The 20th Regular Session of the WCPFC in Rarotonga

I have been fishing and working in the WCPO since 1991, so I pre-date the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) that was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) which entered into force on 19 June 2004.

remember us! we are the reason why you are at thses meetings!! no fisherman, no fishing!

Yet while I have been involved in issues around compliance, science and management for almost 20 years, I only recently got involved in the process of meetings that make up the working of the WCPFC… the intercessional working groups (IWG - I’m involved in 2: labour standards and transhipment), the Science Committee (SC) and the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC)… however until now, never been to the “big meeting” the Regular Session of the Commission… here everything that has been chew and digested in the WG, that then was feed into SC and TCC, gets adopted, kicked for subsequent years or not pursued further.

As with all RFMOs, things are decided by consensus… even if, in the WCPFC case, there is a vote option.

In any case, I'm very much looking forward to being part of the big meeting that will take place in Rarotonga (Cook Islands), where I will be part of the RMI delegation.

Yet the meetings of the WCPFC are preceded by an annually well-lined-up series of preparatory meetings on specific topics by the regional organisations (FFA, SPC, PNA). In these meetings, the policies are formulated, advice is provided and discussed, scenarios evaluated and so on. All this takes place along culturally established sit-downs, negotiating agreements, face-to-face discussions, trust-based consensus building, and so on. Being the Pacific, all is well framed by sharing food, drinks, and stories.

During COVID, that well-oiled routine that had built up for many years disappeared. The travel ban took all that away, and all were based on virtual meetings; the simple fact is that we all needed to learn a new “way to do things” without much preparation and the very variable quality of the internet, which makes some of these meetings very frustrating.

To an extent, it is excellent to be in face-to-face meetings again, yet I also worry about the emissions geared up by all of us getting there.

One can argue that the WCPFC, the youngest of all the tuna RFMOs, is also the most successful, as all the key tuna stocks are in the green, as you can see in the 2022 overview and status of stocks.

Status of the stocks

Of course, it has the “weakness” of any RFMO, which is the slow process of consensus… but I would rather have it that way than the mess of not having an RFMO (look at the South Atlantic!)

There is a lot of unfair talk about the “secrecy” of the WCPFC…. I think it is quite the opposite… all the documents are available online, as you can see from the links above.

Only a couple of compliance reporting meetings are closed to observers (NGOs and multilateral organisations)… these are the sessions where countries present their compliance status. Things are discussed between countries… we have had bad experiences with NGOs running their agenda at the expense of the smallest members, so I understand the reluctance in this area.

There is a lot of pressure on the decision-making, and some NGOs use their online presence to represent their interest as opinion holders, which sometimes does not reflect the direct needs of the Pacific Islands, the real stakeholders in the fishery… I wrote last year on the issues of harvest strategies, which is piling up again this year under the banner of “keeping the stocks green” (in reference to the status of the stocks)… yet it is evident that the interest of those behind this campaign is “to maintain the blue” (the MSC logo)… and you all know I have a VERY dim view of the private certifications business and their neo-colonial ways.

In my case, I’m here as part of my work with RMI and focus on the discussions around the areas I work the most: Compliance, the abuse of the “impracticability” exemption on the Transhipment CMM and the fisher’s labour rights.

It says a lot to me that we have been going for almost 3 years with the Labour rights CMM (I had a bit of a rant on that recently)… yet on the other side, we are the only RFMO at least discussing it.

Furthermore, the WCPFC is run by colleagues and friends I greatly respect, particularly Lara and Rhea, who, besides being excellent professionals, have been very kind with their advice and trust towards my work.

So yeah, I am very much looking forward to the pre-meeting gathering and the meeting itself.

Working in Guinea Bissau

I have generally kept my work based in the Pacific Ocean as I’m already very conscious of the impact of long-distance travel on emissions and my general health.

partt of the local fleet (picture by my colleague H da Silva)

On the other side, as a Portuguese speaker (I grew up on the border between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil), I have worked in most former Portuguese colonies since they are pretty unique.

So when I was contacted with a very good offer to come to Guinea Bissau, I was initially hesitant as it is the other side of the world. I find working in Africa quite confronting and infuriating regarding the impacts of colonisation compared with the Pacific.

The place has a very tortuous history going back centuries, from being a stage in the slavery trade to the present positioning as a narco-state use in the conduit of cocaine to Europe. A lot of that info is here if you are interested.

My presence here is related to their manifest interest in accessing the EU market for their fisheries… EU market access is quite a complex matter I have dealt with substantially in the past (in fact, I wrote a manual that is still being downloaded almost a decade later), since it involves separated seafood safety and legal catch certifications (with their associated systems and authorities). Having experience and post-graduate qualifications in both fisheries and food science, I have been very fortunate to have worked with many countries on both systems, either separately or at once.

While both regimes are as different as the work scope of a Seafood Safety Inspector and a Fisheries Officer, there should be synergies between both certifications, so they should be tackled together, particularly when a country starts from scratch to access the EU market.

After training many people worldwide on the sanitary and catch certification aspects separately, I passed all offers on that line of work to them. Over the last 8-9 years, I focused on MCS, PSM, CDS and fishers’ rights… which are the areas I feel I can help.

Yet, as this project here requires tackling both areas at once (which requires understanding both parts) and is to be in Portuguese… it seems that the number of people able to do this job is very limited… so it felt very ungrateful with life and with the intergovernmental organisation that contacted me not to help if I can

So here I am in a country I have never been to before. Yet, it is offering me an opportunity and the task to be part of their team to tackle a challenge that, if successful, could provide much economic benefit to the country instead of just being a coastal state where others with EU market access come and fish.

This is going to be a long project as there is a lot to do; however, it has the advantage of having highly trained professionals (mainly in Portugal, Brazil, and Cuba) and a “can-do” attitude that is contagious, and to whom I’m very grateful for their trust.

There is no way I can rightfully express the level of infrastructure challenges the country faces as a consequence of colonialism, post-colonial war, and instability. Yet, as in most countries where I work, I try to portray beauty in the best way I know, colors and images, so here is what my eyes have seen so far.

So my work here would be in blocs over the next 2 years to minimise transcontinental flights and operate for a few months in the year here, while the rest of the time, I work from home… the Pacific.

The Loopholes of the WTO Fisheries Subsidies Agreement

For a long time, i been writing about fisheries subsidies , and when I asked what the main problems of fisheries are, my standard answers were fisheries subsidies and people’s inequality. Both are the root of the most known problems (overfishing, overcapacity, IUU, labour abuses, etc.)

so many boast not fishing… how they survive (part of the answer is subsidies)

So I was very positive (and even spoke at WTO events) when the subsidies agreement was signed… yet as with all these agreements (as with CMMs in RFMO) what we agreed to is the lowest common denominator… and you only see the holes later on.

I read the text, and found some things, but waited for my more thoughtful friends to dig deeper and either conform or expand my views.

In this article, my friend Brad Soule and his colleague Christine McDaniel went deep and showed some of the holes behind the good intentions… now, it is not good to have an agreement; it is all the opposite, yet we need to be aware of the embedded shortcomings.

I find it unfair when the media and commentators’ discourse pinpoints the solution to multifaceted seafood value chain problems (from IUU fishing, seafood safety and species fraud to labour issues) on the WTO subsidies agreement (is just a piece of paper). As this risks hyperinflating expectations on what the agreement can offer, with potential operators then walking away disappointed because it does not deliver on the hype built around it.

So yeah… read the original, I quote the intro and the conclusions below.

After more than a decade of meetings and work, an agreement to “end fisheries subsidies” under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was adopted in June 2022. The agreement will enter into force once two-thirds of WTO members formally accept it. With 164 member states, that means 110 is the number needed. As of this writing, 43 have formally accepted the agreement. Members have decided to continue negotiations and discussions on outstanding issues, leading up to the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi in February 2024.

The WTO agreement [1] aims to directly tackle government subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and overexploitation of fish stocks along with other goals. Nearly 90 percent [2] of the world’s marine fish stocks are now fully exploited, overexploited, or depleted. Agreeing to stop using taxpayer dollars to drive down global fish stocks to unsustainable levels sounds like an obvious positive step.

How to implement and enforce the agreement may be as important as the agreement itself. One of the overarching, laudable goals of the WTO agreement is encompassed in Article 3.1: “No Member shall grant or maintain any subsidy to a vessel or operator engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing or fishing related activities in support of IUU fishing.” Article 4 prohibits subsidies regarding overfished stocks, and Article 5 makes clear that the prohibition on subsidies pertains even to areas outside of the jurisdiction of coastal members (i.e., the high seas). But the devil is in the details. In this issue brief we identify several loopholes that should be addressed in the implementation phase to ensure the effectiveness of the agreement.

Loophole #1: No Investigations 

Loophole #2: Weak Penalties 

Loophole #3: Weak or Opaque Science Management

Loophole #4: Lack of Transparency

Conclusion

It is not our intent to say that the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies cannot be effective, but the probability of success for this agreement depends on effective implementation and enforcement. It is one of the last major international agreements related to fisheries in the pipeline of treaties and agreements that followed the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea in the 1980s, along with the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (often called the “high seas” treaty) in 2023. These agreements have sought to improve ocean governance and have espoused goals related to the sustainability of fishery resources, yet the resilience and sustainability of fisheries has continued to deteriorate.

The WTO process can be slow and complex, which does not align well with industrial fishing technology that is capable of diminishing fish stocks on a rapid scale. Few today remember the pollock fishery of the Central Bering Sea, which would be one of the largest fisheries in the world if it still existed. Overfishing led to the collapse of the pollock fishery with “a lack of knowledge about populations biocomplexity added to the confusion of how best to manage the harvest.” [9] Although a “moratorium” on fishing in that area was declared in the 1990s, the fishery collapsed completely and has never recovered.

Transparency and accountability, however, can counter these forces. In the absence of a means to compel compliance, it is critical for interested parties, wherever they are in the world, to have unfettered access to information on the operation of this agreement, no matter how limited that information may be. Implementation must also be designed to require a realistic level of government enforcement, as resources will ebb and flow. [10]

People need to be able to connect the dots. Transparency and accountability will enable individuals, civil society, and businesses to exercise the tools at their disposal to make informed decisions about how they pressure governments or make purchases, or provide feedback to businesses that purchase seafood from subsidized fishing.

The probability of the agreement’s success depends on effective implementation and enforcement. In the short term after ratification, the relevant government agencies and nongovernment organizations should collaborate on designing ways to ensure robust reporting by all members in all countries across all aspects of the agreement, and easy access to that reporting in the public domain. It may be the best we can do to build the case for further agreements. Hopefully, many of our shared natural resources will last long enough for those agreements to come.

Port State Measures Before and After Study

Last year, the good people from MRAG (with whom I have worked in the past) asked to collaborate on this study PEW contracted them to do, and it has finally been published.

doing good PSM is the challenge, not just signing the agreement

Of course, PSM is an area of fundamental interest for me, and I have worked (with different levels of intensity) in 3 of the 5 ports analysed (Majuro, Bangkok and Montevideo), so I provided my technical inputs but also local knowledge on whom to contact as to get on-site knowledge.

Of course, it is good to read the whole document for the details of each port! Yet I will quote the analysis, main messages and recommendations:

For most case study ports, the introduction of PSMs has had relatively little impact on the natural dynamics of port usage

For four of the six case study ports examined here, the implementation of the PSMA (or PSMs) appeared to have relatively little impact on port usage by foreign fishing fleets. This is largely because the choice of port for foreign fishing vessels is primarily driven by commercial and other imperatives, which tend to overwhelm any possible ‘disadvantage’ associated with stronger port controls. For example, in the case of Bangkok, the number of port visits changed little between the before and after periods, largely because Bangkok is the main hub for the processing of canning-grade tuna from the WCPO and demand from canneries remains strong.

Carriers continue to use Bangkok despite stronger port controls being introduced in 2016 because ‘that’s where the canneries are’. While alternative ports for tuna processing exist within the region, these don’t have the same dominant market position of Bangkok. In the case of Majuro, the number of port visits is largely influenced by the distribution of fishing effort within the WCPO purse seine fishery. As an attractive port for transhipment, Majuro will be used preferentially when fishing effort is concentrated in the central and eastern parts of the WCPO (typical during El Nino periods), but will see fewer port visits when fishing effort is concentrated in the western parts of the WCPO (typical during La Nina periods). The introduction of stronger PSMs in 2017 will have little influence in the context of these more dominant macro trends. For Montevideo, the number of Chinese squid jig vessels and Panamanian flagged carriers declined across the study period, although these trends commenced prior to the implementation of the PSMA and were most likely driven by unrelated factors. Chinese industry sources advised that the trend away from visits to Montevideo was mainly driven by lower squid catches in the SW Atlantic, combined with an increase in the number of Chinese- controlled carriers (flagged primarily to Panama and China), directives from squid companies to preferably use Chinese ports (to reduce the risk of crew absconding in foreign ports) and an increasing domestic demand for squid meaning more squid were transhipped at sea and transported directly back to China. Other carrier visit trends by flag occurred primarily as a result of reflagging, and thus were also unrelated to PSMA implementation.

In other cases, the lack of a strong ‘signal’ in foreign fishing fleet behaviour around the time of PSMA implementation may be also partly driven by the incremental implementation of PSMs over time. For example, Namibia is a member of a number of RFMOs that each have PSM-related CMMs. Many of these require similar (or identical) measures to the PSMA and were implemented well before Namibia acceded to the PSMA in 2017. To that end, any adjustment in foreign fishing fleet behaviour may have happened well before practical implementation of the PSMA. This lack of a clear signal associated with incremental implementation is also likely to be true of other ports, with few going from ‘0 to 100’ on PSMs overnight – most PSMs are introduced incrementally over time as capacity builds and industry is allowed periods to ‘get used to’ new arrangements.

For many ports it may also be true that the lack of a clear change post-PSMA is driven by a view amongst the vast majority of foreign fishing vessels that they consider themselves compliant with relevant fisheries laws and therefore have nothing to fear from entry into PSMA ports.

Broadly, these results should provide confidence to most States considering acceding to the PSMA that the Agreement can be implemented without ‘scaring off’ foreign fishing fleets and forgoing important economic activity associated with FFV port visits.

But, in some cases, new PSMs can have a big impact

The most notable example of a PSM-related impact amongst our case study ports was the response to Peru’s requirement to install and operate an approved VMS system, as well as submit VMS data for the previous six months, for all vessels wishing to enter Peruvian ports post-2020. In this case, the introduction of the VMS requirement led to the complete abandonment of Chimbote port by the Chinese high seas squid jig fleet – which had used Chimbote since 2017 as an important port for hull maintenance with up to 129 visits annually – as well as a significant decline in the use of Callao port by both Chinese and Korean squid jig fleets. While the VMS requirement was introduced in the same year as the COVID pandemic, advice from Chinese industry sources confirmed that opposition to the VMS requirement was the main driver of behaviour. Our analysis indicates that these vessels continued to fish in the same areas, but either remained at sea during our study period (with catch likely transhipped at sea) or returned to Chinese ports for maintenance. In the case of the Korean jig fleet, the VMS requirement contributed to a substantial change in fishing pattern. In this case, industry advice indicates that the VMS requirement, together with low CPUE in the south east Pacific, led to the fleet fishing solely on the Atlantic side of South America (abandoning the typical ‘squid route’ seasonal migration from the Atlantic side to the Pacific side for the second half of the year). Interestingly, other foreign fleets to whom the VMS requirement did not apply – e.g. the tuna longline fleet – continued to use Peruvian ports (principally Callao) in the same manner throughout our study period.

The VMS requirement was originally introduced in response to concerns around high seas vessels switching off AIS and fishing in Peru’s EEZ. While the extent to which the VMS requirement contributed is unknown, independent analyses have highlighted changes in Chinese jigging fleet behaviour in the period after the requirement was introduced (GFW, 2020; 2021b). In particular, there were fewer vessels with AIS irregularities leading to confusion over either identity or location in 2021 compared to 2020, and perhaps more importantly the fleet appeared to have introduced a self-enforced buffer zone adjacent to the Peru and Ecuador (Galapagos) EEZs. While 2020 AIS data showed the fleet fishing right up to the EEZ boundary, the closest AIS record for 2021 was 10nm and 150nm from the Peru EEZ and Ecuador (Galapagos) EEZ boundaries respectively.

In addition to what could be considered positive developments, a number of unintended consequences may have resulted. For example, the exit of the Chinese jigger fleet from Chimbote has reportedly had a significant impact on the local economy for whom vessels making up to 129 visits annually at an average of 12 days each made an important contribution. We understand this has led to a level of opposition to the VMS requirement from local business owners. Some analysts have speculated the choice to remain at sea for longer periods amongst the jig fleet also risks a higher level of labour rights abuses.

There is limited evidence of a shift from PSMA designated to non-designated ports

One of the possible consequences of implementing the PSMA was a shift by fishing fleets from PSMA- designated to non-designated ports (either non-designated ports in PSMA Parties, or ports in States not Party to the PSMA) in order to avoid stronger port controls (or to avoid any additional administrative burden). This was particularly the case for fleets with higher risk of involvement in IUU fishing. The available evidence from the case studies indicates that broadly this hasn’t happened. As discussed above, in most cases fishing fleet behaviours around port usage have been driven by natural commercial dynamics around the port/fishery, with relatively few changes that could be explained primarily through the introduction of PSMs. In some cases, this may have influenced in part by relatively few inspections being undertaken (e.g. Montevideo).

When changes did occur – for example, the exit of Chinese and Korean flagged squid jiggers from Peruvian ports following the introduction of the VMS requirement in 2020 – the results were mixed. Some vessels appeared to remain at sea for longer, others returned to home ports (particularly during the height of the COVID pandemic), while others called in to both PSMA and non-PSMA ports. While the return to home ports, where PSMA measures do not automatically apply to domestic vessels, could theoretically reduce inspection coverage of these vessels, it is not yet clear whether these are longer term trends.

Of course, our case studies sample only a very small fraction of PSMA-designated ports internationally andeach port has its own dynamics. On that basis, it’s possible that fleets in other ports may have responded differently, although the risk of vessels shifting to non-designated ports should only reduce in future as more States accede to the PSMA.

There was limited impact on the operational aspects of port usage – e.g. time in port, time at anchor

Another possible consequence of the introduction of stronger port inspection regimes and the requirement for advance entry request under the PSMA was a change in the operational efficiency of using ports – for example, extending the duration of port visits and time at anchor waiting for port entry approval. The available evidence from the case studies indicates no substantial change in the operational aspects of port usage following PSM implementation. Broadly, time in port and wait times at anchor remained relatively constant in the periods before and after PSM implementation (with the exception of time spent at anchorage in Bangkok).

This, again, is likely largely driven by the natural operational dynamics of the port (e.g. the time taken for a carrier to fill up hasn’t changed post-PSMA), and also by the considerable efforts of port States (for all of whom the economic activity associated with port usage is very important) to make the PSMA process as efficient as possible. For example, in several cases (e.g. Bangkok, Majuro) port States have developed electronic platforms, accessible online, to manage port entry requests and data submission requirements as well as coordinate local agencies.

In the one port for which there was some evidence of change – Bangkok – the median length of carrier visits to port was shorter and wait times at anchor were longer. There are a range of non-PSMA factors that could contribute to this result (e.g. smaller average transhipment volumes resulting in faster unload times), although it is also plausible that wait times at anchorage are slightly longer because vessels now have to wait for approval before entering port, while port visit duration may be shorter partly because onshore processes (e.g. inspection teams, unloading logistics) have had slightly longer to get themselves organised. Nevertheless, Thailand’s DoF noted that unload volumes are the key driver of time in port, and because data on these is not available pre- and post-PSMA they cautioned against drawing strong conclusions around the impacts of PSMA processes on the duration of time in port.

AIS should be complemented by other data sources and local knowledge

The emergence of publicly-available AIS data together with sophisticated analysis through ‘big data’ platforms in recent times has offered unprecedented insights into global fishing patterns and fleet behaviour. In this study, AIS has proven an extremely useful tool to examine the practical impacts of the PSMA. However, AIS coverage remains patchy for some fleets and areas, particularly in the earlier years of our datasets. To that end, supplementing AIS data with other sources of information – e.g. publicly available port visits records, transhipment volumes – has been important to gauge the completeness of the AIS dataset as well as fill in gaps where necessary. For most ports, AIS data appeared reliable enough to be a reasonable reflection of actual trends in fishing fleet behaviour, although for Montevideo we substituted AIS data for a groomed version of official port records as our primary dataset.

The other essential element to ensuring best use of AIS data in studies such as this is to use local knowledge. In practice, there are a myriad of commercial and operational factors which influence fleet behaviour, port usage and PSM application across FFVs which may not be evident from trends in AIS data alone. To that end, involving local experts and stakeholders to help interpret any trends is essential in gaining an accurate understanding of the factors driving fleet dynamics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Much of the analysis in this study focused on changes in fleet behaviour in response to the implementation of PSMs and the underlying drivers, rather than examining the effectiveness of the PSMs themselves. To that end, our recommendations below focus on observations and learnings that should assist the conduct of similar studies in future, as well as other similar work that might usefully be undertaken.

1. Monitoring of PSM impacts – for countries interested in implementing the PSMA (or stronger PSMs) and keen to monitor any practical changes in fishing fleet behaviour, AIS offers a potentially valuable and cost-effective dataset. A framework of indicators similar to those used here can be tailored to examine changes in the main issues of interest (e.g. changes in total numbers of vessel visits, changes in flag States, changes by vessel type, duration of vessel visits). One of the main challenges in these types of ‘before and after’ analyses is that PSMs are often implemented incrementally and the point at which key measures ‘start to bite’ is not always well-recorded. To that end, countries interested in analysing changes in fleet behaviour post-PSM/PSMA implementation should maintain clear records of key dates of implementation so that trends may be analysed in the appropriate context.

2. Complement AIS with other available data – As discussed above, the increasingly widespread use of AIS technology across the global fishing fleet and the emergence of big data platforms including Global Fishing Watch offer previously unavailable opportunities to track and analyse patterns in fishing fleet behaviour. The value of these insights should only improve as AIS data coverage and technology improves over time. Nevertheless, this study highlights that AIS data coverage is better in some fleets, areas and ports than others and can be patchy, particularly the further you go back in time. To that end, future studies using AIS data to analyse changes in fishing fleet behaviour should complement AIS with other relevant data (e.g. fisheries/port agency official records of port activity) to gain insights into the completeness of the AIS dataset and asses the confidence with which conclusions can be drawn. Caution should be exercised when AIS is the only available dataset.

3. Use of local experts – The factors driving port usage by fishing fleets are complex and often dynamic. While AIS data is potentially extremely useful in identifying and analysing trends in fleet behaviour, the drivers underlying trends may not be evident from AIS data alone. To that end, stakeholders knowledgeable in the dynamics of the port should be engaged to assist in the interpretation of results.

4. Monitoring global implementation of the PSMA – in addition to examining trends in fleet behaviour at the individual port level, AIS data has potential utility in monitoring implementation of the PSMA at the global level. For example, AIS data could be used to track the proportion of port visits by FFVs to designated ports under the PSMA versus non-designated ports (either ports in non-party States, or non-designated ports in party States). Similar trends could be tracked for other relevant indicators (e.g. proportion of visits by hold capacity) or geographic region (e.g. FAO areas, continents). Clearly there would need to be confidence that the underlying data provided an accurate representation of actual visits, but assuming this was the case, indicators of PSMA implementation might be published in relevant publications including the FAO’s periodic State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture reports.

Ecolabels and labour standards certification as agents of neo colonialism

I’m starting research into my long-held belief that the private certification model (such as eco-labels and crew labour standards), with explicit NGO support, fundamentally extends the neocolonial dependency model. Transnational private certifications reinforce longstanding global relations of domination by creating certification “brands” that have much in common with the colonial-era extraterritorial empires.  

Qe are bad because we a poor

In this research, I came across this jewel of a paper from 2012 - A new extraterritoriality? It focuses on the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (yet includes the MSC in its analysis). It highlights some words that echo my position regarding “white saviours” and the colonial roots of ecolabels and labour certifications.

Some of the key concepts I will use are presented below.

The authors show how the territorial practices in the certification standards replicate aspects of the legal extraterritoriality of the colonial period and how these new forms of extraterritoriality create disaggregated and variegated sovereignty scapes. Key shared features include the identification of subjects that need protection, a narrative that depicts local states as inadequate for providing these protections, and the creation of territories where imperial states provide these protections during the colonial period, and certification agents for transnational eco-certification."

The authors turned to colonial-era extraterritoriality in part because this comparison does more than raise questions about the role of government and the remaking of sovereignty. It also helps them highlight how transnational eco-certification can replicate and reinforce longstanding global relations of domination by creating an eco-certification empire, which has much in common with the colonial-era extraterritorial empires.

Much like an extraterritorial empire, the eco-certification empire does not aim to displace state rule through direct colonisation. Instead, it acknowledges the existing legal system and then creates certification territories, where certification agencies claim rule-making and rule-enforcement authority in ways that pre-empt government authority. These territories contribute to creating a variegated sovereignty in which the state does not have exclusive or absolute sovereignty. We have also shown how there are parallels in how transnational ecolabels seek to protect valued subjects and in how transnational ecolabels is justified through a narrative of deficient states. What has changed is that it is no longer the subjects of Christian countries that are protected but endangered non-human species, local communities, workers, women, and children. Finally, the new extraterritoriality is partial-it does not challenge the legality of state regulation of fishing while at the same time claiming the right to assess whether fishing follows state regulations and to add more regulations.

They also think that it is essential to consider how primarily Northern-based transnational eco-certification actors may be replicating imperialist patterns in identifying subjects in the South that need protection and taking on the role of providing that protection while dismissing or ignoring national or local actors.

Landscape and Opportunity Analysis in the Pacific Tuna Sector

I was involved in an extensive study last year, and the report has just been published. I am generally weary of big across a sector (landscape type analysis)… in Spanish, we have a saying that states, “he who grasps at too much... adjusts too little” (el que mucho abarca… poco aprieta)…. And I tend to be a floor operator.

hopefully it helps them… they are the resources owners

Yet, the team included some friends and people I respect… and the idea was that I would be a “ground truther” so I was pretty happy to be part of it; while unusual, it was actually a good experience… I took it on as: “one needs a big map. to get to small places”  

This project aimed to improve value retention from Pacific tuna resources by being pragmatic and innovative in product/service delivery. The final report is here if anyone is interested.

I quote the executive summary, but is worth having it as a “macro” reference for whatever work people do in the region.

Tuna is a key driver of the Pacific region’s economic growth and there is already coordinated efforts underway between Pacific Island countries to maximise returns while sustainably managing tuna stocks. However, these efforts will need to be accelerated to counteract factors such as climate change, an increasingly complex regulatory environment and emigration of the working-age Pacific Island population. At the annual Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) officials meeting in May 2021 (FFC118), a mandate was given for a landscape analysis of the Pacific tuna sector to be completed. The focus of the analysis was to consider long-term opportunities and constraints, focusing on feasibility and commercialisation of a short list of opportunities. The Australian Centre of International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) has jointly funded this project with FFA on a 50/50 basis.

GLOBAL TUNA SECTOR

Fish is expected to become an increasingly popular source of animal protein over the next decade, driven primarily by its lower carbon footprint compared to other sources of animal protein and a growing middle class who are health conscious and time poor. Tuna is one of the world’s highest value fish in capture fisheries production, prized for its nutritional content and versatility in terms of end use across biomedical, food, feed and industrial sectors. Tuna is suitable for the significant proportion of the population who do not eat pork, providing an alternative source of protein.

Growth in global tuna landings has steadily increased at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.97 per cent over the period 2012 to 2018, with Pacific flagged states experiencing the highest growth rate in landings during this period, i.e., where a vessel is flagged/licenced/registered. The value of the global tuna market for food products was US$42.2 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach US$50.2 billion in 20282. Canned tuna is by far the dominant shelf-stable product while also offering the greatest opportunity for value addition based on dock value of tuna compared to the final consumed end value of tuna product.

PACIFIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC LANDSCAPE

Pacific Island countries (PICs) are some of the most economically and environmentally vulnerable countries in the world. Natural disasters have resulted in estimated average economic losses to the region of US$1.075 billion per year – equivalent to nearly 5 per cent of the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Pacific small island developing states. The region’s business environment has also progressively deteriorated with Papua New Guinea the only country to improve its ease of doing business score since 2014.

Health, education and standards of living have improved in the past two decades across the Pacific region. However, urbanisation and the increased availability of cheap, processed foods through imports has contributed to staggering rates of non-communicable diseases, a key cause of death between the ages of 30 and 70. Furthermore, the Pacific is experiencing ‘brain drain’ due to more attractive work opportunities outside the region.

PACIFIC TUNA SECTOR

Tuna is a crucial resource for PICs and is an important part of the cultural heritage of the region. For some PICs, the tuna resources within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) represent their only significant renewable resource.

Tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) have contributed approximately 53 to 58 per cent of global tuna catch over the past decade for albacore, bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin tuna1. Purse seine catch volumes within the WCPO have steadily increased over the past few decades, while conversely, longline catch volumes have decreased.

The Pacific tuna sector is export driven, with most processed exports comprising intermediate productsdestined overseas for processing into final product. Key markets are Thailand, the European Union (EU), Japan and the United States (US). Most processing within the Pacific region occurs in Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and American Samoa. Notably, Fiji’s onshore processing volumes significantly exceed catch volumes in national waters.

Increasing pressure to ensure sustainable management of fisheries is creating greater tension between two somewhat conflicting definitions of ‘sustainable stocks’ – biologically sustainable versus economically sustainable for businesses operating in the sector.

This is evident in the expansion of marine protected areas (MPA), despite recent studies finding that large-scale MPAs have limited conservation benefits for Pacific skipjack and bigeye tuna1. For example, Fiji has committed to expanding its MPA to 30 per cent of its EEZ2, resulting in many Fiji harvesters concerned about their future viability.

VALUE CHAIN OVERVIEW

The following key barriers and critical success factors were identified in the Pacific tuna value chain with respect to PIC businesses:

Key barriers

• Businesses are typically concentrated on a single value chain segment/function.

• Constrained by high costs of entry, high operating costs and challenges with achieving scale.

• Lack of infrastructure, particularly port facilities.

• High shipping/air cargo costs; infrequent and indirect routes to markets; lack of cold chain.

• Challenges with securing skilled employees, as well as cultural constraints of workers not used to the demands of modern work (e.g., regular working hours).

Critical success factors

• Vertical integration – To improve the flow of information, certainty of supply/offtake and manage other risks.

• Diversification – Distant water fishing nation/foreign companies are generally part of heavily diversified conglomerates.

• Scale – The Pacific’s high-cost operating environment, particularly for logistics, power and water, means that scale is vital to operating profitably.

VALUE CHAIN SEGMENTS

Harvesting
The harvesting value chain segment has the highest risk profile with significant costs involved in purchasing, repairing and maintaining vessels, and a limited resale market. Subsidies are a key issue, distorting the market by allowing distant water fishing nations (DWFN) harvesting from the WCPO to operate below break-even point.

Localisation of the harvester workforce is a challenge with senior positions generally held by expatriates. Recruiting and retaining deck crew is becoming increasingly challenging, faced with competition from opportunities with better working conditions (e.g., other types of vessels such as cargo/container vessels and labour mobility schemes in Australia), as well as a lack of career paths.

There is also limited and/or inconsistent fishing-specific training available from local training institutions.

Processing
Processing volumes in the Pacific have increased but the vast majority of processing is primary only, with secondary processing occurring outside of the region. Securing a steady supply of tuna is a key factor impacting throughput and therefore the profitability of processing operations, with many processors operating below capacity. 63 per cent of the Pacific tuna workforce is employed in the processing and ancillary segment1, with women estimated at 70 per cent of the processing workforce.

End markets
The Pacific region’s key export markets are Thailand, Philippines, EU, US and Japan. Exports to Thailand and Philippines are mostly whole round tuna, while cooked loins are primary exported to the EU, US and Thailand. The regulatory environment is becoming progressively complex and stringent, making it increasingly difficult for Pacific exports to compete in the global market.

Regional consumption of tuna varies from country to country, although an overall theme is that consumers are driven primarily by price.

Services
Key services to the Pacific tuna sector are:

• Transport – Air freight and sea. The cost and frequency of transport is a key factor impacting the cost structure of the Pacific tuna sector.

• Finance – Limited finance options within the region. DWFN/foreign companies rely on non-bank financial support, such as a from a parent company or majority shareholder.

• Training – Limited competency-based training for deck crew available from local institutions, resulting in a high reliance on crew from overseas (e.g., Philippines, Indonesia).

• Infrastructure and associated services – Limited infrastructure, facilities and expertise in the Pacific region. Parts are expensive given that they need to be imported in.

Crewing can also be considered a service but has been captured under ‘harvester workforce’ in this report.

INCLUSIVE INNOVATION PATHWAY OPPORTUNITIES

A key finding from this project is that businesses need to be vertically integrated, diversified and operating at scale in order to be competitive, given the high-cost operating environment in the Pacific – attributes that are virtually impossible for PIC businesses to achieve. Yet these challenges are not new – they have beleaguered the Pacific tuna sector for decades.

The aim of this project was to use a different lens when tackling the challenge of improving value retention from Pacific tuna resources. Given the Pacific’s inherent constraints, the approach was to be pragmatic regarding the product/service being considered but innovative with respect to how it could be delivered.

Innovation requires both creativity and strategic thinking, but timing is often just as important as the idea itself. The opportunities shortlisted in this report consider short-term benefits while also looking towards the future, addressing foundational factors that need to be addressed now to strengthen the sector’s long-term viability.

The five shortlisted opportunities fall into two categories – products and enablers. An additional section called ‘Looking to the Horizon’ considers early-stage innovations that may deliver benefits to the Pacific tuna sector over the medium- to long-term.

PRODUCTS

OPPORTUNITY 1: Health and wellness inputs
Creating intermediate products for the health and wellness industry. The next step for the Pacific region is producing hydrolysed protein powder from valorised tuna processing waste. This is a valuable input for food manufacturing and the nutraceutical industry, with modest equipment and skill requirements.

OPPORTUNITY 2: Fish meal, aqua, animal feed
Fish meal, aqua and animal feed production to support the Pacific local food system. The next step for the Pacific is valorising tuna processing waste into high-quality fish meal and optimising the production process. This involves low equipment and skill requirements and is a critical input for aquaculture development in the Pacific region, supporting food security.

ENABLERS

OPPORTUNITY 3: Cold chain development
One of the key constraints to growth of the Pacific tuna sector and tuna product innovation is cold chain logistics and infrastructure. For tuna, the next step is to determine the minimum viable production volumes for Opportunities 1 and 2 and associated cold chain requirements. However, a broader assessment of cold chain development opportunities across the Pacific is recommended, recognising that PNG’s current state of cold chain development is more advanced than most other PICs.

OPPORTUNITY 4: Attracting and retaining local talent
To secure a pipeline of Pacific Islander talent as the sector becomes increasingly sophisticated (see ‘Product’ opportunities). The next step is raising the awareness of career opportunities in the tuna sector and future-proofing the Pacific fisheries training network.

OPPORTUNITY 5: Collective approach for small businesses
To achieve the critical success factors of integration, diversification and scale. The next step for the Pacific is to explore opportunities for taking a cooperative approach (e.g., vessel food provisioning) and sharing resources (online second-hand equipment market), as well as development of a Pacific food innovation hub.

LOOKING TO THE HORIZON

POSSIBILITY 1: Community-owned infrastructure
Co-financing infrastructure through models such as a cooperative.

POSSIBILITY 2: Output financing innovations
Assessing financing innovations in other sectors/parts of the world, which could be adapted for the Pacific tuna sector.

My take on the latest news on labour abuses un the US / EU seafood

I have been asked by a few people what I think of the article by Urbina et al. on the “human rights” of tainted seafood in the US and the EU, and so on… so here I go

Crew memeber in a USA flagged vessel at the time, now re-flagged to a pic for convenience

The sad reality is that I don't really see anything new there, unfortunately… if you work in food production wich includes fisheries, that has been the reality for a while.

I tend not to take part in commenting and sharing on those articles, as most of what I read there comes from what I see as a White Saviour perspective, where we have some crusaders that are against everyone, even those that are going through the appropriate channels of change… (indignation and writing does not change per se much)

But also, I don’t part take of the present anti-China rhetoric prevalent in the USA… this is a world problem… so I don’t buy into the hypocrisy of saying is only them..

I have seen it in the agricultural fields of the southern USA states and in the USA-flagged vessels in the Pacific… So when I read it, I had to think about that Bible passage that says: “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone”….

It is the same with most DWFNs like Korea and Taiwan (albeit they are doing better), or unfortunately, our smaller Pacific Island countries that flag the vessels of those DWFNs like Vanuatu or Nauru here.  

The picture above was taken on an, at the time, USA-flagged PS, and he was earning 350USD a month, no catch shares, and a 3-year contract with no going home.

Corporations have pushed the model over the last decades.

This is not to say that China is not particularly bad; it is also now the biggest. Yet we forget it was the West (particularly the USA) that sent most of its manufacturing to China for cheap labour just a few decades ago, and now that they are doing the same with others (and, of course, worst in the case of minorities) the USA get on the high moral ground?

I’ve seen that movie before… does not finish well…

The whole thing has become a human tragedy and is the fault of all of us… And something I learn is that you don’t fix a problem by pointing fingers at others. If you (and your country) use inequality to increase profits, you are guilty… and that includes me.

Even we in NZ (a small, well-regulated, and rich country) now have someone in jail for slavery in the food and wine industry.

USA and others could lead by example by giving crew on board their vessels a work visa and minimal labour protections, just as in the factories in their territory. Instead of hiding all our obligations of due diligence behind the industry of labour certifications and eco-labels … that is going the same way… more and cheaper than the competition, and as such, just selling a screen.

I'm unsure if all this is what those who asked me wanted to read… So I’m sorry if it isn't… Is the advantage of not having totow a line and being self employed… this is own (and surely wrong) opinion.

Back to Kiribati after 4 years

I have worked extensively in Kiribati in the past under the auspice of NZ MFAT as well as FFA, and now I’m back under a World Bank-supported mission that will go over a few months. I’ll be coming in and out all the way up to May next year… This may sound like a lot, yet there is barely enough time based on the scope of the work.

Walking to the office

I’ll be dealing with and supporting them in the update of the Kiribati NPOA-IUU Fishing and that MFMRD is well positioned to ensure its effective implementation. Supporting them with a review of their PSM activities, in compliance with national, regional and international expectations, and working with them to set up a safe, effective, and efficient transhipment monitoring scheme and practices based on best practices but also in compliance with national, regional and international expectations.

Kiribati is unique from every aspect I can think of… they are an incredibly proud nation that faces unique and severe challenges placed by geography and the inheritance left by some really rapacious colonialism by the British that only left in 1979 after they ended mining Banaba and testing their nuclear weapons in Kiritimati on the other side of the country.

And while they face the challenges of climate change and sea-level rise with stoicism, they are the giants of the tuna at the fisheries level. More tuna is caught in their waters than in the whole of the Atlantic, and it is the player not only in the WCPFC but also in IATTC.

Unlike most countries, Kiribati runs a well-externally managed Revenue Equalisation Revenue Fund or RERF.Non-RERF cash balances increased from $11.3 million in January 2013 to an estimated $173.5 million by the end of 2018, and the RERF balance grew from $613.9 million to $994.4 million over that same period - just short of the government’s $1 billion target. State-owned enterprise commercial debts with ANZ were also eliminated within this timeframe, and the government invested $10 million in a land purchase in Fiji.

The key revenue inputs to this fund come from Kiribati's earnings from the PNA VDS. Interestingly, the government has started what pretty much is a Universal basic income (UBI) in which all citizens receive a guaranteed income in the form of an unconditional transfer payment (i.e., without a means test or need to work) of 50AUD.

So yeah… if you work in fisheries and care about the impact it can have socially, this is the place…

Of course, other issues are not positive, i.e. prostitution, AIDS, abuse, etc.… yet these are documented and discussed extensively, as they should be… yet you hardly hear about the positives these days.

In any case, I’m happy to be here, working with friends.

The picture below: The Port State Measures whiteboard strikes again! A really simple solution we have been using in Majuro for over 5 years. It helps a lot on PSM and transhipment monitoring, is cheap and power cuts proof!

A personal rant on the day of my 40th year aniversary from my 1st trip on fishing boat

Today is 21 September; back in 1983, it was my first trip on a commercial. I had to be 18 years old to get my “2nd mate ticket”, and even if I had done the equivalence from my Navy one a couple of weeks before while still 17… the day after my b’day (16/9), I was at the Argentinean coastguard (Prefectura) with all the papers.

I had a job lined up as a deckhand in a small coastal trawler of Mar del Plata because while I knew how to take a boat and operate it from A to B, I didn't know shit about fishing. Thankfully, a skipper (a good man named Braulio who lost his son in the war just the year before) took me under his wing and allowed me to learn from him and many others after him.

It was a steep learning curve that, after 40 years, hadn’t stopped yet, mainly when, after a few years of fishing, I got into university and got involved in fisheries science and management to then, go back to fishing in the Pacific in the early 90’s to re-start the road that took me to being here today.

Yes, many things have changed since then, some for good… some for bad (and some that feel the same).

I like to be a positive person, so start with the good things:

Stock assessment and data… this is where I see the most significant change… the stock assessment models of today and the data [path feeding them is sooooo much better than it ever was… I remember coding in Cobol on pathetic (for today’s standards) loops to run Virtual Population Analysis on computers that had less than 0.1 % of the computational capacity of my running phone today. Remember doing plots by hand and working with models that were just minor upgrades from the Beverton–Holt model. My colleagues in SPC, for example, run some more of the most sophisticated models in the world that have moved aeons from then; hence the accuracy of the assessments is astronomically better than then. Add to that the almost live capacity of electronic monitoring to feed those models in real-time…, and we could be talking about a different universe (even if some of the assumptions of those models stayed the same)

Monitoring, Controls and Surveillance… technology allows us to know so much more than ever before about fleet dynamics and fishing efforts… when I started, we just left. We had a radio, and that was it. No one knew where we were, what we were doing, if we sold fish or unloaded fish on the side before coming to port, if the catch declaration on paper (if necessary) matched entries at factories. Sonar and Satellite technology combined, in particular, made such massive changes.

The other side of the coin about advanced Sonar and Satellite technology is effort creep; finding fish was never so easy as today. We then relied on experience and advice from other friendly or family-related skippers. I remember being a “weirdo” by bringing knowledge about “water mass”, fronts and thermoclines…. The crew were looking at me like mad when I was dropping thermometers or longlines with a potato every 10 m, leaving it there for a while and then checking the temperatures like a freak to see where the thermocline was… this has become Stone Age in less than 30 years. Fish finding sonars were crude and exorbitantly expensive and required calibration every few weeks with cables on either side holding a bronze ball that will be progressively levered and the “bouncing” rate adjusted as needed… a total nightmare!

Communication and positioning safety… another area of incredible development… we just relied on VHF and, if lucky UHF radios for everything… my mother would not know anything of me for weeks at the time. The idea of the Internet on board was science fiction. Positioning was also very complex; all was dead reckoning, and I know how to use a sextant, which I will use to take the meridian at lunchtime if the sun was visible; the rest was just guessing, a bit later on the biggest boats we got the capacity to triangulate via coastal radio stations and Loran C… I remember vividly going over the manual of the first proper GPS I got (I was already fishing in the Pacific) and being bewildered by how much safety and efficiency this would bring, particularly as all this tech gets progressively cheaper as well.

Of this, of course, means that more and more vessels got built as things became cheaper and the “need” for fish got up. Fishing was a family / cultural job, with the odd one out like me… But back then, High Seas fisheries weren’t really a thing. Freezing technology hasn't changed so much, but it has become way more generalised, and crewing was primarily tied to nationals of the flag state plus highly protected by unions… I will come back to that later.

The number of boats exploded since then, chasing the same amount of fish initially and progressively less since then… we caught fewer fish overall because there were fewer of us, and we had less tech to find them even if the abundance was bigger…

I remember hitting a school of Southern blue whiting on a bottom trawl in the south of Argentina by chance (I could not really estimate biomass with the sounder, yet I knew that the bottom contour was good). In a few minutes, we packed the net all the way to the mouth; the boat slowed down while maintaining the same revs. We struggled to get the net to surface; all hydraulics were on the limit. I cleared the deck as the cables were at full tension. Once afloat, it was a monster; we could not bring it in, as the fully packed net was wider than the boat. The fish was so squashed that it was useless. I had to get on the inflatable dingy and cut the cod end open to let go of the catch… it was a nightmare. We lost a day and then had to repair the net for a further day. I don’t think abundance as such is typical today, even if all-around catch volumes may be way higher.

I guess I could go on and on and on…But let me focus on what I personally think has gone worse… or at least pissess me off the most

Big business and the Geopolitics of fish… fishing is not anymore about catching for others to eat (and making good money for the hardest and most dangerous job in the world). Fishing has become a huge business and, as such, so much more linked to politics both domestically and internationally… and with that, has taken on board what is, for me, the worst of politics in general and human behaviour in particular… hypocrisy.

I’m constantly biting my thong in meetings when I see statements, presentations, or read news by NGOs, industry associations, marketing people, eco-labels and private certifications on fisheries issues, and even more so when those delivering then as if it was the ultimate truth, are people that NEVER worked on fishing boat… it really gets me.

Let’s get the geopolitics first and its ugliest influence on fisheries: subsidies. I resume it with a principle of diplomacy “If you have a presence, you have rights”… so doesn’t matter is no way let’s say high seas LL does not make money, albeit paying shit to the crew and cutting maintenance and living standards… subsidies will support them because the benefit of being in the table, (i.e. having X amount of vessels there), outplays the cost of subsidizing fuel, giving tax exemptions, etc.…

The industry has become globalised. It is not just a former fisherman that had a few boats and became a fishing company…. It is a corporate business, and as such, like any other big business (from tech to wine and food), it takes advantage of ALL possible ( purposely made or not) shortcomings and loopholes in legislation, tax systems, crewing rules, etc.… Compounding to this, the regulatory framework in the HS was made when there really wasn’t a High Seas industry… so when you have these gaps (as dictated by capitalism), business runs rampant. And this is just not fishing in every industry, so here is one thing that REALLY pisses me off… fishing gets rightly pointed out for many things (around environmental and social impact, tax evasion, etc), but in a way as if it exclusively a fishing problem… and is not is all around us in every industry as soon as you peeling layers.

Example: bottom trawling has environmental impacts, no doubt about it, and the gravity of these impacts depends on many issues, ranging from the benthos in which they happen to the species being trawled… is not “one size fits all”. And then I heard: imagine 2 bulldozers going over a forest and destroying all… and I looked outside my house, I look at farms, roads, sports fields, etc., and that is what literally happened! There were forests there at some stage not so long ago! A field of soybeans has a biodiversity impact of 100%... everything there was killed and removed to plant an exotic species. So where are the “stop agriculture” or “stop housing development” coalitions?

And another I rant on usually: high seas transhipment in the WCPFC, textbook geopolitics-driven hypocrisy.

And the hypocrisy doesn’t stop there… politics and business drove colonialism up to the 1980s and still drive the more subtle neo-colonialism today. I see a direct line between many NGOs, eco-labels, private certifications, some “developing” programmes, etc., with “white (or perhaps rich country) saviourism” as the latest expression of the colonial mindset.

But let me focus the end of my rant on what has definitively gone worst as the consequence of all the above of the above:

The fisherman's income and rights are worse today than 40 years ago… and this is so soul-destroying for me personally, to the point of wanting me to walk off the only job I ever had.

The whole edifice of fishing, from boatbuilders to bureaucrats at RFMO meetings, from truck drivers picking up fish to politically appointed ministers of fisheries, from marketing people in the industry to NGO activists, from eco-labels to fisheries students, and so on… has grown immensely and become so much richer in the last 3-4 decades than it was before. All these people (in 99% of the cases, never worked on a fishing boat), and all their jobs, and all industries associated with them, depend for their existence on fisherman… and their income and life perspectives has gone down since then instead of up like the rest.

There is no way that an 18-year-old kid like me then will get today for the first time on a fishing boat, could do the path I’ve taken to get here and be writing this (while taking a break from my present work for the World Bank, the EU, FAO and NZ MFAT), and that saddens me a lot.

The whole business/politics/certification empire has risen on the backs of people, which is worse at all levels than 40 years ago. A union protected my rights, and my income was based on standardised agreements and catch shares. I could take breaks for exams, I would earn enough to live while having access to a decent education and health system, and the flag in the back of the vessels did actually mean something… all that is gone for someone starting today in most (if not all countries in the world).

For example: I sit on meetings for crewing CMM at an RFMO, and I only see people who have NEVER worked on a fishing boat, trying really hard to find red herrings in an already diluted text; it seems that they are just basically being opposed to act as decent humans and grant fisherman rights, protections and payments that they will not even think in denying their children. Nothing being asked in the discussion papers in front of them are requirements that the states they represent should already comply with under UNCLOS and ILO for their merchant vessels, and they act as if we are asking them to sell their organs.

This is the tragedy of fisheries in my 40 years in it… we created an empire, and like all empires, it was built on the back of those at the basis of it… the essential workers, the fishermen. They are worse instead of better than when there wasn’t an empire, and that is just not right.

So yeah…, it is not a happy 40th anniversary, unfortunately. I owe my life to fisheries, yet I find myself increasingly struggling in the moral no-man lands in between cynicism and mercenaryism, the exactly two aspects of my work I struggle with the most… mainly because those two aspects are the basis of the two “attitudes” I dislike the most in people, and fight hard to never fall into as a person: they are ingratitude and pretentiousness. Yet, booth seems to abound in the circles I move today.

In any case, thanks for reading if you made it all the way here.

The 2023 US NOAA Report on IUU Fishing, Bycatch, and Shark Catch

I wrote in the past about the biennial reports to Congress by NOAA Fisheries as a mandated requirement of the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act, as amended by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act.

I have used and quoted these reports when doing background research on IUU analysis of specific countries… while being aware of the geopolitical interests represented. For example, for many years, the EU identified the Pacific islands as epicentre of worldwide IUU while the USA (using the same IUU definition) identified Central America (but not Panama) as the worst area… as well as other issues around “name and shame” countries as a strategy to dissuade IUU fishing.

In any case, in these biennial reports to Congress, NOAA Fisheries identifies nations and entities that the United States will work with over the next two years to address IUU fishing and forced labour activities and support effective management of protected species and shark catch.

The report provides “certification determinations” – a determination on whether actions were taken to remedy the identified activities -- are announced for the previously identified nations. A negative certification may result in denial of U.S. port access for fishing vessels of that nation and potential import restrictions on fish or fish products.

In its 2023 Report, NOAA Fisheries identified seven nations and entities for IUU fishing:

• Angola, Grenada, Mexico, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, The Gambia, and Vanuatu.

Identifications for the PRC and Taiwan include information related to seafood-related goods produced through forced labour.

The PRC and Vanuatu are additionally identified for shark catch without a regulatory program comparable to that of the United States. This is the first time, as part of this report, that NOAA Fisheries identified nations for shark catch, and considered forced labor in the seafood sector when making IUU fishing identifications.

It is a worry for me that Vanuatu (a member of FFA that otherwise has an outstanding reputation in terms of their controls of IUU fishing), is part of these identified nations since they have the dubious distinction of also being identified by the EU as a non-cooperating country once (and there is talk about being again). The issues with Vanuatu deserve a blog in themselves… in my personal opinion, it starts with the loose registry, vessels in at least 6 RFMOs, their loose control of high seas transhipments, political interference on their fisheries authority (that otherwise tries to do the best with very starved resources) and series of other issues for another time, so I’ll love to see how NOAA will work with them.

Certification determinations

The 2023 Report also announced certification determinations for thirty-one nations and entities identified for IUU fishing and/or bycatch of protected marine life from its 2021 Report. 

IUU Fishing 

• Costa Rica, Guyana, Senegal, and Taiwan received positive certification determinations for taking actions to remedy the IUU fishing activities identified in the 2021 Report.

• Mexico, the PRC, and the Russian Federation received negative certifications for failing to take actions to remedy their reported activities.

Protected Marine Life Bycatch

• Croatia, Egypt, European Union, Grenada, Guyana, Japan, Mauritania, Morocco, the People’s Republic of China, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, and Taiwan received positive certifications for taking corrective actions to address their protected marine life bycatch activities identified in the 2021 Report.

• Algeria, Barbados, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Namibia, Senegal, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Turkey received negative certifications for not having a regulatory program comparable to that of the United States to reduce bycatch of sea turtles in pelagic longline fisheries in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas waters beyond any national jurisdiction.

Additionally, Mexico has been negatively certified for its lack of a comparable regulatory program to reduce or minimize bycatch of endangered North Pacific loggerhead sea turtles.

A summary of the report can be found here, and the full one here.

Why are there not many pacific islanders in the fishing fleets inthe WCPO?

This a fair question that has been asked many times here in the region. Many groups and consultants have had a dig into this complex topic. A few days ago, I was asked my opinion on that topic.

It is a complex one to deal with; I’m not an employment expert, so, my opinions are influenced by my understanding of fishing, having lived and worked with locals for over 30 years and my understanding of labour rights… but critically of having being a migrant fisherman my self….

i took thios picture while being the only non pacific Islander on a fishing boat in the pacific… it should be the norm… not the exemption.

So below is what I wrote, for whatever is worth:

The expectations of PIC’s leadership to increase domestic crewing have remained aspirational, albeit there are different initiatives set up in different frameworks, which are not always consistent between them.

The jurisdictional complexities among the crew's responsibilities are a key factor that does not simplify the incorporation of more Pacific islanders into the fleet. There are still legal tensions under the UNCLOS in regard the scope for States other than the flag State to regulate fishing crew conditions. In considering these tensions, a distinction must be drawn between the right to prescribe rules (prescriptive jurisdiction) and the right to enforce such rules (enforcement jurisdiction), as it is possible to have jurisdiction to prescribe rules but lack the authority under international law to enforce them against foreign vessels. FFA members as coastal states have limited scope to apply their own civil or criminal laws simply by virtue of the presence of a fishing vessel in its waters.

There are some key international law agreements and statements of principle that the flag State ought reasonably to consider as part of its obligations under UNCLOS Article 94(3) and (5). Both ILO C188 and IMO’ Cape Town Agreement, and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (‘STCW-F’) are jointly responsible for ensuring the labour rights of the crew, their safety on fishing vessels and the minimal requirements in terms of safety training of crew on board. However, the majority of the DWFN and FFA Members are not party to these instruments. 

While there has been a drive for “domestication of the fleet” by which the DWFN flag their vessels to FFA members,  with a few exceptions, it seems so far an exercise of reflagging (mostly to 3rd party registries that are not based in the island countries) and as such may not have the interest of domestic crewing conditions at the forefront. While reflagging to FFA member states potentially brings some economic benefits as part of state-owned investments in the reflagged vessels in exchange for cheaper access fees, the presence of nationals of the flagging state on board remains from minimal to non-existent. Hence, conditions may need to be reviewed.

Skilled crewing capacity continues to be a challenge are remains a key cause of the reaching full realisation of domestication efforts. The lack of skilled crew to effectively operate fishing vessels is used as an excuse not to employ domestic crew. While creating capacity among Pacific Islanders has been a constant goal, and worthwhile national initiatives have been variously attempted, very few are maintained for lack of resources. One exception has been the PNG NFA Fisheries College in Kavieng, and its utilisation as a regional centre should be further explored[HHW1] [FB2] .

There is a level of Informalisation of crewing contracting in PICs, this needs to be further explored in detail.

a.     Both domestic and regional actors need to undertake concerted action. At the domestic level, government departments should take greater responsibility for regulating recruitment to ensure robust recruitment practices and standards are in place. At the regional level, the FFA has identified the importance of introducing standardised recruitment and employment contracts for Pacific Island fishers recruited to work on vessels operating in the region. However, more needs to be done to establish and enforce regionally applied minimum standards that are consistent with international standards.

b.     Government stakeholders (such as the Ministry of Employment, Productivity and Industrial Relations) should create a formal, legal mechanism to assess claims for unpaid salary as an avenue to seek redress. A robust compensation scheme for workplace injuries, long-term diminished health and wrongful deaths should be introduced and enforced. These mechanisms need to operate cross-jurisdictionally since fishers with claims might not be from the same jurisdiction as vessel owners or recruitment agencies. This is crucial because when petitioning for unpaid salaries, fishers are often told payment is the responsibility of a party in another jurisdiction.

Although there are ‘layers’ of labour and immigration requirements, including destination country agency and placement fees, work visas and high transportation costs, are not necessary for local citizen crew joining and disembarking vessels in their own territory or other islands, the competitive advantage offered by Pacific Island crew recruitment in terms of lower costs than for migrant workers does not seem to be enough to entice operators to recruit more pacific islanders. This reinforces FFA / ACIAR (2023) findings that working conditions and employment arrangements do not necessarily align with cultural values and ways of life for many Pacific Islanders.

Remuneration: none of the initiatives analysed for this report addresses the key issues why fishermen go to sea: good payment. Other than Tuvalu’s Fishing Crew Regulation, which dictates a minimum salary of US$ 500 per month for crews on Tuvalu-flagged vessels or Tuvalu nationals employed on foreign vessels, no other jurisdiction incorporated this critical factor. It is important to understand that for most fisheries around the world, and throughout history, remuneration has been made using some form of a crew-share payment, where the crew receives a share of the gross return as a “top-up” of a fixed minimum wage. While some DWFNs employing non-local labour conduct operations outside of national waters to avoid paying legislated minimum wages, this should not be the case in the FFA membership. Hence, it would be important not only to have a minimal remuneration that induces fishers to go at sea, but this also should extend to a fair catch shares structure in the contract process.

The chance to entice more Pacific Islanders to the harsh realities of fishing work will remain low while the issues of fair remuneration, legal protection and equal payment for equal work stay as they are now, in my opinion.

Yet, NFD in Noro in the Solomon Islands has proved this can be done. From the 1990s, NFD and Soltuna started supporting local crew with training at all fleet positions, and today NFD has a productive, profitable, predominantly localised fishing fleet of purse seiners and pole-and-line vessels.

The 19th Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the WCPO

As I’m only partially involved this time (since I’m getting certified as a bicycle mechanic – one of my other interests) up in Palau, the Scientific Committee of the WCPFC is taking place.

This is an event I am very interested in, as it discusses all aspects related to science and technology in the WCPFC-managed fisheries.

Generally, there is a plethora of papers to read, and I wonder if anyone in the world has the time to read them all, yet for some reason, this year seems to be even more than usual! There must be over 150 papers, presentations, reports and so on.

There is no way that I could read all the papers I’m interested in, but I do have some absolute topics of interest, and the good thing about the WCPFC is that all of the stuff I’m interested in is accessible online to those that want to read about it, beside those of us that do as part of our work.

Here is my personal selection of the ones I found interesting on the topics I’m keen on (and understand! I’m really interested in stock assessment, yet the depth of the modelling used today is beyond my limited brain)

So for whatever it is worth, here are some of them

Overview of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, including economic conditions – 2022 https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19335

A novel FAD tracking device tested in the Pacific Ocean https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19844

ISSF Workshop on Different Approaches to Limit the Number of FADs in the Oceans  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19487

Spatial and temporal description of drifting FAD use in the WCPO derived from analyses of the FAD tracking programmes and observer data  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19395

A preliminarily analysis of variations in the fishing gear configurations and practices of Japanese longliners in the WCPO since 2007 https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19783

Non-entangling and biodegradable FAD trial in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19392

The Jelly-FAD: new results on its performance  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/20154

Independent Review of the 2020 WCPO Yellowfin Tuna Assessment  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/20156

Technological developments of the fishing devices in the Japanese pole-and-line vessel identified in past surveys  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19782

Proposed purpose, scope, and process for the seabird CMM 2018-03 review https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19793

Updated ACAP Advice on Reducing the Bycatch of Albatrosses and Petrels in WCPFC Fisheries  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19486

Evaluation of the use of netting and biodegradable materials in drifting FAD construction in the WCPO https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19393

Statistical comparison of bycatch mitigation performance with and without streamers in tori-lines for small LL vessels  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19763

Analyses of the regional database of stranded drifting Fish Aggregating Devices (dFADs) in the Pacific Ocean https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19394

Tori line experiments on Taiwanese tuna longline fishing vessels in the North Pacific Ocean https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19923

Ecosystem and Climate Indicators https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19391

A Fisheries Science Vessel for the Pacific – A tool to manage and preserve our common resources and ecosystem  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/19401

Summary of bycatch in WCPFC longline fisheries at a regional scale, 2003-2021  https://meetings.wcpfc.int/node/20161

International Legal Responses for Protecting Fishers’ Fundamental Rights Impacted by a Changing Ocean

I read a lot about climate change impact on fisheries distribution and management, some of which I have shared in many blogs in the recent past.

Yet this paper brings two very interesting aspects for me; first, it deals with fishers' rights under climate change from international law and human rights legal framework, and two because, I got to know one of the authors last year as an alumnus of the Rhodes Academy I was part of.

Julia Lima Weston is one of those really bright young people that seems to do everything right, and I loved the fact that our conversations could move fluidly between Portuguese, Spanish and English. So it was very nice to see her name in this really original paper

As usual, I strongly recommend you read the original; meanwhile, I quote the abstract and conclusions.

Abstract
Climate change directly impacts the marine landscape where fishers operate. Most fishers rely on fishing for food, income and/or employment. A changing ocean can therefore significantly impact fishers’ lives and hinder the full exercise of their rights of access to fisheries resources, rights to fish, to food, to work, to culture, and to a healthy, clean and sustainable environment. This article questions whether international law supports the protection of fishers’ fundamental rights in the changing ocean context. The authors begin by elucidating what such context means to fishers and their rights, taking special account of small-scale fishers and vulnerable groups. The obligations of States Parties to key instruments under the law of the sea and international climate change law, vis-à-vis States’ obligations under human rights treaties and other relevant international guidance, are explored with a view to furthering the protection of fishers impacted by a changing ocean.

 Conclusion
Fragmentation in international law requires interpreting and using treaties, principles, approaches and non-binding instruments from different legal regimes in a systemic, integrated and mutually supportive manner. In examining the support of the human rights, law of the sea and climate change regimes to the protection of fishers in the changing ocean context, special account has been taken of small-scale fishers and other vulnerable groups. Current and future developments are and will show whether duty-bearers will take the necessary actions and measures to further such protection. Many possibilities exist to advance this protection, including, but not limited to, providing capacity development and awareness-raising by governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations in close collaboration with fishers, particularly for the development of adaptation plans and tools. Special rapporteurs can play a key role by elucidating, in their country visits, the challenges and identifying solutions to strengthening the protection of fishers’ rights in the changing ocean context. Notably, thematic reports can focus on this particular topic to deepen the analysis of the matter, and involve and draw the attention of multi-stakeholders to address this issue.

Fishers directly or through their representatives could also take the initiative in seeking the full realisation of their rights or claim reparations or compensation for past and current rights’ violations. Remedies through the justiciability of certain rights may change according to the rights themselves being justiciable within States’ own national systems, affecting primarily social, economic and cultural rights. Litigating on human rights in order to address climate change impacts is not a new tactic and has been increasingly used by civil society to achieve the clarification of certain human rights obligations in the light of climate change impacts. Fishers’ communities may initiate cases under human rights treaty monitoring bodies, as well as other international or regional human rights courts and tribunals, after having exhausted domestic options and following the applicable procedures. Ensuring fishers participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of climate change prevention, adaptation and mitigation measures, policies and programmes is fundamental, and enables the contribution of fishers’ traditional knowledge and perceptions of climate change. This participatory approach to climate change decision-making in fisheries can be realised by the undertaking of socio-cultural environmental strategic and impact assessments prior to the development of plans, policies, programmes and undertakings with potential to cause significant environmental impacts.

 Specifically, the participation of small-scale fishers in decision-making processes requires consideration of their representation, cultural aspects and integration of their views and traditional knowledge, as well as access to information in a way that is easily understood by small-scale fishers.

It is crucial to read, interpret and apply the forementioned treaties, international guidance and technical documents in conjunction with each other so as to strengthen the protection of the fundamental rights of all fishers in the face of climate change. Comprehensive guidance from UN agencies could help in consolidating the recommendations from the applicable regimes in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, furthering the protection of fishers’ fundamental rights in a changing ocean context. Additionally, as certain treaty monitoring bodies have already advanced the climate change discussion in their forums by issuing general recommendations (in the case of CEDAW) and general comments (CRC), which elaborate on States’ obligations under those treaties in the climate change context, it remains to be seen whether other treaty monitoring bodies, including the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, will do the same. Furthermore, regional human rights instruments also include monitoring mechanisms that are specific to each region’s peculiarities. Notably, this is illustrated by the IACtHR jurisprudence on Indigenous peoples’ human right and its ground-breaking advisory opinion which clarified the correlation between human rights and the environment. These can also be pathways through which State obligations can be clarified. Many possibilities indeed exist, and it is hoped this article has contributed to clarifying some options for furthering the protection of fishers in the changing ocean context.

My takeaway thoughts from the international MCS meeting.

What are my takeaway thoughts from the international MCS meeting?

I’m not much of a meetings man, I get easily exhausted, and there is a level of pomposity that I find difficult to deal with… is like when I have to wear a shirt or a jacket, even if they are of the right size, I always have the feeling that there are too small, that makes me fill uncomfortable and generally put of place like if I don’t belong there. 

Also, most people in meetings belong to some organisation and have a job title, business cards and stuff like that… I’m just Francisco… so being in meetings fills me with impostor syndrome.

Yet on the other side, it is absolutely humbling to have so many people coming to say hello and tell me how useful and enjoyable my blogs are, that they appreciate my honesty and independence, and so on. But more importantly, listening to others from other parts of the globe talk about the diversity of their issues and problems is super important and informative.

Many of the IUU-related problems are the same, yet it is like saying the instruments you use to play in a grunge rock and a reggae band are the same, which is the case… yet the mixing, tunning, and playing of the same instruments produces totally different music.

So here are my personal takeaways:

1)    There is nothing like a “global fishery”, hence there is nothing like a “global IUU problem”.
There is a sum of a hell of a lot of very defined and localised specific and in some cases, regional issues.
For example;

a.     for the guys of the Bahamas, the main issue is the American boats sneaking in and not respecting the local lobster maximum take and closure.

b.     Yet for the Americans, the cradle of IUU is China in almost all fisheries

c.     For the crew in Peru and Ecuador, besides their own local issues, is the complexity of dealing with the Chinese and Taiwanese squid fleets outside their EEZ under the structures of a relatively new RFMO.

d.     Sandy Davis from FISH-i Africa told us that transhipping in the highs seas is not their main problem in East Africa’s east coast / Western Indian Ocean, and she worries about the focus given to that, while for us in the Western and Central Pacific is the main problem we quantified and the use of the impracticability loophole of the TS CMM.

e.     While the extent of IUU fishing seems to be huge in some parts is well-defined and quantified as small in other parts. i.e. for us in the Pacific is around 8% of total catches / less than 200 million USD in the WCPO -out of a 6 to 8 billion USD fishery.

f.      So I really question the utility of quoting an old study that says 20% of world fisheries is IUU? Who does that help? There are many places, like in the FFA membership, where things are way less… yet we get cornered with that figure and treated like liars if they dispute those numbers with our own commissioned ones. Furthermore, the worst performing nation in the function of compliance issues per fleet size is not CN or TW, but South Korea… yet in other parts, it is different.

So this makes me also wonder about the IUU index and rankings, not that there is nothing wrong with making them… but what is the use in the local context where we use it? Even big ports tend to (surprisingly for many) with mostly a known number of vessels that keep returning.

g.     IUU Rankings keep telling us that countries with low governance indexes and those that are poor (and even more those that are both), perform worst than those that are rich and well-governed… now tell me one area where that is not the case?

2)    Flag states get a free ride.

a.     According to UNCLOS, the Compliance Agreement, Flag State Performance guidelines, ICJ advisory opinions, etc… the Flag State is primarily responsible for conducting due diligence on the activity of its vessels. End of story!

b.     We had a representative of a DWFN saying that is was very difficult for them because they have over 1000 vessels fishing worldwide… So fuk*n what? Either have more people or fewer vessels! A country doesn’t have to flag fishing vessels… you should not flag them in the number your resources allow you to control them. Don’t ask for sympathy… even if you have only 100 and only the capacity to control 20…. You have 80 too many, and they are your responsibility. When not living up to yours, you are putting it into the hands of port states.

c.     You could be saying… port states have the capacity of not receiving them… yet, and we exercise it, yet we have to have documented reasons… furthermore is not the same… I can only receive as many as my port capacity allows… flag states seem to flag as many as they want.

3)    Nationals get a free ride

a.      The role of “nationals” is present in all multilateral legislation and treaties from UNCLOS onwards all the way to PSMA and others… in fact the IUU International Plan of Action Implementation says “One reason why IUU fishing has been such a persistent problem is that many States have not been successful in controlling the fishing activities by their nationals.” I wrote about here

4)    The AIS analytical platforms are here to stay.

a.     We had a lot of presentations and talks that involved AIS analytical platforms that MCS agencies. And we have two models:

i.     The free platforms (i.e. GFW, Skylight and OM - even if OM is in its own universe), yet it comes with a “mission”, a “line to tow” these are tech providers but also NGOs… where you get to use their tools under their terms and they also engage with universities and NGOs to produce research that normally relates to the conservation side of things.

ii.     Then on the other side you have Starboard.nz, which has produced a fantastic tool with a really user-friendly UX, and they keep working with fisheries agencies, and MCS practitioners to keep refining tools, algorithms and capabilities specifically designed for PSM, dark vessel detection, biosecurity risks and so on designed to cover the needs of clients that keep ownership of the data… yet here is the keyword “clients” which implies that you access their product under a subscription service. Now the issue is that the countries that need them the most, are generally the ones with less money, and they tend to rely on donor funding… which is not always sustainable. I think the model is to create a tool that is good enough as to be paid because it produces results. This is the case in RMI, we got a subscription under funding, yet we made such good use of it and got enough money from fines as to pay for the subscription ourselves at the end of the year contract.

5)    The Pacific is ahead of the pack in terms of MCS and RMI’s PSM is world-class.

a.     I don’t know of any other body like FFA that has had such a massive influence on combating IUU in the world.

b.     I don’t know of any other country in the region (and the developing world) that does the depth of PSM work that MIMRA does… and the price we got shows it.

6)    Good MCS is a process that relies on good and motivated people.

a.     And there is no way around that. Good tech and traditional tools are of no help if there are no good people behind them.  

So this little homemade movie is my way to show my respect and the process we went through with some of the coolest and most motivated people I had worked with.

Thank you guys

MIMRA wins the “Stop IUU Fishing” Meritorious Award

I have written a lot about the work MIMRA has welcomed to be involved with since 2018, even during the COVID years… My work there covers quite a few areas on the oceanic side of their mandate, yet much of the focus has been on MCS, PSM, transhipments, and crew labour issues.

I’ve said many times that working with them has been, so far, the highlight of my consultant career, both at professional and personal levels… they have always welcomed me as one more in the team, and I see my colleagues there more like friends than people I work with. And I will always be very grateful to NZMFAT for the trust, but overall the vision of working with fellow countries on long-term commitments.

iMCSn Chair Garry Orr, MIMRA’s Director Glen Joseph, MIMRA’s Chief Fisheries Officer Beau Bigler, iMCSn Director Mark Young in the from row… I’m the ugly bloke in the back.

My policy and operational approaches are sometimes a bit “unusual”, and focus on separating what is “nice” from what is ”necessary” and focus on the latter, also in making sure that newly acquired responsibilities don’t pile up on the already busy life of the crew there. And I always feel supported by them, even if sometimes against the advice of more “traditional” approaches and colleagues.

Anyway… I love working there.

As I wrote before, this week we have been at the 7th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (7GFETW) here in Halifax, organised by my colleagues at the International Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Network (iMCSn)

And last night, during a ceremony, MIMRA’s Oceanic Fisheries team won the “Stop IUU Fishing” Meritorious Award for their PSM work in Majuro, the world’s largest transhipment port.

Needless to say, I was absolutely stoked for them because is totally deserved.

The award not only recognised the excellence of the systems in place and the work of MIMRA’s oceanic division fisheries officers but also MIMRA’s outstanding level of transparency and mutually beneficial collaboration with technology providers.

The award recognised the long-term collaborations and the leading role that RMI has with regional fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance institutions such as the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) and the iMCSn, where MIMRA’s Director MR Glen Joseph, serves as vice chair, but also at the bilateral level with many partners such as Thailand’s Department of Fisheries and in particular, with NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZ MFAT) that has supported the work of fisheries advisor working with the Oceanic Division operations since 2018.

During the award ceremony, the chair of the iMCSn, Mr Gary Orr, highlighted MIMRA’s contribution to the fight against IUU in the following manner:

• Leading national and regional anti-IUU activities through its world-class Port State Measures best practices.

• Supporting a rights-based management approach to the world’s largest tuna fishery.

• Ensuring robust, efficient, and effective collaboration amongst all other FFA and PNA member countries.

• Sustaining regional focus to promote uniform and transparent Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS).

• Using innovative and cutting-edge IT solutions, including electronic monitoring and reporting.

• Aggregating support from donors and the broader international community

• Ensuring the safety of the observers at sea.

• Committing to gender issues and the elimination of barriers to women

• Promoting regional solutions and effective collaboration with South-South Cooperation.

• Providing practical and effective training across a wide range of MCS functions with the support of regional partners.

• Establishing MoUs for compliance and catch data sharing with crucial processing countries.

• Unmatched levels of transparency and open information are available on their website https://www.rmimimra.com

• Establishing MoUs and collaborations with international technology and transparency partners and the iMCS Network.

At a personal level, to have been for a snd time on a podium regarding my work on the IUU area is very humbling (here are details from when I was the 1st time with my work with both FFA and Thailand’s DoF).

Beau Bigler… all around great guy and fisheries professional

And also, at a personal level, I think that a lot of the work that took MIMRA to this price was in the shoulders of my friend Beau, the great bloke in this picture… enjoy that price, mate; you totally deserve it.

Full respect!

Benefits, concerns, and solutions of fishing for tunas with drifting fish aggregation devices.

I have been writing on different aspects of drifting FADs (particularly those with sonar buoys) for a while now, as they are a paradigm-shifting technology in tuna fishing.

As with all things in fisheries (and life?), everything has advantages and disadvantages, and I explored many of them, yet until today, I have not seen a full analysis of the pros and cons of their use and potential solutions/mitigation strategies around them.

The authorship of this paper reads like a “who is who” in the FAD, Tuna and fisheries world! I’m lucky to know most of them and greatly respect their work.

The paper is critical reading, whatever your position is regarding FADs… and at 20 pages is a bit of a compendium, yet absolutely necessary as the many facets in the topic of FADs.

I’ll quote the Abstract and Conclusions, but I fully recommend you dive deep into it.(is for free)

Abstract
Drifting fish aggregating devices (dFADs) are human-made floating objects widely used by tropical tuna purse seine (PS) fisheries to increase catch of target species. However, dFAD use has several negative impacts, including increased potential for overfishing, higher juvenile tuna catch, higher bycatch compared to other PS fishing modes, ghost-fishing, and generation of marine litter. Based on these impacts, some stakeholders, especially environmental non-governmental organizations and other competing fishing industries, suggest that dFADs should be completely banned. We list the pros and cons of dFAD fishing; address how to improve current management; and suggest solutions for the sustainability of dFAD fishing in the long term. A dFAD ban would lead to major changes in the availability and sourcing of tuna for human consumption and decrease the licensing revenue received by many developing states. Most importantly, we argue that tools exist today to manage for, reduce or elimi- nate most of the negative impacts of dFADs (e.g., bans on discards, limits on active dFADs, biodegradable non-entangling constructions, time-area deployment closures, recovery programs, and full data transparency, among others). Management decisions based on sound scientific reasoning are needed to address the legitimate concerns surrounding dFAD use and ensure the sustainability of both pelagic and coastal ecosystems and tropical tuna PS fisheries.

CONCLUSIONS
dFAD fishing has several negative impacts on the environment, including the potential for overfishing, increased bycatch, environmental pollution, and ghost fishing, among others. However, there are a wealth of potential management solutions for reducing or eliminating these negative impacts (Table 3 above). These solutions roughly fall into three categories. The first category includes solutions that have already been extensively implemented for PS fisheries, such as detailed stock assessments for target species, high observer coverage, use of dFAD entanglement minimizing designs, and best practices for bycatch live release. Extensive advancement in these issues has occurred in all tropical tuna PS fishing areas, especially in the last decade. This does not preclude, however, the need for further improvements or scientific studies, and could improve even more if the current measures in place were strengthened and effectively enforced.

The second category includes management options that have not to date been implemented, but could be rapidly implemented, because extensive background analyses and feasibility studies have already been carried out, management experience with similar tools already exists and/or societal pressures are likely to mandate their rapid implementation. This category includes non-entangling and largely biodegradable dFADs, wider availability of dFAD data, discard bans, valorization of non-target species, spatiotemporal management, dFAD unique identifiers and ownership rules, and recovery programs. In all these cases, extensive background work for their implementation has already been carried out. For example, in order to assess the impact and effectiveness of the diverse solutions, it is necessary to obtain data on dFAD deployments, trajectories, and fates. These data already exist, but scientists and other stakeholders currently have very limited access to them (Escalle, Muller, Hare, et al., 2021). This issue could be almost immediately addressed if appropriate societal and/or political pressures were put in place.

The third category of solutions consists of very promising future innovations in PS and dFAD management that require additional research and advancement before their large-scale applicability and effectiveness can be assessed. This category includes gear modifications and PS strategies to reduce bycatch, using an enhanced understanding of target and non-target aggregative behaviour to reduce dFAD environmental impacts, fully biodegradable dFADs (i.e., including all flotation and potentially even the tracking buoy itself), echo-sounder buoys with reliable biomass estimates per species and self-navigating dFADs. These are all extremely interesting ideas for which promising proposals and/or initial trials exist, but further work is needed to realize the full promise of these solutions.

If most of these solutions were applied and enforced, fishing activities that use dFADs could be sustainable. Developing incentives with eco-labelling, co-management and MSC programs could also help to improve and motivate best practices for dFADs fishing. There are some dFADs fisheries already certified by MSC such as the Echebastar PS skipjack tuna fishery in the IO, among others. Others are in the process of MSC certification such as the PNA Western and Central Pacific skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye tuna PS fishery on dFADs (skipjack and yellowfin unassociated is already certified). If this fishery is certified it will cover around 1.5 million mt of catch. PNA has its own control mechanism in place in the EEZs of PNA members, through the highly successful Vessel Day Scheme and annual reviews of all requirements set by WCPFC to limit the total tuna fishing effort to 2010 levels.

A ban on dFAD fishing could either reduce global food supplies or transfer food production to other methods that are less efficient and or have larger environmental impacts (e.g., higher bycatch rate), possibly risking overfishing of species that are currently fished at sustainable levels or increasing overall impacts on marine ecosystems. For these reasons, it is essential to consider the full scope of positive and negative impacts of any dFAD management initiative, including a dFAD ban, particularly in light of the many viable management solutions for reducing the negative impacts of dFADs dis- cussed here.

Finally, it is noteworthy that some of the solutions to bycatch, ghost-fishing and marine pollution identified in this study have been developed together with or by fishers (Jefferson Murua, Moreno, et al., 2023; Poisson, Séret, et al., 2014; Restrepo et al., 2018, 2019). Some key fleets have voluntarily shared with scientists data on dFAD tracking and biomass estimates, participated in research and agreed to a self-limitation on the number of dFADs to be used per vessel, even before a limit on active dFADs per vessel were mandated by different tRFMOs. The support of fishers, both to fish more sustainably and to provide data to scientists, is the product of a decade of collaborative research to mitigate dFAD-related impacts between scientists of different institutions and fishers from tropical tuna PS fleets around the world (Murua et al., 2023b). Although so-cial pressure, through environmental NGOs, led to faster progress of the fishing industry towards more sustainable fishing, numerous research projects (e.g., ISSF skippers' workshops) focused on participatory approach and co-management have generated strong connections between the fishing industry and scientists. This unprecedented scale of cooperation with hundreds of vessels taking part in research and fishers educated in best practices, will probably lead to a faster implementation of mitigation measures and solutions for the long-term sustainable fishing with dFADs.

The IMCS Network 7th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (GFETW)

And here we are, starting the 7th GFETW in Halifax. I’m not much of a guy that enjoys meetings, but this one is very special… I know and like a lot of the people here… not only the ones participating, but the organisers are people I have worked with in the past and are friends (besides colleagues), and I have learned a lot from them.

The MCS family

My friends Mark Young (the iMCS boss) and the two excellent experts working with him, Damian Johnson and Sarah Lenel, are not only at the top of their fields but have done an incredible amount of work organising all this. I have nothing more than personal and professional respect for the 3of them!

This is the 4th GFETW I’m involved with, and I have had the chance to be a panellist, which is not only a great honour, but something I would never have expected, having been a fisherman in the past.

Furthermore. with MIMRA, we are involved in two different panels around Carrier’s risk assessment and transhipments controls, and my friends (and clients) from Starboard.nz will be presenting some of the new tech tools they have developed.

The IMCS Network, in partnership with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, will hold the 7th Global Fisheries Enforcement Training Workshop (GFETW) in Halifax, Nova Scotia, from 31 July to 4 August 2023. The IMCS Network will welcome 180 delegates from 52 countries for the only event of its kind in the world.

The GFETW is the international meeting place for those that work at the forefront of fisheries MCS, compliance, and enforcement and those that support this work at the national, regional and international levels. The event offers a forum for sharing information about the challenges facing fisheries and a place to share successful MCS and compliance initiatives and practices.

The theme for the event is Moving from Words to Action ̶ Innovative Collaborative Partnerships to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.

Global efforts to ensure long-term sustainable management of fisheries continue to face multiple complex challenges, including the ongoing threat of IUU fishing. Innovative and collaborative partnerships are an essential part of meeting this continually evolving challenge. The Workshop offers a forum to promote and facilitate these collaborative partnerships.

Global issues require global responses. This can only be achieved by effective communication, collaboration, and information exchange. The IMCS Network acts by supporting this information exchange and collaboration among the global MCS compliance and enforcement community.

“He aha te mea e kaha ai tatou………what makes us strong?
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata……………it is people, it is people, it is people.
Our community represents the greatest resource in combatting IUU fishing and ensuring our marine resources are protected in the years to come. The passion, the professionalism and the commitment of those in our community is critical and without it, the world's oceans would be significantly worse off”.
Mr Gary Orr, Chair of the IMCS Network

The agenda for the Workshop is focused on themes that are relevant to the fisheries MCS, compliance and enforcement community and achieve the training intent of the Workshop. Throughout the event, participants will be introduced to effective compliance strategies, fisheries law enforcement best practices and interactive conversations about the MCS challenges and innovations for fisheries.

Tabletop exercises, panel discussions and breakout sessions have been designed to ensure participants are engaged and gain the opportunity to develop networks with their counterparts across the globe.

For more information about the GFETW visit the Workshop website:

For more information about the IMCS Network, please visit our website: https://imcsnet.org/

Connect with us on LinkedIn: @IMCS Network.

Media: Sarah Lenel, +61 408 860 935, slenel@imcsnet.org

#GFETW #IUUfishing #combatIUUfishing #getGFETWordstoAction #MWAcollaborateIUU

#stopIUUfishingaward

The ultimate review of Processing Tuna, Scombridae, for Canning

One of the issues that I found in common between the Pacific and my upbringing in the Guarani lands of northern Argentina and Paraguay is the one of respect to your elders. This was only emphasised by my time in the Navy and then fishing… you listen to and respect experience.

Processing is by far the biggest empoyer of the whole tuna value chain.

In this case, you read experience… I have been honoured to know two of the main authors of this massive review on tuna processing (Chris Lord and John Debeer), and they know their stuff encyclopedically.

In the over 30 years I have been involved with tuna, from catching through processing to market access. I have never encountered such a complete and integral document covering all the aspects of canning. This is key reference material for anyone working in this industry.

I recommend downloading and reading Processing Tuna, Scombridae, for Canning: A Review; even if processing is not your speciality, it will help you understand that getting the tuna on deck is just the start of a long and complex chain with more variables than you ever imagine, and is by far the biggest empoyer of the whole value chain.

I quote the conclusions and recommendations below, but give the original a go!

Conclusions

Commercial tuna processing is a complex operation with many individual process steps and requirements. The raw material supply lines have long time periods, as the fish may travel long distances both for migrations while alive or dead with shipping, processing, and distribution. Tunas are harvested from all of the tropical and temperate oceans, depend- ing on the species. The harvesting, onboard handling, and freezing equipment determine how the fish are frozen on the fishing vessel. The factory then determines how it is thawed, processed, and packaged in the tuna cannery. These handling and processing procedures have strict HACCP guidelines and controls for incoming testing and time-and-temperature processing scenarios. The commercial tuna processing business is very competitive, and profitability benefits from the economies of scale. Manufacturing efficiencies and benefits are facilitated with big modern factories.

Although bigger is better, cannery size does have limits, since as the cannery gets larger, the processing complexities and processing controls resulting from different processing times required for different-sized fish will eventually overwhelm the factory management.

The United Nations defined tunas and billfishes as “Highly Migratory Species” because of the vast distances these fishes travel in either temperate or tropical seas while passing in and out of the coastal zones of various countries. Some tuna swim up and down the coasts seasonally with the oceanic currents, while some make trans-oceanic migrations. Successful commercial tuna canneries require ongoing tuna deliveries for processing, while successful commercial tuna fishing boats require canneries to receive their tuna deliveries. Prior to the development of onboard refrigeration for freezing fish, the tuna-processing industry was locally focused and restricted by the distances that fishing boats could fish and return to port in a reasonable amount of time with the fish preserved on ice. The amount of catch and types of species processed depended on what was available to the fishing vessels. Once these boats had the ability to freeze the fish, transhipment became feasible and has become a common commercial practice. Refrigerated carrier vessels containing frozen raw tuna could move freely to canneries around the world, limited only by the transhipping costs, enabling commercial tuna canning to become an international business. For example, al- albacore is transhipped from Cape Town, South Africa, to a tuna can- nery in American Samoa for processing, and then the cans are shipped to and sold in New York. This harvested and frozen fish and resulting canned product travelled globally more than halfway around the world, west to east, and 74 degrees south to north, and passed through the Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Hemispheres. The canned tuna business is truly a global business.

Although there are many complexities, a tuna cannery is a relatively easy factory to build using off-the-shelf and used equipment. However, the supply lines for cans and ingredients, the availability of skilled seamer mechanics and technicians, and other mechanical trades mean that tuna canneries are often difficult to operate and manage efficiently and profitably. Keeping fast-moving equipment such as seamers and labelers with very tight tolerances operating and maintained can be especially difficult when only local tradesmen are available. Scheduling many different sizes of fish for processing through a cannery on a time-sensitive or restricted basis can make for a very challenging work environment.

Maintaining absolute food safety practices while recovering the highest value from each fish is a requirement for a successful commercial tuna cannery. The recovery or yield of white or light edible meat from the purchased round tuna must be maximised into saleable products while controlling food safety and complying with HAC- CP regulatory requirements. Profit- ably using by-product streams such as fish meal, fish oil, and red meat for pet food is also a part of the challenge.

Recommendations for Improving or Maintaining High Recoveries

1. When the fish are not being processed, keep them as cold as possible and the colder, the better. Fish that have had salt penetration during freezing can suffer from drip loss during frozen storage.

2. Sort the fish by species and size at receiving and unloading. Store the same species and sizes together in the freezer for easy access and removal. Process the same-sized fish together to minimise overcooking and unnecessary energy wastage.

3. Thaw the fish to a consistent backbone temperature. Schedule and thaw the fish by size so that they arrive at the butchering table properly thawed. Avoid thawing the tuna in the precooker.

4. Thawing the fish to a uniform temperature facilitates proper precook- ing of whole fish and split pieces. Improperly thawed fish will result in overcooking the outside before the fish core thaws and heating begins. This situation will certainly lower recoveries.

5. Split the large fish into the pieces of the same thickness or precook different sizes in separate precookers.

6. Cook the tails from the same lot of fish separately if they are not the same thickness as the other split pieces. Tails can present difficulties during cleaning because of the high number of tendons. The tail meat can get very sticky to clean and needs to be cooled and treated properly: keep it moist.

7. Cook all of the fish to 60°C (140°F) or over at the core or backbone to meet the HACCP guidelines and minimize the cooling time to avoid the muscle breakdown due to the cathepsin enzymes.

8. Train the fish skinning and cleaning personnel to use consistent methods.

9. Clean the precooked tuna meat using two-stage cleaning. Keep the skinning and deboning tables separate from the cleaning tables. Maintain the fish cleaning area in a neat and clean condition. Do not mix the cleaned white or light edible meat with red meat or bone fragments.

10. Fill the cleaned edible meat into cans, pouches, or freezer bags as soon as cleaning is completed. Oxidation can occur, and moisture is lost, resulting in reduced recovery for every minute the meat is exposed after cleaning.

11. Loading the precooked loins and meat properly into the tuna filling machine conveyor can greatly improve the canned product appearance. Filling machine knives must be kept sharp. The correct filling machine formats must be used for the desired fill weights. Work with the filling machinery suppliers to optimise the loin feeding and resulting canned product appearance.

12. Be as consistent as possible. A consistent operating team can adjust times and temperatures as needed. Without this consistency, the outcomes of the needed changes cannot be accurately predicted.

Critical Issues that Confront the Tuna Processing Industry

1. Food safety: The first duty of the tuna cannery management is to produce a safe seafood product with no elevated levels of histamine, decomposition, S. aureus enterotoxin, leaking cans, and especially no viable C. botulinum spores or botulinum toxin. Ev- Everything else is secondary.

2. Sustainability: Access to fish of the usable commercial species and sizes will be a constant problem as the cost of capture and costs of processing change and fishing areas are opened and closed.

3. Scheduling: Optimal scheduling of the variety of sizes of wild-caught tuna is a never-ending, ever-changing challenge. The processing times and capacity parameters for each step of production need to be coordinated by fish size, all this while in compliance with HACCP requirements of CCP’s and CL’s for time-and-temperature is required for every processing shift. Linear programming software is available to develop a useful scheduling program. Such a program will require applying all of the inherent complexities to successfully schedule tuna through a processing factory in an optimal fashion.

4. Thawing: The critical problem is to successfully thaw smaller fish in conventional fish bins without forming an ice ball in the center of the box, as the fish softens and collapses on itself. This issue is still an unsolved problem in 2022.

Final thoughts: The fish is swimming in the ocean, someone will harvest it, someone will process it, someone will sell it, and people will purchase it to use as a high-quality source of protein. The authors hope this manuscript helps the tuna business in some small way.

Examining Indicators of Effort Creep in the WCPO Purse Seine Fishery

Among the “way too many” interests I have in fisheries science (besides management, MCS, labour and climate change), one that I have been very keen on is eFADs and “effort creep”… I wrote a lot about it, but basically, it changed tuna purse seining during my lifetime. My skills 25 years ago would be obsolete now if I had not jumped in the FAD wagon… in fact, I’ll say that the catch and size of the fleet we have today are only possible because of FADs. (and that can be seen as a bit creepy)

definitivelly a before and after in Purse seine with FADs

I see it blatantly during FAD closure, where it takes at least twice the time for a vessel to catch enough to come to port, the logarithmic growth of the eFADs tech providers and the fact they enlist carriers to deploy them on their behalf.

One of the “obscure” consequences of eFADs and other technologies (like remote oceanographic sensing, specialised drone technology, and whatever else facilitates finding fish) is what is called “effort creep”, so I’m a sucker for any publications on the topic, and as the Scientific Committee meeting of the WCPFC gets closer, the excellent crew of SPC always produce a good paper on this topic that is worth reading Examining Indicators of Effort Creep in the WCPO Purse Seine Fishery (and I recommend you do that)

I quote some aspects I find key to it, and the summary below (for the lazy of you)!

Introduction
Fisheries management controls that are based on limiting effort require ongoing monitoring to track how effectively the unit of effort continues to constrain the fishing mortality. The effectiveness of a unit of effort in catching fish can change over time due to the adoption of new technologies, gear modifications, fisher skill, enhanced communication/networking among skippers and/or access to other information such as oceanographic data that helps locate fish.

Changes in the effectiveness of fishing effort can potentially alter the expected relationship between effort and fishing mortality compared to that when the effort limits were initially established, and this may undermine the achievement of management objectives.

 Gradual or abrupt change in fishing effectiveness, within an effort-based management framework, is generally referred to as “effort creep”. While effort creep can be positive for a fishing industry when it reduces the cost and environmental impacts of harvesting fish, management systems that rely on effort controls may need to consider adjusting effort limits over time to account for effort creep. Finally, industry adaption to effort based management can also lead to sub-optimal investment in operational aspects, such as technology, whereby the effectiveness of harvesting fish may increase but the cost required to harvest them increases disproportionately.

Effort creep can be difficult to quantify because it is composed of both direct and indirect components.
The direct components relate to nominal fishing effort (e.g. vessel fishing days, number of net hauls, sets or hook deployments etc.), while the indirect components may relate to factors related to technology uptake (‘technology creep’), slight gear modifications, increased information and networking, increased knowledge and skills of individual fishers. These aspects may not influence the amount of nominal fish effort, but they can influence the effectiveness of each unit of effort, i.e., the effectiveness of a purse seine net set to catch a certain volume of fish. While the direct components of effort are relatively easy to measure and track, the influence of indirect components on fishing effectiveness are challenging to quantify.

For the pacific island countries parties to PNA, the effort management unit is ‘the vessel day’, which refers to any day that is related to harvesting fish, and thus includes days in which nets are deployed and days when searching is conducted but a net is not necessarily deployed. Under the VDS system, most days when a vessel is within a member EEZ will initially be counted and charged as vessel days, but the days can be reduced through a process of claiming for non-fishing days according to specific criteria. Purse seine fishing outside of PNA member EEZs and archipelagic waters is managed by flag specific limits on catch or effort as specified in the Tropical Tuna Conservation and Management Measure CMM 2021-01. Further effort in archipelagic waters of some countries that are members of the PNA may not be managed under the VDS (i.e. Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).

FAD dynamics and implications
Using fishery data combined with FAD tracking information, it was estimated that at the scale of the WCPOthere were 31,000 FAD buoy deployments in 2016 and approximately 34,500 in 2017, 39,500 in 2018 and 33,400 in 2019. If these estimates are reliable this means the number of FAD buoys deployed per year issimilar to the number of FAD sets per year. The median number of active buoys monitored per vessel per day ranged from 45 to 75 depending on the year, well below the current management limit of 350. It remains unclear how close the number of FAD buoy deployments is to the number of actual FAD rafts deployed, as raft theft and buoy change over is considered a common occurrence. More work is required to better estimate the number of FAD raft deployments to account for theft and exchange of buoys, and any trends in these activities. FAD density may influence catch rates along with FAD technologies (e.g., sonar-equipped FADs)and these factors could both influence changes in fishing strategies and catch rates. Integration of FAD information is a continued priority for future work to increase understanding of the indirect and difficult to measure drivers of effort creep.

Summary
Understanding effort creep as it relates to effort-based management requires coupling changes in nominal effort indicators, in this case purse seine sets, with changes in the effectiveness of nominal fishing effort, in this case the effectiveness of purse seine sets in catching tuna. This paper presents simple aggregated annual estimates of indicators of nominal effort creep in terms of numbers of purse seine sets per year and per fishing day, and the effectiveness of nominal effort in terms of catch rates per set. For both types of indicators there were no long-term trends since the implementation of the VDS system, either for the PNA waters under the management of the VDS or non PNA waters where the fishery is managed under flag specific catch or fishing day limits. The lack of trend in catch rates per set was also consistent for associated and unassociated set types. While there was considerable interannual variability in the indicators, the lack of sustained increasing trends suggest that despite the implementation of an effort based management systems based on fishing days, there was not an overall increase in the amount of nominal effort realised within the fishing day effort unit.

We do note however that at the introduction of the VDS there was a major increase in the total number of sets each year for PNA waters, largely driven by an increase in the number of unassociated sets. This step change may be a result of the change in the management system, but is not indicative of effort creep. In fact this change is entirely consistent with an increase in the number of fishing days from 2009 to 2010, and there is no notable increase in sets/day over the same period. We note that the aggregated nature of the data presented does not preclude that nominal and effective effort creep could be occurring for specific flags and EEZs. A more detailed analysis at flag and EEZ level is required to explore this possibility. Finally, it is clear that increases in effectiveness of associated sets did occur prior to the VDS implementation that appeared related to the transition to dominant use of drifting FADs facilitated by the availability of affordable satellite tracking buoys.

Despite the increased use of technologies such as acoustic sensors on FAD bouys, we did not see any sustained increase in catch rates per set for associated sets since the VDS was implemented. This is a somewhat surprising result in light of industry perceptions that FAD technologies have been a major contributor to improving their effectiveness. It may be that the FAD technologies have improved the efficiency and economics of fishing operations (i.e. time and travel) to the extent that employing these technologies improves profitability but that they have not been so effective in increasing catch rates per set or capacity for higher setting rates per day.

The lack of positive trends in catch rates per set is, however, not entirely conclusive that no efficiency creep is occurring. If increased efficiency at catching fish is occurring against a backdrop of stock decline, it could result in stable catch rates per set (i.e., the effort/efficiency creep compensates for declining stock abundance/availability). Furthermore, even if efficiency creep is not occurring the highly selective nature of purse seine fishing (both associated and unassociated modes) can result in hyperstable catch rates per set even when the stock may be declining or even increasing. The strong potential for hyperstability in purse seine catch rates presents an issue when interpreting how these data indicate both stock trends and effort creep. The catchability proxy included in this analysis considers daily catch rates in relation to biomass estimates. In a scenario where harvest efficiency is stable, catch rates would be expected to decline as biomass declines. The increasing trend in the catchability proxy for purse seine skipjack suggests that increased capture efficiency may be offsetting the recent estimated decline in biomass from the 2022 stock assessment. This may be influencing the stability in the catch rate indicators.

Effort creep can have implications for the performance of the VDS in relation to meeting stock conservation objectives and economic returns to PNA members. Increased efficiency could have at least three implications:
i) if vessels can catch more fish in one day they may not need to purchase as many days,
ii) if fishers can catch more fish in one day without incurring significant additional cost, the value of a day could be higher, and
iii) if fishers can catch more fish in one day this could undermine the ability of the VDS to constrain fishing mortality to the expected level.
The aggregated data presented in this study suggest the variation in catches per day is dominated by interannual variation that is likely difficult to predict.

However, it is possible that different EEZs and or flags may show different patterns and or sustained trends in catch rates per set or sets per day that could be of interest to individual PNA members for optimizing economic returns from their allocations of VDS days. These higher resolution type analyses are beyond the scope of this paper but could be considered in future work, subject to data confidentiality and SPC staff time. The indicators presented do not suggest that overall effort creep is undermining the VDS control on fishing mortality compared to when it was implemented. In this analysis, we have examined catch and effort indicators independently from vessel characteristic indicators ( e.g., vessel length, GRT, well capacity); further analyzing changes in catch rates with respect to changes in vessel characteristics or technologies employed may improve our ability to assess effort creep. Continued research into the development of suitable effort creep indicators should focus on these integrated analyses, including improved understanding of changes in operational decision making and fishing strategies influenced by advances in technology. This would require closer collaboration with industry which has proven difficult. We would encourage enhanced data collection or reporting of technology and information sources used by purse seine fishing operations. We also note the importance of enhanced data collection from the fishery, including the wide array of drifting FADs throughout the Pacific. Building a more complete and accessible database with information on the location, movement, and characteristics of FADs should enhance these analyses. In addition, Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data will become increasingly important as we investigate changes in fisher behaviour over time.

SPC looks forward to continuing to work with the PNA on effort creep in the purse fishery.

The present at my feet

Asked Squarespace AI to write this blog post

Everyone is talking about it, so I thought about giving it a go since my website/blogging platform offers it for free.

I asked AI to write about IUU and if fisheries ecolabels are any good?. To be honest, I’m mildly impressed, and it would be stupid for political speech writers and journalists not to take a hint since it is much better than many of the speeches that I heard ministers say or "news" that one reads normally.

Overall nothing new… but congruent nevertheless… yet we shall see where all this takes us. May I ask about it again in a year.

Decide for yourself; this is verbatim what AI “wrote”:

Picture still real!

Tell me about IUU fishing.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing poses a significant threat to the sustainability and health of our oceans and fisheries. As global demand for seafood continues to rise, combating this detrimental practice becomes increasingly crucial. Fortunately, governments, international organizations, and local communities have been working tirelessly to address IUU fishing and implement measures to protect our marine resources.
One of the primary strategies used to combat IUU fishing is the establishment and enforcement of stricter regulations and laws. Governments around the world have recognized the urgency to defend their marine ecosystems and have implemented measures such as vessel monitoring systems, satellite tracking, and onboard surveillance to deter and detect illegal fishing activities. These technologies enable authorities to identify suspicious behavior and take immediate action against offenders.
Furthermore, international collaborations between countries have proven to be essential in combating IUU fishing. Through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) and multilateral agreements, nations are coordinating their efforts to address illegal fishing in shared waters. These partnerships foster information sharing, joint surveillance operations, and data analysis, resulting in better enforcement and a more robust system to combat IUU fishing across borders.
Strengthening port controls has also become a critical component in combating IUU fishing. Implementing strict inspection measures at ports ensures that seafood products entering the market are legally caught, reported, and regulated. By conducting thorough inspections and verifying the authenticity of catch documentation, authorities can prevent illegally acquired fish from reaching the market and disincentivize offenders.
Raising public awareness is another essential aspect of combating IUU fishing. Educating consumers and urging them to make sustainable seafood choices can significantly impact market demand. By supporting well-managed fisheries and certifying sustainable seafood products through reputable organizations, consumers play a vital role in incentivizing legal fishing practices and discouraging IUU activities.
Moreover, empowering local communities in fishing areas is key to combating IUU fishing. Many illicit fishing operations occur in regions where poverty and lack of alternative livelihoods prevail. By investing in education, infrastructure, and sustainable economic development, we can offer affected communities the opportunity to pursue legal and sustainable fishing practices, reducing the incentives for IUU activities.
In conclusion, combating IUU fishing requires a multi-faceted approach that involves the collaborative efforts of governments, international organizations, local communities, and consumers. Stricter regulations, international cooperation, robust port controls, public awareness, and community empowerment

Are Fisheries Ecolabels any good?
Fisheries ecolabels have gained popularity in recent years as a tool to promote sustainable fishing practices. These labels, often awarded by independent certification bodies, aim to inform consumers about the environmental impact of the seafood they purchase. While the intention behind fisheries ecolabels is commendable, their efficacy and overall impact remain subject to debate.
One of the key arguments in favor of fisheries ecolabels is that they provide consumers with transparent information about the sustainability of the seafood they buy. By displaying a recognizable ecolabel on their product, fisheries can communicate their adherence to certain environmental standards. This may influence consumer behavior and encourage the demand for sustainably sourced fish, thus incentivizing responsible fishing practices.
Proponents also argue that the certification process behind fisheries ecolabels encourages fisheries to assess and improve their sustainability practices. In order to obtain an ecolabel, fisheries must meet specific criteria established by the certification body. This raises awareness within the industry about the need for sustainable management and can encourage positive change in fishing practices.
However, critics question the effectiveness of fisheries ecolabels in achieving genuine sustainable outcomes. Some argue that the criteria for certification may not be stringent enough, resulting in cases where ecolabeled products do not meet consumers' expectations in terms of sustainability. This can erode consumer trust in the credibility of ecolabels and undermine their intended purpose.
Moreover, fisheries ecolabels often focus primarily on the environmental aspects of fishing, potentially overlooking other critical factors. They may not adequately address social and economic aspects, such as labor rights, fair wages, or the impacts on local communities. True sustainability ought to encompass a holistic approach that considers the entire ecosystem, as well as the well-being of people involved in the fishing industry.
Another significant concern is the potential for "greenwashing" – the act of giving a misleading impression of environmental responsibility. Some fisheries might view obtaining an ecolabel as a marketing opportunity rather than a genuine commitment to sustainability. If certification bodies do not rigorously evaluate and monitor the certified fisheries, the ecolabel could lose credibility and become merely a marketing gimmick.
In conclusion, fisheries ecolabels have the potential to play a positive role in promoting sustainable fishing practices. They allow consumers to make informed choices and can drive positive change within the industry. However, the effectiveness of these labels is dependent on robust certification criteria, transparent auditing practices, and a holistic approach to sustainability.