same data as non-participants, but may not need to provide it prior to entry. NMFS requests comment regarding the potential design and use of a Trusted Trader Program in connection with the requirements proposed in this rule, in particular how it could be used to streamline entry while allowing the United States to determine that imported seafood has been lawfully acquired and not misrepresented and to deter the infiltration of illegally harvested and misrepresented seafood into the supply chain.

And my favorite:

Consideration of the European Union Catch Certification Scheme

The EU's IUU regulations do not include a traceability scheme equivalent to that as contemplated by the IUU Task Force and as proposed in this rule. However, NMFS is interested in comments on how some of the elements inherent in the EU's IUU regulations may be adapted to this rule as a means of facilitating compliance and reducing burden for exporters, either through the design of the traceability process itself or as part of a trusted trader program.

Implementation Timeframe

As an initial estimate, NMFS anticipates that firms may need between 90 days and 12 months to adapt their practices to comply with the requirements of this rule and proposes an implementation date of somewhere between 90 days and 12 months following publication of the final rule.

International Cooperation and Assistance

Subject to the availability of resources, NMFS intends to provide assistance to exporting nations to support compliance with the requirements of this proposed rule, including by providing assistance to build capacity to: (1) Undertake effective fisheries management; (2) strengthen fisheries governance structures and enforcement bodies to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud; and (3) establish, maintain, or support systems to enable export shipments of fish and fish products to be traced back to point of harvest.

Reality is that the US never been been particularly interested in incorporating other people's or countries views (unless they match completely their own ones), hence I have no idea if the consultation process will, at the end of the day, incorporate the doubts of the non US interests... the key voice here is the one of the American companies that import and trade fish.

From my side, I still not clear how the conundrums in between ports, flag, coastal and processing states would be worked out... and I just hope that the final system (that will indubitably affect the Pacific Islands because all tunas are included) is data format friendly so the systems we are developing can be "twitched" at the final step to interact with their system... it would be truly frustrating having to run paralleled systems to satisfy two masters.

Reinserting state agency in global value chains

My friend Gilles sent me new paper on the PNA and MSC certification, written by someone I know, the paper called my attention and was a good reading. I’ll quote some parts only… as always read the original! Is worth.

The resource owners (in the small boat) and the users (in the big one)

I have meet Steven Adolf at some of the tuna forums I been invited, and I always like when someone from outside the industry (his background in economics and journalism), as it brings a fresh approach that sometimes those who are on the inside don't really see. His latest publication (surely part of his PhD) raises some interesting points about the role of PNA and its association with the MSC.

Abstract

In the agri-food sector global sustainability partnerships play an increasing role in setting and enforcing certification standards through global value chains. Amidst perception that the capacity of states to steer sustainable transnational forms of production is diminishing, these partnerships are increasingly led by firms and non-firm actors. Using the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) certification of free school skipjack tuna purse seine fisheries, this paper challenges this idea of diminished state agency by exploring how these states are repositioning themselves in the global tuna value chain.  We document how PNA created the conditions for its small island member states to use the MSC certification for expanding their role as the owner of tuna resources and becoming global value chain actors themselves through a novel and disruptive public–private partnership. The results indicate that states can use market demand for certified tuna to improve their position as both producers and intermediaries in the chain, and in doing so recapture greater sovereign control over tuna resources while improving their capacity for domestic wealth generation.

The 1st part that I like is hat bring to my attention a concept that I wasn't very aware of:

Global sustainability partnerships exist in a variety of forms, but are most commonly between lead firms in GVCs and non-firm actors, such as environmental and social NGOs. And the (re) insertion of the state in market oriented forms of global sustainability governance.

They go into a good analysis of the MSC (Marine Stewardship Council) Ecolabel. My cautious views on ecolabels are not a secret… but I always admit that the only of the lot I have some respect is MSC, because it certifies a fishery and not a company like the others… and if you deal with a fishery, even if the ones paying for the certification is the industry the state (or states like in PNA) need to have a key role.

They bring this up nicely:

Empirical studies of MSC recognize that changing chain coordination depends on the interests of large retailers, food service companies and their chain-suppliers in European and US markets.  How-ever, an emerging set of studies have also examined the interaction of MSC certification with states, and in doing so have looked beyond standards as objective, technical, science-driven instruments for achieving sustainable management of marine resources .

The State has a dual position in the certification process when claiming the role of ‘producer’ in the chain. By doing so, he argues, the state is able to directly intervene in struggles over surplus value, and influence the environmental conditions of production.

The paper then focus on the MSC certification of PNA Skipjack tuna and makes a good analysis of the global value chain of skipjack and present a good table naming all of the players, and which “strangulation” points they have and a very nice illustration.

Points of concentration of main companies in the global value chain of canned skipjack tuna caught by the purse seiner fleet in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

The role of PNA is also made clear:

In doing so the PNA members have attempted to establish a monopoly-like control over approximately 25% of the global production of canned tuna. As outlined by leading officials, the PNA has as such sought to define itself as the ‘OPEC of Tuna’: a state driven, profit maximizing commodity cartel. By creating a cartel-like structure the PNA hope to create a new coordinating mechanism that goes beyond the ownership of the resource alone.

And the role of Pacifical:

Key to the PNA’s MSC certification strategy is the creation of Pacifical; a 50/50 public–private partnership with the Dutch trading company ‘Sustunable’. Pacifical is part of a wider strategy of the PNA to gain greater control over the production, trade and marketing of the certified skipjack tuna. Pacifical is therefore seen by the PNA as an instrumental part of both commercial and state policy objectives to promote and control the sustainable management of skipjack tuna as well as capture higher future national revenues from tuna through a price premium. Through Pacifical the PNA seeks greater agency in three ways. First, Pacifical expands the position of member states from ‘owners’ of the skipjack stock in their EEZ, and clients and holders of the MSC certification, to a central commercial role in the chain contracting fishers, traders and processors, and marketing the Pacifical brand to retailers. Second, Pacifical compliments the management systems of the PNA by feeding back information from the chain of custody traceability system and in doing so increases surveillance over vessels, crew and processing factories. Third, by branding cans of the MSC certified canned skipjack tuna, Pacifical is designed to create a direct link to consumers by promoting the PNA as a recognizable production source of sustainable tuna and social accountability.

Which is all fair enough, as the pacific island gets pathetically little form tuna revenues in comparison to the DWFN and the processors (even if they are solid reasons on why processing in smaller pacific island countries would always struggle)

Then he goes on a explanation on why there was opposition to the MSC assessment process and doubts on the success.

Notwithstanding the interest of retailers for the Pacifical canned tuna, non-cooperation to outright exclusion of the MSC-Pacifical scheme has directly influenced the success of the PNA in reaching their goals. Because conventional traders and leading brands did not want to participate, processors were also reluctant to participate. The industrial fleets of purse seine vessels contacted by Pacifical lacked interest, with the exception of Frabelle — one of the biggest Philippines fisheries in the region. Frabelle has strong long-standing strategic links with the PNA through processing plants and fishery licenses in the EEZ waters. By landing MSC certified fish, the company has supported the PNA in its aspirations of establishing an extended role in the chain. In return Frabelle has further reinforced its business relation with the PNA and strengthened its commercial interests in Papua New Guinea, the main processing hub in the PNA with tariff free entry to the EU market. Respondents outlined several reasons for the lack of cooperation by these firms. Traders and brands expressed doubts that the proposed price premium of 20%, to be divided between the fisheries, the traders, processors, retailers and Pacifical, was realistic over the long term. They also noted that this concern would become even more real if the MSC certified tuna move from a niche to mainstream consumer product given that margins in the trade and processing of canned tuna are small (Hamilton et al., 2011). The industry is convinced there is a strong negative price elasticity of demand in canned tuna, resulting in lower demand when the consumer prices rise. Econometric modelling supports this negative relation in demand for canned tuna, but not as strongly as the industry suggests, while overall demand in the US is falling and stagnating in Europe.

He does document then the change in hearth by the big players such a Trimarine and FCF.

I did always had an issue with the price premium (and form what you read above I wasn't the only one)… particularly in low cost product like canned tuna.

The ideal of that a certified product may get a price premium is not a golden rule, furthermore the logic of that assumption is flawed, in NZ we have argued that the industry should not even expect a price premium for certification noting that: “No plausible case can be made for a premium for ‘sustainable seafood’. I anything, a well managed fishery should also be a cheaper fishery to harvest as the fish should be more abundant and easier to catch!” said my friend Alastair MacFarlane.

Their discussion then bring 3 good elements

We distinguish three contingent factors that must be in place for states to play these multiple roles in the evolving processes of certification and standard-setting in global value chains.

First, in order to become the client and holder of the MSC certification, states must have some sort of ‘landed property right’ on the resource that is being certified (Campling and Havice, 2014). As they describe, state ownership of the EEZ is the basis of property in fisheries and therefore defines the role of the state in relation with the market. This enables coastal states to capture surplus value from fish stocks, as well as enforce measures to improve the environmental conditions of production. By setting harvest control rules for free-school tuna, and having them certified, the PNA member states are moving beyond capturing control back from the distant water fleets through the WCFPC (see Havice, 2013, 2010; Miller and Bush, 2014), to also taking greater control over their tuna resources by extending control over surplus value through the market. This supplementary extension of property relations in the oceans is an innovative development in industrial fishery value chains, allowing states to draw on their position as ‘landlord’ and confront the prevailing market power of transnational firms.

Second, the role of the state in the local and regional economy of control can create new forms of governance facilitated through the market, wherein producers and intermediaries offset the power of global buyers (Foley and Hébert, 2014; Gereffi, 2014). Because clients are defined based on their capacity to control and manage a specific resource territory (Foley and Hébert, 2013; Vandergeestet al., 2015), resource ownership is a pre-requisite condition. How-ever, by positioning themselves as a MSC client in the Pacifical partnership, the PNA member states are also extending their influence over the value chain through the chain of custody certification. Through this dual position, the PNA member states are able to increase their influence over multiple stages of the chain by set-ting clear conditions for cooperating with an alternative value chain than that coordinated by the prevailing lead firms in the non-MSC certified chain. By using the demand for certified tuna to strengthen their position as producer and intermediary in the chain, the PNA member states not only position themselves in the tuna GVC but also reshape the captive and hierarchical governance structures in the prevailing tuna global value chain led by traders, brands and retailers.

Third, these states are able to fulfil and combine these roles because they partner with a company in the public–private partnership Pacifical, which is legitimised by the MSC certification (Glasbergen, 2007). The participation of states in the partnership enable them to create and try out new combinations of their rules and practices with those of the private sector. Hence, they not only compete with firms but establish partnerships in order to find common ground for creating projects that link businesses to the state in a legitimate way (Evans, 1995). In doing so, the role of these state changes from a custodian regulator to a subordinate but regulatory demiurge, which facilitates competition with industry for the sake of reaching the collective end goal of sustainable fish stocks. This role can be seen as the mutual reinforcement between state and industry through partnerships, which is a fundamental characteristic of Evans ‘developmental state’. How this developmental role is organised within the state is beyond this scope of this paper, but does present a relevant set of questions for further research. As a consequence, value chain partnerships offer the conditions to combine the market based power of lead firms with the legiti-macy of states to regulate natural resource management (Vellemaand Van Wijk, 2014). By partnering in joint activities with a commercial partner, states can explore new modes of governance by coordinating the implementation of voluntary sustainability measures and in doing so increase their influence over production and trade, as well as the sustainability of fishery resources. The even broader consequence of these findings is that assessment of certification impacts needs to go beyond the technical assessment of sustainability performance, to look at the wider impacts and consequences certification holds for sustainability ‘governance’ in more general terms (Eden and Bear, 2010; Ton et al., 2014). Doing so can reveal the positive impact certification can have as a tool for influencing the political economic conditions that often under-lie persistent and complex sustainability issues in sectors such as seafood.

I like the paper, made me think... (and I like thinking!)

Now... the “issue” I still have, is that ecolabels exist because good fisheries governance and management has failed in the first place… so shouldn't we fix that first, independently of the fishery be dealing with? Ecolables only have an interest in highly traded species, as is commercially driven by retailers and paid by producers, who will only invest in a certification for the fisheries they make more money. So I feel that we are commercializing fisheries management trough a branding exercise… and those who are not part of the commercial market chain (as most subsistence fisheries or low value species) will as in many other areas, be left aside.

Please cite this article in press as: Adolf, S., et al., Reinserting state agency in global value chains: The case of MSC certified skipjack tuna.Fish. Res. (2015)