Climate change is a really complex issue and is difficult to take perspective of what are the issues and "who" is to blame (like if that is to help).
This little video by "The Economist" ads to that understanding and discussion.
Climate change is a really complex issue and is difficult to take perspective of what are the issues and "who" is to blame (like if that is to help).
This little video by "The Economist" ads to that understanding and discussion.
Recently published, a new collection of research designed to inform decision makers, including governments and investors, on effective ocean and coastal resource management strategies to maximize economic, conservation and societal benefits.
The research demonstrates how governance and management reform can reduce poverty while achieving economic gains, increasing food production, replenishing fish and conserving ocean health for future generations. This is especially true in the case of wild capture fisheries.
I would be presenting some of the research in the blog, but is always better to go to the source (as good scientist I’m) but if you want a digest, then stay here ☺
This came out in May, and is supported by a “stars” filled group of fisheries scientists… most analyses of fisheries often demonstrate the potential biological, economic, and social benefits of fisheries recovery, but few studies have incorporated the costs associated with the design and implementation of the management systems needed to achieve recovery.
Using available data and anecdotes they suggest that the current cost of fishery management may be quite substantial and that additional costs arising from major upgrades in management could be prohibitive in some countries. Their analysis focused on OC (Output Controls) and CS (Catch Shares - Quotas) Scenarios of Management measure and compared them a Business as Usual Scenario
A careful analysis comparing the country-level benefits of fishery management improvements to the additional costs of doing so has never been undertaken. Therefore, a study focusing on the current and incremental costs of fishery management upgrades could have important implications for policy design to efficiently rebuild global fisheries.
This analysis has three objectives. The first is to estimate the current cost of managing fisheries in the top fishing countries of the world. The second is to estimate, for a range of alternative management approaches, the concomitant change in cost, also at the country level. Finally, they combine these cost estimates with recent estimates of the economic benefits of fishery recovery to arrive at a cost-benefit calculation of improved fishery management around the world.
This comparison determines if the expected economic benefits of a suite of fishery management reforms are greater than the management costs associated with those reforms. The analysis is decidedly practical: our goal is to derive ballpark estimates of these values to ultimately inform the question of whether the potential benefits can justify the likely increase in management costs.
Methodology
There are five major steps to completing this analysis. First, they estimate the cost of managing fisheries for all major fishing countries in the world and standardize by the cost per metric tonne (MT). This step is accomplished by developing a cost database including as many countries as possible and then imputing cost, based on the available data, for countries with limited data. They then focus on the 25 countries with largest fish catch.
Second, They categorize the landings in each country by management type. The third and fourth steps are developing and implementing a model of incremental management cost parameterized with cost data, fishery management data, and a survey of global fishery management experts to estimate the future costs of alternative management interventions using.
Finally, using projected profits in the year 2050 associated with different management interventions, they compare the economic benefits of management reform with the estimated costs associated with the new management in each country.
Results
They find substantial variation in current management costs across countries (approximately an order of magnitude difference in management cost per MT) and that incremental costs of upgrading fishery management can be quite substantial (in some countries, this could involve a doubling or tripling of management cost). Despite these results, our overall finding is that in every country examined, the benefits of reform substantially outweigh the incremental costs in management. This result holds across a wide range of assumptions and is consistent with empirical data, new case studies, and ad hoc interviews conducted with fishery managers in countries that have already undergone these welfare-improving transitions.
OC and CS Scenarios Compared to BAU, 2050
Figures below shows the incremental cost vs. the incremental benefit of fishery management reform, where each country is represented by a single point. The size of the point indicates the size of the fishing sector in that country measured in total harvest (in MT) for 2012. Therefore, larger dots represent counties with higher annual landings in 2012. The top panels provide results for CS vs. BAU and the bottom panels provide results for OC vs. BAU.
Difference between future profits and management costs: CS Scenario and OC Scenario compared to BAU. Benefit-cost-ratios are capped at 10 in the figures on the right.
Difference between future profits and management costs: CS Scenario and OC Scenario compared to BAU. Benefit-cost-ratios are capped at 10 in the figures on the right.
Three results immediately pop out. The first is that when considering reforming all fisheries in a country to some form of CS, we find that the cumulative benefits always exceed the costs (all dots are above the 1:1 line on the top left panel and all benefit cost ratios exceed 1.0 on the top right panel). Indeed, the benefit cost ratios range from just over 1.0 up to 82 or more, averaging at about 29. The global benefit cost ratio average for catch share management is 34. These results are at the country level and do not necessarily imply that the benefits of switching to catch share management will outweigh the costs in each fishery. Instead, this result compares the aggregate benefits of moving to CS against the aggregate costs of doing so.
The second result is that the large fishing countries tend to also have the largest benefit cost ratios – it turns out that the larger a country’s catch, the more it stands to gain from aggressive fishery management reforms.
The third result is that while the numerical results are somewhat muted when moving from BAU to OC, most countries would still benefit from such a shift. The global cost of managing all fisheries in our database under catch share management in 2050 is about USD 11.09 billion, which is not quite double the global cost of BAU (USD 6.21 billion) and 2012 current global management costs (USD 5.76 billion).
Discussion
Two interpretations emerge from this study: First, while adopting effective catch shares is likely to entail the largest incremental increases in management cost, it is also likely to lead to even more significant increases in economic rent or profit. In fact, expert opinion suggests that depending on how well fisheries are already managed, the cost of switching to catch share management might even lower costs relative to BAU, which would further strengthen our main results. If some of that increase in profit can be captured to pay for the change in management cost (indeed, only a small fraction of it would be required in most countries), then the policy reform would be win-win.
A key question that comes up when considering management costs is who should pay. It has been argued because the fishing industry benefits from management services, it should pay the costs associated with that management. Generally, taxpayers end up paying for these services, which are in turn provided by the government.
Importantly, the benefits depicted in these results do not reflect individual fisheries, but the generalized benefits at the national level. Specific fisheries might benefit differently from management changes, and effective catch shares will surely require careful design tailored to each fishery.
In addition, while this study suggests that those directly employed by the fishing industry could experience an increase in profits with a shift from less effective management to catch shares, and to a lesser extent, strong output controls, it does not investigate the implications of management reform down the supply chain. The value of this sector could potentially decrease with management that requires decreases in harvests. More research is needed to determine the economic implications of improved management on other related sectors.
The finding that adopting OC is still beneficial, but not as beneficial as adopting CS, is not too surprising, particularly given our assumption that securing long-run economic profit is still possible under OC. While output controls alone can be effectively implemented to regulate catch and achieve conservation objectives, there is a strong theoretical argument that they cannot ensure significant long-run profits, because rents will be dissipated by excessive effort on unregulated margins.
Thus, they regard the OC scenario as an intermediate case between open access and fully rent-capturing catch shares. As such, the profit upside from OC will always be lower than the profit upside from CS. While it is also true that our results suggest lower management costs under OC (than CS), they are not sufficiently low to make OC more attractive than CS.
Future work
There are a number of ways in which this study could be built upon to further examine the relationship between costs and fisheries management. First, while this study focused on the annual cost of management after management reform has been implemented, studies and interviews indicate that transition costs can be significant. During the transition period, the reform is designed and planned. This stage can be labor intensive and take a substantial amount of time, thus incurring significant fixed costs. In addition, it may require expensive research efforts to guide reform design. Including this expense would capture a more comprehensive cost of fisheries management.
Second, future studies could expand on this work by developing a more precise model for determining changes in management cost, for example by incorporating complexities in rules and regulations such as bycatch regulations, limits on days at sea, gear restrictions, and required reporting and analysis likely to influence the costs of administration, research, and enforcement services.
Finally, while the country-level approach used in the current study is useful for making decisions at the national level, a fishery level-approach might provide key insights for managers working on the reform of individual fisheries. This approach would require fishery-level data on the cost associated with management attributes specific to fishery type. Importantly, improved data on the cost of managing fisheries at both the country and fishery level would facilitate more precise analyses.
Conclusion
The research highlighted here demonstrates that when governments implement and enforce strong policies and regulations to manage their fisheries sustainably, the benefits are mutually reinforcing: fish production increases; economic profits rise; and fish stocks recover and rebuild. The path to sustainable fisheries will require not only reform by government, but also accompanying practices such as an improved business environment, increased transparency, and sound science and careful monitoring. Collectively, these practices create a synergy that helps enable the transition to sustainable fisheries management.
One of the remaining challenges is determining how best to finance the comprehensive costs of reform, particularly during the transition period. We believe there are emerging opportunities for all sectors to contribute to the transition to sustainable management, from the private sector and public finance playing an innovative role in financing the transition, to the research community providing critical and timely data as well as innovative technologies that can enable smart policy decisions.
The rewards of sustainable management have never been higher—and the costs of inaction have never been more clear—in unlocking the underlying potential of global fisheries.
I get asked often about this issue… A truly complicated topic I know very little about (and I believe not many people do really know a lot about it). Its really complex and truly interesting, since it adds a full new set of variables to fisheries management, which is per se already multifaceted.
A few years ago, SPC published an interesting book (Vulnerability of Tropical Pacific Fisheries and Aquaculture to Climate Change), that in my opinion still leads the pack and what is (could?) be happening.
The build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is acting in two major ways that are ultimately expected to affect fisheries and aquaculture in the tropical Pacific.
First, the accumulation of greenhouse gases is trapping more of the heat that would normally escape from the Earth, leading to an overall increase in global surface Temperature. The oceans have absorbed almost 80% of the additional heat, acting as a buffer against more rapid atmospheric warming. However, the continued uptake of this extra heat has wide-ranging implications for marine resources.
Generalised effects of increased greenhouse gases on oceanic and coastal ecosystems in the tropical Pacific
Thermal expansion of the ocean, together with melting of land ice, is resulting in rising sea levels. Increases in ocean temperatures are also changing the strength and direction of currents, and making surface waters more stable, reducing vertical mixing and the availability of nutrients in the upper layer of the ocean. Reductions in the supply of nutrients usually limit the primary production at the base of the food chains that support fisheries.
Warmer oceans also cause changes in atmospheric circulation patterns, giving rise to regional changes in climate. In the tropical Pacific, greater evaporation and moisture availability are expected, leading to an intensification of the hydrological cycle, and a pole ward expansion and possible slow down of the Hadley circulation. As a result, rainfall is projected to increase in tropical areas of the Pacific and decrease in subtropical areas, although there is still considerable uncertainty about the regional pattern of projected changes. There is also the possibility that warmer conditions may result in more intense cyclones and storms, resulting in rougher seas, more powerful waves and greater physical disturbance of coastal environments.
The second way that increasing greenhouse gases are expected to affect fisheries and aquaculture is through changes to oceanic concentrations of CO2 and the resulting effect on ocean acidity. The ocean has absorbed more than 30% of human CO2 emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution and it is now more acidic than at any time during the last 800,000 years.
This effect is largely independent of global warming but also has grave consequences for marine ecosystems. The dissolved CO2 reacts with sea water to form weak carbonic acid, which reduces the availability of dissolved carbonate required by many marine calcifying organisms to build their shells or skeletons.
There is serious concern that continued emissions of CO2 will drive sufficient gas into the sea to cause under-saturation of carbonate in some areas of the ocean this century. Where this happens, the environment will favour dissolution rather than formation of carbonate shells and skeletons.
Nature of effects of climate change on fisheries and aquaculture worldwide
The basis of tuna production in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and the main methods used to harvest tuna
We already know that variations in climate on time scales of years to decades can cause significant changes in fisheries production. For example, catches of Peruvian anchovies have varied between < 100,000 tonnes and > 13 million tonnes since 1970 as a result of changes in ENSO46,47. The different phases of the ENSO cycle also determine the distribution of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean – the fish move further east during El Niño events and further west during La Niña episodes ( I wrote about this here and here)
Over and above normal year-to-year variations, longer-term changes in physical oceanography and biology, known as regime shifts, can have major consequences for the species composition and productivity of fisheries. Some heavily fished stocks have collapsed due to the additive effects of environmental and fishing stresses.
However, the effects of such changes in climate have not always been negative. For example, a period of ocean warming around Greenland starting in 1925 resulted in a northern extension in the range of cod by > 1000 km and the creation of an international fishery of up to > 400,000 tonnes per year.
Questions abound for fisheries management. Will the species that currently support substantial harvests still be available as climate change continues? If not, which types of species are most likely to replace them? For those species that continue to support fisheries, will climate change reduce the capacity for replenishment and production, and increase the risk of overfishing? How should managers and policymakers respond to the projected changes to maintain sustainable benefits from fisheries? How will fishers perceive and react to the risks associated with projected changes? Will fishing at sea become more hazardous? How much will it cost to adapt?
Potential impact of climate change on fisheries and aquaculture in the tropical Pacific
The range of coastal fisheries activities in the tropical Pacific, and the habitats that support them.
All fisheries and aquaculture activities in the region are likely to be affected by climate change. The distribution and abundance of tuna, which dominate oceanic fisheries and are the mainstay of the economies of some smaller PICTs1, are influenced largely by water temperature and the availability of nutrients.
The coastal fisheries that currently provide much of the animal protein for Pacific islanders14, and the contribution of aquaculture to the economies of French Polynesia and Cook Islands, are based largely on coral reef habitats. These habitats are threatened by changes to water temperature, acidification of the ocean and sea-level rise, and possibly more severe cyclones and storms.
The freshwater fisheries of PNG have evolved in a climate of heavy rainfall and any major alterations in precipitation can be expected to change the nature of these resources, on which hundreds of thousands of people rely.
Preliminary analysis has already identified the following possible effects of climate change on fisheries and aquaculture production in the tropical Pacific from climate change:
Changes to the distribution and abundance of tuna: Alterations in ocean temperatures and currents and the food chains that support tuna, are projected to affect the location and abundance of tuna species21,48. In particular, the concentrations of skipjack and bigeye tuna are likely to be located further east than in the past. This has implications for the long-term management of the region’s tuna resources, and for the development and profitability of national industrial fishing fleets and canneries in the western Pacific.
Decline in coral reefs and coastal fisheries: Rising sea surface temperatures and more acidic oceans are projected to have direct impacts on coral reefs and the habitats and food webs they provide for reef fish and invertebrates. Degraded coral reefs are likely to support different types of fish and lower yields of some species. Reduced catches of reef-associated fish will widen the expected gap between the availability of fish and the protein needed for food security.
Difficulties in developing aquaculture: Changing patterns of rainfall and more intense storms could flood aquaculture ponds more regularly in some places, and make small pond farming for food security impractical in others due to more frequent droughts. There could also be higher financial risks associated with coastal aquaculture as a result of (1) greater damage to infrastructure and equipment from rising sea levels and the possibility of more severe cyclones and storms; and (2) the effects of higher water temperatures, ocean acidification, reduced salinity and increased incidence of disease on the growth and survival of shrimp, pearl oysters, seaweed and ornamental specimens90.
Increased operating costs: Projections that cyclones and storms could possibly become progressively more intense would involve increased risk of damage to shore-based facilities and fleets for domestic tuna fishing, and processing operations. Fleets operating within the cyclone belt may need to be upgraded to provide improved safety at sea. Rising sea level may eventually make many existing wharfs and shore-based facilities unusable. Taken together, increased costs associated with repairing and relocating shore-based facilities, and addressing increased risks to occupational health and safety for fishers, may affect the profitability of domestic fishing operations. Such increased costs will need to be taken into account by PICTs when planning the optimum mix of developing local industries for tuna and providing continued access for DWFNs.
Reality is that the main findings are mixed – there are likely to be winners and losers – underscores the importance of this vulnerability assessment. Practical adaptations, policies and investments are now needed to reduce the threats of climate change to the many fisheries and aquaculture activities that are part of the economic and social fabric of the region. Adaptations, policies and investments are also needed to capitalise on the opportunities.
Otherwise we will keep running behind the ball (as usual)… unfortunately I don’t see that happening.
Fish aggregating devices (FADs) are artificial floating objects, specifically constructed to attract pelagic fish. Typically, they consist of a floating raft, submerged synthetic netting. Many this days have a “marker” of a satellite buoy that allows a fishing vessel to return to a specific location. They can be anchored or drifting ones, and they are as many design types as people deploying them!
Many fish species naturally congregate near objects floating in the ocean, a fact that is the basis of FADs existence. How they work still debated, but here is a good talk about then.
FADs have become widely adopted as a means of improving fisheries production. In most cases, the effects of FADs—both positive and negative—are not monitored, and there is no real information on the true impacts of sometimes very costly FADs on local fisheries.
A good manual on their design use and cost efectivines has been produced by SPC here
The Pew Environment Group evaluated that FAD deployments have more than doubled since 2006 in the eastern Pacific Ocean alone. Without being as scientific my personal evaluation trouhj my wrk documents, will say the same about the western pacific.
Still, there are few regulations for fishermen or vessel owners to follow, and no penalties for deliberately abandoning FADs at sea when they are no longer deemed useful or productive.
Some RFMOs have measures intended to improve the monitoring of drifting FADs, but the overall lack of standarised regulation makes counting these objects difficult.
Information on FAD deployments remains hard to find. Much of the data that would be needed to develop a precise estimate of their numbers exist but are confidential as industry invest heavily on the construction and electronics of it (just think how much 3 km of Polyethylene line will cost!) and they don't want other companies to use their FADS, so this information proprietary
In 2012 Pew took on the task of developing a ‘back of the envelope’ estimate of how many drifting FADs are currently in use, while acknowledging that it would be a challenging exercise and the results both imperfect and preliminary. Collating data gathered using three separate methodologies, they estimated that in 2011 the number of drifting FADs put into the oceans each year ranges from 47,000–105,000.
Using data on fishing obtained since then, along with new scientific research and an examination of recent trends in FAD use and technology, Pew has produced updated estimates indicating that the total number of drifting FADs deployed in 2013 ranged from 81,000 to 121,000. The upper estimate has increased by 14 percent since the calculations for 2011.
Other analyses have come to similar conclusions. For instance, the European Commission released a report in 2014 estimating that 91,000 drifting FADs are deployed annually. Meanwhile, new initiatives are underway to better track and understand FAD use. For example, three French purse seine companies, operating in the Atlantic and Indian oceans, provided researchers with detailed tracking data of FAD movements to create the most extensive analysis yet of how FADs move in those ocean areas.
Parties to the Nauru Agreement, a group of eight Pacific island states that have the world’s largest skipjack fishery within their waters, plans to implement an electronic tracking system that will allow monitoring of FAD numbers and locations in near real time to better understand the impact on the tropical tuna fishery. This will provide useful data to fisheries scientists and managers on the use of tens of thousands of drifting FADs in the western and central Pacific Ocean.
Starting in 2017, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) will require vessels to provide additional FAD data and physically mark their FADs with unique identification codes.
Given the practical and feasible steps available to improve FAD management, they have been calls on RFMOs and fishing entities to:
Recently I quoted Dr. Shelton Harley presentation at the TunaForum in Fiji, where he reckon (and I totally agree) that sun powered/satellite data transmission capable Sonar devices attached to FADs are a massive game changer and complex development.
In the past the vessel had to go to their FADs and then see if there was fish around it; with this technology fleet managers from the desk somewhere in the world can direct the vessels to the FADs that are showing signal. Here is an example of what you can buy this days.
As anything in fisheries, there are no easy answers… in these aspects i always refer to something I learned many years ago: “the risk is never in the substance, is always in the dose”
The WCPFC’s Eleventh Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC11) met in Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia on 23-29 September to discuss technical and compliance matters in advance of WCPFC12 (and as always a mix bag)
TCC is responsible for administering the Commission’s Compliance Monitoring Scheme (CMM 2014-07). During the annual TCC meeting a review is conducted in a closed working group session of compliance of Commission members’ and cooperating non-members’ (CCMs) with obligations established in the WCPFC Convention, scientific data requirements, Commission Decisions and Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs).
TCC11 marked the fifth year of implementation of the Compliance Monitoring Scheme, with several days dedicated to conducting the compliance monitoring review. The compliance of 36 CCMs was reviewed with a priority list of over 100 obligations for 2014 (however the report is password protected :-( )
A three-tiered system of rating compliance was applied for the second year running, where members are rated for each obligation as compliant (green), non-compliant (orange) or priority non-compliant (red) (when a CCM is non-compliant for an obligation for two or more years, is breaching catch limits and/ or is not submitting Annual Reports). If a CCM is in compliance with all assessed obligations, TCC recommends an overall compliant rating to WCPFC.
Following the compliance monitoring review process, TCC11 developed a Provisional Compliance Monitoring Report to be forwarded to WCPFC12 for consideration which includes a provisional assessment of each CCM’s compliance status and recommendations for corrective action, as well as issues arising during the compliance monitoring review process and requests for assistance and capacity building.
While CMM 2014-07 includes provisions for responses to non-compliance, including the establishment of a small working group to identify a range of responses to non-compliance, this issue was not progressed by TCC11. Since the current Monitoring Scheme measure expires in 2015, time was also spent during TCC11 to develop proposed text to extend the Scheme into 2016 and beyond.
No one is dodgy... is all a misunderstanding
In previous years, a key TCC concern was continued failure of South Korea, Japan, Chinese Taipei and China to provide operational level data, which compromises the ability of the Commission to carry out its compliance functions, as well as reducing the robustness of stock assessments. At WCPFC11, operational level data requirements were included in the CMM on tropical tunas (CMM 2014-01) to help address this issue. TCC11 noted there has been significant progress in the provision of operational data from Korea and China, but further improvements are still required. Further progress is expected in 2016.
Discussions on the Regional Observer Program touched on the paramount concern for health and safety of observers, particularly in light of the recent case of a US-observer going missing from a Panamanian carrier in Peru, as well as other reported cases of harassment, intimidation and assault. WWF delivered a strong statement to TCC11 about the critical issue of observer health and safety and indicated that it will be pushing for market-based sanctions for companies/fishing vessels who violate observer health and safety. WWF’s position was supported by several WCPFC CCMs.
TCC11 discussed proposed amendments to existing WCPFC CMMs as well as new CMMs for consideration by WCPFC12.
On proposed new CMMs, at the time of TCC11 only one new proposal had been tabled by PNA for establishing a WCPO skipjack target reference point, which is a revision on their 2014 proposal to WCPFC11.
No new proposals tabled by any members on major changes to the existing measure or a proposal for a new measure for skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye, despite this being one of the most contentious and highly-debated measures in recent years.
However, TCC11 has recommended WCPFC12 address some ambiguities in the text (e.g. defining ’current’ levels) to better facilitate review of compliance with certain requirements.
Also, there are elements that are required to be addressed in 2015 by WCPFC12 including high seas purse seine effort limits, purse seine yellowfin catch limits and longline yellowfin measures.
Additional FAD measures for 2015 and the capacity management work plan may also be discussed. FFA members also met in late October for their annual Management Options Consultation where they usually prepare multiple proposals.
All this info was adapted from FFA's FTIN for the period Sept – Oct 2015 being Volume 8: Issue 5
As blogged before, I took a job that is a far distance from my usual topics... Bringing new tools to a traditional fishery. I like to branch out sometimes, and is good for my "interest" and it challenges me to "see" things with a new mindset.
Not the usual image of the Pacific
In Chile, benthic species, small pelagic and demersal fisheries, have historically been exploited by artisanal fishermen due to an initial open access to the fisheries and the opening of new global markets. Today, approx. 60,000 fishermen depend for their livelihoods and income on these declining resources. Despite the socioeconomic importance of the artisanal sector, its “development stage is precarious” due to organizational fragmentation and institutional weaknesses.
Understanding how small scale fisherman make ends needs with fishing is complicated, since the fresh fish trade involves transacting characteristics that are very difficult to be measured, without a specific ad hoc tool needed to understand the way fishing business works at small scale vessel level, furthermore the disparity of vessels characteristics at each location varies profoundly, hence making a generalist approach to the analysis of limited utility. Furthermore, the artisanal fishery organizational structures in Chile are highly complex and regionalised.
The understanding of the cost benefit reality for fisher operation, becomes even more relevant since the introduction of quotas, as the earnings of a fisher are based on a limited quantity of catch that has already a market value, hence knowing on trip by trip basis the earning and loss situation allows for catch planning. And if that wasn't enough, exclusivity fix price arrangements for catch do not reflect the cost of fishing due to the lack of a specific tool for that aim.
So mi first job was to adapt and update a spreadsheet we used in Samoa many years ago, to help the fisherman association to keep a much better tab on if they make money or the don't.
The spreadshhet is design to give a immediate appreciation of where they are in terms of cost benefit.
My next proposal is way more ambitious... from the findings it was clear that a tool that improves the transparency of the value chain, while providing traceability and information to fisher, buyers and authorities alike, could alleviate many of the shortcomings of the present scenario for many fisherman.
In fisheries today, new ICTs are being used across the sector, from resource assessment, capture or culture to processing and commercialization. Some are specialist applications such as sonar for locating fish. Others are general purpose applications such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) used for navigation and location finding, mobile phones for trading, information exchange and emergencies, radio programming with fishing communities and Web-based information and networking resources.
However many of these especially dedicated tools are in a cost range that exceed the financial capabilities of the fishers, or have to be install and removed form the vessels. However, the new generation mobile phones are incredible tools that bring together in one various different “technologies”, they are at once a personal locator beacon, a GPS navigation device, and GPS equipped camera, besides being a 2-way communication device.
Based on work prior done in East Timor and Indonesia plus a existing tool being used in the Caribbean, I proposed the development of a app containing a “suite” of tools that could be used from a mobile phone that could ally itself the following focal FAO focal points:
So I proposed the conceptual design of a Android App (initially named “PescApp”). This app will open a “suite of services” that are at the disposition of the registered fishers including regulatory and traceability components as well as a market and trade services.
The App concept is not new, the original was one in Trinidad and Tobago and it looks like the one illustrated here. I just expanded the concept to:
Registration
SOS
Navigation / Weather Information
Compliance
Alerts
Traceability
Market Information and Auction
However is important to point that while all fisherman interviewed had a “intelligent” phone of some sort, and all of them reported having 3G signal up to 10 miles from shore (hence the technology and tools are well incorporated by the ultimate beneficiaries). The App are not expected to yield desired outcomes unless these are well articulated and drive the App design and implementation strategy.
A recent report in ITC in small scale fisheries topic, nails the complexity of this process:
Rejuvenation of the small-scale fisheries sector with its complex interdependencies and rich ecosystem is not an easy, mechanical or even technical challenge. The integration of ICTs in the small-scale fisheries sector requires the development of various cognitive and skills-based capacities, as well as the formation, refinement and authentic ownership of new attitudes and behaviours. It calls for the human systems to be established to, in turn, articulate the various processes that in concert, aggregate to achieve bold, meaningful and consensual outcomes.
Technology cannot take the place of collaboration, engagement and negotiation, and can do little to take the place of time. Technology cannot provide a solution to the fundamental challenges, which limit participatory governance in fisheries anywhere in the world. It can only be as good as its human partners who must plan, design, implement and nurture the sector, its agents and its growth.
I wrote about this in the past, but my friend and college Christopher Kevin from PNG's NFA that did the programming published recently a more detailed explanation on the system. So I share it here.
The objective of the Fishing Accountancy System (FAS) is to prevent the mixing of or processing and Exporting/Selling of Fish that has been caught and landed legally from fish that has been Illegally caught and landed, as a necessary tool for PNG's system for EU Catch Certification
The FAS is controlled and maintained by the NFA's Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS) team, and it works this way:
When a Catcher or Carrier calls into PNG port to land, a Landing Authorization Code (LAC) or Unloading Authorization Code (UAC) is issued to the catcher/carrier.
SCENARIO 1 - Wewak Port Example for a Catcher Landing Fish at ABC Seafoods Corporation:
SCENARIO 2 - Lae Port Example for a Carrier Landing Fish from 3 different Catchers at XYZ (PNG) Limited:
Work through - Fish Transaction and Balancing:
Every time an export is made, all the details are entered into the system by the CDS Officers/CDS Monitors/Export Officers.
For every new Export, the Catcher Name, LAC, Lot # and Species are entered into the system to check the Fish Balance remaining per specie and Lot # for this particular catcher. See fig 1 below:
Fig. 1- Fish Balancing/Transaction Screen
Using Scenario 1 – Fish Usage
From the above fish usage:
If the Catcher with said LAC, Lot # and Specie is NOT ALREADY registered in the system, No Fish Balancing Records/Details will be displayed on the screen and an Error Alert Message Box will be displayed notifying the user that there are no records available for this search criteria. The user will now enter the new details into the system and export approval is given. See Figure 2 below:
Fig. 2 Fish transaction details Per Lot# and Species.
For the above example, the system will now display on the screen as seen below
Fig. 3: Fish transaction details Per Lot No and Species – Error message indicating that there is no record available as per the search criteria
Fig. 4: Report to display the fish transaction details Per Lot # and Species
Fig. 5: Report to display the Total Quantity Processed (Loins and Canned) or sold Whole Round Tuna Per Lot# and Species
Fig. 6: Report to display the Total Quantity Sold Locally or Sold Locally as Whole Round Tuna Per Lot No and Species
Obviously the reporting can be customised to reflect any (or many) of the parameters in the relational database, and the design of the system is flexible as to be adapted to other fishery operations.
While is quite frustrating to explain screens on a text, all is possible with good will and patience, and from what I know NFA and Christopher (who is a great guy) are happy to share their systems and knowledge.
That is definitively not the type of statement that you read often in fisheries... but that depends from where you look at it. I have known Phil Roberts (from Trimarine) for a long time, he knows the tuna world from the inside out, and I always like to listen to what he has to say.
He always has the right information to complement his words. The graph above is explanatory on itself the world is catching to much fish and that oversupply is driving the price down, so what is the point?
No one wins... that is what my 13 years old boy said when I explained the graph... Is so evident that I just don't understand how we got here.
From 2000 – 2014 catch increased by 75% in the WCPFC. That leads that to oversupply and depressed market prices, there has been a 39% drop in value from 2013 to 2015.
Oversupply is bad for boat owners. Oversupply = low prices = unprofitable boats.
Low prices are bad for island based processors are only low prices are good for brands and dutiable processors.
SPC indicates that 220 seiners could fish to 50% target reference point. The WCP fleet may need a 25 to 50% reduction and make more room for locally flagged vessels.
Every year at this time is Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meeting in the western and central Pacific Ocean in Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. And a lot of fisheries technical informations is prepared and presented. Is one of those places where the scientists present their data and the politics ignore it...
As the guys from ISSF said: While some members have made great progress through stakeholder collaboration throughout the intersessional period, given the ongoing and pending issues again on the agenda, one wonders if we are attending TCC 10 or TCC 11? There is certainly a sense of déjà vu as we prepare for this meeting.
Reading fisheries papers is not for the non initiated... and the dynamics and problems of Big Eye tuna are not one dimensional. However, in my eyes the graph below from this paper just tells all the story:
Each colour is a different part of the pacific where the data comes from, the trend is clear even if you are not a fisheries biologist.
Management failure at its best
Every year around September - October I do a few weeks of work in Latin America. Working here is a bit of sabbatical: completely different language, fisheries, realities, problems, etc… It put my head back to the other reality of fisheries; where catching fish is part of everyday subsistence and not only a job that brings money.
Small scale long line fisherman in Chiloe Island.
Over the next week I will be working again for the Swiss Government SIPPO Programme in Peru, selecting small fishing operations for their direct contact with world buyers cutting off the middleman.
Then I’m off to Southern Chile, working for WWF Smart Fishing Initiative, supporting the development of low cost technologies that facilitate catch volumes evaluation, traceability, transport logistics and fisherman safety in the small scale hake fishery around Puerto Montt.
I always believed that Information and Communications Technology (ICT) can greatly benefit both fisheries administrations and fishing communities alike, I have utilized information and communications equipment in a wide range of initiatives. And more and more I believe that new generation mobile phones are incredible tools that bring together in one various different “technologies”. They are at once a Personal locator beacon, a GPS navigation device, and GPS equipped camera… besides being a Communication device! And in fisheries we have use for all of them!
Those “tools” can be easily and cheaply interfaces with google maps platforms and we then appeal to willingness of the social responsibility and sustainability sections of mobile companies to support it, so many positive advances in small scale fisheries can be acheived via win-win scenarios… the only things you need are a phone, a waterproof cover, some call credit and thinking out of the box… (I like that last bit a lot!)
Hence, I see this a good challenge and a opportunity to refresh my head and then go back to tuna, IUU and Catch documentation at the end of November.
I keep updates coming.
A couple of weeks ago, when I was in the Pacific Tuna Forum in Fiji, I posted about the presentations I was keen to hear and see. Today I present Shelton Harley's one, he is the Principal Fisheries Scientist (Stock Assessment and Modelling) of SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme. Shelton is a very clever man at the top of its game, and equally important, a good communicator of the science and status of the stocks.
I will attempt to pass some of his message, that was quite strong and cautionary, most of the images and graphs are self explanatory.
2014 was the largest in tuna fishery catches in history 1.96 Million Tonnes of skipjack. To make sense of this number, see above: If we were to put all the skipjack caught nose to tail, the line would extend almost half a million km... enough to go around 100000 km beyond the dark side of the moon.... that image blew my little brain off into pieces.
Every year more and more Skipjack get added to the statistics while the rest has been quite stable... but for how much more?
The Pacific catches are way more than all other oceans combined... just some Kiribati and PNG and you have more than the whole Indian ocean. This numbers are staggering.
The usual graphs that are shown, have green (is all good), orange (we need to take measures) and red (overfishing)... this time he believes that that green gives a fake sense of security... hence he circumscribed the statatus of the healtiest stocks to a smaller oval of where the fishery operates at good biological and economical returns. under that view, even skipjack looks borderline.
Hence, the overall picture is not very good for the other pelagics
Purse Seine fishing is increasing it efficiency , and there is an increase in the number of sets. Skipjack biomass is going down and catch rates are going up.
Sonar FADs (Fish Aggregation Devices) are the biggest game changer, in the past the vessel had to go to their FADs and then see if there was fish around it; with this technology fleet managers from the desk somewhere can direct the vessels to the FADs that are showing signal. Also helicopters are back in the fleet as there is lot of replacement vessels. New purse seiners are more powerful and more efficient. (And many are subsidised as i suggested before)
Of course this impact Yellowfin, as is to be seen in the 3 maps or relative abundance above. Juvenile Yellowfin associates to Skipjack and is caught with it, as purseine is not really a discriminatory fishing method.
Hence the take home message is sobering, we have long reached or exceeded long term sustainable catch levels. The harvesting at such level is also felt in nations that do not catch Skipjack, as there are ecosystems implications that are not well studied yet.
The solutions to these issues are not new:
Unfortunately, the precautionary words that he has, seems to fall in the deaf hears of most DWFN and some Pacific Islands decision makers. But good on him for bringing these issues up in public forums.
I always maintained that the region is very lucky to have organisations like SPC, that can attract and maintain scientists of Shelton's caliber. Their analytical capacity and the level of the mathematical modelling that guys like him do is quite amazing. Total respect to him.
Is the 20th anniversary of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, a unique document that is not always valued as it should. FAO media unit interviewed some worldwide key stakeholders on their views about the importance of the Code of Conduct and what they see as the main challenges to overcome to fully attain the objectives of the Code of Conduct over the next 20 years.
By some reason they also asked me... This is how I sound in my mother language.
During the FAO Expert Consultation I was invited in Rome in July, FAO asked my view on the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the challenges it faces.
Basically I say that for me, the code is reference point that we all should mantain as yardstick in whatever area of fisheries we work. We need to have a "masterplan set of guidelines" and that is what the code ought to be.
I also say that the key challenge that has faced and continues facing is exactly that! We need to keep inthe forefront of whatever we as the "meta language" we use, and is not always done.
What the code "is" and "do" is explained in the video below by my ex colleagues and friends from FAO.
What is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries? Is a introductory document to the code has been translated to most languages of the world, and I'm happy to see that includes many of the Pacific Islands ones, click on the links for versions in Cook Islands Maori, Fijian, Taetae ni Kiribati, PNG Tok Pisin, Solomons Pijin, Samoan, Tongan, Tuvaluan, and Vanutu Bislama.
Recently came across this very good article about fisheries subsidies (a topic that normally hits me in the guts) by some heavy weights in terms of international trade Pascal Lamy (ex DG of WTO), Oby Ezekwesili (cofounder of Transparency International) and José María Figueres (ex President of Costa Rica).
Based on 2006 figures
This also ties up with the figure above, that notes that the global cost of fisheries subsidies is greater than the cost of IUU fishing.
The article presents good figures and arguments, hence is worth reading:
The just-adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are expected to herald the start of a new era in global development, one that promises to transform the world in the name of people, the planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership. But there is an ocean of difference between promising and doing. And, while global declarations are important – they prioritize financing and channel political will – many of today’s pledges have been made before.
In fact, whether the SDGs succeed will depend to a significant degree on how they influence other international negotiations, particularly the most complex and contentious ones. And an early test concerns a goal for which the Global Ocean Commission actively campaigned: to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development.”
When political leaders meet at the tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December, they will have an opportunity to move toward meeting one of that goal’s most important targets: prohibition of subsidies that contribute to overfishing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by no later than 2020.
This is not a new ambition; it has been on the WTO’s agenda for many years, and it has been included in other international sustainable development declarations. But, even today, countries spend $30 billion a year on fisheries subsidies, 60% of which directly encourages unsustainable, destructive, or even illegal practices. The resulting market distortion is a major factor behind the chronic mismanagement of the world’s fisheries, which the World Bank calculates to have cost the global economy $83 billion in 2012.
In addition to concerns about finances and sustainability, the issue raises urgent questions about equity and justice. Rich economies (in particular Japan, the United States, France, and Spain), along with China and South Korea, account for 70% of global fisheries subsidies. These transfers leave thousands of fishing-dependent communities struggling to compete with subsidized rivals and threaten the food security of millions of people as industrial fleets from distant lands deplete their oceanic stocks.
Global Ocean Commission data (not sure about the accuracy of the data, in no way I believe that China and PNG are in the same bracket)
On the high seas, the distortion is even larger. According to fisheries economists, subsidies by some of the world’s richest countries are the only reason large-scale industrial fishing in areas beyond coastal countries’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones is profitable. But fish do not respect international boundaries, and it is estimated that 42% of the commercial fish being caught travel between countries’ exclusive zones and the high seas. As a result, industrial fishing far from shore undermines developing countries’ coastal, mostly artisanal, fisheries.
Eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020 is not only crucial for conserving the ocean; it will also affect our ability to meet other goals, such as our promises to end hunger and achieve food security and to reduce inequality within and among countries.
The credibility of both the WTO and the newly adopted SDGs will be on the line in Nairobi. The Global Ocean Commission has put forward a clear three-step program to eliminate harmful fishing subsidies. All that is needed is for governments finally to agree to put an end to the injustice and waste that they cause.
Fortunately, there are encouraging signs. Nearly 60% of the WTO’s membership supports controlling fisheries subsidies, with support from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of developing countries – together with the EU’s contribution to improve transparency and reporting – giving new momentum to the effort.
Among the initiatives being put forward in advance of the Nairobi meeting is the so-called “NZ +5 proposal.” Co-sponsored by New Zealand, Argentina, Iceland, Norway, Peru, and Uruguay, the plan would eliminate fisheries subsidies that affect overfished stocks and contribute to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
The Global Ocean Commission urges the remaining 40% of the WTO’s members – and especially the biggest players currently blocking this process – to accept the relatively modest proposals on the table. A sustainable future for our planet and its oceans depend on it.
The original is here
I have never meet Mercedes Rosello, other than by tweeter (sign of the times) but she knows her stuff very well!, and has been very kind to my work/blog in more than one occasion. As far as I know she she is a PhD researcher and runs House of the Ocean (a not-for-profit consultancy) and a blog (the IUU fishing blog). Her more recent piece is very informative in terms of the legal perspectives of the "concept of IUU fishing". She kindly allowed to "re blog" (is that a real word?) her content. I recommend you read her piece, as I just pick up some quotes from her blog.
some of 100 scenarios....
The first global instrument to introduce the expression IUU fishing was the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA), a non-binding international tool.
Known as a toolbox for States to guide them in the fight against undesirable fishing practices, the IPOA is extensively referenced as the source of the definition of IUU fishing, contained in its paragraph 3. This definition has now been integrated in treaty law, the legal regimes of several States, and European Union legislation. Yet, despite its popularity, the term is controversial due to its lack of legal clarity.
Rather than understanding the term IUU fishing as a single tool with which to assess conduct, it is useful to think of it as three distinct but overlapping categories. Each category presents a different perspective on undesirable fishing activities. Except for the first one, which is all-encompassing in its descriptive simplicity, the categories are not comprehensive. Further, they do not comprise a set of standards on which to judge the illegality of a fishing operation, or the conduct of a State in respect of its international obligations. In this respect, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement is better equipped to deal with such tasks.
First and second categories: illegal and unreported fishing
The first category, that of illegal fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.1 of the IPOA. It is a straightforward description of what makes a fishery conduct a wrong in law at the domestic and international levels.
Firstly, domestically: when the conduct of a vessel (a more accurate reference would be to the person or persons responsible for its operation) contravenes applicable domestic law, it is illegal. Secondly, internationally: certain conducts by vessels may demonstrate a shortfall by the State responsible for their control in the observance of its international legal obligations. When this occurs, there may be an international wrong.
Ultimately, however, whether any illegality has indeed occurred will need to be determined by a relevant authority. Domestically, this may be an administrative authority or a court of law. Internationally, a tribunal with jurisdiction.
A second category, that of unreported fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.2 of the IPOA. Domestically, it refers to vessel conducts that contravene the specific laws that regulate the reporting of fishing activity or catch. Internationally, paragraph 3.2 goes on to refer to activities that contravene the rules of regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) in areas of the high seas where they have regulatory competence. The reference to a contravention implies that the subject (a State) must have agreed to abide by those rules. If such State permits a vessel in its register to operate in a manner that is inconsistent with those rules, the State may be committing an international wrong. Hence, domestically as well as internationally, unreported fishing is a sub-category of illegal fishing. Curiously, other than RFMO rules no reference is made in the IPOA to the contravention of international laws that oblige States to report on fishery data. Given this incompleteness, unreported fishing has little value as a legal category beyond national and regional management contexts.
These categories describe what illegality looks like, but they do not act as legal yardsticks. Domestically, the illegality of a fishing activity can only be determined by way of assessment of the conduct of an operator against the applicable municipal laws by a competent authority. These laws may vary from country to country. However, before the birth of the IPOA, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA) had already typified a number of fisheries activities that it referred to as serious violations. State parties to the FSA are required to address those violations in their respective domestic legal regimes. The non-exhaustive list in FSA Article 21.11 includes conducts such as fishing without authorisation, failing to report catch, using destructive fishing gear, or obstructing an investigation by concealing evidence, to name a few. Hence, in FSA State parties at least, those will be the conducts that will be restricted or outlawed – they will be the illegal fishing conducts to which the IPOA refers or, at least, some of them.
However, the regulatory influence of the FSA does not extend to non-parties, or to the conservation and management of stock that is neither straddling nor highly migratory. Where non-transboundary stock is located in the EEZ of a coastal State, it is left to the discretion of that State to determine what fishing activities should be restricted or outlawed. It will need to do this within the general parameters of international law, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other treaties to which it is bound, including bilateral agreements.
Whether illegal fishing conducts may also be typified as criminal will depend on the discretion of each State. The FSA does not oblige State parties to criminalise any fishery behaviours, only to address certain conducts as serious violations. Most countries choose to do this by way of non-criminal public law and administrative measures. Currently, illegal fishing is not considered a transnational crime in accordance with the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, and therefore States are not obliged to treat it as such. Further, the IPOA discourages this, considering the rigours of criminal law in terms of proof and process too onerous.
It is, however, noteworthy that some States have chosen to criminalise some specific conducts associated to illegal fishing practices. In other cases, strategy documents have referred to illegal fishing as a crime, but the relevant legislators have failed to adopt the necessary laws to ensure criminalisation in their domestic regimes.
Finally, a domestic instance of illegal fishing – whether criminal or not – will be of little significance internationally unless an international legal standard of conduct has also been contravened by a State with responsibility. At the time of writing, such legal standards are principally found in general international law, UNCLOS, the 1995 Compliance Agreement and, in respect of straddling and highly migratory stock, the FSA. Whilst several paragraphs of the IPOA have substantially defined some of those rules, its voluntary nature makes it unsuitable as a yardstick against which the conduct of a State can be assessed in order to determine its possible illegality.
Not just inspecting...
Third category: unregulated fishing
The third category, unregulated fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.3 of the IPOA. It has two distinct prongs:
The first one refers to activities carried out inside areas and for stocks under the regulatory competence of RFMOs, in a manner that is inconsistent with their conservation rules. Such activities must be carried out by vessels without nationality, or by vessels flying the flag of a State that has not agreed to be bound by the rules that RFMO (for States who have agreed to this, the activity contravening the rules would be categorised as illegal fishing, as explained above). In effect, this label is slightly misleading, because the sea areas and stocks to which it refers are regulated by RFMOs, notwithstanding the States or vessels’ choice to disregard such regulation.
The second prong refers to activities carried out in a manner inconsistent with the flag State’s international obligations in respect of high seas areas or stocks not affected by RFMO conservation or management rules. Hence, the label unregulated fishing here refers to the absence of RFMO rules.
Although superficial reading of paragraph 3 of the IPOA may suggest that unregulated fishing is an entirely separate category from illegal fishing and is therefore legal, this is not the case. As paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA subsequently clarifies, unregulated fishing will also be illegal if it is inconsistent with the flag State’s international obligations. Beyond obligations acquired in the institutional context of RFMOs, States also have conservation and cooperation obligations derived from general international law and applicable treaty law.
However, the protection offered to those ocean areas and stocks by international law is generally considered thin and unclear in practical terms, making assessments of legality particularly difficult. This is specially so in cases where States have not agreed to important treaties such as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or the 1993 Compliance Agreement, or where no other binding rules (such as those that may be established in a bilateral agreement) exist.
Hence, unregulated fishing is a wide spectrum category comprising high seas activities that are always pernicious insofar as they undermine conservation and cooperation efforts, but whose illegality may be uncertain in accordance with the current international framework. The value of this category lies not in its ability to facilitate an assessment of what may constitute legal or illegal conduct, but in its usefulness to ascribe a negative value to certain fishing activities irrespective of their illegality. This can be practical for a State or group of States who have adopted certain conservation rules, and have to deal with other States who have not done so.
The conserving States may be reluctant to commence international proceedings against the non-conserving States for many reasons, ranging from the political undesirability of engagement in a high profile dispute, to cost, to lack of confidence in the international legal framework, to name a few. In this context, such States may opt for the deployment of trade measures against non-conserving States. Amongst the advantages of this process are the presence of incentives, as well as the avoidance of the rigours associated to international legal process.
Subject to a number of procedural conditions, if the products from the non-conserving States have been captured in a manner that is detrimental to conservation and are excluded by the conserving States on the basis of a non-discriminatory process, they may be considered compliant with the rules of the World Trade Organisation and be, therefore, viewed as legitimate.
Conclusion
The ‘hold all’ composite term IUU Fishing is instrumental in ascribing a negative value to a wide range of fishing and fishery support activities whose illegality is uncertain in order to enhance the accountability of operators and States through trade measures. Beyond this, paragraph 3 of the IPOA does not constitute a proper standard against which the conduct of an operator or a State can be legally assessed by a relevant administrative or judicial authority. Its voluntary nature makes it unsuitable for this task in any event. Appropriately therefore, the IPOA does not list actual behaviours by private actors that States can then domestically class as illegal.
By contrast, the FSA does contain such list in respect of fishery activities targeting straddling and highly migratory species. The list in its Article 21.11 should be replicated, expanded and changed where necessary to be made applicable to non-transboundary stocks across domestic regimes, and in the context of bilateral fishery agreements. This, plus the treaty’s integral management of RFMO conservation consent by State parties makes its adoption and implementation essential in the management of illegal fishing and the delimitation of unregulated fishing to cases where there is no RFMO regulation.
The FSA is, therefore, an essential tool in the regulation of fisheries and the eradication of illegal practices, and States should work hard to foster its generalised adoption alongside the adoption of national plans of action and the Port State Measures Agreement.
In a move that was expected (and truly deserved) the EU lifted the "yellow card" it had on Papua New Guinea since June 2014.
IUU fishing is actually mostly about people, cultures and greed... fish is just what they do. (the body languages in this scene tells a lot)
The EU's press release that announced it recognises that PNG has "amended their legal frameworks to combat IUU fishing, strengthened their sanctioning systems, improved monitoring and control of the fleets".
The good news touches me at personal level, if you follow this blog you must have noted that I have written about working there (here, here, here and here). Over the last 18 months I have worked many times in the country supporting their strengthening actions, and I have been a front row witness of the personal and systemic transformation of the National Fisheries Authority (NFA) staff in charge of the Catch Certification Scheme and its associated Fish Legality and Accountancy controls. I know is very rewarding to them (and me) to feel that they have helped pushing their country off a sticky situation (they are VERY proud people).
Professionally for me is a great satisfaction, there is no template on "how" the system should work... The EU in this area wants outcomes and does not rule how you get there. So is up to countries to come up with systems that provide those results.. the few model available are all in developed countries with vastly different realities than PNG. In PNG we say that if something works here, then there is no excuses not to work anywhere else... (listen to that Philippines, Korea, China and Taiwan!)
So I'm very thankful to NFA, their management and staff, as well to my contractors FFA/DevFish II, for having trusted my vision and the unorthodox development of my systems. We delivered the results expected by the EU, but from a more efficient exporting country perspective and not from a market imposition.
Over the years I made "tru" friends in PNG, which is in many ways a 2nd home for me in the Pacific. I'm immensely proud of the people have I worked with, because it has been 100% their own merit, drive and pride that got the yellow card lifted. Good'n'ya wantoks!
Furthermore, I'm happy to see the EU tackling the bigger guys too! I knew that Taiwan was in the pipeline since April, but is good to see it happening!
I have yet to see (in over 15 years doing this work in the pacific) a Taiwanese flagged or owned (even if flagged in Vanuatu) longliner that is in full compliance and that reports their logsheets in time (perhaps they are... I have just not seen them). So hopefully they do some deep work like the one done in PNG!
Taiwanese longlining logsheets... works of art...
The declining status of the Southern Albacore Fishery has been well documented. Even in its more limited stance; the fishery in Fijian waters that is under a MSC certification, may not be able to pass the next certification (as well there are no way to pay for it, without the catches)
Chinese Longliners in Suva Harbour (Beautiful image for a sad reality)
While the reasons are various, the main culprits are overcapacity, subsidies and the failure of the regimentation and controls in the high seas (a responsibility of the WCPFC)
Is quite sad, as it used to be a profitable fishery that employed mostly Fijians. Unfortunately the concessions and subsidies provided to the Chinese fleet throw the situation into the doldrums.
See below a press release by FTBOA (Fiji Tuna Boats Owners Association) quite self-explanatory
It was a professional and personal challenge to give a talk in regards the “Impact of the EU Yellow cards in the Pacific” at the Pacific Tuna Forum in Fiji this week.
The EU made a game changer with its IUU regulation by denying market access to those products that did not arrived to the border with a “official guarantee” of the flag state of the catching vessel/s attesting on the legality of the catch. Conceptually that is just awesome.
I always recognised and supported that principle, my “beef” with it has been with the practicalities of the Catch Certification Scheme (the tool the regulation uses), the design of the certificate, the fact that is paper based and the backwards (from market to vessel) approach taken less than year after it was 1st introduced (when initially was forwards vessel to market). The fishing industry dynamics and its operational complexities where in existence before the 2010 implementation of the IUU regulation, hence operationally the legislation would have benefited from a much deeper study and understanding of the reality, prior to trying to capture it under a substandard scheme.
My work has been always aimed to make it better from a operational perspective but not to abolish the concept… In fact I’ve dedicated most of the last 5 years of my professional life to help countries to comply with it, by working around many of the operationally frustrating challenges of the scheme while at the same time strengthening the "in country" tools required so the legislation key objective (minimise IUU fishing) is not lost.
Slide 1
Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later (no that one notice much change in the quality and content of their catch certs). The latest country under this process is Thailand, but interestingly even if they get red carded, the impact in the tuna world would be minimal… because the “ban” in exports to the EU will only affect tuna caught by Thai flagged vessels… and paradoxically there are none. The biggest exporter of can tuna in the does not operate a tuna fleet (welcome to one of the many twists of the fishing world).
In any case, I decided immediately that there was no point of dwelling in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalysed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme. And I’m happy to say, we got plenty of positives to report.
Slide 2
The 1st step we took was to foster the understanding of what this whole issue was about, because in reality not many people in the region (and the world I may add) really understood what it was about. The training provided by the EU prior of its implementation was minimal and quite poorly structured (one session for the whole pacific in New Caledonia, based on a powerpoint that just copy and pasted the regulation – I still have it! – as a trainer I can assure that is the best way to loose an audience). Followed by the late publication of a “handbook” which provides guidelines and answers on the implementation of the EU IUU Regulation is a lengthy and wordy document and it was written before the implementation of EU IUU Regulation itself, so many scenarios are not contemplated and the substantial changes of interpretation (such as the Weight in the Catch Certificate - WICC notes 1&2), make the document, while well intended, of very limited use.
Slide 3
For me the analogy of the iceberg fits the situation, what we only see is the tip: the certificate (the-unfortunately- piece of paper). But what really matters is what is below… what I called the “fish legality” and the “fish accountancy”, so all this needed to be strengthen and systematized, so the tip is meaningful.
Hence was very important to develop and standardize a training program that dealt with the conceptual issues first and later with the scenarios that the regulation requires to be contemplated, and FFA's DevFish II programme contracted me for that.
Slide 4
The Certificate itself is a complex document with a multi-layered structure of responsibilities that do not always correlate chronologically with reality, hence detailed explanations and a standardization of the way the information is to be presented was required. These also had to be expanded indirectly to foreign flag states that operate in the region as to maintain “a system” that is homogenous trough the operational chain. The “quality” of foreign certificates was a constant source of frustration for many of the officers we worked – how come they send us this shitty documents and they are not yellow carded? Was a frequent question, that I had no answers to provide.
Slide 4
The next element was to train on the content and scenarios presented by the regulations and understand which ones applied to each case in each island country. This was not easy, because besides the difference in the industries in each country it had to consider as well the interactions in between the Catch Certification, the Health Certification (normally under Health Authorities) and Certification of Origin (under Customs)… so not easy task.
Furthermore we had to consider the scenario of the transhipment countries, as this countries are part of the system but not initially contemplated (not “notified” using the EU IUU lingo) but have an important role without getting any direct benefits (other than fees for use of their ports), as this countries are not allowed to trade fish with the EU because they lack of sanitary authorisation. As in the other cases, all this knowledge had to be built from scratch.
Slide 5
Initially we had to understand how to re-structure the traditional view of MCS into a more holistic approach. Fish does not become illegal during processing, is caught illegally. Therefore if we stop it before landing, then a big chunk of the problem is gone… but then we also need to stop the laundering of illegal fish with legal fish. So we introduce the concept of the "Unloading Authorization Code" (UAC) and Fish Accountancy to link with MCS.
The concepts “mixes” two basic elements; the requirements (in one way or another) of Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) and a Key Data Element needed to follow a landing through the value chain. Under PSMA, vessels have to seek advance approval to enter a port, sufficient to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the information provided. Hence the information required needs to be provided and assessed to facilitate a decision as to whether or not to deny or grant entry. If an “authorization” is given, either the master or the vessel’s representative can present the authorization to the authorities when the vessel arrives in port.
This “authorization” will need to be “coded” (on some form or another) as to be recorded in one way or another as to be able to review and accounted and potentially crosschecked if it is deemed necessary. So why not simply use this Unloading Authorization Code (UAC) as the tool for the initial Key Data Element required for any Catch Documentation Scheme or traceability analysis along the value chain from landing to consumer (or wherever it is needed or most cost effective).
Furthermore, most fishing vessels operators (company own or independent) do maintain a trip or voyage coding systems in order to monitor logistics, fuel consumption, crewing rosters, general costs and more importantly “final payments”(which are in the form of a % of the catch volumes, species composition and values) are to the traced back to that landing, minus the fix costs. Therefore the concept already exists in the sector, so this UAC becomes a better and standardised use of an existing tool.
The "Process" associated to the use design and use of the UAC is as follow:
Arrival notification
The “authorization” to land is assessed by the fisheries authorities in the port in a compliance response to a series of requirements that are decided by the authorities of the Port State in relationship to its own legislation and requirements or those of an RFMO, international agreements, etc. The scope of the requirements can be arranged in accordance to a pre determined risk index based on the characteristics of the vessels requiring port access.
As an example: domestic flagged vessels fishing in the Port State EEZ with local VMS and observers may be at the lowest risk tier (i.e green). Foreign vessels with local licenses, foreign charter vessels, domestic vessels fishing in other EZZ or the High Seas, Fish Carriers, vessels with patchy observer coverage, indirect VMS access, etc. are in middle risk tier (yellow). Finally, foreign flagged vessels with no direct VMS access by the coastal or port state, or no observer coverage or vessels identified as a Vessels of Interest (VoI) by any country or RFMO are singled as high risk vessels (red).
As noted, the risk profile of the vessel defines the required time for arrival notification (12, 24, 48 hrs), plus the amount and depth of the information to be provided by the vessel intending to land. In considering the assessment an UAC can be provided and the vessel is allowed to dock with intention to unload. In instances where it is not provided the vessel may be allowed to dock for humanitarian or force majeure reasons but not to land.
The structure and nature of the UAC is up to the Port State or RFMO to decide, but it is important that it is inclusive in the information it holds, and in principle is to be an integral part of relational database such as a Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS).
The UAC “design” should include for elements such as: country identification, trip and port traceability, fishing effort measurements, observer reporting, etc. and it should have inter-operability with the vessels operators trip/voyaging coding systems, and if needed with the maritime authorities. Interestingly, this inter-operability of the vessels operators and authorities UAC can be beneficial to crews and captains in case of payment disputes or safety at sea issues arising from the maritime authorities.
Inspections
The risk profile and compliance level during the previous step defines the need for inspection of the landing and the expected % of yearly inspections decided by the port state, i.e. 25% of landings for green tier vessels, 50% for yellow and 100% for red.
The decision of whether an inspection should take place needs to be based on the risk profile of the vessel (if red) and the % of inspections that have already taken place (yellow, green) or issues arising from the documentation presented. If an inspection is performed, then the UAC is recorded in the inspection forms in order to provide for future verification if required and for compliance performance monitoring. Ideally the Inspection forms are digitalized on a tablet type device and the data enters the FIM is real time under the specific UAC of that operation. If the results of the inspection shows inconsistencies or non compliances (and based on the extent of these) the landing may be authorized under bond or denied. Then the UAC associated to that landing is “flagged” into the FIMS in order to interrupt any further movements or transactions associated to that landing until the issues are resolved.
Unloading
If it is decided that an inspection is necessary then the results, if compliant, will provide the permission to unload (or transship). This landing could be conditional, as explained before (under bond). If an inspection does not take place the LAC then becomes the “de facto” authorization for unloading.
In the case of transshipments, the UAC is attached to the catch estimates (from logsheets) or real (if hanging scales are used) and reflect the captains/mates receipt or any the document the volumes being transshipped. The UAC will then accompany the transshipping documentation (printed) and if the receiving country has an MoU with the port state or is part of the same RFMO, then they can potentially log-in on to a common FIMS to cross check the legality and estimated volumes of the landing and to add their own information. If landing or transshipments are partial (and this practice should be discouraged by principle) then the UAC would need to be “partitioned” into lots associated to the original UAC with this retained as the main reference and the lots can be incorporated into FIMS. Any volumes not landed should be considered as a “lot” in the same manner as the landed ones.
Reception or weight in
At the coosltore or processing facility reception or anywhere where the official sorting and weight in of the fish is done the UAC “marks” the volumes in the FIMS and into the receiving operator’s inventory system. If the whole fish is loaded into containers for direct export then the weight in is to be recorded under the UAC on the FIMS and the volumes containerized discounted of the total volumes recorded that that landing. That exported lot would still be associated to the UAC as in the case of partial landings or transshipments.
The private operators receiving the fish could either load all the data on a FIMS portal or maintain their own inventory and traceability systems that could either be “absorbed” by FIMS or audited by fisheries authorities. In any case final volumes by species would be incorporated into FIMS for the UAC.Companies normally use lot systems based on the species, size and vessel of origin. All these parameters can be linked to the UAC under FIMS or their own inventory and traceability management system.
Processing establishments and cool stores
Most responsible MCS systems include Mass Balance evaluation (fish landed = fish in storage + fish processed or sold) on the establishments, by the fisheries authorities. These evaluations starts with the UAC of all fish received for a period of time and what is presently in the inventory. The officers for example may chose a minimum of 5 different pallets/boxes/bins to do a full traceability exercise and check that each of those pallets/boxes/bins (raw material as well as processed fish) are registered on company documentation and that can be traced to the UAC.
Volumes withdraw from storage for processing are “discounted” from the original landed volumes in relation to the UAC, hence each withdrawal would leave a smaller volume left from the original until the landing is exhausted. Obviously same principle applies to whole fish withdrawals. Processed product volumes will be inventoried under the same UAC taking in to consideration the processing ratios (conversion factors) associated to that type of products.
Final product Sales and Exports - Catch Certificates
Prior to the product leaving the premises Catch Certificates (domestic or market specific) are prepared based on all the operations relating to the original UAC (or UACs in the case of mixed products). The referencing and traceability to the specific UAC plus the fish volumes accountancy through the value chain becomes the basis and condition “sine qua non” for a catch certificate, either paper or electronic.
Slide 6
That leave us with the “how much” Fish Accountancy knowing this has 2 benefits… we know how much is being caught, which management importance, and then we can record those volumes as the “initial deposit”, and by this we avoid chances of “fish laundering” from any potential illegal landing (just as any financial systems deals with money laundering)
We use the volumes unloaded as the initial deposit from which extractions will be made from, and the different species unloaded become “different currencies” on a same deposit. Then a traceability scheme in the system allow us to follow the “extractions” of different currencies trough time either by whole fish sales or processing. Furthermore, processing losses get dealt by the system like currency exchange (1kg of fish = 400g of loins).
Finally, we “mass balance” each sale/export against that original “deposit” until the volume is exhausted, and no more fish can be attributed to that unload. If some one wants to export fish he “didn’t” land… then we know something is happening there and the inspectors can focus on them.
Slide 7
As you imagine, there is lot of developmental and technical complexity behind these systems… PNG took the lead in developing this concept… even if they don’t have the money that a bank have! Furthermore the system is understandable by proxy to the banking system and “fair”… as there are no “interpretations”… is just about balancing volumes… “fish in” vs. “fish out”
Slide 8
All this took work place at a big cost for the countries and refer only to one of the elements highlighted on the Yellow cards, so a series of other issues (new legislation, IUU NPOAs, VDS allocation, etc) had to be worked as well.
After almost 2 years, we all agree we know much better now what is expected than before and we tried to make the system work in our favour. Even if there are some big issues on pipeline to be worked out... But reality is that for small Islands states, it is always a "catch up" game... They read the rule book while running behind the ball.
Slide 9
I personally think that a lot of the initial "yellow card" issues came up out of personal conflicts in between the parts, at the end of the day the decisions are made by people and justified by paper, and there were a lot of entrenched positions (attacker - attacked, colonial - independent, and so on) being taken initially and this dragged down the process. Things are calmer now and the PICs have responded with actions and not only words. While a lot of the world Tuna is caught in these waters, very little is done under PICs flagged vessels, hence the responsibilities also rely heavily with the DWFN that fish here and not just on the coastal states.
Finally, I always make this point at any presentation, while the EU impose the rules - beyond how good they are - they also fund the assistance to help comply with them.
During the Q&A session, NZ's Ambassador for Pacific Economic Development Shane Jones (and a good man I have been working with for a few months now) shot point blank at me the question in everyones mind:
Did it had a positive impact? PIC go to the WCPFC meetings and promises are done but little is deliver, so do the EU dis us a favour with the yellow cards?
I just smiled, and said something like:
Brooh... I can't answer that question... I'm just a deck-boss helping fellow deck crew. That is a question for the Captain.
From the deck, I can tell you that everyone knows now much better their job than before, and know better their own limitations... but if to get to this you needed a economic powerhouse like the EU with 1/2 a billon inhabitants to "name and shame" minnow coastal states with less than 40 years of independence and VERY limited human and economic resources... well... I just not qualified (or independent enough) to provide you an answer.
End Slide
As I write, a traditional Fijian welcoming ceremony (that of course includes drinking some kava) is opening this years Regional Tuna Industry and Trade Conference on its 5th edition.
Is the 5th time I been invited to be a speaker, and I take it as big honour. I'm crap at the networking thing and the PR side of my work... I just like the job I do and I like the people I work with, and I take this opportunity as a chance to communicate across the region some of the aspects of what are the advances happening in my area of work. At the same time gives me the chance to learn what other people I like and work with, are up to.
While I'm interested what everyone has to say, the ones that I'm more looking forwards this year are:
Achieving Optimal Economic Benefits Through Sustainable Tuna Management and Development, by Transform Aqorau, Executive Director of PNA. Transform is a very smart man and articulate man, that is not afraid to trow the right punches when necessary. His presentation are always entertaining.
Tuna Stock Status, Management Regime and Policies in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Shelton Harley, the Principal Fisheries Scientist (Stock Assessment and Modelling), Oceanic Fisheries Programme, of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Shelton is a very clever man at the top of its game, and equally important, a good communicator of the science and status of the stocks. His presentations are always good learning opportunities.
Developments in Fishing Quotas and Cuts by Transform Aqorau again. There has been a lot of talk of reshaping the tuna landscape by the introduction of quotas as alternative/addition to the Vessels Day Scheme. While conceptually interesting, and having worked and lived on the inside of the NZ Quota Management System, I see al lot constraints on the operational side of it (i.e. controlling fish receivers, aggregation limits, migratory status, etc) so i'm very interested on what he has to say.
Crew Conditions on Fishing Vessels in the Pacific Islands Region by Patricia J Kailola, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Pacific Dialogue Ltd. I don't know Patricia, but I'm very interested in the topic and I'm partially working on the topic.
Constraints to Domestic Industry and Development Through Mitigating Strategies by Adrian Wickham (but delivered by Charles Hufflet) from thePacific Islands Tuna Industry Association. I known both gentlemen for years and they are great people and real fighters for Pacific Island based fishing.
The Viability of Longlining in the Southern Albacore Fishery by Russell Dunham, Director for Fresh and Frozen ULT Tuna of Tri Marine International Pte Ltd. Russell is great guy I've know for years. He know the longline tuna business left, right and centre. Always great presentations.
Foreign Fishing Tuna Operations and Investment in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Hugh Walton, Fisheries Development Advisor, DevFish Project, Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. "Uncle Hugh" as my kids refer to him, is a good mate and he has supported my vision, my work (and my English!!!) for the last 4 years with DevFish II. He is a former fisherman and a guerrilla gardener (that alone makes me like him) and has done every job in the Pacific fisheries (twice!), so is always good to hear what he has to say.
Updates on E-Reporting and E-Monitoring Projects in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Malo Hosken, Regional Electronic Reporting Coordinator, Oceanic Fisheries Programme of SPC. I have meet Malo recently, and I like what he does and why he does it, he is relaxed and very professional, as well as family man... I respect that a lot. His work on e-monitoring (cameras on board) and e-reporting (real time electronically updated logsheets form the vessels) has been pivotal to a lot of work we for see in the near future (furthermore is one of the few tools I know work for avoid shark finning).
The Changing Proportion of Legally-Sourced Tuna in International Trade and FAO’s Best Practice Guidelines on Tuna Catch Documentation System (CDS) by Gilles Hosch, Technical Coordinator – Tuna Traceability & CDS at FAO. Gilles is a very long time friend and a very clever man that knows his stuff deeper than anyone I know. He is actually not gonna deliver it, I will :-)... he is at the present in FSM at the WCPFC CDS Working Group (where I was also invited), and unfortunately we cannot be in two places at once, he is passing my views there and I'm passing his views here.
Finally I'm looking forwards to deliver my one: Impact of EU ‘yellow card system’ on Pacific Island Countries here is the brief as written in the programme: (I'll publish the presentation after delivery tomorrow)
The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have significantly experienced the effects of the EU’s role as the world IUU fisheries evaluator. There are more “yellow cards” in the PICs than in any other region in the world in relation to their population and development status. Fiji and Vanuatu were the first ones, then Papua New Guinea, followed by the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, while FSM and RMI are in dialogue process.
While the EU IUU regulation legally concerns itself only with fish being imported into the EU, it is interesting to note that Vanuatu, Tuvalu, FSM or RMI do not trade with the EU as they lack of Sanitary approval required never the less have been impacted by the EU measures. Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably, major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later. The latest country under this process is Thailand and the jury still out on what is going to happen, PNG on its side seems to still running towards the elusive “green card” goal post, albeit substantial work done.
Nevertheless, this presentation will not dwell in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalyzed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme with the support of the DEVFISH II/FFA Programme. Including the incorporation of elements of the PSMA as to be working towards a pacific wide Catch Certification Scheme as a tool to offset the administrative and economic burden that compliance with the EU scheme has enacted in the PICs.
Looking forwards to all of this!
Continuing from my last post on "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, I focus in this post on the 2 technical bodies of the region, FFA and SPC, two organisations close to my souI, as I do a lot of work for them.
Since 1979, the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is based in Honiara, Solomon Islands, FFA's 17 Pacific Island members are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The founding document of the Agency is the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention. The Forum Fisheries Committee meets annually to consider regional policies and the budget and work programme of FFA.
FFA was established to help countries sustainably manage their fishery resources that fall within their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA is an advisory body providing expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and participate in regional decision making on tuna management through agencies such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).
FFA purpose is to maximise economic and social benefits of fisheries, i it supports its countries and territories in three broad tasks:
FFA assists members to carry out these three broad tasks by providing advice, information, policy recommendations, regional strategies, technical support and development opportunities. It provides support at the national and regional level.
At the national level, FFA provides support direct to countries and territories who are members of FFA. At the regional level, FFA solicits the views of leaders, identifies consensus areas and emerging areas for debate and briefs leaders on technical and policy issues in preparation for their participation in the decision-making body on tuna management in the region (WCPFC) and for negotiations about binding legal agreements (the various treaties, agreements and arrangements pertaining to fishing in Pacific). Pacific Island leaders are active in setting the agenda and priorities of FFA through their involvement in the various FFA projects and meetings and formally through the Forum Fisheries Committee.
Approximately 80 staff at the regional FFA headquarters in Honiara support their national contact points in departments of foreign affairs and fisheries in each member jurisdiction. FFA focuses its work on:
Fisheries management – providing policy and legal frameworks for the sustainable management of tuna. It does so in 4 areas:
Treaties & Agreements - FFA administers and provides support for negotiations and meetings regarding several fishing treaties and agreements. These are the:
Fisheries development – developing the capacity of members to sustainably harvest, process and market tuna to create livelihoods.
Fisheries operations – supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty administration, information technology and vessel registration and monitoring.
Corporate services - supporting the organisation's work through administration, human resources, budgeting and other corporate functions.
The Executive Team of FFA provides high-level policy advice to FFC and members, and manages the work of the Secretariat and member support services in support of the five key output areas for the FFA Executive:
1 Policy Advice
2 FFA Governance
3 Strategic management
4 Relationship management
5 Legal Advice, Media, and Training
Specific MCS Role
The FFA Regional Surveillance Centre and coordinated Joint Deployment Plans
Annual regional multilateral fisheries surveillance operations support the MCS tools and communications of Pacific Island countries. Four of the surveillance operations conducted annually in region are planned and coordinated by the RFSC. These are Operation KURU KURU, BIGEYE/ISLAND CHIEF, TUI MOANA and RAI BALANG. The QUAD OWG is made up of military personnel from Australia, France, New Zealand and the U.S. The role of this group is to share and coordinate operational plans for the FFA member region. FFA attends these meetings and covers regional fisheries surveillance operations, particularly the allocation of aerial surveillance assets and surface unit support.
The FFA Surveillance Operations Officer (SOO) has the responsibility for facilitating the coordination of the surveillance assets provided by the QUAD nations in support of national and multilateral fishing surveillance and response activities. The SOO, and thus the RFSC, is in many cases the conduit between the QUAD nations and FFA members.
All FFA members have access to the FFA RSP covering both their respective EEZ’s and the high seas. The three information sources (FFA VMS, WCPFC VMS and AIS) are used to correlate additional sighting reports from QUAD and FFA member assets, potentially highlighting ‘dark’ vessel contacts not polling on VMS or AIS. These are referred to individual nations for further management. The RSP is linked to the extensive FFA secure databases containing a range of fisheries information that are designed to assist national MCS officers to assess the relative level of compliance of all vessels on the FFA VMS. In the RSP, all vessels are ‘traffic-light’ colour coded to indicate the level of compliance risk (Compliance Index (CI)), which can then be used by member countries to plan MCS activities and operations for their PPB’s, with red indicating the possibility of a high-risk/non-compliant vessel, green indicating a greater probability of a low-risk/compliant vessel.
The 2016 operational phase will include:
Over-flight Approvals: Nations providing maritime surveillance aircraft must coordinate over-flight of territorial boundaries as part of routine diplomatic clearances. Participating nations request these over-flight clearances using their standard procedures and channels. Blanket over-flight approvals are no longer authorised despite this allowing greater flexibility in the tasking of air assets.
Watchkeepers: Participating nations who provide watchkeepers to the RFSC for the duration of the operation need to have nominated personnel well ahead of time to allow for travel and associated arrangements to have been made.
Information-Sharing: If long-term agreements for sharing information are not in place, it is imperative that short-term data sharing arrangements for the duration of the operation have been agreed upon and are in place ahead of time.
WCPFC Non-Public Domain Data: Those participants with EEZs adjacent to high seas areas should ensure they have requested access to WCPFC High Seas VMS data (100NM buffer) as well as their respective in-zone data.
The South Pacific Commission, as SPC was formerly called, was founded in Australia in 1947 under the Canberra Agreement by the six ‘participating governments’ that then administered territories in the Pacific: Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They established the organisation to restore stability to a region that had experienced the turbulence of the Second World War, to assist in administering their dependent territories and to benefit the people of the Pacific. The name, South Pacific Commission, was changed to the Pacific Community at the 50th anniversary conference in 1997 to reflect the organisation’s Pacific-wide membership. Now, in 2010, SPC’s 26-strong membership includes the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories along with four of the original founders (the Netherlands and United Kingdom withdrew in 1962 and 2004 respectively when they relinquished their Pacific interests).
FAME (SPC Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems) main's work is to provide the 22 SPC's member countries and territories with the information they need to make informed decisions on the management and development of their aquatic resources, and help to provide the tools and strengthen the capacity needed to implement these decisions.
The Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) is the Pacific Community’s regional centre for tuna fisheries research, fishery monitoring, stock assessment and data management. It was established by the 1980 South Pacific Conference (as the Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme) to continue and expand the work initiated by its predecessor project, the Skipjack Survey and Assessment Programme.
The OFP provides scientific services relating to oceanic (primarily tuna) fisheries management to its membership. These services include fishery monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research relevant to the fisheries, and stock assessment and evaluation of species- and ecosystem-based management options.
The most important programme outputs are information (e.g., reports on the status of fisheries, stocks and ecosystems), infrastructure (e.g., databases, monitoring programmes), advice (e.g., regarding appropriate levels of fishing), and national capacity building in SPC members.
The OFP has three main objectives as outlined in the FAME Strategic Plan:
Their “clients” are the fisheries administrations of SPC members, for whom they process and manage data from commercial tuna fishing fleets (both domestic and foreign licensed), assist in the development and implementation of effective fishery monitoring programmes, provide advice on the status of tuna and other affected pelagic fish stocks, conduct research on the biology and ecology of the pelagic ecosystem and provide training and other capacity building in these areas.
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and its various sub-groups (particularly the Parties to the Nauru Arrangement (PNA) and the Te Vaka Moana Arrangement) are also key “clients”.
The OFP provides data products, scientific analyses and advice to assist these groups with the assessment and development of fisheries management measures.
The OFP provides data management and stock assessment services and advice to WCPFC under an annual service agreement. The overall budget of the OFP in 2014 was approximately USD 8 million, with funding contributions from the SPC core budget (made up of the assessed contributions of SPC members), programme funding (made up of additional multi-year commitments made by the Governments of Australia, France and New Zealand)
The key work areas or OFP are:
Tuna Fishery Monitoring. The Fisheries Monitoring Section works in collaboration with the Data Management Section to achieve "Accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic species".
The Fisheries Monitoring Section is particularly concerned with"Enhanced national fishery monitoring and data management systems" and, "Enhanced capacity of PICTs to monitor fisheries, manage and use data". The OFP has provided support to SPC member countries and territories for tuna fisheries monitoring since port sampling and observer programmes were implemented by several members in the early 1990s. Since then, the scope of the support has expanded to cover all elements of national tuna fishery monitoring.
Over the years, support has been provided to 20 members and has included advice on the structure fishery monitoring systems, funding of national staff and the provision of sampling equipment, in additional to technical support for sampling programmes; the support that has been provided to SPC members is summarised here.
The OFP has also developed tuna fishery sampling protocols to ensure that sampling data are representative and unbiased.
Capacity building is an important activity of the Fisheries Monitoring Section, and it has been closely involved in the development of Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer (PIRFO) standards, in collaboration with SPC members, FFA and the Secretariat of the WCPFC.
Regional Tuna Fisheries Databases
OFP is responsible for the development and maintenance of the collective regional tuna fisheries database which provides both direct and in-direct benefits to their member countries.
The collective regional tuna fisheries databases comprise nine types of fishery data
• Operational catch and effort logsheet data
• Aggregated catch and effort data
• Annual catch estimates
• Port Sampling data
• Unloadings data
• Observer-reported catch/effort data
• Aggregated size frequency data
• Tagging data
• Biological data (e.g. otolith and stomach contents data)
At the regional level, tuna fishery data collected by member countries are used extensively for research and monitoring purposes. OFP uses the data in the regional tuna fisheries database to assess the state of exploitation of the stocks [on behalf of member countries, the WCPFC, FFA and the PNA] and to study interactions between the different fleets operating in the region. Monitoring of the fisheries includes the biannual publication of statistics compiled from the catch and effort database in the WCPFC Tuna Bulletin and through publication of the WCPFC Tuna
Fishery Yearbook. Tuna fishery data also provide important information for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities and are used in economic and social science studies.
The OFP provide member countries with a sub-set of the regional tuna fisheries database with software query tools to facilitate the extraction of summary tables, graphs and maps to assist in the decision-making processes related to the management of their tuna fisheries and satisfy their reporting obligations to the WCPFC. Member countries also contact OFP on a regular basis with a variety of ad hoc requests for summarised data prepared from the regional tuna database.
Stock Assessment. Within the section, they have five areas of work.
Unless you are an insider, is really hard to understand "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, this blog post hope to share some light on that, as it is complex. The key players of the governance and fishery management framework for tuna and related species in the WCPO include:
I'll start with the role of the commission (WCPFC) and PNA.
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) which entered into force on 19 June 2004. The Convention was concluded after six years of negotiation which commenced in 1994. The period between the conclusion of the Convention and its entry into force was taken up by a series of Preparatory Conferences that laid the foundations for the Commission to commence its work.
The WCPF Convention draws on many of the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement [UNFSA] while, at the same time, reflecting the special political, socio-economic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region. The WCPFC Convention seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks.
A framework for the participation of fishing entities in the Commission which legally binds fishing entities to the provisions of the Convention, participation by territories and possessions in the work of the Commission, recognition of special requirements of developing States, and cooperation with other Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO) whose respective areas of competence overlap with the WCPFC reflect the unique geo-political environment in which the Commission operates.
The Commission supports three subsidiary bodies; the Scientific Committee, Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee, that each meet once during each year. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are followed by a full session of the Commission. The work of the Commission is assisted by a Finance and Administration Committee.
Members: Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu.
Participating Territories: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna.
Cooperating Non-member(s): Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, Vietnam.
How is WCPFC governed?
The Convention establishes a governing body known as the Commission which is comprised of representatives from members, cooperating non-members and participating territories (collectively, CCMs). The Commission holds annual meetings and is presided over by a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who are elected from amongst the membership.
Four subsidiary bodies support the work of the Commission and meet in the months prior to the annual meeting, which is always held in December.
Decisions taken by the Commission are generally done by consensus. In cases where decisions have to be taken by vote, usually on substantive matters, a “two-chamber system” applies. The FFA members of the Commission comprise one chamber, while the non-FFA members form the other chamber. Decisions are taken by a three-fourths majority of those present and voting in each chamber and no proposal can be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber.
How does WCPFC promote compliance?
The Convention establishes a requirement for each member to establish and maintain a record of fishing vessels that are authorised to fish in the Convention Area beyond that member’s area of national jurisdiction. The Secretariat maintains a central database of each member’s authorised list of fishing vessels, which acts as a verification tool to ensure that fishing vessels are legally operating in the Convention Area.
The WCPFC establishes a number of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) programme to promote compliance by Commission members with conservation and management measures and other decisions of the Commission (such as in relation to requirements concerning data submission). One such programme is the Regional Observer Programme (ROP), which manages the placement of personnel on board fishing vessels to observe and collect data on fishing operations. Data collected by observers is critical in assessing the effectiveness of measures, as well as providing scientists with important fishery independent information on the size and weight of species taken. In addition, the role of an observer can be useful in ensuring compliance, through verification of fishing information such as vessel location, time of year and species caught.
Complementing the ROP is the Commission’s vessel monitoring system (VMS). Vessels fishing in the Convention Area are required to install a transmitting device known as an Automatic Location Communicator (ALC), which transmits a signal to a land-based receiving station where fisheries managers can view and track the location of fishing vessels. This tool allows fisheries managers to better promote compliance with any area closures or restrictions that may be in place at any given time. It also helps scientists and managers understand the nature of fishing operations and where fishing is taking place. The Commission’s VMS became operational in April 2009.
A third important MCS element is the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas by patrol vessels registered with the Commission by CCMs. These patrol vessels conduct routine operations throughout the Pacific Ocean. Under an important measure adopted by the Commission, members have agreed to allow their fishing vessels to be boarded and inspected by the patrol vessels of other members. Patrol vessels provide the Commission with an important tool with which to monitor and in some situations, take action against, fishing violations on the high seas.
Another critical component in the Commission’s compliance toolbox is the list of vessels that have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) activities. Vessels that have been found, through sufficient evidence, to have committed violations as described by the Commission, are placed on what is known as an “IUU List”. Members are prohibited from engaging in fishing activities or other related transactions with vessels that are on the IUU List, which can act as a strong incentive for countries to closely monitor and regulate the activities of their fishing vessels.
PNA
The Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, or The Nauru Agreement is an Oceania subregional agreement between the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. The eight signatories collectively control 25–30% of the world's tuna supply and approximately 60% of the western and central Pacific tuna supply.
Historically, the Nauru Agreement and other joint fishery management Arrangements made by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (usually referred to as PNA) have been concerned mainly with the management of tuna purse-seine fishing in the tropical western Pacific.
In October 2010, the eight member states Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) extended their prohibition on tuna purse-seine fishing in approximately 4.5 million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean high seas by purse-seine vessels licensed to fish in their combined Exclusive Economic Zones. The extension was unveiled at the 6th meeting of the Technical and Compliance Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Other recent actions by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement include a prohibition on setting purse-seine nets around whale sharks, a ban on fishing near fish aggregation devices during the months of July, August and September (with an option to extend this for up to an additional three months if scientific advice suggests that tuna stocks would benefit), a requirement for 100% observer coverage aboard purse-seiners, a minimum mesh-size, and a requirement for retention of all catch of tuna on board (no discards).
The full range of fishery management instruments implemented by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement includes:
The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement: which defines a multilateral licensing arrangement providing annual access to all PNA EEZs by purse-seine vessels which contribute significantly to the enhancement of a PNA country's (the Home Party) economic involvement in the fishery.
The Palau Arrangement: which formerly set an agreed, binding, limit on the number of purse-seine vessels allowed to operate in PNA waters. The Palau Arrangement, through the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme, now limits the amount of effort (in terms of number of fishing days) that can be exercised by purse-seine vessels in PNA waters during any one calendar year. A Longline Vessel Days Management Scheme is currently under trial.
The Implementing Arrangements of the Nauru Agreement: There have been three of these, defining the measures that have been agreed by all Parties that will be implemented in the management of the activities of purse-seine vessels in their own EEZs, either through Regulations or licensing conditions. These include the measures highlighted above, such as the requirement not to licence any purse-seine vessel which also fishes in certain defined High Seas areas (High Seas Pockets).
These PNA-specific measures are also supplemented by the Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access to FFA member EEZs by Foreign Fishing Vessels, agreed by all FFA member countries including the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. These terms and conditions apply to all foreign fishing vessels, not just purse-seiners, and include a requirement for an Automatic Location Communicator to be switched on at all times and reporting to the regional Vessel Monitoring System, minimum standards for reporting to national authorities, and a requirement for annual regional vessel registration.
In May 2012 the PNA Fisheries Ministers met in Alotau, Papua New Guinea, and through a Resolution on Marine Animals gave their commitment to implement even stronger management measures in their joint EEZs order to maintain sustainable tuna fisheries and minimise impact on bycatch species. The new commitments include:
Agreeing an amendment to the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme that provides a clear and unambiguous definition of the Fishing Day. In particular, clarifying that any calendar day in which any fishing activity takes place will be counted as a full fishing day, with limited exemptions for days in which the only activities during that day are bona-fide emergencies, breakdowns, refuelling, repairs, or expeditious transit with fully stowed fishing gear (non fishing days). Ministers also approved a PNA Office Business Plan, and welcomed Tokelau as a party to the Palau Arrangement Purse-Seine Vessel Days Management Scheme.
Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) is a scheme where vessel owners can purchase and trade days fishing at sea in places subject to PNA. The purpose of the VDS is to constrain and reduce catches of target tuna species, and increase the rate of return from fishing activities through access fees paid by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). The total allocation of fishing days is set and apportioned between Pacific Island members for one-year periods up to three years in advance.
The VDS is implemented as part of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM2005-01). The VDS replaces the purse seine vessel number limit of 205 vessels under Annex 1 of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Arrangement). The Palau Arrangement is a multilateral treaty governing the operation of purse seine vessels in the national waters of the PNA. Its primary purpose is to place a limit on the number of vessels operating in the waters of the PNA. Under the VDS Management Scheme the PNA set the total number of days that can be fished in their waters combined and the apportionment of the total number of days between each country. These allocations of fishing days are set for 12 month periods and can be set up to 3-years in advance. The most recent stock assessment information on the target species of Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna and economic information relating to the maximisation of economic returns and optimal utilisation of the resource is used to assess the allocations of fishing days.
If you think I miss or misunderstood something please let me know. :-)