The Southern Albacore tuna crisis

The declining status of the Southern Albacore Fishery has been well documented. Even in its more limited stance; the fishery in Fijian waters that is under a MSC certification, may not be able to pass the next certification (as well there are no way to pay for it, without the catches) 

Chinese Longliners in Suva Harbour (Beautiful image for a sad reality)

While the reasons are various, the main culprits are overcapacity, subsidies and the failure of the regimentation and controls in the high seas (a responsibility of the WCPFC)

Is quite sad, as it used to be a profitable fishery that employed mostly Fijians. Unfortunately the concessions and subsidies provided to the Chinese fleet throw the situation into the doldrums.

See below a press release by FTBOA (Fiji Tuna Boats Owners Association) quite self-explanatory

The Impact of the EU yellow cards in the Pacific

It was a professional and personal challenge to give a talk in regards the “Impact of the EU Yellow cards in the Pacific” at the Pacific Tuna Forum in Fiji this week.

The EU made a game changer with its IUU regulation by denying market access to those products that did not arrived to the border with a “official guarantee” of the flag state of the catching vessel/s attesting on the legality of the catch. Conceptually that is just awesome.

I always recognised and supported that principle, my “beef” with it has been with the practicalities of the Catch Certification Scheme (the tool the regulation uses), the design of the certificate, the fact that is paper based and the backwards (from market to vessel) approach taken less than year after it was 1st introduced (when initially was forwards vessel to market). The fishing industry dynamics and its operational complexities where in existence before the 2010 implementation of the IUU regulation, hence operationally the legislation would have benefited from a much deeper study and understanding of the reality, prior to trying to capture it under a substandard scheme.

My work has been always aimed to make it better from a operational perspective but not to abolish the concept… In fact I’ve dedicated most of the last 5 years of my professional life to help countries to comply with it, by working around many of the operationally frustrating challenges of the scheme while at the same time strengthening the "in country" tools required so the legislation key objective (minimise IUU fishing) is not lost.  

Slide 1

Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later (no that one notice much change in the quality and content of their catch certs). The latest country under this process is Thailand, but interestingly even if they get red carded, the impact in the tuna world would be minimal… because the “ban” in exports to the EU will only affect tuna caught by Thai flagged vessels… and paradoxically there are none. The biggest exporter of can tuna in the does not operate a tuna fleet (welcome to one of the many twists of the fishing world). 

In any case, I decided immediately that there was no point of dwelling in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalysed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme. And I’m happy to say, we got plenty of positives to report.

Slide 2

The 1st step we took was to foster the understanding of what this whole issue was about, because in reality not many people in the region (and the world I may add) really understood what it was about. The training provided by the EU prior of its implementation was minimal and quite poorly structured (one session for the whole pacific in New Caledonia, based on a powerpoint that just copy and pasted the regulation – I still have it! – as a trainer I can assure that is the best way to loose an audience). Followed by the late publication of a “handbook” which provides guidelines and answers on the implementation of the EU IUU Regulation is a lengthy and wordy document and it was written before the implementation of EU IUU Regulation itself, so many scenarios are not contemplated and the substantial changes of interpretation (such as the Weight in the Catch Certificate - WICC notes 1&2), make the document, while well intended, of very limited use.

Slide 3

For me the analogy of the iceberg fits the situation, what we only see is the tip: the certificate (the-unfortunately- piece of paper). But what really matters is what is below… what I called the “fish legality” and the “fish accountancy”, so all this needed to be strengthen and systematized, so the tip is meaningful.

Hence was very important to develop and standardize a training program that dealt with the conceptual issues first and later with the scenarios that the regulation requires to be contemplated, and FFA's DevFish II programme contracted me for that.

Slide 4

The Certificate itself is a complex document with a multi-layered structure of responsibilities that do not always correlate chronologically with reality, hence detailed explanations and a standardization of the way the information is to be presented was required. These also had to be expanded indirectly to foreign flag states that operate in the region as to maintain “a system” that is homogenous trough the operational chain. The “quality” of foreign certificates was a constant source of frustration for many of the officers we worked – how come they send us this shitty documents and they are not yellow carded? Was a frequent question, that I had no answers to provide.

Slide 4

The next element was to train on the content and scenarios presented by the regulations and understand which ones applied to each case in each island country. This was not easy, because besides the difference in the industries in each country it had to consider as well the interactions in between the Catch Certification, the Health Certification (normally under Health Authorities) and Certification of Origin (under Customs)… so not easy task.

Furthermore we had to consider the scenario of the transhipment countries, as this countries are part of the system but not initially contemplated (not “notified” using the EU IUU lingo) but have an important role without getting any direct benefits (other than fees for use of their ports), as this countries are not allowed to trade fish with the EU because they lack of sanitary authorisation. As in the other cases, all this knowledge had to be built from scratch.

Slide 5

Initially we had to understand how to re-structure the traditional view of MCS into a more holistic approach. Fish does not become illegal during processing, is caught illegally. Therefore if we stop it before landing, then a big chunk of the problem is gone… but then we also need to stop the laundering of illegal fish with legal fish. So we introduce the concept of the "Unloading Authorization Code" (UAC) and Fish Accountancy to link with MCS.

The concepts “mixes” two basic elements; the requirements (in one way or another) of Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)  and a Key Data Element needed to follow a landing through the value chain. Under PSMA, vessels have to seek advance approval to enter a port, sufficient to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the information provided. Hence the information required needs to be provided and assessed to facilitate a decision as to whether or not to deny or grant entry. If an “authorization” is given, either the master or the vessel’s representative can present the authorization to the authorities when the vessel arrives in port. 
This “authorization” will need to be “coded” (on some form or another) as to be recorded in one way or another as to be able to review and accounted and potentially crosschecked if it is deemed necessary. So why not simply use this Unloading Authorization Code (UAC) as the tool for the initial Key Data Element required for any Catch Documentation Scheme or traceability analysis along the value chain from landing to consumer (or wherever it is needed or most cost effective). 

Furthermore, most fishing vessels operators (company own or independent) do maintain a trip or voyage coding systems in order to monitor logistics, fuel consumption, crewing rosters, general costs and more importantly “final payments”(which are in the form of a % of the catch volumes, species composition and values) are to the traced back to that landing, minus the fix costs. Therefore the concept already exists in the sector, so this UAC becomes a better and standardised use of an existing tool.

The "Process" associated to the use design and use of the UAC is as follow:

Arrival notification
The “authorization” to land is assessed by the fisheries authorities in the port in a compliance response to a series of requirements that are decided by the authorities of the Port State in relationship to its own legislation and requirements or those of an RFMO, international agreements, etc. The scope of the requirements can be arranged in accordance to a pre determined risk index based on the characteristics of the vessels requiring port access. 

As an example: domestic flagged vessels fishing in the Port State EEZ with local VMS and observers may be at the lowest risk tier (i.e green). Foreign vessels with local licenses, foreign charter vessels, domestic vessels fishing in other EZZ or the High Seas, Fish Carriers, vessels with patchy observer coverage, indirect VMS access, etc. are in middle risk tier (yellow). Finally, foreign flagged vessels with no direct VMS access by the coastal or port state, or no observer coverage or vessels identified as a Vessels of Interest (VoI) by any country or RFMO are singled as high risk vessels (red).

As noted, the risk profile of the vessel defines the required time for arrival notification (12, 24, 48 hrs), plus the amount and depth of the information to be provided by the vessel intending to land. In considering the assessment an UAC can be provided and the vessel is allowed to dock with intention to unload. In instances where it is not provided the vessel may be allowed to dock for humanitarian or force majeure reasons but not to land. 

The structure and nature of the UAC is up to the Port State or RFMO to decide, but it is important that it is inclusive in the information it holds, and in principle is to be an integral part of relational database such as a Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS). 

The UAC “design” should include for elements such as:  country identification, trip and port traceability, fishing effort measurements, observer reporting, etc. and it should have inter-operability with the vessels operators trip/voyaging coding systems, and if needed with the maritime authorities. Interestingly, this inter-operability of the vessels operators and authorities UAC can be beneficial to crews and captains in case of payment disputes or safety at sea issues arising from the maritime authorities.

Inspections
The risk profile and compliance level during the previous step defines the need for inspection of the landing and the expected % of yearly inspections decided by the port state, i.e. 25% of landings for green tier vessels, 50% for yellow and 100% for red.

The decision of whether an inspection should take place needs to be based on the risk profile of the vessel (if red) and the % of inspections that have already taken place (yellow, green) or issues arising from the documentation presented. If an inspection is performed, then the UAC is recorded in the inspection forms in order to provide for future verification if required and for compliance performance monitoring. Ideally the Inspection forms are digitalized on a tablet type device and the data enters the FIM is real time under the specific UAC of that operation. If the results of the inspection shows inconsistencies or non compliances (and based on the extent of these) the landing may be authorized under bond or denied. Then the UAC associated to that landing is “flagged” into the FIMS in order to interrupt any further movements or transactions associated to that landing until the issues are resolved.

Unloading
If it is decided that an inspection is necessary then the results, if compliant, will provide the permission to unload (or transship). This landing could be conditional, as explained before (under bond). If an inspection does not take place the LAC then becomes the “de facto” authorization for unloading.

In the case of transshipments, the UAC is attached to the catch estimates (from logsheets) or real (if hanging scales are used) and reflect the captains/mates receipt or any the document the volumes being transshipped. The UAC will then accompany the transshipping documentation (printed) and if the receiving country has an MoU with the port state or is part of the same RFMO, then they can potentially log-in on to a common FIMS to cross check the legality and estimated volumes of the landing and to add their own information.  If landing or transshipments are partial (and this practice should be discouraged by principle) then the UAC would need to be “partitioned” into lots associated to the original UAC with this retained as the main reference and the lots can be incorporated into FIMS. Any volumes not landed should be considered as a “lot” in the same manner as the landed ones.

Reception or weight in
At the coosltore or processing facility reception or anywhere where the official sorting and weight in of the fish is done the UAC “marks” the volumes in the FIMS and into the receiving operator’s inventory system.  If the whole fish is loaded into containers for direct export then the weight in is to be recorded under the UAC on the FIMS and the volumes containerized discounted of the total volumes recorded that that landing. That exported lot would still be associated to the UAC as in the case of partial landings or transshipments.

The private operators receiving the fish could either load all the data on a FIMS portal or maintain their own inventory and traceability systems that could either be “absorbed” by FIMS or audited by fisheries authorities. In any case final volumes by species would be incorporated into FIMS for the UAC.Companies normally use lot systems based on the species, size and vessel of origin. All these parameters can be linked to the UAC under FIMS or their own inventory and traceability management system.

Processing establishments and cool stores 
Most responsible MCS systems include Mass Balance evaluation (fish landed = fish in storage + fish processed or sold) on the establishments, by the fisheries authorities. These evaluations starts with the UAC of all fish received for a period of time and what is presently in the inventory. The officers for example may chose a minimum of 5 different pallets/boxes/bins to do a full traceability exercise and check that each of those pallets/boxes/bins (raw material as well as processed fish) are registered on company documentation and that can be traced to the UAC.

Volumes withdraw from storage for processing are “discounted” from the original landed volumes in relation to the UAC, hence each withdrawal would leave a smaller volume left from the original until the landing is exhausted. Obviously same principle applies to whole fish withdrawals.  Processed product volumes will be inventoried under the same UAC taking in to consideration the processing ratios (conversion factors) associated to that type of products.

Final product Sales and Exports - Catch Certificates
Prior to the product leaving the premises Catch Certificates (domestic or market specific) are prepared based on all the operations relating to the original UAC (or UACs in the case of mixed products). The referencing and traceability to the specific UAC plus the fish volumes accountancy through the value chain becomes the basis and condition “sine qua non” for a catch certificate, either paper or electronic.

Slide 6

That leave us with the “how much” Fish Accountancy  knowing this has 2 benefits… we know how much is being caught, which management importance, and then we can record those volumes as the “initial deposit”, and by this we avoid chances of “fish laundering” from any potential illegal landing (just as any financial systems deals with money laundering)

We use the volumes unloaded as the initial deposit from which extractions will be made from, and the different species unloaded become “different currencies” on a same deposit. Then a traceability scheme in the system allow us to follow the “extractions” of different currencies trough time either by whole fish sales or processing. Furthermore, processing losses get dealt by the system like currency exchange (1kg of fish = 400g of loins).

Finally, we “mass balance” each sale/export against that original “deposit” until the volume is exhausted, and no more fish can be attributed to that unload. If some one wants to export fish he “didn’t” land… then we know something is happening there and the inspectors can focus on them.

Slide 7

As you imagine, there is lot of developmental and technical complexity behind these systems… PNG took the lead in developing this concept… even if they don’t have the money that a bank have! Furthermore the system is understandable by proxy to the banking system and “fair”… as there are no “interpretations”… is just about balancing volumes… “fish in” vs. “fish out” 

Slide 8

All this took work place at a big cost for the countries and refer only to one of the elements highlighted on the Yellow cards, so a series of other issues (new legislation, IUU NPOAs, VDS allocation, etc)  had to be worked as well. 

After almost 2 years, we all agree we know much better now what is expected than before and we tried to make the system work in our favour. Even if there are some big issues on pipeline to be worked out... But reality is that for small Islands states, it is always a "catch up" game... They read the rule book while running behind the ball.

Slide 9

I personally think that a lot of the initial "yellow card" issues came up out of personal conflicts in between the parts, at the end of the day the decisions are made by people and justified by paper, and there were a lot of entrenched positions (attacker - attacked, colonial - independent, and so on)  being taken initially and this dragged down the process. Things are calmer now and the PICs have responded with actions and not only words. While a lot of the world Tuna is caught in these waters, very little is done under PICs flagged vessels, hence the responsibilities also rely heavily with the DWFN that fish here and not just on the coastal states.

Finally, I always make this point at any presentation, while the EU impose the rules - beyond how good they are - they also fund the assistance to help comply with them.

During the Q&A session, NZ's Ambassador for Pacific Economic Development Shane Jones (and a good man I have been working with for a few months now) shot point blank at me the question in everyones mind:

Did it had a positive impact? PIC go to the WCPFC meetings and promises are done but little is deliver, so do the EU dis us a favour with the yellow cards?

I just smiled, and said something like:

Brooh... I can't answer that question... I'm just a deck-boss helping fellow deck crew. That is a question for the Captain.

From the deck, I can tell you that everyone knows now much better their job than before, and know better their own limitations... but if to get to this you needed a economic powerhouse like the EU with 1/2 a billon inhabitants to "name and shame" minnow coastal states with less than 40 years of independence and VERY limited human and economic resources... well... I just not qualified (or independent enough) to provide you an answer.

End Slide

The 2015 Pacific Tuna Forum

As I write, a traditional Fijian welcoming ceremony (that of course includes drinking some kava) is opening this years Regional Tuna Industry and Trade Conference on its 5th edition.

Is the 5th time I been invited to be a speaker, and I take it as big honour. I'm crap at the networking thing and the PR side of my work... I just like the job I do and I like the people I work with, and I take this opportunity as a chance to communicate across the region some of the aspects of what are the advances happening in my area of work. At the same time gives me the chance to learn what other people I like and work with, are up to. 

While I'm interested what everyone has to say, the ones that I'm more looking forwards this year are:

Achieving Optimal Economic Benefits Through Sustainable Tuna Management and Development, by Transform Aqorau, Executive Director of PNA. Transform is a very smart man and articulate man, that is not afraid to trow the right punches when necessary. His presentation are always entertaining.

Tuna Stock Status, Management Regime and Policies in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Shelton Harley, the Principal Fisheries Scientist (Stock Assessment and Modelling), Oceanic Fisheries Programme, of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Shelton is a very clever man at the top of its game, and equally important, a good communicator of the science and status of the stocks. His presentations are always good learning opportunities.

Developments in Fishing Quotas and Cuts by Transform Aqorau again. There has been a lot of talk of reshaping the tuna landscape by the introduction of quotas as alternative/addition to the Vessels Day Scheme. While conceptually interesting, and having worked and lived on the inside of the NZ Quota Management System, I see al lot constraints on the operational side of it (i.e. controlling fish receivers, aggregation limits, migratory status, etc) so i'm very interested on what he has to say.

Crew Conditions on Fishing Vessels in the Pacific Islands Region by Patricia J Kailola, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Pacific Dialogue Ltd. I don't know Patricia, but I'm very interested in the topic and I'm partially working on the topic.

Constraints to Domestic Industry and Development Through Mitigating Strategies by Adrian Wickham (but delivered by Charles Hufflet) from thePacific Islands Tuna Industry Association. I known both gentlemen for years and they are great people and real fighters for Pacific Island based fishing.

The Viability of Longlining in the Southern Albacore Fishery by Russell Dunham, Director for Fresh and Frozen ULT Tuna of Tri Marine International Pte Ltd. Russell is great guy I've know for years. He know the longline tuna business left, right and centre. Always great presentations.

Foreign Fishing Tuna Operations and Investment in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Hugh Walton, Fisheries Development Advisor, DevFish Project, Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. "Uncle Hugh" as my kids refer to him, is a good mate and he has supported my vision, my work (and my English!!!)  for the last 4 years with DevFish II. He is a former fisherman and a guerrilla gardener (that alone makes me like him) and has done every job in the Pacific fisheries (twice!), so is always good to hear what he has to say.

Updates on E-Reporting and E-Monitoring Projects in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Malo Hosken, Regional Electronic Reporting Coordinator, Oceanic Fisheries Programme of SPC. I have meet Malo recently, and I like what he does and why he does it, he is relaxed and very professional, as well as family man... I respect that a lot. His work on e-monitoring (cameras on board) and e-reporting (real time electronically updated logsheets form the vessels) has been pivotal to a lot of work we for see in the near future (furthermore is one of the few tools I know work for avoid shark finning).  

The Changing Proportion of Legally-Sourced Tuna in International Trade and FAO’s Best Practice Guidelines on Tuna Catch Documentation System (CDS) by Gilles Hosch,  Technical Coordinator – Tuna Traceability & CDS at FAO. Gilles is a very long time friend and a very clever man that knows his stuff deeper than anyone I know. He is actually not gonna deliver it, I will :-)... he is at the present in FSM at the WCPFC CDS Working Group (where I was also invited), and unfortunately we cannot be in two places at once, he is passing my views there and I'm passing his views here.

Finally I'm looking forwards to deliver my one: Impact of EU ‘yellow card system’ on Pacific Island Countries here is the brief as written in the programme: (I'll publish the presentation after delivery tomorrow) 

The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have significantly experienced the effects of the EU’s role as the world IUU fisheries evaluator. There are more “yellow cards” in the PICs than in any other region in the world in relation to their population and development status. Fiji and Vanuatu were the first ones, then Papua New Guinea, followed by the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, while FSM and RMI are in dialogue process.

While the EU IUU regulation legally concerns itself only with fish being imported into the EU, it is interesting to note that Vanuatu, Tuvalu, FSM or RMI do not trade with the EU as they lack of Sanitary approval required never the less have been impacted by the EU measures. Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably, major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later. The latest country under this process is Thailand and the jury still out on what is going to happen, PNG on its side seems to still running towards the elusive “green card” goal post, albeit substantial work done.

Nevertheless, this presentation will not dwell in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalyzed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme with the support of the DEVFISH II/FFA Programme. Including the incorporation of elements of the PSMA as to be working towards a pacific wide Catch Certification Scheme as a tool to offset the administrative and economic burden that compliance with the EU scheme has enacted in the PICs. 

Looking forwards to all of this!

Governance and Tuna related Institutions in the pacific (part 2)

Continuing from my last post on "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, I focus in this post on the 2 technical bodies of the region, FFA and SPC, two organisations close to my souI, as I do a lot of work for them. 

FFA - Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency

Since 1979, the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is based in Honiara, Solomon Islands, FFA's 17 Pacific Island members are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The founding document of the Agency is the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention. The Forum Fisheries Committee meets annually to consider regional policies and the budget and work programme of FFA.

FFA was established to help countries sustainably manage their fishery resources that fall within their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA is an advisory body providing expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and participate in regional decision making on tuna management through agencies such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

FFA purpose is to maximise economic and social benefits of fisheries, i it supports its countries and territories in three broad tasks:

• Manage the fishery to ensure use is sustainable and will provide tuna now and in the future
• Develop the fishery to harvest, process and market tuna to create jobs, income and a thriving industry
• Monitor, control and survey the fishery to stop illegal fishing and make sure fishing benefits goes towards fishers who follow the rules of development and management set by governments.

FFA assists members to carry out these three broad tasks by providing advice, information, policy recommendations, regional strategies, technical support and development opportunities. It provides support at the national and regional level.

At the national level, FFA provides support direct to countries and territories who are members of FFA. At the regional level, FFA solicits the views of leaders, identifies consensus areas and emerging areas for debate and briefs leaders on technical and policy issues in preparation for their participation in the decision-making body on tuna management in the region (WCPFC) and for negotiations about binding legal agreements (the various treaties, agreements and arrangements pertaining to fishing in Pacific). Pacific Island leaders are active in setting the agenda and priorities of FFA through their involvement in the various FFA projects and meetings and formally through the Forum Fisheries Committee.

Approximately 80 staff at the regional FFA headquarters in Honiara support their national contact points in departments of foreign affairs and fisheries in each member jurisdiction. FFA focuses its work on:

Fisheries management – providing policy and legal frameworks for the sustainable management of tuna. It does so in 4 areas:

• Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management assists FFA member countries to use a process of management for their fisheries. EAFM reports have been done for Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga and Vanuatu. The process is similar to risk management and involves four overall stages:

1. determining the scope of the assessment – develop a clear description of what is to be managed/assessed;
2. given the scope, identifying all the issues that need to be assessed; preferably across the five key areas of EAFM and agreeing on the values wanted to be achieved for each of these;
3. determining, using risk analysis, which of these issues needs to be managed directly; and
4. establishing the levels of performance that are acceptable, the management arrangements that will be used to achieve these levels, and the review processes needed to assess performance for those issues requiring management.

Treaties & Agreements - FFA administers and provides support for negotiations and meetings regarding several fishing treaties and agreements. These are the:

• FSM Arrangement: The FSM Arrangement was developed as a mechanism for domestic vessels of the PNA to access the fishing resources of other parties. It was signed on the 30 Nov 1994 and came into force on the 23 Sep 1995. Signatories are Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau,  Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
• Nauru Agreement: The subregional agreement on terms and conditions for tuna purse seine fishing licences in the region (see PNA) 
• Palau Arrangement: The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and CentralPacific was developed by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement and entered into force in November 1995
• Niue Treaty: The Niue Treaty is an agreement on cooperation between FFA members about monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing - it includes provisions on exchange of information (about where the position and speed of vessels at sea, which vessels are without licences) plus procedures for cooperation in monitoring, prosecuting and penalising illegal fishing vessels. 
• US Multilateral Treaty: The Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries Between Certain Governments of the Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (commonly known as the “US Treaty”) began in 1987. It entered into force in 1988 and has since been renewed twice, with the last renewal in 2003 allowing the US Treaty to continue for an additional 10 years until 2013. The treaty enables a maximum of 40 US purse seine vessels to fish in the waters of the 16 Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member states. From the 16 countries, Australia and New Zealand do not receive any development aid from the treaty. In exchange for fishing access the US contributes an agreed annual amount, regardless of how much fish they take out. Under this arrangement the USA has, in the first 16 years of operation, paid the FFA a total of US$276 million. Once the administration fee is put aside, the FFA then divides these funds in two parts. First, each Pacific Island party receives a fixed minimum payment and the other, a major component, is based on the amount of tuna caught in national waters of each member states. In effect 79 % of the money has been diverted to five countries (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu) suggesting the uneven distribution of tuna stock in the region. Negotiations are stall at the moment since PNA want them to either pay 90 million or bid under the VDS system

Fisheries development – developing the capacity of members to sustainably harvest, process and market tuna to create livelihoods.

• Trade & Industry: FFA advises members about relevant developments in international trade policy and economic co-operation frameworks and how to advance their individual and collective fisheries interests in trade policy and economic partnership negotiations. Regular trade and industry reports include Fisheries Trade Briefing, Tuna Market News & Fisheries Economic Indicators. Many of these activities are part of the DEVFISH II project (where I work :-) 
• Economic Indicators: two reports are annually prepared; the WCPFC Area Catch Value Estimates and the Tuna Economic Indicators        

          
Fisheries operations – supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty administration, information technology and vessel registration and monitoring.

• Monitoring, Control & Surveillance: FFA provides policy and services, to its members to build national capacity and regional solidarity to control fishing in the Pacific, including illegal, unreported and unknown fishing. This includes technical expertise, information sharing and projects around monitoring activities, regional surveillance operations, the FFA Observer Program, FFA Vessel Monitoring System, FFA licence information list, and staff training and support regarding relevant regional decision making bodies, notably the Technical Compliance Committee of the WCPFC.
• FFA Vessel Monitoring System: this service allows FFA members to track and monitor fishing activities across the region. Based at the FFA's regional headquarters, but accessible to all FFA member countries, this a satellite-based system monitors the position, speed and direction of registered fishing vessels. 
• Information & Communications Technology: FFA's Information and Communications (ICT) Team provides a range of ICT and Library services to the Secretariat and to its members.

Corporate services - supporting the organisation's work through administration, human resources, budgeting and other corporate functions.

The Executive Team of FFA provides high-level policy advice to FFC and members, and manages the work of the Secretariat and member support services in support of the five key output areas for the FFA Executive:
    1    Policy Advice
    2    FFA Governance
    3    Strategic management
    4    Relationship management
    5    Legal Advice, Media, and Training

Specific MCS Role
The FFA Regional Surveillance Centre and coordinated Joint Deployment Plans
Annual regional multilateral fisheries surveillance operations support the MCS tools and communications of Pacific Island countries.  Four of the surveillance operations conducted annually in region are planned and coordinated by the RFSC.  These are Operation KURU KURU, BIGEYE/ISLAND CHIEF, TUI MOANA and RAI BALANG.  The QUAD OWG is made up of military personnel from Australia, France, New Zealand and the U.S.  The role of this group is to share and coordinate operational plans for the FFA member region.  FFA attends these meetings and covers regional fisheries surveillance operations, particularly the allocation of aerial surveillance assets and surface unit support.  

The FFA Surveillance Operations Officer (SOO) has the responsibility for facilitating the coordination of the surveillance assets provided by the QUAD nations in support of national and multilateral fishing surveillance and response activities. The SOO, and thus the RFSC, is in many cases the conduit between the QUAD nations and FFA members.  

All FFA members have access to the FFA RSP covering both their respective EEZ’s and the high seas. The three information sources (FFA VMS, WCPFC VMS and AIS) are used to correlate additional sighting reports from QUAD and FFA member assets, potentially highlighting ‘dark’ vessel contacts not polling on VMS or AIS. These are referred to individual nations for further management.  The RSP is linked to the extensive FFA secure databases containing a range of fisheries information that are designed to assist national MCS officers to assess the relative level of compliance of all vessels on the FFA VMS.  In the RSP, all vessels are ‘traffic-light’ colour coded to indicate the level of compliance risk (Compliance Index (CI)), which can then be used by member countries to plan MCS activities and operations for their PPB’s, with red indicating the possibility of a high-risk/non-compliant vessel, green indicating a greater probability of a low-risk/compliant vessel.

The 2016 operational phase will include:
Over-flight Approvals:  Nations providing maritime surveillance aircraft must coordinate over-flight of territorial boundaries as part of routine diplomatic clearances. Participating nations request these over-flight clearances using their standard procedures and channels.  Blanket over-flight approvals are no longer authorised despite this allowing greater flexibility in the tasking of air assets.
Watchkeepers:  Participating nations who provide watchkeepers to the RFSC for the duration of the operation need to have nominated personnel well ahead of time to allow for travel and associated arrangements to have been made.
Information-Sharing:  If long-term agreements for sharing information are not in place, it is imperative that short-term data sharing arrangements for the duration of the operation have been agreed upon and are in place ahead of time.
WCPFC Non-Public Domain Data:  Those participants with EEZs adjacent to high seas areas should ensure they have requested access to WCPFC High Seas VMS data (100NM buffer) as well as their respective in-zone data.

SPC - Secretariat of the Pacific Community

The South Pacific Commission, as SPC was formerly called, was founded in Australia in 1947 under the Canberra Agreement by the six ‘participating governments’ that then administered territories in the Pacific: Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They established the organisation to restore stability to a region that had experienced the turbulence of the Second World War, to assist in administering their dependent territories and to benefit the people of the Pacific. The name, South Pacific Commission, was changed to the Pacific Community at the 50th anniversary conference in 1997 to reflect the organisation’s Pacific-wide membership. Now, in 2010, SPC’s 26-strong membership includes the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories along with four of the original founders (the Netherlands and United Kingdom withdrew in 1962 and 2004 respectively when they relinquished their Pacific interests).

FAME (SPC Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems) main's work is to provide the 22 SPC's member countries and territories with the information they need to make informed decisions on the management and development of their aquatic resources, and help to provide the tools and strengthen the capacity needed to implement these decisions. 

The Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) is the Pacific Community’s regional centre for tuna fisheries research, fishery monitoring, stock assessment and data management. It was established by the 1980 South Pacific Conference (as the Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme) to continue and expand the work initiated by its predecessor project, the Skipjack Survey and Assessment Programme.

The OFP provides scientific services relating to oceanic (primarily tuna) fisheries management to its membership. These services include fishery monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research relevant to the fisheries, and stock assessment and evaluation of species- and ecosystem-based management options.

The most important programme outputs are information (e.g., reports on the status of fisheries, stocks and ecosystems), infrastructure (e.g., databases, monitoring programmes), advice (e.g., regarding appropriate levels of fishing), and national capacity building in SPC members.

The OFP has three main objectives as outlined in the FAME Strategic Plan:

• High-quality scientific information and advice for regional and national fisheries management authorities on the status of, and fishery impacts on, stocks targeted or otherwise impacted by regional oceanic fisheries;
• Accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic species; and
• Improved understanding of pelagic ecosystems in the western and central Pacific Ocean.

Their “clients” are the fisheries administrations of SPC members, for whom they process and manage data from commercial tuna fishing fleets (both domestic and foreign licensed), assist in the development and implementation of effective fishery monitoring programmes, provide advice on the status of tuna and other affected pelagic fish stocks, conduct research on the biology and ecology of the pelagic ecosystem and provide training and other capacity building in these areas. 

The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and its various sub-groups (particularly the Parties to the Nauru Arrangement (PNA) and the Te Vaka Moana Arrangement) are also key “clients”.
The OFP provides data products, scientific analyses and advice to assist these groups with the assessment and development of fisheries management measures. 

The OFP provides data management and stock assessment services and advice to WCPFC under an annual service agreement. The overall budget of the OFP in 2014 was approximately USD 8 million, with funding contributions from the SPC core budget (made up of the assessed contributions of SPC members), programme funding (made up of additional multi-year commitments made by the Governments of Australia, France and New Zealand)

The key work areas or OFP are:

Tuna Fishery Monitoring. The Fisheries Monitoring Section works in collaboration with the Data Management Section to achieve "Accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic species".

The Fisheries Monitoring Section is particularly concerned with"Enhanced national fishery monitoring and data management systems" and, "Enhanced capacity of PICTs to monitor fisheries, manage and use data". The OFP has provided support to SPC member countries and territories for tuna fisheries monitoring since port sampling and observer programmes were implemented by several members in the early 1990s. Since then, the scope of the support has expanded to cover all elements of national tuna fishery monitoring.

Over the years, support has been provided to 20 members and has included advice on the structure fishery monitoring systems, funding of national staff and the provision of sampling equipment, in additional to technical support for sampling programmes; the support that has been provided to SPC members is summarised here.
The OFP has also developed tuna fishery sampling protocols to ensure that sampling data are representative and unbiased. 

Capacity building is an important activity of the Fisheries Monitoring Section, and it has been closely involved in the development of Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer (PIRFO) standards, in collaboration with SPC members, FFA and the Secretariat of the WCPFC.

Regional Tuna Fisheries Databases

OFP is responsible for the development and maintenance of the collective regional tuna fisheries database which provides both direct and in-direct benefits to their member countries.  
The collective regional tuna fisheries databases comprise nine types of fishery data
    •    Operational catch and effort logsheet data
    •    Aggregated catch and effort data
    •    Annual catch estimates
    •    Port Sampling data
    •    Unloadings data
    •    Observer-reported catch/effort data
    •    Aggregated size frequency data
    •    Tagging data
    •    Biological data (e.g. otolith and stomach contents data)

At the regional level, tuna fishery data collected by member countries are used extensively for research and monitoring purposes. OFP uses the data in the regional tuna fisheries database to assess the state of exploitation of the stocks [on behalf of member countries, the WCPFC, FFA and the PNA] and to study interactions between the different fleets operating in the region. Monitoring of the fisheries includes the biannual publication of statistics compiled from the catch and effort database in the WCPFC Tuna Bulletin and through publication of the WCPFC Tuna

Fishery Yearbook.  Tuna fishery data also provide important information for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities and are used in economic and social science studies.

The OFP provide member countries with a sub-set of the regional tuna fisheries database with software query tools to facilitate the extraction of summary tables, graphs and maps to assist in the decision-making processes related to the management of their tuna fisheries and satisfy their reporting obligations to the WCPFC. Member countries also contact OFP on a regular basis with a variety of ad hoc requests for summarised data prepared from the regional tuna database. 

Stock Assessment. Within the section, they have five areas of work.

1. Regional oceanic fisheries management policy and decision-making by WCPFC are informed by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. This is achieved primarily through the Regional WCPO stock assessments that they undertake as service provider to tWCPFC, but in addition they have active Research being undertaken into software for use with stock assessments and addressing many of the important issues in stock assessments. 
2. FFA’s oceanic fisheries management initiatives are supported by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. They work closely to support FFA in providing analytical support for their Regional fisheries management initiatives. This are of work also involves support of PNA and Te Vaka Moana. 
3. National tuna oceanic fisheries policy and decision-making are informed by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. They work closely with National fisheries agencies to provide scientific advice that assists them in the development of Tuna Management plans and other relevant fisheries management plans. A key part of this support is the development of National Tuna Fisheries Status Reports (NTFSRs). 
4. Enhanced capacity of SPC members to interpret stock assessment information and advice. For 7 years they have been running Stock Assessments Training Workshops (SAWs), have attachments at SPC for national scientists, and provide in-meeting support, particularly for FFA and WCPFC meetings.

Governance and tuna related institutions in the Pacific (Part 1)

Unless you are an insider, is really hard to understand "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, this blog post hope to share some light on that, as it is complex. The key players of the governance and fishery management framework for tuna and related species in the WCPO include:

1. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
2. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement, known as PNA or the Nauru Group
3. FFA and SPC that are regional organisations that provide management services to its member countries, the WCPFC and the PNA.
4. The national governments

 I'll start with the role of the commission (WCPFC) and PNA.

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) which entered into force on 19 June 2004. The Convention was concluded after six years of negotiation which commenced in 1994. The period between the conclusion of the Convention and its entry into force was taken up by a series of Preparatory Conferences that laid the foundations for the Commission to commence its work.

The WCPF Convention draws on many of the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement [UNFSA] while, at the same time, reflecting the special political, socio-economic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region. The WCPFC Convention seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks.

A framework for the participation of fishing entities in the Commission which legally binds fishing entities to the provisions of the Convention, participation by territories and possessions in the work of the Commission, recognition of special requirements of developing States, and cooperation with other Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO) whose respective areas of competence overlap with the WCPFC reflect the unique geo-political environment in which the Commission operates.

The Commission supports three subsidiary bodies; the Scientific Committee, Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee, that each meet once during each year. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are followed by a full session of the Commission. The work of the Commission is assisted by a Finance and Administration Committee.

Members: Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu.
Participating Territories: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna.
Cooperating Non-member(s): Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, Vietnam.

How is WCPFC governed?
The Convention establishes a governing body known as the Commission which is comprised of representatives from members, cooperating non-members and participating territories (collectively, CCMs). The Commission holds annual meetings and is presided over by a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who are elected from amongst the membership.

Four subsidiary bodies support the work of the Commission and meet in the months prior to the annual meeting, which is always held in December.

• The Scientific Committee (SC) meets in August and ensures that the Commission has the best available scientific information on which to consider appropriate conservation and management measures. The Scientific Committee utilizes the services of expert fisheries scientists and its meetings usually comprise scientific and other related technical representatives. The SC also coordinates with the Technical and Compliance Committee on certain matters to ensure consistent advice is provided to the Commission.
• The Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meets in October and is the “enforcement” committee of the Commission. The TCC reviews members’ adherence to Commission decisions and monitors individual countries’ implementation of those measures. The TCC also makes recommendations to the Commission with respect to encouraging, improving and enforcing compliance by members with the decisions of the Commission.
• The Northern Committee (NC) meets in September and makes recommendations to the Commission on species that are mostly found in the Convention Area north of 20 degrees north. Unlike the SC and the TCC, not all members of the Commission are represented on the NC. Although participation in the NC is limited to those members that are located in the area north of 20 degrees north, or are fishing in this area, any member of the Commission may participate in NC meetings as an observer. Any decisions the Commission takes on species under the purview of the NC must be based on recommendations from the NC.
• The Finance and Administration Committee meets annually along with the Commission meeting and deliberates over the Commission’s budget. All Commission members are represented on the Finance and Administration Committee and recommendations are forwarded to the Commission for adoption.

Decisions taken by the Commission are generally done by consensus. In cases where decisions have to be taken by vote, usually on substantive matters, a “two-chamber system” applies. The FFA members of the Commission comprise one chamber, while the non-FFA members form the other chamber. Decisions are taken by a three-fourths majority of those present and voting in each chamber and no proposal can be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber.

How does WCPFC promote compliance?
The Convention establishes a requirement for each member to establish and maintain a record of fishing vessels that are authorised to fish in the Convention Area beyond that member’s area of national jurisdiction. The Secretariat maintains a central database of each member’s authorised list of fishing vessels, which acts as a verification tool to ensure that fishing vessels are legally operating in the Convention Area.

The WCPFC establishes a number of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) programme to promote compliance by Commission members with conservation and management measures and other decisions of the Commission (such as in relation to requirements concerning data submission). One such programme is the Regional Observer Programme (ROP), which manages the placement of personnel on board fishing vessels to observe and collect data on fishing operations. Data collected by observers is critical in assessing the effectiveness of measures, as well as providing scientists with important fishery independent information on the size and weight of species taken. In addition, the role of an observer can be useful in ensuring compliance, through verification of fishing information such as vessel location, time of year and species caught.

Complementing the ROP is the Commission’s vessel monitoring system (VMS). Vessels fishing in the Convention Area are required to install a transmitting device known as an Automatic Location Communicator (ALC), which transmits a signal to a land-based receiving station where fisheries managers can view and track the location of fishing vessels. This tool allows fisheries managers to better promote compliance with any area closures or restrictions that may be in place at any given time. It also helps scientists and managers understand the nature of fishing operations and where fishing is taking place. The Commission’s VMS became operational in April 2009. 

A third important MCS element is the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas by patrol vessels registered with the Commission by CCMs. These patrol vessels conduct routine operations throughout the Pacific Ocean. Under an important measure adopted by the Commission, members have agreed to allow their fishing vessels to be boarded and inspected by the patrol vessels of other members. Patrol vessels provide the Commission with an important tool with which to monitor and in some situations, take action against, fishing violations on the high seas.

Another critical component in the Commission’s compliance toolbox is the list of vessels that have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) activities. Vessels that have been found, through sufficient evidence, to have committed violations as described by the Commission, are placed on what is known as an “IUU List”. Members are prohibited from engaging in fishing activities or other related transactions with vessels that are on the IUU List, which can act as a strong incentive for countries to closely monitor and regulate the activities of their fishing vessels.

PNA
The Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, or The Nauru Agreement is an Oceania subregional agreement between the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. The eight signatories collectively control 25–30% of the world's tuna supply and approximately 60% of the western and central Pacific tuna supply.

Historically, the Nauru Agreement and other joint fishery management Arrangements made by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (usually referred to as PNA) have been concerned mainly with the management of tuna purse-seine fishing in the tropical western Pacific.

In October 2010, the eight member states Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) extended their prohibition on tuna purse-seine fishing in approximately 4.5 million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean high seas by purse-seine vessels licensed to fish in their combined Exclusive Economic Zones. The extension was unveiled at the 6th meeting of the Technical and Compliance Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.

Other recent actions by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement include a prohibition on setting purse-seine nets around whale sharks, a ban on fishing near fish aggregation devices during the months of July, August and September (with an option to extend this for up to an additional three months if scientific advice suggests that tuna stocks would benefit), a requirement for 100% observer coverage aboard purse-seiners, a minimum mesh-size, and a requirement for retention of all catch of tuna on board (no discards).

The full range of fishery management instruments implemented by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement includes:
The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement: which defines a multilateral licensing arrangement providing annual access to all PNA EEZs by purse-seine vessels which contribute significantly to the enhancement of a PNA country's (the Home Party) economic involvement in the fishery.
The Palau Arrangement: which formerly set an agreed, binding, limit on the number of purse-seine vessels allowed to operate in PNA waters. The Palau Arrangement, through the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme, now limits the amount of effort (in terms of number of fishing days) that can be exercised by purse-seine vessels in PNA waters during any one calendar year. A Longline Vessel Days Management Scheme is currently under trial.
The Implementing Arrangements of the Nauru Agreement: There have been three of these, defining the measures that have been agreed by all Parties that will be implemented in the management of the activities of purse-seine vessels in their own EEZs, either through Regulations or licensing conditions. These include the measures highlighted above, such as the requirement not to licence any purse-seine vessel which also fishes in certain defined High Seas areas (High Seas Pockets).

These PNA-specific measures are also supplemented by the Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access to FFA member EEZs by Foreign Fishing Vessels, agreed by all FFA member countries including the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. These terms and conditions apply to all foreign fishing vessels, not just purse-seiners, and include a requirement for an Automatic Location Communicator to be switched on at all times and reporting to the regional Vessel Monitoring System, minimum standards for reporting to national authorities, and a requirement for annual regional vessel registration.

In May 2012 the PNA Fisheries Ministers met in Alotau, Papua New Guinea, and through a Resolution on Marine Animals  gave their commitment to implement even stronger management measures in their joint EEZs order to maintain sustainable tuna fisheries and minimise impact on bycatch species. The new commitments include:

• Establishing a PNA Observer Agency by 1 January 2013 to improve efficiency of national observer programmes in maintaining 100% independent observer coverage aboard purse-seine fishing vessels in PNA waters;
• Adopting the MSC Implementation Plan, including fast-tracking an agreement on Precautionary Reference Points and Harvest Control Rules for the PNA free-school skipjack purse-seine fishery, as required to maintain MSC Certification (see below);
• Approving work on developing a FAD registration and tracking scheme to be trialled in 2016, in collaboration with the Pew Environment Group

Agreeing an amendment to the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme that provides a clear and unambiguous definition of the Fishing Day. In particular, clarifying that any calendar day in which any fishing activity takes place will be counted as a full fishing day, with limited exemptions for days in which the only activities during that day are bona-fide emergencies, breakdowns, refuelling, repairs, or expeditious transit with fully stowed fishing gear (non fishing days). Ministers also approved a PNA Office Business Plan, and welcomed Tokelau as a party to the Palau Arrangement Purse-Seine Vessel Days Management Scheme.

Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) is a scheme where vessel owners can purchase and trade days fishing at sea in places subject to PNA. The purpose of the VDS is to constrain and reduce catches of target tuna species, and increase the rate of return from fishing activities through access fees paid by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs).  The total allocation of fishing days is set and apportioned between Pacific Island members for one-year periods up to three years in advance. 

The VDS is implemented as part of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM2005-01). The VDS replaces the purse seine vessel number         limit of 205 vessels under Annex 1 of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Arrangement). The Palau Arrangement is a multilateral treaty governing the operation of purse seine vessels in the national waters of the PNA.  Its primary purpose is to place a limit on the number of vessels operating in the waters of the PNA. Under the VDS Management Scheme the PNA set the total number of days that can be fished in their waters combined and the apportionment of the total number of days between each country.  These allocations of fishing days are set for 12 month periods and can be set up to 3-years in advance.  The most recent stock assessment information on the target species of Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna and economic information relating to the maximisation of economic returns and optimal utilisation of the resource is used to assess the allocations of fishing days.

If you think I miss or misunderstood something please let me know. :-)

El Niñote (a big niño)!

It has been in the news a lot, and we see it in fishing. The fish has moved East big time and the vessels have followed them... the usual Western transhipment ports look empty while the Eastern ones are in overload.

During August, sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies were near or greater than +2.0°C across the eastern half of the tropical Pacific (see figure above). Large positive subsurface temperature anomalies persisted in the central and east-central equatorial Pacific during the month, with the largest departures exceeding 6°C (see below).

The atmosphere remained coupled to the anomalous oceanic warmth, with significant low-level westerly wind anomalies and upper-level easterly wind anomalies persisting from the western to east-central tropical Pacific. Also, the traditional and equatorial Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) were again negative, consistent with enhanced convection over the central and eastern equatorial Pacific and suppressed convection over Indonesia (see below). Collectively, these atmospheric and oceanic anomalies reflect a strong El Niño.

All models surveyed predict El Niño to continue into the Northern Hemisphere spring 2016, and
all multi-model averages predict a peak in late fall/early winter (3-month values of the Niño-3.4 index of +1.5°C or greater). The forecaster consensus unanimously favors a strong El Niño, with peak 3-month SST departures in the Nino region near or exceeding +2.0°C. Overall, there is an
approximately 95% chance that El Niño will continue through Northern Hemisphere winter 2015-16, gradually weakening through spring 2016.

Unfortunately, a strong "El Niño" does not affect only fishing in the western and central Pacific, but also the islands themselves, as the event will likely contribute to a above-normal hurricane seasons in both the central and eastern Pacific hurricane basins.

All this info comes from the 10th September 2015 ENSO Alert System Status issued by NOAA's Climate Prediction Centre

My TEDx Talk on Fisheries Compliance, Fairness and Us

Finally the talk I did in May 2015 is in Youtube! I'm really self conscious and talking to "non fisheries people" is always a challenge. But as a TEDx speaker is quite a soul search not just to develop the "what" are you saying... but as well the "why" are you saying it.  I'm already wiser then when I started the process and that, can only be a good thing!. My deepest "thank you!" to all the people putting their time on this, just for the love of it.

Coincidentally, while publishing this, I'm working in Papua New Guinea where right now the system I'm describing has started operating and I'm incredibly proud of how NFA (PNG National Fisheries Authority) has taking ownership and developed the concept. There is no other system like this one in any other country I worked (50 so far).

US IUU Approach: Different Does Not Mean Bad

The 2nd part of that statement should be applicable to anything from race, sexual orientation, supporting team sports, and so on... but in that case I was talking about IUU fishing control policies.

A few days ago, Molly Johnson a journalist from atuna.com, contacted me in reference to an article they published entitled "US not imposing sanctions on IUU fishing", in regards a declaration of David Balton (US Deputy Assistant for Oceans and Fisheries) where he outlined the US vision on their anti IUU fishing policy developments. 

She sent me the article (as I'm not a paying subscriber of the site) and after reading it, I replied:

"Is hard to make an opinion out of one article. And from what I read there is a plan and a system. The fact that they chose a different approach does not mean that they are 'not imposing sanctions on IUU fishing', and I think that statement may be misleading".

Furthermore, I gave my views on the article sent, she quite gracefully accepted my criticism and published the following article based on my response.

You want to make your own mind? Here is the info:

The U.S. House of Representatives passed on the 27 July H.R. 774: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 by voice vote. (Thanks FishWise!) 

The bill is now awaiting Senate decision. If passed, this bi-partisan legislation would combat IUU fishing activities by:

• Strengthening enforcement by building domestic capacity for monitoring and identifying IUU activities.
• Creating stiffer penalties for vessels caught illegally fishing in U.S. waters.
• Implementing legislation needed for the U.S. to ratify the United Nations Port States Measures Agreement (PSMA).

The Importance of Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Islands

Most of my work deals with oceanic/commercial fisheries; nevertheless I have a keen interest in the coastal fisheries in the region, as it is uniquely worldwide. In no other place i ever worked, fisheries plays such a key role in everyday life.

Much of the region’s nutrition, welfare, culture, employment, and recreation are based on the living resources in the zone between the shoreline and the outer reefs of the region. The continuation of current lifestyles, opportunities for future development, and food security are all highly dependent on coastal fisheries resources. 

In this post I quote the work of my friend and colleague Bob Gillett on a report (Pacific Island Fisheries: Issues and Challenges) he prepared for the UN ESCAP Pacific Office in 2014. Bob knows the Pacific as no one else, and he is  my references in regards how profession/work, ocean sports and life can (should?) be complementary.

While Coastal fisheries are dwarfed in both volume (approx. 12% vs 88%) and value by the offshore tuna fisheries, the region’s fisheries based on coastal resources provide most of the non-imported fish supplies to the region and hence have a crucial role in food security. 

Coastal fishery resources include a wide range of finfish and invertebrates. They are characterised by their shallow water habitats or demersal life-styles, restriction of individual movements to coastal areas, and, in most cases restricted larval dispersal. Because of their relative accessibility, these resources form the basis of most of the region’s small-scale fisheries.

An important characteristic of the coastal fisheries of the region is the diversity of the catch. The coastal fisheries of the region take a very large number of species. For example, it has been stated that subsistence fishing in Samoa makes use of 500 species. The term “tropical multi-species fisheries” is often used to describe the situation – as well as to allude to the difficulty of managing such a heterogeneous array of species. The coastal catch can be divided into finfish, invertebrates, and others:

• A 2002 study of coastal fisheries in the region showed that a typical small-scale commercial reef fishery in the region may harvest between 200 and300 finfish species, although it is likely that only a few species will dominate landings. Approximately one-third of the coastal catch total is comprised of emperors (Lethrinidae), surgeonfish (Acanthuridae) and snappers (Lutjanidae).
• The most-landed invertebrate food species groups in the region are: giant clams, and beche de mer, followed by much smaller amounts of crabs, lobsters, strombus, turbo, arc shell, other bivalves/gastropods, trochus, urchin, octopus, shoreline gastropods, beach bivalves, and land crabs (SPC 2008). Beche de mer, trochus and pearl oysters are important invertebrate export 
• Seaweeds are considered a “fishery” resource in most Pacific Island countries. They are mainly used for local food, but exported from a few countries (e.g. Tonga). “Live rock” which is portions of reef rock covered with attached organisms, particularly coralline algae, is thought to be a fishery resource in several countries. 

Coastal fishing methods reflect the diversity of the target species, and include activities while walking, wading, swimming, and fishing from non-motorised and motorized vessels. Popular techniques include gleaning, spearfishing, trapping, gillnetting, hook/line dropline fishing, and trolling.

In general, the coastal fishery resources are heavily fished and often show signs of overexploitation, especially in areas close to population centres and for fishery products in demand by the rapidly-growing Asian economies. The coastal fisheries are also negatively affected by habitat degradation, which occurs from destructive fishing practices, urbanisation, siltation from mining/logging, and competing uses of the coastal zone.

Coastal fisheries statistics are not very good in most countries of the region. Typically, government fisheries agencies give low priority to estimating the total amount of domestic catches. In general, the smaller the scale of the fishing, the less is known about the production levels, with quantitative information being especially scarce for the subsistence fisheries in most countries. Samoa, where a survey of village fisheries was completed a few years ago, is a notable exception. 

Short-term support to enhance fisheries statistical systems has been provided by FAO, SPC, NMFS, JICA and other agencies. A major lesson from almost 30 years of such support to establishing and enhancing national fisheries statistical systems is that, once external support is withdrawn, the systems usually degenerate and eventually become dysfunctional. Despite the importance of such data, the reality is that (a) in the prioritization of scarce government funding, the on-going routine collection of fisheries data has not received much priority, and (b) it is quite unlikely that any of the donors active in the fisheries sector in the region would be willing to fund such systems over the long-term.

Another issue is that most of the countries in the region attach great importance to their subsistence and small-scale commercial fisheries. However, it is these fisheries that present the greatest difficulties for the collection of production information. Also to be considered is that many fisheries specialists have questioned the cost-effectiveness and practicalities of regular and extensive detailed data collection from small-scale fisheries in the Pacific Islands.

The management of coastal fishery resources in many Pacific Island countries is a mixture of several systems:

• Traditional management. This is most prevalent in rural areas and characteristically involves village leaders restricting the fishing by those outside the community and by various controls on fishing by community members.
• Central government management. All Pacific Island countries have a fisheries law giving wide powers to the government fisheries agency in controlling fishing activity. For various reasons, the system is often ineffective. There is some degree of success, for example, in central governments applying point of export restrictions on those products which are exported.
• In recent years non-government organisations have taken the lead in creating an awareness in villages of the need for, and benefits of, community-based management of fishery resources – using primarily marine protected areas (MPAs) as the main management tool.

Current coastal fishery management measures (both centrally-administered and community driven) tend to be non-quantitative and are intended to protect stocks in a generalised way. These include MPAs, size limits (both minimum and maximum), gear restrictions (minimum mesh sizes for nets, bans on torch fishing at night), prohibitions on the use of destructive fishing methods (blast fishing, poisons), prohibitions on the taking of berried females, and seasonal or area closures.

El Niño, Walker Circulation and Fish

El Niño (the boy in Spanish) is part of a wider climate system called El Niño Southern Oscillation, in which the Pacific Ocean and the atmosphere above it influence each other. This interaction drives the warming and cooling of the equatorial Pacific, which in turn affects the weather elsewhere in the world.

The process starts with surface water, propelled westward across the ocean by trade winds and heated by the sun as it travels, running into the Philippines, the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea. Over the course of between two and seven years the pool of warm water thus created grows into something with an area of about 12 million sq km.

Balmy, humid air rises from the pool, cooling and shedding rain as it does so, as part of a phenomenon called the Walker Circulation (see figure). Some of this air travels west, where it irrigates Indonesia with its precipitation. Some travels east, discharging its load on the Pacific, and then sinks back to the surface near the coast of South America, replacing the air that has travelled west as the trade winds.

Below the surface things are happening, too. The movement of warm water towards the Pacific’s west draws cool water to the surface in its east. This process, known as upwelling, lifts nutrients from the dark ocean bed to sunlit levels where they can be absorbed by planktonic algae and thus support some of the world’s richest sources of wild protein, the Peruvian anchoveta and the Tuna fishery.

As the pool of warm water grows, the ocean’s surface rises. This means the western equatorial Pacific’s surface can be up to 30cm higher than that of its eastern counterpart. Take the trade winds away, though, and this mountain of water will collapse and start spreading east. That collapse and spread is the essence of El Niño.

To a large extent, the pooled warm waters of the Pacific west are the author of their own destruction. Once their surface temperature exceeds 26.5°C, cyclones can form. These sap the trade winds’ energy, and thus their ability to keep the raised pool intact. The result is that the whole system quickly fails, the warm water sloshes back towards South America, and the "El Niño" is born.

Higher-than-usual sea-surface temperatures across the central and eastern equatorial Pacific then slow the trade winds further, accelerating the pool’s demise. The upwelling stops, and the  fishery disappears. The ascending air that starts the Walker circulation moves east, and no longer brings rain to Indonesia. And the knock-on effects of the Walker circulation’s easterly movement echo around the Earth, disturbing rainfall systems everywhere, in a pattern that usually peaks in December.

Source here

5th Pacific Tuna Forum 2015

The biggest tuna industry gathering in the Western and Central Pacific region, the 5th Pacific Tuna Forum is scheduled from 22-23 September 2015 at the Sofitel Resort, Denarau, Nadi, Fiji.  More than 250 delegates are expected to be part of this Pacific tuna meeting with over 30 well known speakers scheduled to speak at the event.

Tuna... is what the whole deal is about...

This years theme is Achieving Optimal Economic Benefits through Sustainable Tuna Management and Development and the keynote presentation is by the boss of PNA, my colleague and friend Transform Aqorau, that said:

"There has been a lot of development in the Western and Central Pacific with low tuna prices and increased catches in the high seas areas that have impacted the industry. The Pacific Tuna Forum 2015 offers an opportunity for governments, industry and other service providers to the industry to hear what each has to say about what is happening. There has been a greater focus on the PNA Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) and the transformative power of the VDS. We have also seen the resurgence of the WTPO which have coagulated around the low tuna price and have taken voluntary measures for their members to stay in port for 10 days, and a surge in interest in MSC and FAD free tuna from the supermarkets. All these developments will be discussed by practitioners. The Pacific Tuna Forum 2015 presents an excellent opportunity for all those interested in the largest tuna fisheries in the world to hear from vessel operators, traders, processors and regulators about what is happening globally in the tuna world"

I have asked again to be one of the presenters (I been a speaker every year since 2011), and like last year on a double act, initially I'll be presenting the work of my friend Gilles Hosch on Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS),  since he at the time would be in FSM at the WCPFC Working Group (WG) talking about the work he did on best practices for Tuna CDS and the work out of our expert consultation work in recently in Rome. Initially I was also asked to be there with him, but it was no point for both to assist, so i'll bring his message to the Forum while he takes mine to the WG.

Since the Pacific Island Countries have significantly experienced the effects of the EU’s role as the world IUU fisheries evaluator (there are more “yellow cards” in the PICs than in any other region in the world in relation to their population and development status) I was asked to make presentation on this topic. 

I will not dwell in the perceived politics or unfairness of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalyzed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme with the support of the DEVFISH II/FFA Programme. Including the incorporation of elements of the PSMA as to be working towards a pacific wide Catch Certification Scheme as a tool to offset the administrative and economic burden that compliance with the EU scheme has enacted in the PICs.

There has been an overwhelming response from tuna industry players from not only within the region but from other parts of the world.  For details of the event and to register please visit: http://infofish.org/index.php/pacific-tuna-forum-2015/

Tentacles that think

Today's is not strictly a fisheries post... but is about one of my favourite sea creatures: Octopus  While I love to eat them,  I'll have to admit that the more I know about them, the harder it gets... Particularly for anthropomorphic reasons, I like people and things that are our of the ordinary... and octopuses are real awesome freaks!

Schematic of Octopus bimaculoides anatomy. Nature 524, 220–224

Where else would you find an intelligent organism that has a hydraulic skeleton, grab stuff with suckers out of its 8 arms, has the capacity to change  the colour and texture of their skin, moves by jet propulsion, and spits ink when they are upset... common!

The Economist publish recently the results of an interesting paper on some genetical aspects of their intelligence, I quote it below

Almost all intelligent creatures, be they parrots, sharks or human beings, are vertebrates. This is inconvenient for anyone trying to understand the nature of intelligence because it means, by and large, that he can study only how it has developed down a single evolutionary path. But there is an important exception. Molluscs branched off to form their own lineage before any organism had a spine—and one particular class of them, the cephalopods, has since become smart enough to rival some vertebrates.

Modern cephalopods are octopuses, squid, cuttlefish and an unusual shelled creature called the nautilus. Octopuses, in particular, are rated as intelligent. Some carry coconut shells across the seabed to make shelters. Others have worked out that fishing boats offer easy pickings. There have even been cases of them climbing out of aquarium tanks to raid a neighbouring tank that contained a tasty morsel. Many researchers would like to know whether these behaviours have come about in a different way from vertebrate intelligence, or if there are common traits that are necessary for smart creatures of any sort.

Caroline Albertin, of the University of Chicago, and her colleagues have been trying to understand the basis of cephalopod intelligence. To do so, as they report this week in Nature, they have mapped the genome of an octopus species called the California two-spot. They wanted to see which sets of genes in this species were pronounced in comparison to those in other, simpler, molluscs. They found two genetic families that were indeed greatly expanded. One of these, known as C2H2, encodes proteins called transcription factors, which regulate the activities of other genes. The second is the protocadherins, which encode proteins that guide the development of neurons in the nervous system. Both of these gene families are also expanded in vertebrates—but not, as far as is known, in any other group of animals.

Ms Albertin’s co-author, Daniel Rokhsar, of the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology, in Japan, describes protocadherins as molecular barcodes that identify a cell to its neighbours, enabling appropriate connections to be made. This is vital when building a nervous system. Such a system’s essence is the correct connection between its neurons. Expanding the number of genes for these proteins means they can exist in more diverse forms. In vertebrates this makes it possible for nerve cells to form more complex circuits, and the same is probably true in octopuses.

The effects of the C2H2 genes are less well understood, but having more of them presumably lets octopus genes function in more diverse ways than those of simpler creatures. That would allow a more sophisticated nervous system to develop.

Certainly, the octopus nervous system is sophisticated. It is also different from that of vertebrates, the neurons of which are concentrated in the brain and spinal cord, whence protuberances called axons travel to the rest of the body, to tell it what to do. An octopus brain holds only a third of the animal’s neurons and, being an invertebrate, an octopus by definition has no spinal cord. Instead, the balance of its neurons are concentrated in its arms, which therefore have a curious sort of independence.

This arrangement seems to have come into existence after the split, 270m years ago, that separated octopuses from other cephalopods. The arms of squid and cuttlefish remain under the control of the brain. Each octopus tentacle, however, acts autonomously as it feels around for food or threats. The brain can take over if necessary, but their decentralised nervous systems make octopuses less dependent than vertebrates on transmitting long-range signals through their bodies. That means they can act quickly and instinctively, though at a cost: they can exercise precise control of their arms only by looking directly at them.

With around half a billion neurons, a California two-spot can probably out-think a rat, which has only 200m of them. Yet the decentralisation of its nervous system means the nature of that thinking is surely alien to the vertebrate approach. This, alone, shows intelligence can develop in more than one way. Pursuing Ms Albertin’s approach may help researchers to get their arms around the details.

Original story here

A Pathway to Prosecuting High Seas Criminals

A story the public needs to read

My friend and colleague Mark Young, a former commander of the US Coast Guard that was for a few years FFA operation boss and now is the Senior Officer of conservation enforcement at PewEnvironment, wrote this good piece in Medium website. There he state in clear words some of the key challenges that we face in the high seas; these also indirectly apply to the issues of human rights we are facing in the industry. Furthermore, it shows that there are no easy answers to complicated problems. I quote his contribution below:

These are not high seas criminals, but they always looked dodgy to me :-)

Ian Urbina’s compelling series demonstrates the complexity of prosecuting crimes committed on the high seas. Criminals have enormous opportunities because vessels spend a considerable amount of time away from land, often beyond the reach of authorities.

And while treaties and laws provide a certain level of governance beyond the jurisdiction of national waters, their rules are often not applied. That’s largely because vessel owners fly “flags of convenience,” which means they have registered their ship in a country whose government has little interest in, or capacity for, holding them accountable.

There are also challenges when citizens of one country are on a vessel bearing the flag of a second country while fishing in the waters of a third country. As I asked in Part 1 of the series, if a crime is committed under these circumstances, “who leads such an investigation?” Who has the authority and jurisdiction? How do victims of offshore crimes get justice?

Trying to answer these questions can be complex and difficult. But following the example of commercial fishing presents an avenue to prosecuting high seas criminals, or at the very least, a penalty for breaking the rules. This can be done by using a set of complementary tools working in tandem across jurisdictions to identify suspicious activity, document the evidence, and take action once a suspected vessel ties up in port. The criminals of commercial fishing are the poachers. Illegal fishing accounts for roughly one out of every five fish taken from the seas, at a cost of up to $23.5 billion every year, according to a study in PLOS One.

The challenge with monitoring fishing vessels, just as with other types of ships, is that thousands of them are spread out over vast ocean regions. Ian points out that the world’s naval presence is diminishing; in any case, a physical presence on the water doesn’t have as great an ability to detect suspicious vessel activity as remote monitoring platforms do. But the challenge with remote monitoring is that not all governments can afford it — which is why platforms such as Project Eyes on the Seas were developed. These tools can give resource-poor regions the potential to identify illegal activity using a range of emerging technologies, from vessel location reporting to satellite imagery.

But what good is this information if there’s no enforcement vessel to catch the suspect ship in the act?

That’s where Port State Measures, an agreement adopted by the United Nations and awaiting ratification by 25 nations before becoming enforceable, comes into play. These measures would allow enforcement officers at any port to use information collected about a ship’s activities at sea to determine if the vessel warrants closer inspection. In the most serious of cases, vessels identified as fishing illegally can be denied port access and services altogether.

International cooperation, even without an official U.N. agreement, has already paid dividends in combating illegal fishing. For instance, in 2012, the Liberian government accused the fishing vessel Premier, flagged to South Korea, of illegally catching tuna in its waters. But by the time the Liberians had enough information to take action, the vessel was gone. When Liberian authorities learned that the Premier was headed for port in Mauritius, they requested that the vessel be boarded and searched, actions that uncovered documents that bolstered Liberia’s case. Ultimately the Premier’s owners settled with Liberia for $2 million.

Once the Port State Measures Agreement is ratified, the international community will have another important tool to deny access to the marketplace for illegal fishing vessels. Combined with tracking technologies and a universal standard for applying unique identifiers to all commercial ships, the increased port enforcement capabilities offered by the agreement have the potential to be a game changer in fighting not only illegal fishing but all maritime crime — because a vessel engaging in illegal fishing is often wrapped up in other nefarious business as well. The more illegal fishing vessels we can drive out of business, the more crime we can combat.

But there’s still a lot of work to be done before most victims of maritime crime get justice. The one common denominator among all the cases Ian uncovered for his series is a lack of leadership in effectively prosecuting those responsible. And that leads to one inevitable conclusion: All of the enhanced technologies and updated laws will have little effect if world leaders don’t prioritize fighting these crimes.

One-year transitional arrangement for the U.S. treaty deal underlines value of Pacific fishery

The one-year transitional arrangement for United States vessels for 2016 is seen as “positive development reflecting the value of rights-based fisheries management” for the Pacific islands

the image has no relation to the tuna treaty, but i really like it :-)

The one-year deal agreed to on 5 August 2015 at the end of a negotiating session in Australia brings greater benefits to all Pacific islands and confirms the value of the PNA’s vessel day scheme (VDS) for managing the skipjack tuna fishery in the western and central Pacific ocean. The deal, however, is only for one year, which underscores the increasing difficulties in getting agreement on longer-term access for U.S. vessels that they enjoyed until the PNA introduced the VDS.

The islands will receive higher fees for fewer fishing days than in the current agreement for 2015. The total package, including both U.S. industry payments and the U.S. government fisheries subsidy comes to US$89,271,350 for 2016.  

The eight PNA members will receive US$12,600 per fishing day, a 34 percent increase over the US$9,380 currently being paid by the U.S. purse seine fleet. PNA set US$8,000 as the minimum fee for VDS days for 2015 and 2016 while capping the number of fishing days for 2015 and 2016 at fewer than 45,000. Many fishing nations in 2015 are paying significantly more than this benchmark price to secure fishing days for their fleets.

In addition, the agreement for 2016 will, for the first time, see the Cook Islands receive significant payments under the VDS, and the U.S. fleet will begin “exploratory” fishing opportunities in the exclusive economic zones of five South Pacific nations.

The U.S. tuna industry will pay US$68,271,350 and the U.S. government will provide a subsidy of US$21 million. Fishing day payments aside, each of the Pacific islands involved in the treaty will receive an equal share payment of US$680,397.

The U.S. also agreed not to fish in two high seas “pockets” located in the PNA region.

PNA has enforced the VDS for the purse seine industry for over five years, setting a minimum fishing day fee now at US$8,000. Since 2010, revenue from the VDS to the eight-member PNA has increased more than five-fold, from US$64 million in 2010 to an estimated US$350 million this year.

Since the access and financial terms of the Treaty lapsed in June 2013, the U.S. and the Pacific Islands have agreed on a series of one-year or 18-month interim arrangements to maintain the treaty, which gives U.S.-flagged vessels access to the region for fishing while negotiating extension of the Treaty.

Although there continue to be challenges — issues such as the U.S. desire for more fishing days in the waters of particular countries and a request for exemption of a few large purse seiners from the requirement that a fishing day be defined as 1.5 days for vessels with significantly increased capacity and sophistication , these issues are to be worked on in the future.

Original source in the PNA page

Status of the World Fisheries for Tuna

The International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, publishes its status of the World fisheries for Tuna and does regular updates.

It tracks 23 stocks of the major commercial tuna species worldwide (6 albacore, 4 bigeye, 4 bluefin, 5 skipjack and 4 yellowfin stocks), and summarizes the results of the most recent scientific as-sessments of these stocks, as well as the current management measures adopted by the RFMOs. In addition, it ranks the status and management of the 23 stocks using a consistent methodology in terms of three factors: Abundance, Exploitation/Management (fishing mortality) and Environmental Impact (bycatch).

They are in a interesting position and get a lot of slack because to 80% of the world’s tinned tuna brands have formed it, with the proclaimed mission of which is to ‘undertake science-based initiatives for the long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna stocks, reducing bycatch and promoting ecosystem health.’ I guess is up each person's believes to deal with the facts around if a organisation made by fishing companies, can be trusted in the information they provide, even if  the reports are really well referenced from the RFMOs documentations.

Personally, I always believe that if industry is part of the problem, they have to be part of the solution. Hence I welcome their existence, and personally appreciate some of their staff and members. I find the reports quite good, albeit personally I would present some of the graphs and language in a less "massaged" way.

Said so, I really like their "visual approach" to data presentation, for example: their "Colour Ratings Decision Table" as way to present their ranking system.

The latest update (Feb 2015) shows for the Pacific the following picture: 

Where BET is Big Eye, YFT is Yellow Fin, SKJ is Skipjack, ALB is Albacore and PBF is Pacific Bluefin

As you see is a mix picture, but in my opinion is shows firstly the species and elements that need more attention and oversight, and the those where lessons learns in terms of management and compliance can be used.

I'm not saying that things are good (or are going to be good), but that for moving in the right direction we need information, and here is one that helps.

The EU Distant Water Fleet

From 2010 to 2014 at least 15,264 fishing vessels operated under EU flags in external waters using a FAR authorisation. The data has been provided by the European Commission and also includes additional information from 2006 to 2020, amounting to 16,336 unique vessels – including 978 licences that were given to third (or non-EU) countries to operate in EU waters.

This is what WhoFishesFAR, a recently launched website sponsored by a series of NGOs (EJF, Oceana, and WWF) has found after an access of information request to the European Commission. The data includes all official agreements, but not private agreements, as the EU Commission itself admits that the EU has no data on these agreements.

The website is fully interactive and searchable, I recommend you have a go at your key interest areas.

The aim is to share light over the rules governing both the licensing of the European Union’s large fishing fleet operating outside EU waters, and the licensing of non-EU countries’ vessels such as Norway, Iceland and Faroe Islands to fish in EU waters, the so-called FAR, which will be rewritten in 2015. The reform of the FAR must ensure that the activities of the EU fleet and nationals operating outside EU waters are transparent, accountable and sustainable. Otherwise, the EU risks allowing its fleet to be engaged in IUU fishing through legal loopholes. 

Would be interesting to see if there is a correlation in between the difficulties around some of those agreements and the incidence of yellow cards under the EU IUU Regulation.

The Sashimi Tuna Industry in the Pacific

Got good feedback from my post on the canned tuna industry, so under the same "modus operandi" here are my findings on the Sashimi / Longining side of the tuna business in the Pacific. A very different scenario in all accounts, I wish Longliners were only half as regulated and under control as Purseiners are, but we are slowly getting there... at some stage :-)  

Jamie doing the best job he can

Again, lot of the info comes from the great publication by my friends and colleges Hamilton, McCoy, Campling et all "Market and Industry Dynamics in the Global Tuna Supply Chain" published by FFA/DevFISH II in 2011. 

The Players 

Annual tuna supply to the global sashimi market is currently around 500,000 mt, the majority of which is supplied to the Japanese sashimi market (around 80%). The Japanese and Taiwanese longline fleets are the top two suppliers of sashimi-grade tuna, collectively accounting for over half of global longline catches. Other significant longline fleets include Korea, China and Indonesia.

The longline industry is generally characterised by two vessel types – large-scale distant water vessels (supplying frozen tuna) and small-medium scale offshore vessels (supplying fresh tuna). Longline vessels targeting albacore for canning (e.g. Taiwanese, Chinese, PIC fleets) or other species such as sharks and swordfish, may also supply incidental bigeye and yellowfin catch to the fresh sashimi market.

Distant water vessels operate in all three oceans and are typically around 400-500 GRT, significantly greater than 24 metres in length, steel-hulled, have ultra-low temperature (ULT) freezer capabilities (-55-60°C) for storing catch and generally tranship at sea. Smaller-scale fresh tuna longliners usually limit operations to one ocean area and are typically less than 100 GRT, below 24 metres in length, fibreglass reinforced plastic (FRP) or steel-hulled and use ice or refrigerated seawater (RSW) for storing catch, which is offloaded in ports.

Longline vessel numbers in most fleets have declined markedly over the past 5-10 years, in part due to serious profitability constraints stemming from increasing operating costs (especially fuel) and declining catches relating to overcapacity and stock sustainability issues. Further vessel number reductions relate to capacity reduction programs implemented by the Governments of the two largest distant water fleets, Japan and Taiwan, in an effort to reduce global longline fishing overcapacity.

A notable exception is the Chinese fleet which, contrary to vessel number declines in other major fleets (i.e. Japan, Taiwan, Korea), has increased in size, due largely to the purchase of ex-Japanese vessels which had ceased operations due to bankruptcy.

A number of key issues currently impacting longline vessel fishing operations globally include – longline fishing overcapacity, purse seine fishing overcapacity, IUU fishing, stock sustainability issues, rising fuel costs, stagnant prices and market demand, and competition from ranched/farmed bluefin. Large distant water longline fishing operations have been, and continue to be, the most vulnerable to these issues.

Smaller-scale vessels, particularly those capable of multiple targets (e.g. albacore and/or bigeye) have demonstrated greater resilience, as they have more flexibility to adapt to changing operating conditions.

Tuna longline for sashimi is categorized based on type of operation, area fished, and target species:

South Pacific offshore albacore longline fishery comprises Pacific-Islands domestic “offshore” vessels, such as those from American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu; these fleets mainly operate in subtropical waters, with albacore the main species taken.

Tropical offshore bigeye/yellowfin-target longline fishery includes “offshore” sashimi longliners from Taiwan, based in Micronesia, Guam, Philippines and Taiwan, mainland Chinese vessels based in Micronesia, and domestic fleets based in Indonesia, Micronesian countries, Philippines, PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vietnam.

Tropical distant-water bigeye/yellowfin-target longline fishery comprises “distantwater” vessels from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, mainland China and Vanuatu. These vessels primarily operate in the eastern tropical waters of the WCP–CA (and into the EPO), targeting bigeye and yellowfin tuna for the frozen sashimi market.

Chinese longliners waiting (for more subsidies?) in Suva harbour

Fleets
Japan

• Japan’s sashimi market is supplied with catch from the Japanese longline, pole and line and purse seine fleets.
• The Japanese longline fishery has three major vessel classes – distant water (>120 GRT), offshore (10-120 GRT) and coastal (<20 GRT). Total longline catch (excluding coastal vessels) was 47,199 mt in 2009, with catch volumes declining significantly in conjunction with decreases in vessels numbers.
• In 2000, 529 distant water longline vessels were in operation; by 2010 this number had decreased to 268. Around 30% of Japan’s distant water longline vessels are profitable; only 100 or so vessels survived since then. In late 2010, there were 275 small offshore vessels (10-20 GRT) and 51 mid-sized offshore vessels (20- 120GRT) in operation. The number of mid-sized offshore vessels has reduced significantly (142 in 2000), while small offshore vessel numbers have remained relatively stable.
• Japan’s pole and line fleet is comprised of two major vessel classes – distant water (>120 GT) and offshore (20-120 GT). In 2010, the fleet consisted of 26 distant water and 67 offshore pole and line vessels; vessel numbers have decreased over time. Total catch in 2009 was 95,000 mt; a significant decrease from 150,000 mt in 2005. Catch composition has also changed with much higher catch volumes of albacore (i.e. 10% albacore in 2005, 34% in 2009).
• High fuel prices, as well as the ageing of experienced officers and problems with recruiting young Japanese crew members were identified as the most serious factors which will continue to impact Japanese sashimi fishing fleets in the future.
• Following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, vessel numbers in the coastal longline and pole and line fleets have declined due to wreckages sustained from the natural disaster. Lives of fishing crew members and employees in shore-based tuna businesses have also been lost.

Taiwan

Compliance troubles

• Taiwan’s sashimi-grade longline fishing fleet consists of two classes of vessels - large scale (>100 GT, primarily targeting bigeye) and small-scale (<100 GT, primarily targeting yellowfin). Some of the albacore-targeting longliners of both size classes may also produce sashimi-grade fish from their incidental catch of bigeye and yellowfin.
• Two major operational characteristics define Taiwan longline activity - the ability to switch target species and in some cases freezing and holding temperature to maximize value of a particular segment of the catch; and, the retention where possible of much of the incidental catch.
• The number of vessels in Taiwan’s large-scale longline fleet has decreased significantly in recent years – in 2010, the fleet consisted of 359 vessels, a decrease from 562 in 2004. In 2008, an estimated 1,400 small-scale longline vessels between 20-100 GT were in operation and around 500 vessels less than 20 GT. There is also significant Taiwanese ownership of non-Taiwan flag longline vessels fishing for sashimi-grade tunas.
• The number of Taiwan’s large-scale tuna longline vessels operating in WCPO waters in 2009 was 75, a steep decline from 133 active in 2005. The total bigeye catch for the large-scale fleet was reported to be 8,863 mt in 2009. About 1,220 small-scale tuna longline vessels fished in the WCPO in 2009, catching an estimated 16,500 mt of yellowfin and 4,500 mt of bigeye.
• Among the two fleets, the large-scale component is the most vulnerable to increased operating costs. Similarly, small-scale vessels are challenged by operating cost increases, but exhibit greater flexibility and are in a better position to adapt to changing conditions in the fishery. The design and construction of small-scale longliners has continued to evolve in recent years.

Korea

• In 2008, the global Korean longline fleet was comprised of 158 vessels (compared with 276 in 1990), with a total global catch of almost 38,000 mt. Most are large ULT vessels, typically 350-500 GRT in size.
• In 2009, 111 Korean longliners operated in the WCPO, catching around 31,000 mt; 50% of the retained catch was bigeye and 30% yellowfin.
• The majority of Korean longline catch is exported to Japan, but increasing volumes are supplied to the growing domestic sashimi market.
• Vessel numbers in the longline fishery have continued to fall due to increased regulation, increased operational costs and uncertainties regarding the resource base, although vessel numbers are believed to have stabilized for the time being.
• Given most of the Korean longline catch is taken in WCPO waters, future prospects for the Korea’s longline fleet closely relate to ongoing developments in the region. At-sea transhipment is critical to the viability of the Korean fleet. Hence, Korean vessel owners are particularly concerned about the possible prohibition of at-sea transhipment in the WCPFC convention area.

China

• Sashimi-grade tuna is produced from two Chinese longline vessel categories - smaller vessels (<30 metres) based in Pacific Island ports, and larger distant-water ULT vessels (up to 70 metres) operating in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Fiji-based Chinese longliners targeting canning-grade albacore also supply fresh sashimi-grade fish from the last 10-15 sets of a trip. Global bigeye catch by Chinese longliners totalled around 21,800 mt for 2008.
• About 138 Chinese large-scale distant water tuna longliners operate worldwide. In 2010, 90-100 distant water longliners were active in WCPO waters; an increase from a reported 45 vessels operating in 2008. In 2009, 70-80 small-scale vessels delivered fresh fish to fish bases in FSM and Marshall Islands. Total longline catch by Chinese longliners in WCPO waters in 2009 of bigeye and yellowfin was around 9,800 mt and 6,300 mt respectively.
• Although distant water longliners do not require extensive support from shore bases, Suva (Fiji) has become the preferred port for re-supply and general support of Chinese ULT longliners, when required. ULT catch by distant water longliners is exported to Japan. Fresh sashimi-grade yellowfin and bigeye from smaller-scale vessels is air-freighted to the Japanese and US markets.

Indonesia

• Indonesian longline and handline fisheries operate in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
• In 2009, total sashimi-grade catch by Indonesian vessels was around 45,000 mt, 25,000 mt of which was caught in Indian Ocean waters (one-third of late 1990s levels) and around 20,000 mt in Pacific waters.
• Indonesia has declined considerably in importance as a supplier of sashimi-grade tuna since the late 1990s, particularly with the reduction in Indian Ocean catch. However, it remains a significant source of lower grade frozen sashimi-grade tuna to the US market.

US

• US longline fisheries in the WCPO are based in Hawaii and American Samoa. In 2010, 156 vessels operated in the region. The Hawaii-based fleet comprised of around 130 vessels, targets sashimi-grade bigeye. The American Samoa-based fleet (26 vessels in 2009) supplies canning-grade albacore, although incidental bigeye and yellowfin may be marketed for sashimi.
• Total catch of all tuna species by the US longline fleet in the WCPFC convention area was approx 9,000 mt in 2010; a marked decline from 2007 catch volumes of 12,753 mt. Around 4,000 mt of bigeye and 820 mt of yellowfin were caught in 2009.
• The Hawaii-based longline fleet targets not only bigeye, but also swordfish. A three year closure of the swordfish fishery from 2001-2004 and the subsequent introduction of stricter management regulations has harmed vessel operators’ swordfish and tuna businesses, due to a buyer perception that vessels could not consistently provide product.

Others - WCPO

• Vietnam’s small-scale longline fleet lands an estimated 15,000 mt (mostly yellowfin), while larger vessels land less than 5,000 mt annually. Vietnam is a significant exporter of fresh and frozen tuna (mostly yellowfin) in various processed forms and was the largest exporter of fresh tuna to the US market in 2009 (2,600 mt, 12% of total US imports).
• Potential exists to further develop the domestic longline fishery and value-added export processing sector, with recent dramatic growth experienced in these sectors.
• While the Philippines has a small fleet of less than twenty large distant water longliners, it has a significant handline fishery of around 1,000 vessels (total catch 8,200 mt in 2009; 90% yellowfin). During the 1990s, much of the catch was exported as sashimi-quality fresh chilled whole fish to Japan. However, with the increasing shift to value-added processing (typically CO-treated tuna products), less than 25% of exports are now marketed in whole round fresh-chilled form.
• In 2012, 97 Fiji-based longline vessels caught approx 15,000 mt of tuna (of which (7,200 mt) was canning-grade albacore;. High quality fresh-chilled bigeye and yellowfin is exported mostly to the Japanese and US markets. Significant quantities of frozen loins also exported to the EU market that is recovering after  Fiji losing EU market access in late 2008.
• Tonga, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea all produce (or have formerly produced, in the case of Solomon Islands) small quantities of sashimi quality tuna for export to the Japanese and US markets. French Polynesia has a large domestic longline fleet (68 vessels), although the majority of catch (80%; ~5,000mt) is utilised for local consumption.

Principal Sashimi Markets

Japan is the world’s principal and pioneer market for fresh-chilled and frozen sashimi-grade tuna, given sashimi and sushi are food dishes which are unique to Japanese cuisine. Until the 1990s, sashimi tuna was almost exclusively consumed in Japan. Today, Japan still remains by far the largest sashimi market, accounting for at least 80% of global consumption.

soon to come to your sushi rstaurant

By comparison, the second most significant sashimi market, the US, accounts for an estimated 8-10% of total sashimi consumption. Annual tuna supply to the global sashimi market is currently estimated at around 500,000 mt; 300,000-400,000 mt of which is supplied to Japan.

An estimated 60,000-100,000 mt is currently supplied to other non-Japanese sashimi markets. The first sashimi markets to develop outside of Japan in the 1990s were the US and Europe (particularly, the UK). Sizeable markets have since developed elsewhere in Asia, with consumption in Korea, China and Taiwan already exceeding that of the European Union.

The growing popularity of Japanese food is also evident in Australia and New Zealand, with a huge boom in the past several years of fast-food retail sushi outlets. Markets are also emerging in Eastern Europe (i.e. Russia) and South America (i.e. Peru and Ecuador).

Japan

• Japan consumes an estimated 80% of total annual global sashimi production, with a market value of US $3.4 billion (2006 estimate). Sashimi consumption in Japan peaked in 2002 at around 650,000 mt, but has declined significantly since this time; by 2009, annual consumption was an estimated 308,000 mt.
• An estimated 149,000 mt of sashimi-grade tuna was supplied by Japanese domestic landings in 2009. The remaining supply (159,000 mt) was met from imports from other longline and handline fleets, as well as bluefin tuna ranching operations in the Mediterranean, Mexico and South Australia. Roughly, 30% of total sashimi-grade tuna supply to Japan is fresh-chilled, while 70% is frozen.
• Since the mid 1990s, sashimi prices in the Japanese market have been depressed due to oversupply. Price stagnation has been further exacerbated by economic recession in Japan and the recent global economic crisis, which has depressed food prices generally and influenced
• Japanese consumer’s preference for cheaper, lower-end sashimi and sushi products. Competition from cheaper farmed product has also placed pressure on prices.
• The Japanese sashimi market is characterised by multiple complex market arrangements and distribution systems, but these can largely be distinguished into two channels according to the fresh and frozen sashimi market segments – ‘traditional’ channels (i.e. government regulated wholesale markets systems) and, ‘unofficial’ channels (i.e. more direct marketing channels which largely by-pass the traditional wholesale market system). Historically, both fresh and frozen tuna was marketed through the traditional wholesale market system. This market channel remains significant for high quality fresh-chilled tuna. However, with large advances in freezing technology and development of the cold chain over the past 20-30 years, coupled with the growing significance of trading companies in tuna sashimi trading, there has been a considerable shift in the volume of frozen sashimi-grade tuna sold through unofficial channels, rather than the traditional wholesale market channel. Unofficial channels dominate sales to supermarkets and large retailers (i.e. restaurants, sushi bar chains).
• Over the past twenty years, Japanese consumers’ purchasing preferences for sashimi tuna have changed markedly. During the economic boom of the 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese consumers’ expenditure on eating out was high and their exposure to, and subsequently, consumption levels of high quality of fresh sashimi tuna increased. However, since the mid 1990s, economic recession prompted Japanese consumers to eat at home much more, which has had a major influence on the rise in supermarket sales of lower-priced and lower quality frozen sashimi-grade tuna. Japanese household consumption of tuna in Japan is in decline, in both volume and value terms. This stems from competition from other protein sources, both seafood and non-seafood. The declining overall trend in sashimi consumption (both in restaurants and homes) is likely to continue given continued low population growth, declining household expenditure on food items generally, and changing consumer taste preferences of the younger generation away from seafood to non-seafood protein sources.

Other Products – Katsuobushi

• In addition to shelf-stable and fresh-chilled and frozen products, another notable product utilizing tuna, which is unique to Japan, is katsuobushi – flakes or shavings of dried and smoked skipjack (bonito) tuna, used widely in Japanese cooking as a condiment and as a key ingredient in soup broths (dashi) and sauces. The use of katsuobushi in Japanese cuisine is steeped in tradition as its origins date back as early as the Muromachi period (1336-1573).
• Previously, around 200,000 mt of raw material was required annually for domestic katsuobushi production in Japan. Over the past five years or so, raw material requirements have declined to around 160,000 mt, due to decreasing consumer demand, as well as an increase in the volume of imported katsuobushi products. Japan’s katsuobushi processing industry relies heavily on raw materials caught in WCPO waters by the Japanese purse seine fleet (and to a much lesser extent the Japanese distant pole and line fleet), as well as imported skipjack from other fleets, also operating in WCPO waters.
• Total annual domestic production volumes of katsuobushi products in Japan in the early 2000s ranged between 35,000-40,000 mt (net finished weight), but have since declined to around 32,000 mt in 2009.
• Katsuobushi accounts for almost 25% of total tuna consumed in Japan annually. Given katsuobushi products are so culturally ingrained in Japanese cuisine and the market is mature, this relative trend is long-standing and unlikely to change. However, like Japanese canned tuna and sashimi consumption, the actual volume of katsuobushi products consumed annually is steadily declining, due to an ageing population and low population growth.

Longline Transshipment and Unloading Activities in the WCPO

• No firm transshipment volume amounts are available for the four distinct longline fisheries in the WCPO that unload at sea or in port. It is believed the greatest amount of transhipping at sea takes place in the distant water bigeye/yellowfin target fishery as the practice is an integral part of operations in that fishery.

State of the global market for shark products

After a long wait this publication by my friends and colleges, Felix Dent and Shelley Clarke is available from the FAO virtual library. Is the resource to go to, if you want to know what is happening with sharks and to infer what works and what does not. Download the original from here, (It complements on my shark assumptions post of 4 weeks ago).

This publication is intended to complement and inform the International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, developed in 1998 to address concerns over possible negative effects of increased shark catches on vulnerable shark populations. It is also intended as a part complement to, and part continuation of, Shark Utilization, Marketing and Trade (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 389), published in 1999.

Much of that paper remains valid, e.g. the information on product utilization and processing, as well as that on the biological characteristics of shark species.

Consequently, the present publication focuses primarily on providing an updated picture of the world market for shark products using data that in many cases have only become available in recent years, such as origin and destination data.

Where data are still lacking, an effort has been made to estimate the relevant figures through examination of the trade databases of the world’s major traders of shark products. This increased availability of data is believed to have allowed a more accurate – and up-to-date – initial evaluation of the relative importance of each country or territory, thus providing a more solid basis on which to target investigative efforts.

saved by the camera

The country-by-country assessments of shark fin trade recording practices also constitute another important area of focus that had not previously been addressed. However, given the primary objective of this study, those details that are necessarily not captured in such a broad-scale review will need to be identified and elucidated in regional or country-specific studies

The Canned Tuna Fishing Industry in the Pacific

I recently was asked to "explain" in a training brief, "how" the tuna fishery aimed at canning operates in the Pacific... a daunting task per se, but one I took as it was good for me to condense a lot of of information I had into one document, so here I transcribe some of the findings. But if you have more up dated data, let me know please and I make the corrections :-) 

from the bridge of a pole & line in the Solomons.

Thankfully a lot was done on a great publication by my friends and colleges Hamilton, McCoy, Campling et all "Market and Industry Dynamics in the Global Tuna Supply Chain" published by FFA/DevFISH II in 2011. 

Annually, at least 2.5 million metric tonnes of the global tuna catch is destined for canning; the majority of which is caught by purse seine vessels. Given canned tuna is a price competitive and nutritional source of protein, overall demand has increased markedly over the past three decades and remains strong. To match this growing demand, the canned tuna fishing industry has experienced massive growth in terms of vessel numbers, vessel catching capacities and total catch. The level of complexity of the canned tuna fishing industry has also deepened due to factors such as resource sustainability issues, stricter regulatory requirements, increasing operating costs, developments in consumer demand, changing preferential market access regimes, to name a few.

Globally, there are currently at around 580 industrial-scale tuna purse seine (PS) vessels in operation in four major ocean regions - Western and Central Pacific (260), Eastern Pacific Ocean (230), Indian Ocean (50) and Atlantic Ocean (40). Total capital investment in purse seine fishing vessels is in the order of US$ 5.8 billion, representing over 30% of total capital investment in the global canned tuna industry (around US $15 billion).

In the last years there has been significant additional investment in vessels (at least $1.2 billion worth); the majority of new investment being for vessels based in the WCPO. Interestingly, this investment occurred despite increasing operational and regulatory challenges for the tuna industry including overcapacity and sustainability issues, increased regulations and newly introduced fishing restrictions, erosion of tariff preferences, as well as the global financial crisis.

Transhipment in FSM

The big players in the tuna canning game are:

Fleets
Japan

• The Japanese purse seine (JP-PS) fleet is stable in terms of vessel numbers and catch volumes – the fleet has been comprised of 35 vessels since 1997 and annual catch volumes consistently exceed 200,000 mt;
• Japan Fisheries Agency regulation limiting PS vessel size to 1,096 GRT has been relaxed, enabling three companies to trial three new larger vessels (1,800 GRT) with helicopters, in an effort to improve the competitiveness of the Japanese fleet relative to other fleets operating larger vessels (notably, Korea and Taiwan).
• While a Government regulation has been relaxed which stipulates that JP-PS vessels must return to Japanese ports to offload catch rather than transhipping catch in fishing grounds, most vessels are still opting to return to port at this stage. If the Bangkok skipjack price continues to strengthen relative to the Japanese skipjack market, transhipment volumes will likely increase.
• The majority of the JP PS fleet’s catch is sold to katsuobushi processors (60%); 20% to low-end sashimi markets (ULT-portion of catch); 10% to Japanese tuna canners; 10% to Thailand tuna canners.
• In response to PNA countries’ calls for greater domestic investment from DWFN, several fishing companies have established joint venture PS fishing operations in PNG, FSM and Kiribati. Japanese companies are more likely to invest in ‘islandisation’ projects that centre on joint fishing ventures and/or technical cooperation, rather than investing in processing facilities, given negative experiences of Japanese companies in tuna processing investments in the Pacific region in the past.

Taiwan

• The Taiwanese purse seine fleet expanded rapidly during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite the introduction of a Taiwan Government regulation limiting the number of Taiwan-flagged vessels to 34, the fleet has continued to expand through alternative flagging arrangements.
• In 2014, there were an estimated 60 Taiwanese-owned purse seine vessels operating exclusively in the WCPO - 34 Taiwan-flagged; 20 Vanuatu-flagged; 4 Marshall Islands , 2 PNG flagged; 3 joint ventures (Marshall Islands, Tuvalu). A further 18 Taiwanese-owned vessels operated as US vessels under the US Multilateral Treaty.
• A long-standing Government prohibition on the importation of used purse seine vessels resulted in the development of a domestic shipbuilding industry in Taiwan that has been able to carefully refine vessel design and size to be economically efficient in purse seine fishing and transhipping in the WCPO. The ongoing success of the Taiwanese purse seine fleet has meant that financing new vessels and operations has not been difficult for experienced operators.
• Total estimated catch of Taiwanese-owned/controlled vessels was approx. 430,000 mt in 2014 (excluding US-flagged vessels). The majority of catch (90-95%) is marketed to trading companies and transhipped to Bangkok.
• To ensure ongoing fisheries access in WCPO waters, some Taiwanese vessels owners are forming strategic alliances with PIC-based processors and/or establishing joint fishing ventures in a several PICs (FSM, RMI, Kiribati, Solomons).
• Taiwanese-owned longline vessels targeting albacore for canning operate in the WCPO, Atlantic and Indian Oceans (estimated total catch of 40,000 mt in 2008). The number of Taiwan’s large-scale longliners has decreased worldwide (359 in 2013), largely due to high operational costs, particularly fuel. Conversely, the number of small-scale longliners has increased (over 2000 in 2012), as they are more fuel efficient and less impeded by Government regulations. An estimated 40 large-scale and 60-80 small-scale longliners targeted albacore in the Pacific in 2012. These vessels utilise port facilities in American Samoa and Fiji for unloading and re-supply, with the majority of catch marketed through trading companies.

Korea

• The Korean purse seine fleet is comprised of 28 vessels, owned predominantly by three large diversified companies. The fleet peaked at 39 vessels in 1990, but has remained stable at 28 since 2004.
• The Korean fleet operates almost entirely in the WCPO. In 2009, total catch was a record 280,000 mt – the first year in which Korea has been the highest catching fleet in the WCPO. Catch volumes from 2010 onwards have been affected by high seas closures, while the impact of FAD closures has been less severe than for other fleets, as Korean  vessels fish more on free-swimming schools.
• Catch is transhipped to Korean ports for domestic processing or to export markets. Annually, around 120,000-130,000 mt is unloaded in Korea. In 2012, 160,000 mt was exported; 80% of which was destined for Thailand.
• Several ‘islandisation’ projects are underway with PICs – two vessels are reported to be commencing a joint fishing venture with Kiribati; Dongwon (owner of 15 PS vessels and major US tuna brand, StarKist) has been talking of establishing a canned tuna processing facility in the Solomon Islands, but not much has happened so far.
• Some industry operators are nervous about ongoing access to PNG waters (an historically important fishing ground for Korean purse seine vessels), as Korea has no existing onshore investments in PNG, with related second-generation access arrangements for vessels.
• In terms of broader fisheries access in WCPO waters, Korea is potentially vulnerable due to the lack of absence of any significant aid programme and a lack of close diplomatic ties with most PICs.

US

• In the 1980s and 1990s, the US purse seine fleet was comprised of 30-50 vessels. The fleet was deeply affected by international competition and declining fish prices in the early 2000s and contracted significantly to 11 vessels. Since 2007, the fleet has burgeoned again as a result of external investment, with 38 vessels active in the WCPO in 2012.
• The US fleet is now characterised by two vessel groups – the ‘old fleet’, being US-built and owned vessels which have been historical players in the fleet (18 vessels in 2012); and, the ‘new fleet’ (20 vessels in 2012), being Taiwanese-built vessels which have come under US flag since 2007, under joint venture arrangements between US nationals and foreign investors.
• US vessels spend the majority of their time fishing in the WCPO, with 40 licences available under the US Multilateral Treaty. Occasionally, US vessels will fish in EPO waters. With fleet re-expansion in 2007, total catch volumes in the WCPO expanded rapidly.
• Around 20% of the US fleet’s catch is offloaded in American Samoa for processing, mostly by the ‘old fleet’ which is based in Pago Pago. The majority of catch (80%) is transhipped from WCPO fishing grounds to tuna processors in Thailand and Latin America, largely due the ‘new fleet’ utilising the Taiwanese operational model. 
• The US Treaty expired in 2013 and negotiations have been ongoing between the US Government, US industry and Pacific Island Parties (PIPs) for the Treaty’s renewal. In light of overcapacity in the WCPO purse seine fishery and related sustainability concerns, PIPs have been seeking to apply fishing effort restrictions to US vessels under the Vessel Day Scheme. In addition, PNA members in particular, have been pushing for greater economic returns in the form of domestic development, increased broader cooperation and preferential market access to the US.

Philippines

• The Philippines has one of the largest purse seine fleets operating in the WCPO – in 2012, 40 large vessels (>250 GRT) and 55 smaller vessels (<250 GRT) were on the WCPFC vessel register.
• Around 22 large PS vessels currently fish in PNG waters under bilateral access arrangements; a further 18 operate under charter arrangements in PNG (and are regarded as part of the PNG fleet) and eight vessels have re-flagged to PNG. However from 2015 onwards most of the charter ones will be re-flagged to PNG
• Catch rates of Philippines vessels are significantly lower than those of the larger and more modern vessels operated by other DWF fleets operating in the WCPO (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, Korea). Total catch by domestic vessels in Philippines waters in 2012 was estimated at around 148,000 mt, with a further 71,400 mt caught in PNG waters by foreign access vessels.
• Catch from Philippines domestic vessels is largely processed by Philippines canneries (around 130,000 mt), with the remaining catch exported to Thailand and possibly, Vietnam. A portion of catch by PNG-based vessels is processed by PNG processors (owned by Philippines investors), with the rest either exported to Philippines domestic canneries and Thailand.
• The Philippines domestic fleet has been significantly hampered by the loss of access to Indonesia waters in 2007, as well as the recent closure of several WCPO high seas areas.
• To maintain catch levels, the Philippines fleet is under pressure to find alternative fishing grounds, which will likely see increased fishing in PIC EEZs by existing vessels, as well as additional vessels seeking licences in association with new processing plants (in PNG and the Solomon Islands).

China

• As China only began to develop its WCPO purse seine fleet in 2001, it is a relatively new player in the fishery. In 2010, Chinese firms owned 16 purse seiners, with twelve registered in China, four in Marshall Islands  and one in FSM. In 2012, total catch by Chinese-flagged PS vessels was approx 77,000 mt.
• PS fishing companies without direct ties to processing facilities market their catch to the three major trading companies, the majority of which is sent to Thailand. Some catch (~15,000-20,000 mt) is likely sent to China for processing. The Marshall Islands registered vessels will offload a portion of their catch to the newly re-opened Chinese loining plant in Majuro, with the remaining catch sold to a trading company. 
• While China operates longline vessels in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans; vessels targeting albacore specifically for canning operate exclusively in the WCPO, using Fiji (Suva) as a primary operating base. An estimated 90 or so Chinese-owned vessels operated from Fiji since 2008, with some fishing in Fiji waters, while others operated outside of Fiji waters (in adjacent high seas areas, as well as Vanuatu and Solomon Islands EEZs), while using Fiji as a base. Total reported catch in 2012 was almost 22,000 mt, with albacore supplied to canneries in Levuka (Fiji) and American Samoa.
• Most of the impetus for China’s entry and expansion in the tuna industry, both in the WCPO and globally, has come from state-owned enterprises. Government policy is strongly supporting expansion in the agriculture sector, which includes overseas tuna fisheries. Hence, China is a ‘developmental’ mode in terms of the WCPO purse seine and longline albacore fisheries. Given the dominant role of state-owned enterprises there is adequate capital available for expansion and government subsidies (i.e. fuel, shipbuilding) to assist new and existing operations. Fleet expansion, including increased vessel registration in PICs, in some cases in association with joint fishing ventures and processing investments, is inevitable.

Papua New Guinea (PNG)

• Since 2010, the PNG purse seine fleet (that being, vessels whose catch is attributed to PNG) is comprised of around 45 vessels –  PNG-flagged vessels (fishing in PNG archipelagic and EEZ waters); Philippines-flagged chartered vessels operated by PNG-based processors (fishing in PNG EEZ); and, PNG home-party vessels operating under the FSM Arrangement (fishing in PNG waters and beyond). However many of these vessels have been flagged to PNG during 2015 under the new Tuna Management Plan
• All vessels are privately-owned, mostly by Philippine and Taiwanese companies with investment in onshore processing and net repair facilities in PNG, as well as fishing/ processing operations elsewhere.
• PNG’s second generation access agreements link vessels to PNG-based processing plants and other onshore developments, with catch unloading provisions included in the agreements whereby vessels must unload a portion of catch to domestic processors. In 2010, 30% of the PNG fleet’s catch was processed onshore in PNG, with the balance transhipped and exported mostly to Thailand and the Philippines. PNG has a long-term goal to locally process 100% of tuna catch from within its EEZ.
• PNG is committed to enhancing the value of catch taken from PNG waters through fishing-related onshore investments in processing. As such, fisheries access will be geared even further towards second-generation access agreements where fishing licences will be tightly linked to onshore processing obligations and investments.

EU

• The EU purse seine fleet is the largest in the world and is comprised of some of the most powerful purse seiner businesses in the world. In 2012, an estimated 88 vessels were owned or controlled by EU-interests; 56 of which were flagged by EU member states (Spain, France and Italy), and 32 (at least) which carried foreign flags. The EU fleet is active in each of the world’s main tropical tuna fisheries; the main fishing grounds being the Eastern Central Atlantic and Western Indian Ocean.
• The EU is a very minor player in the WCPO, with only four Spanish-flagged vessels actively operating in the region to date under fisheries partnership agreements with Kiribati. Two El-Salvadorian fagged purse seiners (but Spanish owned - Calvo) also fish in Kiribati waters (8,824 mt in 2009). Given the current complexities associated with implementation of the Vessel Day Scheme in the WCPO, EU vessel owners have indicated that they are unlikely at this stage to extend their current levels of activity in the region beyond the existing network of FPAs.
• EU vessels that are owned by vertically integrated companies supply catch to their processing plants or those with whom they have financial connections, with any surplus catch sold on the global market. Specialised boat-owning companies supply the global market. Given catch by EU-vessels is Rules of Origin (RoO) compliant under preferential trading arrangements between the EU and ACP countries, vessels are generally orientated towards supplying ACP-based tuna processing facilities.
• EU import tariffs and preferential RoO are central to the commercial survival of the EU fleet. The provision of ‘global sourcing’ RoO for processed tuna under the P-ACP Interim EPA is a deep source of concern for the EU fishing and processing sectors. 

Indonesia

• In contrast to other large industrial tuna purse seine and longline fleets operating in the WCPO, Indonesia’s tuna fisheries are largely artisanal in scale and multi-gear/multispecies by nature. Commercial-scale purse seine and longline vessels account for only 3% of the total number of inboard-powered vessels (~200,000 vessels).
• In 2012, approx 180 commercial-scale purse seine vessels (<2,000 GT) were licensed to fish in two Fishery Management Areas in Indonesia’s Pacific EEZ waters. There is very little fishing outside domestic waters by Indonesian vessels by virtue of their generally small size and limited range.
• Production figures for Indonesia tuna fisheries are generally incomplete or uncertain due to the difficulties of monitoring catch and effort artisanal vessels offloading to multiple landing points. Total purse seine catch in 2009 may have been in the order of ~190,000-200,000 mt.
• An increasing volume of catch is processed locally by tuna canneries (~90,000 mt/year), and smaller volumes are smoke-dried for katsuobushi production. Catch is also exported to Thailand and Vietnam-based processors.
• Since production levels and exports cannot be quantified with any level of certainty, it is difficult to ascertain Indonesia’s significance in the canned tuna supply chain. Indonesia remains an important middle-level supplier of raw material to WCPO canneries and its own growing domestic canning industry, but no major increases in supply is anticipated in the short term.

Other Fleets – EPO

• In 2012, there were 220 licences purse seine vessels operating in the EPO. The two largest fleets in the region are Ecuador and Mexico, each comprised of 40-50 vessels.
• Both fleets primarily supply domestic processing industries, which are also the two largest processing countries in the EPO. Panama and Venezuela have fleets consisting of 20-30 vessels each, while Colombia has 11 vessels. Nicaragua, Peru, Vanuatu, Spain and Honduras (mostly spaniush owned) each have less than 10 vessels operating in the EPO fishery. Current total purse seine carrying capacity in the EPO is the highest in history (~212,000 m3).
• Total skipjack catch in EPO waters (for all gear types) was around 305,000 mt in 2008. In 2012, skipjack catches reached a record low, resulting in EPO processing plants sourcing a considerable volume of raw material from the WCPO.

Others Fleets – WCPO

• In 2012, the Solomon Islands fleet consisted of five purse-seine vessels and three pole&liner, which supply Soltuna processing plant based in Western Province. They produce for the local and regional markets as well exports of cooked loins to Italy and Spain
• Catch over and above Soltuna requirements is transhipped and exported to other markets.
• With productive skipjack resources and encouragement from the Solomon Islands Government for onshore investment, there may be more locally-based purse seine fishing and processing developments in the near future.
• The FSM purse seine fleet consisted of seven vessels in 2010, five of which have FSMA status. Total catch in 2009 was 19,143 mt, but much of this catch was taken outside of the FSM EEZ, given five vessels are licensed to fish in other PNA members’ EEZs. All catch by FSM vessels is exported to Thailand.
• In 2010, the Marshall Islands (RMI) fleet consisted of eight purse seine vessels, five of which were licensed under the FSMA. In 2010, total catch was around 44,000 mt. The fleet will increase to ten vessels in 2011, with an additional two vessels (of a total of four licences) commencing operations in conjunction with the recently re-established loining plant in Majuro, which is now owned and operated by Chinese interests (Pan Pacific Foods (RMI) Ltd.). While some of the fleet’s catch is processed by the loining plant, the majority of catch is exported for processing elsewhere (i.e. Thailand, Philippines, Japan).
• In 2010, 19 purse seine vessels were Vanuatu-flagged, although 13 of these were classified as PNG home party vessels under the FSMA (with catch attributed to PNG).
• Vanuatu’s vessels are generally owned by Taiwanese investors and are some of the most efficient in the entire WCPO fleet. Total Vanuatu PS catch in 2009 was around 38,000mt; all of which was transhipped. In 2009, four vessels switched to US flag to operate under the US Treaty.
• The Kiribati purse seine fleet consisted of five vessels in late 2010, comprised of three vessels of Ecuadorian origin and two Japanese joint venture vessels. With the introduction of the Ecuadorian vessels in 2009, total catch increased from 6,000 mt in 2009 to over 21,000 mt in 2009. Prior to 2009, the entire Kiribati PS catch was exported to Thailand. Now, the catch from the three Ecuadorian vessels is exported mostly to Ecuador-based processors.
• Four New Zealand vessels were licensed to operate in the WCPO, with a recorded catch of 26,600 mt in 2012. The majority of catch is unloaded in Pago Pago, with small volumes exported to Thailand and other markets via Majuro. From 2015 onwards the the NZ fleet is only two vessels.

Longline-Caught Albacore for Canning

• The estimated catch of albacore in the WCPO was 120000 mt in 2012. Longline catches comprised close to 70% of this total. Taiwan and Vanuatu (Taiwan owned) vessels accounted for the largest share of longline albacore catch, closely followed by China and Japan. 
• PIC-flagged fleets (mostly foreign owned) operating in the South Pacific albacore fishery also made a significant contribution to the WCPO catch (i.e. Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands) (around 65,000 mt in 2012). 
• Most of the albacore longline catch is destined for canning, with the US being the primary market. Some at-sea transhipping occurs for export to Thailand, as well as unloadings to processing plants in Fiji, American Samoa and French Polynesia.

Canned Tuna Trading Companies – The ‘Big Three’

In the simplest sense, tuna trading involves the procurement of raw materials from multiple fishing vessels and coordinating transhipment of catches into reefer carriers for sale and delivery to tuna processors. Canning-grade tuna    trading companies have grown to a position of relative dominance in the supply chain, largely due to the effectiveness of the services offered to vessel owners. Engaging a trader enables vessel operators to channel their energies into fishing, rather than having to deal with the financial, administrative and logistical hassle and risk associated with marketing catch.In the case of processors, purchasing raw material from tuna traders removes the complexities of dealing with a large number of vessel owners selling small volumes of catch. Working with trading companies also ensures that processors have continued access to large volumes of raw material. Tuna trading is a highly competitive business; as limited profit is made per shipment, trading companies capitalise on economies of scale and attain profits through trading high volumes of product.

Unloading in General Santos -  Philipines 

Three major companies dominate canned tuna trading activities in the WCPO - Tri Marine, Itochu and FCF Fishery Co. Ltd. Collectively, these companies handle annually over 1,350,000 mt of raw canning material; around 70% (900,000 mt) of which is sourced from vessels operating in the WCPO.

Of the three companies, FCF handles the largest volume of raw material (around 650,000 mt per year) and is by far the most prominent tuna trader in the WCPO region. While Tri Marine handles lower volumes than FCF (500,000 mt/year), it has a much stronger global presence (especially in the European market and other oceans) and has a more vertically integrated business model. Itochu is the most conservative of the three, operating almost exclusively in the WCPO and trading the smallest volume of raw material (200,000 mt annually).

The canned tuna trading business in the WCPO grew significantly in the 1980s, largely in conjunction with the development of Thailand’s tuna packing industry. Tuna traders established an integral role for themselves since WCPO fishing grounds are located a fair distance from Bangkok and Thailand did not have an established domestic purse seine fleet from which to source raw material, nor a sufficiently sizeable local market for finished product. Originally, there were 20 or so trading firms supplying raw material to Thai processors. However, by the mid 1990s, FCF, Tri Marine and Itochu emerged as the dominant players and nowadays, collectively supply Bangkok-based tuna processors with around 80% of their raw material needs.

The ‘Big Three’ tuna traders have established an integral position for themselves in the WCPO tuna fishery and, to an extent; the global canned tuna supply chain as a whole. Their position is unlikely to change or be challenged anytime soon given their well established long-term relationships with fishing and processing clients, strong financial backing to fund trading transactions and sophisticated market intelligence systems. It is unlikely that any new trading companies could enter the market and compete with FCF, Tri Marine and Itochu in the WCPO.

Canned Tuna Processors

The contemporary global canned tuna processing industry developed in the mid 1950s, in conjunction with the development of industrial-scale tropical tuna fisheries, with significant growth experienced in the late 1970s-early 1980s. Originally, the US mainland, EU and Japan were the dominant canned tuna processors. Commencing in the early 1980s, with the development of tuna canning industries in the Philippines and Thailand, and later in other lower-cost production sites in South East Asia, Central/Latin America and the Indian Ocean, the dominance of the former three major producers diminished. Today, global canned tuna production exceeds 1.7 million metric tonnes (net finished weight) annually.

Globally, there are at least 144 tuna processing facilities in operation producing canned tuna products and/or frozen cooked loins. In 2008, global maximum processing capacity was around 14,220 mt/day of raw material and estimated annual production was 3.05 million mt (whole round equivalent). Currently, Thailand processes almost one-quarter of the world’s canned tuna (736,000 mt in 2008). The second largest processing site is Ecuador which accounts for almost 12% of global annual production (362,400 mt in 2008).

Total global capital investment in canned tuna processing facilities is estimated to be around $1.3 billion. In 2009, it was estimated that new capital investment in processing facilities over the three years prior was around $0.5 billion, around 40% of which went into onshore investments in the WCPO region ($186 million).

Developing world players have risen in dominance in the past 20-30 years due to these countries’ ability to achieve economies of scale, as well as other factors including some sites being located close to major fishing grounds, having access to productive and lower-cost labour sources, and in some cases, preferential access to the major canned tuna markets (EU, US). High-cost processing locations (i.e. US, EU) are increasingly switching to using frozen cooked loins for canned tuna production that are sourced from lower-costs sites of production (or outsourcing
production altogether) where labour costs are considerably less.

Like the canned tuna fishing industry, the canned tuna processing industry is both complex and dynamic. Global processing operations are currently influenced by factors such as increasing cost of raw materials and other production inputs, tuna resource sustainability issues, overcapacity, complex tariff regimes, increasingly stricter standards (i.e. labour, quality, food safety and environment) and changing consumer preferences.

Tuna Plant 

Thailand

• Thailand is the world’s leading producer of canned tuna and global price market leader for canning-grade whole round frozen tuna. Over the past 30 years, Thailand’s tuna canning industry has grown exponentially, with annual total production of canned tuna and cooked loins now exceeding 700,000 mt.
• In late 2010, there were 30 canned tuna processors operating in Thailand; with a total combined annual processing capacity of 3,000 mt/day. Facilities are currently operating at around 85% capacity (2,500 mt/day).
• The industry is dominated by two large-scale processors, Thai Union (1,000 mt/day) and Sea Value (850 mt/day). Several medium-scale operations process around 300 mt/day (or less), with the remaining processing firms being mostly small companies.
• Around 85% of raw canning material for processing is imported by Thai tuna processors. The majority of raw material is sourced from the WCPO (~90%) through trading companies. Thai canners experience difficulties attracting Thai workers and rely heavily on migrant labour from Burma (50-60%). The most significant markets for canned tuna exports from Thai tuna processors are the US, EU Middle East, Australia and Canada.
• The most notable recent industry developments include the takeover of major EU processor and brand owner, MW Brands by Thai Union and Thai Union’s investment in a joint processing facility in Lae, PNG.
• Given Thailand’s huge processing capacity and related economies of scale, global competitiveness, industry know-how and market share, it will continue to dominate the global canned tuna processing industry. The industry is considered to be relatively stable; it is unlikely that there will be any new entrants in the short-term.

US – Mainland

• The US was the first and the largest contemporary tuna canning industry in the world.
• As low cost competition emerged from Southeast Asian countries, the US switched production to the US territories of American Samoa and Puerto Rico to combat high wages and strict environmental regulations on the US mainland. Since 1979, twelve canneries based in the US and its overseas operations have closed.
• In 2010, there were two tuna canneries operating in mainland US – Bumble Bee (Santa Fe Springs) and Chicken of the Sea (Georgia). Both plants only process cooked tuna loins in highly productive, capital intensive production systems. In 2010, total combined maximum processing capacity of the two US mainland facilities was 60,000 mt of frozen loins.
• The US has three major branded tuna processing firms - Bumble Bee Foods, Chicken of the Sea International and StarKist Seafood Co; each of which have investments and/or managerial control over processing plants in third countries.
• The WCPO is a critical source of supply for the three major US brand firms.
• The vast majority of product produced by the US ‘big three’ is destined for the North American market, primarily the US. The ‘big three’ brand labels command upwards of 80% of the US market.

US – American Samoa

• In the 1950s, Chicken of the Sea International and StarKist invested in processing plants in American Samoa (Pago Pago). With production capacities of well over 100,000 mt per annum each, the plants were two of the biggest operators globally. One of American Samoa’s major strengths has been in the processing of high value albacore (white meat).
• Canned tuna processed in American Samoa is destined for the US market, as it enters duty free.
• Beginning in the 2000s, the Pago Pago plants began to lose their competitive edge as wage costs were far higher than competitors in Asia and Latin America. In 2007, minimum wage legislation was passed in the US, requiring American Samoa to incrementally increase wages by more than double. This was a significant blow to the two canneries and a major contributing factor to Chicken of the Sea closing its plant in 2009 and relocating to the US mainland (Georgia).
• StarKist remains operational, but is making significant changes to its production system to remain as competitive as possible, including reducing its labour force and processing increasing volumes of loins. In 2010, StarKist processed 70,000 mt of skipjack and 32,000 mt of albacore.
• The former-Chicken of the Sea facility was purchased by Tri Marine in October 2010 and will recommence operations (under the name of Samoa Tuna Processors Inc.), albeit processing smaller volumes under a completely different business model.
• The Government of American Samoa was attempting to protect its canning industry through the proposed Protection of Industry, Resources and Employment (ASPIRE) bill, which if passed by the US Congress, would subsidise tuna processors in Pago Pago. However, Aspire never happened.
• Tri Marine's cannery in American Samoa is now up and running and is ramping up production. The battle now is preserving access to productive fishing grounds in the Western and Central Pacific for the American Samoa based U.S. flag fleet.  Without access to nearby EEZ's, the American Samoa purse seiner fleet will have to relocate and become a transshipment fleet just like the rest of the U.S. fleet, the one that is joint ventured with Taiwanese interests and managed effectively in Taiwan. (Thanks Joe Humby for the update! 09/08/15)

EU

• The most important canned tuna processor in the EU is Spain, which accounted for around 60% of annual EU canned tuna production from 1998-2007. In 2012, Spanish production was approx.  230,000 mt.
• There are five major Spanish processing firms (Calvo, Jealsa, Frinsa, Garavilla and Salica); four of which own their own fishing capacity. A further four major non-Spanish companies are also involved in canned tuna production (Bolton, Princes, MW Brands and Thunnus Overseas Group); only one of which is owned by ‘European’ capital (Bolton).
• Given relatively high labour costs in the EU, considerable attention is paid to labour time/ cost and fish yield; canneries source large-sized whole round fish (i.e. yellowfin over 10 kg) to enhance labour productivity through high recovery rates (average 48.5%).
• Investment in processing facilities in the developing world (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa and Ecuador) is central to the production strategy of most EU-based firms and is closely connected to EU trade preference schemes.
• The vast proportion of canned tuna processed in Spain, Italy, France and Portugal are sold within the European Union.
• The survival of EU-based canned tuna processing firms will continue to depend on tariff protection against relatively low cost imports and cost-reduction strategies. Some of the major Spanish players are moving away from a focus on market share growth to increasing operational profitability, and as such are focusing increasingly on value-added products to minimise the impact of rising raw material price.

Ecuador

• Ecuador is the most significant canned tuna processing player in the Americas, with a total daily maximum raw material processing capacity of 1,865 mt/day (~450,000 mt annually). In 2012, there were approximately 18 processing plants located in Guayaquil (1), Posorja (1) and Manta (16). In 2012, Ecuador processed around 360,000 mt of raw material, making it the world’s second largest producer behind Thailand.
• In 2010, plants in Ecuador were suffering from supply constraints (both overall and of RoO-compliant fish) due to poor catches in the EPO (an estimated 40% lower than 2009 catches). Plants undertook several strategies to respond to supply shortages – operating at below capacity and extending planned maintenance closures, expanding cold storage capacity to stockpile raw material, and importing larger volumes of fish (mostly from WCPO).
• Two critical factors are cited for Ecuador’s success in canned tuna processing - an efficient, productive and stable labour force, and in the case of several plants, vertically integrated business models including purse seine fishing operations.
• Ecuadorian processing plants produce primarily for the EU and US markets; it is the top volume supplier of tuna loins into the European Union (mostly to Spanish and Italian canned tuna processors)
• There is also increasing production for the growing Latin American market. Ecuadorian processors are interested in expanding supply for the regional market, in part to reduce their dependence on sourcing RoO compliant fish for the EU and US markets.

Philippines

• Philippines’ canned tuna processing industry developed during the late 1970s and 1980s and it has become the second largest processor in the WCPO, following Thailand. Seven canneries are currently in operation (six of which are based in General Santos).
• In 2009, annual production was ~220,000 mt (daily processing capacity 850 mt/day); a reduction from a peak in 2006/07 of 250,000 mt.
• Several of the canners are part of vertically integrated operations, sourcing at least some of their raw material requirements from their own company fleets in Philippines or overseas (PNG, and formerly, Indonesia).
• The majority of Philippines cannery production is exported, mostly to the EU and US market (10.4 million cases (83,604 mt) in 2009), with around 10% of canned tuna consumed locally.
• Production in domestic Philippine canneries seems unlikely to expand due to raw material supply problems (i.e. declining domestic catches and reduced access to Indonesian waters). Any strategy for major expansion in production capacity will more likely involve the construction of new processing plants elsewhere in the WCPO (i.e. PNG, Indonesia).

Korea

• The establishment of the Korean tuna canning industry is a relatively recent development, beginning in the early 1980s.
• There are currently five major Korean canneries in operation, with a combined daily processing capacity of 500 mt. In 2009, total annual production was around 125,000 mt. Production is entirely for domestic consumption.
• All fish currently processed in Korean canneries is sourced from catches in the WCPO by the Korean purse seine fleet. Two of the canning companies are vertically integrated operations with their own fishing vessels (i.e. Dongwon and Sajo).
• The most significant recent industry development has been Dongwon’s acquisition of StarKist from Del Monte Foods in 2008.
• Future growth in the Korean domestic processing sector is possibly limited. Any expansion of Korean processing capacity will likely be linked to the establishment of overseas operations, with export rather than domestic markets to be found for the product.

Japan

• The Japanese canned tuna processing industry was originally export-orientated, supplying the US market primarily. Due to rising competition from lower cost sites of production, Japan’s canned tuna processors changed their focus to produce exclusively for the domestic market.
• Since the mid-1980s, canned tuna production in Japan has declined markedly due to diminishing consumer demand, and increased competition from cheaper imports of finished production (mostly from Thailand).
• In 2008, fourteen canned tuna processors were operating in Japan, with a combined raw material processing capacity of 400 mt/day (annual production of ~80,000 mt).
• Japanese canners mainly source raw materials (whole round and loins) through the major tuna trading companies. Catch sourced from Japan’s purse seine fleet currently only accounts for around one-quarter of production (20,000 mt annually).
• Japanese canned tuna production is entirely for domestic consumption and is a high quality market. Hagoromo Foods Corporation, Japan’s pioneer canned tuna processing company (est. 1931), dominates domestic canned tuna production and its ‘Sea Chicken’ brand claims 60-70% market share.
• Japan’s domestic canned tuna production is likely to increasingly shift to offshore locations (either through Japanese investment in offshore facilities or increased sourcing of finished product from overseas supplies), due to several issues impacting on the competitiveness of Japan’s processing operations – labour cost and availability, strict environmental standards, stagnant consumer demand, and increased competition from Thai imports.

China

• Canned tuna processing in China represents a very small fraction of the country’s large and active export-driven fish re-processing sector. Processing is primarily undertaken by the private sector; the large state-owned enterprises engaged in tuna fishing do not appear to be directly engaged in the processing sector.
• Obtaining a clear picture of the sector (in terms of the number of facilities and raw material sources and processing volumes) is difficult due to China’s commodity tracking system.
• In 2010, two tuna processing facilities were likely in operation, processing between 30,000–50,000 mt of raw material.
• The US has been the largest market for canned tuna from China for the last several years\ (6,000 mt in 2009). There appears to be a general trend towards increased production and exports of loins, with exports to EU processors reportedly increasing by 300% from 2007-2009 (4,400 mt in 2009).
• The major problems confronting China’s tuna processing sector are similar to those facing the country’s fish processing sector in general - increasing labour costs in a labour intensive industry, as well as rising land, water and energy costs as China’s economy develops, particularly in coastal cities.
• Given these constraints, coupled with a very limited domestic market for canned tuna, it is unlikely that China will become a major tuna loining or canning centre, in the same way as it has become a significant player in other manufacturing industries in recent years. No one geographic centre has emerged for tuna processing, which limits the opportunities for gaining economies of scale, an important factor in counteracting rising costs.

Indonesia

• The Indonesian tuna processing sector is showing clear signs of resurgence, after a period of decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Prior to this, over twenty tuna canneries were in operation.
• In 2010, there were at least thirteen canneries in operation with an estimated annual throughput of around 100,000 mt. The supply of raw material to Indonesian canners is almost fully sourced from local vessels.
• Canned tuna production is predominantly for export, with minimal local demand. Canned product is exported to a wide range of markets including the EU, US, Japan and the Middle East.
• The revitalisation of canneries in Bitung is a major development for the Indonesian canned tuna processing industry, with three plants commencing or expanding operations] in 2008-2009. A fourth plant is scheduled to open in 2011 and an inactive plant may also resume operations in the future. It is unclear whether Indonesian canning capacity will continue to grow beyond the current period of resurgence.

Vietnam

• Tuna canning and processing capacity in Vietnam has developed since the early 2000s, in parallel with processing of product for export markets from its very large aquaculture industry.
• There are three main privately owned tuna canners based in the Mekong Delta area; two of which are owned by overseas interests (Thailand, US). Other small seafood processors may also occasionally process small volumes of light meat. In 2009, Vietnam’s estimated production was 50,000 mt.
• The US and EU markets collectively accounted for close to 70% of the total value of exports in 2009. There is also a small local market for canned tuna.
• Vietnam’s major strength is its cheap and highly productive labour force. However, there is some pessimism about Vietnam becoming a significant canned tuna processing site in future, given several constraints, including the heavy reliance on imported raw material,
• comparatively higher freight costs, a restrictive bureaucratic environment and lack of economies of scale.

PNG

• PNG’s first canned tuna processing facility was established in 1997 by a Philippines investor (RD Tuna Canners). Since this time, two more plants have been established (SSTC and Frabelle).
• Total production capacity is estimated at 100,000 mt per year), although all  plants are operating at below capacity. All three plants source fish locally from either PNG flagged or PNG-chartered vessels.
• Duty free access to the EU market, coupled with the recent RoO relaxation under global sourcing provisions, enables PNG to compete against lower cost sites of production for exports to the EU. The domestic canned tuna market is significant, accounting for 20- 30% of production by local canners.
• There has been significant interest from foreign investors to establish additional canned\ tuna processing facilities in PNG, with proposals in various stages of development for an additional four plants in 2010. New investment is driven largely by licensing incentives from second generation access arrangements.
• Despite advantages conferred by duty preferences, relaxed RoO and rich tuna resources, PNG processors continue to face many challenges including low labour productivity, a high-cost operating environment and infrastructure constraints.

Solomon Islands

• SoltTuna Fishing and Processing Ltd. (formerly Soltay & Solomon Taiyo) is currently the Solomon Islands’ sole tuna processing plant.
• The plant operated at less than full capacity during 2009 and mostly focused on loining for the EU market (Italy). In September 2010, Tri Marine became SolTuna majority investor (51%).
• Two proposals for new processing developments are in place. Philippines-owned Frabelle Fishing Corporation is proposing to establish a facility (50-100 mt/day) in either Guadalcanal or Western Province. Dongwon (Korea) has also proposed to establish a facility in Guadalcanal (200 mt/day), contingent on Solomon Islands Government establishing wharf facilities. But not nothing has happened so far.

Others - WCPO

• There is one major canned tuna processing operation in Levuka, Fiji (PAFCO) which commenced operations in 1976. It has operated since 1999 as a loining plant under contract to Bumble Bee. Daily processing capacity is 120 mt/day, but could potentially be increased to 180 mt/day if sufficient cold storage becomes available.
• A loining plant was built in Majuro, Marshall Islands in 1999. After withdrawal by the former owner and a period of inactivity for several years, the plant was purchased by a Chinese investor (Pan Pacific Foods, a subsidiary of Shanghai Deep Sea Fishing Company) in 2006. The plant commenced trial processing in 2008, but suffered technical difficulties and temporarily closed until mid-2009. Potential processing capacity is 80-100 mt/day, but to date, the plant has been operating at less than half this capacity.

Others - EPO

• In addition to Ecuador, there are a number of other Latin-American (EPO) based canned tuna processing sites) – Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala. Total production capacity of these plants is 1,710 mt/ day. After Ecuador, Mexico is the second most significant EPO-based processor. Latin American processors enjoy duty free access to the EU (loins/cans) and US (pouch) markets.

FAO expert consultation on Catch Documentation Schemes

All of next week I’ll be back at UN FAO headquarters in Rome, a place where I lived during my time as a fishery officer for them. July is a nice time to be there, balmy nights, aperitifs and so on… not that I would have much time to be outside, tho…

regulatory sword fight venue :-)

FAO is conveying an expert consultation on catch certification and invited a various experts from different parts of the world to sit and discuss a series of technical guidelines that emanated from a background study.

I’m one of the 2 authors (with Alastair MacFarlane) of the study and guidelines. Our methodology was based on the review of the existing bibliography and our experience in the issue. We incorporated the work done by my friends Shelley Clarke (Best Practice Study of Fish Catch Documentation Schemes, 2010) and Gilles Hosch (Activity on Tuna CDS Best Practice, present).

A number of documentation schemes have developed over the last twenty years and others are under consideration. We reportedthe current state of play of existing schemes and a draft set of Technical Guidelines for schemes from a supply, market and cooperative perspectives and are offered for discussion.

Needles to say it is not an easy process, a lot of heavy politics and patch defending from some of the stakeholders, furthermore this type of semi-diplomatic work does not come natural to me.

I’m firstly an operational guy (fishers, boats, wharfs, industry, fishery officers work), then I like research and fact finding and lately increasingly involved in data management, but I'm definitively not a meeting room guy. It frustrate me intensely the long discussions about words here and there...  I really care about concepts and plans ahead, but that surely is a personal view out of not being engaged much in the necessary bureaucracy. 

A lot of my contributions to the study were vetoed or removed, (for example: the details on the administrative burden for the supplying states -particularly least developed countries-, nor any of the operational difficulties associated to the forms and timings around the schemes, as this was determined to be too sensitive and critical of the organizations and trade-blocks driving the schemes.

Nevertheless, I’m looking forwards to the next days, even if meeting rooms are not my element, but based on my background and experience in dealing with these certifications from a small countries perspective that need to export, I feel I can contribute to the discussions and hopefully to a catch certification system that is able to minimize the prevalence of IUU fish and at the same time does not imply a disproportionate burden to lesser developed countries. 

Once, I read that in this type of processes; if you are not sitting at the table, you become dinner ☺. So let see!