EU’s Long Distance Advisory Council (LDAC) says something we knew, but is good that they say it

The LDAC is an EU fisheries body representing stakeholders of both the distant water fishing sector and other groups of interest, whose mission is to provide advice to the European institutions and EU member states on matters including the international market for fishing products.

illustration for a EU IUU CCS manual I did for Indonesia in 2014

They have recently published an Opinion on improving implementation of the EU IUU Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008), that reflects many of the issues a few of us working outside the EU have been talking about for quite a few years now. Back in 2015 I was heavily censured by an EU official who opposed my nomination to a FAO expert group for what I wrote here, here, it builds on one published in 2016 by some of the LDAC members that failed to impress me.

Beyond the technicalities of these contributions, I'm happy they exist. Because they bring good criticism to a CDS that could have the potential to be truly influential, yet fails to live up to its full potential due to some lethal flaws that have nothing to do with technical capabilities, but rather design and politics. Also, because they criticise from a full European context.

LDAC’s recommendations to the Commission to improve implementation of the IUU Regulation include the following:

• establish a centralised electronic database at EU level for the CC scheme as a matter of priority by latest mid-2017;
• establish risk analysis criteria to verify those CCs with high risk;
• establish a minimum import verification %, using variables such as risk analysis depending on the country of origin or track record of the operator, amongst others;
• ensure improved and harmonised reporting of activities by member states in their biennial compliance reports under the Regulation; and
• undertake audit missions to member states to assess compliance of their procedures with the Regulation’s requirements regarding the CC scheme.

In some way they also revindicate the opinion that myself, and friends like Gilles Hosch and Carlos Palin have been arguing since 2011 at least.

I never been against the EU IUU CCS (in fact it has kept me very busy!) it is just that it always had fatal flaws and the potential for them to be fixed relatively easy, and somehow yet it never happened. But i still hopefull :-) (i'm always are!)

Keystone dialogue for Ocean Stewardship

In June 2015, I blogged about a paper published by researchers at the Stockholm Resilience Institute,  which focused on the role of global transnational fishing corporations instead of the role of nation states as the key players which traditionally formed the basis for governance of fisheries resources.

fisherman fish, traders rule

They used the ecology concept of “keystone species”, that are those …"that have a profound and disproportionate effect on communities and ecosystems and determine their structure and function to a much larger degree than what would be expected from their abundance'… And they adapt this concept to identify “seafood companies” that take a similar role in the global seafood industry “ecosystem”.

I was quite taken but that approach, since I see a similar pattern in tuna with 3 big traders that influence everything and everyone in the sector, and I always wondered how could be getting those guys at a table and find solutions.

Now the authors have moved another step by getting the key managers of the 8 biggest fishing conglomerates identified in their paper, into a fancy resort in the Maldives (smart move!) and getting them to issue a ten-point statement committing to action on ocean stewardship following the first “keystone dialogue” between scientists and business leaders.

The companies commit to improving transparency and traceability and reducing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in their supply chains. Antibiotic use in aquaculture, greenhouse gas emissions and plastic pollution will also be prioritized. The seafood businesses commit to eliminating any products in their supply chains that may have been obtained through “modern slavery including forced, bonded and child labour”.

As keystone actors, they set up a new global initiative – “Seafood Business for Ocean Stewardship” – that brings together, for the first time, leaders in science and business, the wild capture and aquaculture sectors of the seafood industry, and companies from Asia, Europe and North America, operating globally.

Through “Seafood Business for Ocean Stewardship”, they intend to develop a common understanding and a common approach among the keystone actors globally, building on the many existing initiatives in which our companies are already engaged.

This is an initiative between science and business, with an ambition to engage with governments and other stakeholders for positive change. It is not only about supplying sustainable seafood to consumers; it is about becoming stewards of the world’s ocean and aquaculture environments.

And they will act on the following:

• Improve transparency and traceability in our own operations, and work together to share information and best practice, building on existing industry partnerships and collaborations.
• Engage in concerted e orts to help reduce IUU fishing and seek to ensure that IUU products and endangered species are not present in our supply chains.
• Engage in science-based e orts to improve fisheries and aquaculture management and productivity, through collaboration with industry, regulators and civil society.
• Engage in concerted e orts to eliminate any form of modern slavery including forced, bonded and child labour in our supply chains.
• Work towards reducing the use of antibiotics in aquaculture.
• Reduce the use of plastics in seafood operations, and encourage global efforts to reduce plastic pollution.
• Reduce our own greenhouse gas emissions.
• Secure new growth in aquaculture, by deploying best practices in preventive health management, including improved regulatory regimes.
• Collaborate and invest in the development and deployment of emerging approaches and technologies for sustainable fisheries and aquaculture.
• Support novel initiatives and innovations for ocean stewardship

Is all nice words, but for me, the point is that if these guys are really committed, they have a massive driving force.

Interestingly the Q&A section has a very good question (and answer):
Why should people think this is nothing more than just a corporate PR project?
This is a long-term initiative facilitated by science. The initiative did not come from the companies themselves, but originated from research conducted by the Stockholm Resilience Centre. The scientists believe that the largest companies within the seafood industry have the capacity to lead a transformation towards a more sustainable and transparent business. This meeting was intended to test this idea and future meetings will define how concrete actions will be developed. This will inevitably take some time, but the future will show how it can complement efforts and actions developed by governments. This initiative will be supported by independent science, and it is up to the companies to live up to their joint commitments.

I don't know how far will this go, but I would keep an eye on it because is a novel and realistic approach. Furthermore, I would love to have something like that in the tuna world, because while we work with flag, coastal, port and market states, in our sector we have 3 "supra states" that amalgamate all others, the 3 big traders: "Trimarine, FCF and Itochu", and their combined influence shape the industry.

Fisheries Management Impacts on Target Species Status

We all know that many fish stocks around the world are in trouble, but also that there are some success stories with fish stocks increasing in abundance and overfishing being reduced. A key question is why is the status of fish stocks improving in some places and declining in others?

Scores for each country for 5 different aggregate measures of the management system and the status of the stocks

Mike Melnychuk and 3 co-authors (Emily Peterson, Matthew Elliott, and Ray Hilborn) made an effort to answer this question in a recent paper.

Their answer is on the logic and simple side: countries that have effective fisheries management systems generally have healthy fish stocks, while those without effective fisheries management have declining abundance and increasing fishing pressure on fish stocks.

In a survey of 28 countries, including the top 20 countries in terms of total landings, they found a good correlation between the management of the fisheries and the state of the fish stocks.

Not surprisingly, three characteristics are particularly important to good outcomes:
(1) the scientific assessment of the status of the stock,
(2) limiting fishing pressure, and
(3) enforcing regulations.

To score on the management system, the authors elaborated a “Fisheries Management Index” (FMI) based on 5 different aggregate measures of the management system and the status of the stocks (Research, Management, Enforcement, Socioeconomics, and Stock status).

I know quite well the fisheries realities of many of the top 14 countries, and the position of some do surprise me... so I search in the  methodology and not surprisingly, at least for me, is the absence of a measure for corruption (perhaps via the Transparency Int ranking of the country). But then I agree that is difficult to quantify measure.

In any case (and not surprisingly) the FMI was closely related to the wealth of the countries. Those countries with high per capita GDP had the highest scores in fisheries management.

After accounting for this influence, they further found that fisheries subsidies had considerable impact as well. Investment into the management system (“beneficial subsidies”) produced positive results for the overall management score, as one would hope, but capacity-enhancing subsidies (“bad subsidies”) were associated with poorer overall performance at meeting management objectives.

The FMI, showed wide variation among countries and was strongly affected by per capita gross domestic product (positively) and capacity-enhancing subsidies (negatively). Among 13 management attributes considered, three were particularly influential in whether stock size and fishing mortality are currently in or trending toward desirable states: extensiveness of stock assessments, strength of fishing pressure limits, and comprehensiveness of enforcement programs.

These results support arguments that the key to successful fisheries management is the implementation and enforcement of science based catch or effort limits, and that monetary investment into fisheries can help achieve management objectives if used to limit fishing pressure rather than enhance fishing capacity. Countries with currently less-effective management systems have the greatest potential for improving long-term stock status outcomes and should be the focus of efforts to improve fisheries management globally.

In recent years there has been increasing concern about whether our fisheries can sustainably provide seafood without overfishing fish stocks. Several papers have described the global status of fish populations (i.e., their abundance and exploitation rates) and have hypothesized influences of fisheries management, but this report is unique in being a comprehensive analysis of how specific management attributes (which are numerous and operate simultaneously) affect population status across oceans, countries, and taxonomic groups. This report integrates management policies and population ecology to assess sustainable harvesting outcomes of target species in marine fisheries; results have important global food security implications.

The authors suggest that sustainability of fisheries results from a functioning management system, and the nature of the management system more than the current abundance of fish stocks or the history of catch is a better reflection of sustainability into the future. Improving the performance of global fisheries will be best achieved by improving the fisheries management system in the low-performing countries, especially by building capacity to perform stock assessments, restrict fishing pressure and enforce regulations.

Criminal case against Vidal Armadores fails on appeal

I have quoted work by my colleague Mercedes Rosello before, she is a PhD researcher in fisheries law, hence her views on the recent failure of the Spanish courts to criminally charge members of the Vidal family for their involvement as beneficial owners of notorious IUU vessels, are of interest to me. I know from a first source that the lawyers of this family are some of the most ruthless people he has ever seen, so no doubt all technicalities possible would have been exploited for this trial. Here is what Mercedes had to say:

Pride of the Spanish feet...

The Spanish press has reported that the criminal case commenced against several individuals connected to the Vidal conglomerate has failed following an appeal to the Spanish Supreme Tribunal. According to the latest media report the appeal succeeded as the Tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis that the national law of the accused is insufficient to attach criminality to an act committed on a territory where it was not classified as a crime.

The case highlights the current underdevelopment of the legal bases required for the establishment of transnational criminal accountability of individuals in respect of illegal and unregulated fishing activities. It also suggests administrative and economic routes to be more resilient and expedient policy choices at the present time, pending further international work regarding the assignation of criminality to illegal fishing activities.

The criminal case was separate to the administrative proceedings commenced by the Spanish Fisheries Secretariat earlier this year, which ended in the imposition of several fines and suspensions. Mercedes blogged about this in March.

Transnational crime is definitely an area that needs research and juridical development, I feel a bit sorry for the Spanish prosecutors that had to see the binning of their case. Furthermore, the case creates a worrisome instance of jurisprudence, that can be exploited by other fisheries syndicates.

WTO members engage on new fisheries subsidies proposals

Members engaged in detailed discussions on three new proposals aimed at achieving an outcome on fisheries subsidies at the WTO’s upcoming Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in December 2017. The proposals from the European Union, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of members, and six Latin American members — Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and Uruguay — all seek to achieve the 2020 targets set out in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

image from http://www.nereusprogram.org/

SDG 14.6 calls for prohibiting certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminating subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and refraining from introducing new such subsidies, by 2020. Goal 14.6 also recognizes that appropriate and effective special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing and least developed members should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations.

The three proposals presented at the 9 December meeting of the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) all share the same objectives:

• achieving the goals set out in SDG 14.6
• ensuring effective disciplines while also providing special and differential treatment for developing and least developed country (LDC) members
• securing an outcome at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11) in Buenos Aires. 

In addition, the proponents call for the negotiations to proceed on a stand-alone basis, i.e. there should be no linkage with other issues being discussed as part of the rules negotiations.

The proposal, which was first introduced at the previous NGR meeting on 11 November, seeks to prohibit subsidies linked to overcapacity (including those used to increase the capacity of, or support the construction of, fishing vessels) and to IUU fishing, provides special and differential treatment for developing members and LDCs, and highlights the importance of members notifying all kind of subsidies that support, directly or indirectly, marine fishing activity.

The ACP proposal primarily targets subsidies provided to large scale commercial or industrial fishing and subsidies to fishing activities outside of members' maritime jurisdictions. The proposal would impose a ban on all IUU subsidies and all subsidies granted to fishing vessels or fishing activity negatively affecting fish stocks that are in an overfished condition; flexibilities would be included allowing developing members with small scale fishing sectors to increase their capacity to fish.

The joint proposal from Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and Uruguay advocates using a flexible approach to the application of disciplines by developing members and LDCs, inspired by that adopted in the Trade Facilitation Agreement. In particular, under the proposal these countries could apply transition periods (to be defined through negotiations) for implementing the specific disciplines to be established, in some cases subject to the receipt of technical assistance and support for capacity building.

Summing up the discussions, Ambassador Wayne McCook of Jamaica, the chair of the NGR, noted commonalities in the proposals, in particular their reliance on SDG 14.6.  It is clear that members will need to look at the impact of certain subsidies that contribute to overfishing and to overcapacity of fishing fleets, as well as how to address IUU fishing, he said.  Members have been working on these issues for more than a decade, so any solution will require new creativity, which he said was perhaps being seen in some of the proposals now being put forward.

Plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies

Canada told members that a group of members participating in a plurilateral initiative on fisheries subsidies were planning to hold their first substantive meeting early next year and that any member wishing to take part in the initiative could join in. So far, 16 members have signaled their interest, Canada said.

Next meeting

The next dedicated session on fisheries subsidies is tentatively scheduled to take place on 24 January 2017.

source https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/fish_09dec16_e.htm

Some details on the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program

Last week I posted on the "new" U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program, and lamented that as the EU at the time, they put they coins in a unilateral CDS, instead of using their market strength to set up a multilateral one, (after all in between both they have the have at least 2/3 of the import trade... corral Japan and China into it, and the picture is complete. But yeah... truly international concerted action is always dreamland stuff unfortunately.

Who's your importer?

In any case here are some of the details:

As I presumed they kind of follow the model set originally up by the Seafood HACCP rule that kicked in around 1998, the responsibility is in the importer.  In most countries, importers must be registered for customs and tax purposes, hence these are identified and can be registered, licensed and "audited" by the authorities against defined responsibilities. That didn't work particularly well initially with the HACCP rule, but been refined since then

Those responsibilities over importers got bigger with the Bioterrorism Act 2002 and then the US Food Safety Modernization Act 2014, that includes specific provisions for a Voluntary Qualified Importer Program, Import Certifications for Food and Prior Notice of Food Shipments among others. Hence there is a solid base to add fisheries requirements on top. On a positive note, from scratch via the US Presidential Task Force, got the fisheries authority (NOAA) and Food Safety (FDA) under the same page, always a smart move as many of the traceability requirements are similar.

The information to be collected and is to be available by the importer at the moment of reception is the ABC of any basic (but well designed) CDS, namely: 

Harvesting or Producing Entity

• Name and flag state of harvesting vessel(s)
• Evidence of authorization to fish (permit or license number)
• Unique vessel identifier (when available)
• Type(s) of fishing gear.

Note: The fishing area and type of fishing gear should be specified per the reporting convention and codes used by the competent authority exercising jurisdiction over the wild capture operation. If no such reporting requirements exist, FAO fishing areas and gear codes should be used.

Fish – What, when and where?

• Species of fish—Scientific/Acceptable market name (ASFIS three-alpha code)
• Harvest date(s)
• Product form(s) at time of landing - including quantity and weight of product
• Area(s) of wild-capture or aquaculture harvest
• Point(s) of first landing
• Name of entity(ies) to which the fish was landed or delivered

Note: In cases where entries and products comprise more than one harvest event, each event that is relevant to a shipment must be reported but the importer does not need to link each event to a particular fish or portion of the shipment.

Importer of Record

• Name, affiliation and contact information
• NOAA Fisheries issued international fisheries trade permit (IFTP) number.
• Importer of record is responsible for keeping records regarding the chain of custody detailed above.
• Information on any transshipment of product (declarations by harvesting/carrier vessels, bills of lading)
• Records on processing, re-processing, and commingling of product.

As I mention las week, the collection of catch and landing documentation for these the seafood species will be done through the International Trade Data System (ITDS), the U.S. government’s single data portal for all import and export reporting.

I think that in the Pacific (all tunas are in) we are ripe to set up a "multilateral CDS" that even if does not incorporate all the "end-markets", it can provide the requested set of data to the ITDS in centralised way. Otherwise we need to rely on individual exporters, which may be cheaper, but information has a massive value for decision making in the fishery. Furthermore is not yet clear for me how the importer knows that the information provided is true?  As I said, the most common sense solution is a multilateral CDS that can communicate with the ITDS, where the information is "real"

US FINAL RULE TO IMPLEMENT A SEAFOOD IMPORT MONITORING PROGRAM

On December 8, 2016, NOAA Fisheries released the final rule establishing the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP).  The Program establishes, for imports of certain seafood products, the reporting and recordkeeping requirements needed to prevent illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)-caught and/or misrepresented seafood from entering U.S. commerce, thereby providing additional protections for our national economy, global food security and the sustainability of our shared ocean resources.

prove me right

This is the first-phase of a risk-based traceability program—requiring the importer of record to provide and report key data—from the point of harvest to the point of entry into U.S. commerce—on an initial list of imported fish and fish products identified as particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing and/or seafood fraud.  

Overview of the Final Rule 

The final rule reflects the efforts to establish an effective program that minimizes the burden of compliance on industry while providing the necessary information to identify illegal and/or misrepresented seafood imports before they enter the U.S. market.

The Seafood Import Monitoring Program establishes permitting, data reporting and recordkeeping requirements for the importation of certain priority fish and fish products that have been identified as being particularly vulnerable to IUU fishing and/or seafood fraud.

The data collected will allow these priority species of seafood to be traced from the point of entry into U.S. commerce back to the point of harvest or production to verify whether it was lawfully harvested or produced.

The collection of catch and landing documentation for these priority seafood species will be accomplished through the International Trade Data System (ITDS), the U.S. government’s single data portal for all import and export reporting.  

The Seafood Import Monitoring Program is not a labeling program, nor is it consumer facing. In keeping with the Magnuson-Stevens Act authority (under which the regulatory program has been promulgated) and the strict information security of the ITDS--the information collected under this program is confidential.

The importer of record will be required to keep records regarding the chain of custody of the fish or fish product from harvest to point of entry into U.S. 

List of Priority Seafood Species
Abalone *                     
Atlantic Cod                 
Blue Crab (Atlantic)       
Dolphinfish (Mahi Mahi)
Grouper                                   
King Crab (red)             
Pacific Cod                    
Red Snapper
Sea Cucumber
Sharks
Shrimp *
Swordfish
Tunas: Albacore, Bigeye, Skipjack, Yellowfin, and Bluefin

Implementation

January 1, 2018 is the mandatory compliance date for most priority species listed in the rule, with *shrimp and abalone compliance phased in at a later date. The effective date of this rule for all imported shrimp and abalone products – wild capture and aquaculture-raised - will be stayed until commensurate reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements have been established for domestic aquaculture-raised shrimp and abalone production.  

Just by reading this one see that the US has gone in a complete different path that the EU system, hence in principle we will have two masters asking for different things and saying “I don't care about the other one”, as we had when the market access requirements from the sanitary perspective were put in place.  I see this as an opportunity to strengthen the efforts towards a comprehensive eCDS, where the data streams are compiled and the full set of movements and transformation from a legal capture to final products are incorporated, then how you present this information to the final market becomes an "end function" and not a process driver.

sources: here

A new Market Access requirement by the US

Under the Fish and Fish Product Import Provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, exporters of fish and fish products to the United States must now follow the same protective rules for marine mammal bycatch as domestic fishing operations, even if they dont have the same issues.

Marine mammals interacting with a fisherman and his kids :-)

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has issued a final rule that, effective 1 January 2017, will revise its regulations to implement the import provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. NOAA states that under this rule U.S. trading partners will need to show that killing or injuring marine mammals incidental to fishing activities (bycatch) in their export fisheries do not exceed U.S. standards. There will be an initial five-year exemption period to give nations time to assess their marine mammal stocks and estimate and lower their bycatch.

Among other things, this rule establishes procedures and conditions for evaluating a harvesting nation’s regulatory programme addressing marine mammal incidental mortality and serious injury in fisheries that export fish and fish products to the United States to determine if it is comparable in effectiveness to the U.S. regulatory programme (even if it uses different mechanisms).

Harvesting nations will be required to apply for and receive, every four years (after the initial five-year exemption period), a comparability finding for each fishery identified by NOAA in the List of Foreign Fisheries to export fish and fish products to the United States. Notably, imports of fish and fish products from fisheries that do not receive a comparability finding or have had a previous finding terminated will be banned.

Any such import prohibition will become effective 30 days after publication of a notice in the Federal Register announcing the comparability finding and will only apply to fish and fish products caught or harvested in that fishery.

NOAA, in consultation with the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, will consult with harvesting nations that fail to receive a comparability finding for a fishery, provide the reasons for the denial, and encourage the harvesting nation to take corrective action and reapply for a comparability finding. A harvesting nation may, at any time, reapply for or request the reconsideration of a denied comparability finding for a fishery and submit documentary evidence in support of such application or request.

Harvesting nations will have to follow certain procedures and meet certain conditions to receive a comparability finding. For export fisheries operating within a harvesting nation’s exclusive economic zone or the territorial waters of that nation, the conditions include:

• marine mammal stock assessments that estimate population abundance for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in the export fishery;
• an export fishery register containing a list of all vessels participating in the export fishery under the jurisdiction of the harvesting nation, including the number of vessels participating and information on gear type, target species, fishing season and fishing area;
• various regulatory requirements (e.g., including copies of relevant laws, decrees and implementing regulations or measures);
• implementation of monitoring procedures in export fisheries designed to estimate incidental mortality and serious injury of marine mammals in each export fishery under its jurisdiction, as well as estimates of cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in the export fishery and other export fisheries with the same marine mammal stock, including an indication of the statistical reliability of those estimates;
• calculation of bycatch limits for marine mammal stocks in waters under its jurisdiction that are incidentally killed or seriously injured in an export fishery; and
• comparison of the incidental mortality and serious injury of each marine mammal stock or stocks that interact with the export fishery in relation to the bycatch limit for each stock, as well as comparison of the cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury of each marine mammal stock or stocks that interact with the export fishery and any other export fisheries of the harvesting nation showing that these export fisheries
  • (i) do not exceed the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks, or
  • (ii) exceed the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks but the portion of incidental marine mammal mortality or serious injury for which the exporting fishery is responsible is at a level that, if the other export fisheries interacting with the same marine mammal stock or stocks were at the same level, would not result in cumulative incidental mortality and serious injury in excess of the bycatch limit for that stock or stocks.

For export fisheries operating within the jurisdiction of another state, the conditions include:

• with respect to any transboundary stock interacting with the export fishery, any measures to reduce the incidental mortality and serious injury of that stock that the United States requires its domestic fisheries to take with respect to that transboundary stock; and
• with respect to any other marine mammal stocks interacting with the export fishery while operating within the jurisdiction of the state, any measures to reduce incidental mortality and serious injury that the United States requires its domestic fisheries to take with respect to that marine mammal stock.

The rule allows NOAA to consider, during the initial five-year exemption period, an emergency ban on imports of fish and fish products from an export or exempt fishery that are having or are likely to have an immediate and significant adverse impact on a marine mammal stock. In addition, it establishes provisions for intermediary nations to ensure that they do not import and re-export to the United States fish or fish products subject to an import prohibition.

Now, how small development coastal states whose fisheries have very limited interaction with marine mammals would be able to prove all this while doing all the other thinkgs they are expected to do, is the eternal dilemma of fisheries development.  All this comes as another addition to their burden of having to prove themselves innocent of problems that they didn't create.

have no issues with protecting marine mammals, yet I’ll like to see trade measures to countries that support inequality, withholding drugs for communicable diseases based on IP, war (just search Aleppo war and images in Google), and so on. Equally important areas if you wish, were the same high moral ground consumers are bystanders.

Sources: here, here

World Tuna Day announced by UN

The United Nations General Assembly has voted today to make May 2nd World Tuna Day.

is more than just a fish... is life for the pacific islands. (Pic by my brother Hugh Walton)

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement have been pushing to establish an internationally recognised event for the past five years.  The United Nations General Assembly voted without objection to ratify a resolution on World Tuna Day that had been endorsed by nearly 100 nations prior to today’s vote at UN headquarters in New York City. Ambassadors from PNA nations attended the vote.

Tuna is a primary source of revenue for Pacific Island governments and is a key part of food security in the region and World Tuna Day helps strengthen the voice of Pacific nations striving to ensure their succeses and challenges are part of the global tuna conversation.

As the resource owners of the regions multi-billion-dollar fishery, it is clearly important that Pacific knowledge, progress and experiences must lead the global tuna conversations. And tuna is keeping the Pacific working, with jobs in the fisheries sector rising from 10,500 in 2010 to an estimated 19,000 in the present.  Added to that, while just under 20% of the tuna catch in the Pacific EEZs is caught by domestic fleets, that is still a rising trend, on top of another area of increase-- the amount of the catch being processed on shore, where the majority of the jobs are filled by women.

A range of factors lead to these upward trends, amongst them an ability to implement at national level the results of regional agreements and actions for fisheries licensing, compliance, and monitoring policies, and management measures 

Our challenge in the region is to continue this growth, including extending it to a broader range of the membership and to all fisheries.  The success of the PNA members in leveraging huge returns from the purse seine fishery is our collective inspiration for also reforming and benefiting more from long lining for example.  

And of course, fisheries are not all rosy.  The Pacific faces numerous and substantial challenges including the overfished status of bigeye tuna, marginal economic status of albacore and concerted attacks on pacific islands sovereign rights from distant water fishing nations.  

A Skipper of Interest (SoI) is better that Vessels of Interest (VoI).

Usually when driving a car and you get an infraction, is you the one that get the fine, not the car. The more fines you have the bigger the fines, in fact it will lead to your driver’s license being removed for even longer period of time. So why we focus on the boat in the fisheries equivalent, is the skipper that is responsible for what the boat and crew does.

You are of interest.

So I’m quite pleased that the pacific nations are initiating a watch list of vessel masters linked to the WCPFC IUU vessel blacklist. The move to strengthen tracking of IUU fishing vessels with another layer of information listing vessel masters, is hoping to gain traction amongst Tuna Commission members. 

 "At the moment we blacklist boats that have been caught illegally fishing, but as we all know, it is the people on board that are actually doing the wrong thing.  The Persons of Interest (POI) watch list will help detect vessel masters slipping through the current IUU vessel blacklist and going on to lead rogue fishing from another vessel", says FFA DG James Movick. 

FFA members first raised the idea of Persons of Interest being added to the Vessels of Interest lists at the WCPFC Technical and Compliance session this year. Their concerns over compliance by vessel crew at the centre of actual IUU activity, rather than the vessel used to carry it out, are behind the new concept.

 “FFA members have been strongly supportive of the WCPFC IUU blacklist, and the ability to identify vessels that have operated illegally and hold them to account, but we recognise a more important body of work is being able to identify the individuals who drive those vessels, and are interested in putting a far greater emphasis the master and owner,” says Movick. 

Members are looking to deal with this in two ways- by increasing the WCPFC measure to include information about the name and nationality of the master on the IUU blacklist; “and to run some internal work amongst ourselves to increase the level of information we have on the FFA Vessel Register, so we have specific details on the master of each vessel.”

Tracking performance of individuals in charge of vessels will not just focus on IUU, but help ensure countries refine the approach for prioritising dealings with compliant vessels, so that both ends of the compliance spectrum are covered, says DG Movick.

 “Obviously, our members want that information to help them make licensing decisions, especially when it comes to licensing one vessel over another,” he says.   The new persons of interest data layer will build on the current FFA database feeding the FFA Regional Surveillance Picture, or RSP. 

 “The regional surveillance picture provides a rich layer of information tracking location, activity and vessels including their license information, compliance rating and previous boardings,” says Movick, “soon, this will be yet another piece of information that FFA members will have at their disposal.” 

FFA members have already advised the WCPFC plenary of work underway on the issue, and welcomed advice from any Commission members doing similar work. 

They’ve asked the Commission Secretariat, where available, to include names of vessel masters on the WCPFC IUU Vessel list

The FFA press release is here: http://www.ffa.int/node/1861 

Fisheries Observer Safety Measure is finally agreed at WCPFC13

This has been (unfortunately) a long fight, after 5 fisheries observer deaths in the last 6 years, a very disputed CMM (like a law) on the safety of observers while on board was finally accepted today at WCPFC meeting

United they stand...  ©FFA

Fisheries Observers are the frontline of management and compliance evaluation in the pacific fishery, and their safety is paramount. Read for your self if anything is beyond the minimum anyone at sea will expect. 

Nevertheless, there was fierce opposition by Japan based on tenuous (allegedly unsubstantiated legal arguments), China (who wanted psychological and medical reports – something they don't ask from their own crew) and similar pathetic arguments by Taiwan and Korea… the usual DWFN suspects .

In an unprecedented move the Pacific nations took a stand for the 'invisible' frontline of human observers watching over fisheries practice in our oceanic fisheries. WCPFC Chair Rhea Moss-Christian confirmed a vote on a proposed Observer Safety CMM tabled by the US, after it stalled in plenary without reaching consensus, due to domestic legislation reasons given by Japan. 

However, Commission Observers WWF and the FFA bloc of all Pacific members at the Commission made it clear the time for waiting was over. "There is not another way forward," said FFA's Wez Norris before the Chair's decision to hold the vote starting 6.10pm Fiji-time. "The discussions have been had, the works been done, the drafting's been drafted." The strong condemnation from all Pacific members and call for a vote has put the Commission in no doubt that when it comes to the safety of nearly 300 Pacific Observers watching over our tuna fishery, human life can't wait.

It would have been the 2nd time the commission would have gone to a vote in their history. But at the end Japan conceded and consensus prevailed.

Bubba takes a stand...  ©FFA

My colleague Bubba Cook from WWF has been a big supporter of the observer’s measure (he already supported the distribution of a safety 2 way communication device for the e-observer app, so we get the reports on real-time, as well as any emergencies on board). "We've heard a lot about 'domestic restraints' this week.” He said… “Prove it, make evidence available. Provide facts, show us the laws. Don't make blind assertions, it wastes the time of everyone here”

"I am sorry for being angry -- but this is about people”, he said... and I agree totally… it is about people.

So may times I said, that I don't work with fish, I work with the people that work with fish. Nothing is going to change if don’t address the people factor first. 

A maori proverb says it clearly:
He aha te mea nui o te ao (What is the most important thing in the world?) 
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata (It is the people, it is the people, it is the people)

Anyone that has spend time in the Pacific knows that.

I wrote about an observer lost at sea here, one of the hardest days in my life.

FFA block cites 'management failure' of WCPFC

Pacific Islands members have pulled no punches on the critical state of Bluefin Tuna stocks in the Northern part of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean fishery, citing lack of progress from the Commissions Northern Committee as  "nothing short of a management failure".  

2016 stock assessments for Pacific Bluefin tuna confirm continued low stock levels, with the spawning stock biomass now at a perilously low level of 2.6% of unfished levels. In response, the Northern Committee at its September meeting in Japan(link is external) had recommended taking up a harvest strategy and catch limits- but not to be negotiated until next year.

There was a resounding rejection from the FFA bloc of the Northern Committee's hopeful projections and 'business as usual' scenario as their agenda item came up at the morning plenary marking the mid-way point of the annual Commission meeting. FFA members say the Northern Committee is not fulfilling its mandate, and raised their voices with enough momentum to force the Committee to reconvene at WCPFC13 and offer a solution to calm frustrations.

"The failure of the Northern Committee to sustainably manage the very stock they were set up to protect is quite frankly, bringing the whole of the WCPFC into disrepute," says FFA Director General James Movick. "FFA member countries have no role in that fishery, and its management has deliberately been kept separate - and we are now facing the consequences of international scorn for failing to manage the Bluefin fishery."

While any Commission decisions on this stock must be based on recommendations from the Northern Committee, some FFA members have gone so far as to imply that they will take the Bluefin decision to the Commission’s first ever vote if they have to. 

He says the strong responses from FFA members in plenary at the deferred approach from the Northern Committee mirrored "strong frustrations from members that this decision making process from Northern Committee to Commission means we have a Convention which gives particular protection to the culture of inaction."

"The Northern Committee has failed to develop meaningful management recommendations and as a Commission, we failed to hold the Northern Committee to the same standards that are adopted for the other stocks we manage, and we have got to do better," FFA members told the Commission plenary. 

Other fisheries stocks around the world have been slapped with commercial fisheries bans to bring them back from similar low levels. While the current management measure for Pacific Bluefin 2015-04 includes a requirement to develop emergency rules in in the event of a recruitment failure, the Northern Committee has failed to do so. 

"Commission members from all sides, and the Northern Committee in particular, have been warned in no uncertain language, that Pacific nations haven't fished Bluefin because there is no Bluefin to fish. Saying it’s just too hard to address that challenge is simply not an option,” says Movick

Source here

Solid opening from the Solomon Islands at the WCPFC13

You all know I'm very partial to the Solomon Islands, is like a 2nd home to me, and the Tuna town of Noro exemplify what I believe fisheries should be in the Pacific. So I was very proud to read the transcript of the stern opening address that my colleague Ferral Lasi, Undersecretary (Technical) to the Ministry of Fisheries delivered today at the opening of the WCPFC. I quote it below:

Don't disappoint the fish owners WCPFC13

Solomon Islands would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the work of the Chair and WCPFC Secretariat who have so ably directed the work of the Commission over the last 12 months. We recognise that this is a very challenging task due to the sheer size of the Commission and the different interest of members.

We also would like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation and thanks to the government of Fiji as host for WCPFC 13 in terms of background preparatory work, organizing, and arranging for the meeting to be held in this magnificent venue. The hospitality that we have received since our arrival here in Fiji has been very warm and friendly.

Madam Chair, we note the long list of agenda items that is before us. Some of the critical issues on the agenda need decisive action to be taken during this Commission meeting.

The Solomon Islands believes that the Commission needs to be take strong action on the following critical issues:

1. Radical management initiatives are needed to address the severely overfished Northern Bluefin tuna fishery. The current status of this stock is an embarrassment to this Commission and an indictment on the Northern Committee.
2. A new CMM to give greater protection to the health and safety of our observers is urgently needed. The Solomon Islands is very concerned at the unmanaged risks being faced by observers.
3. Progress needs to be made on the development of Harvest Strategies for all tuna species. Solomon Islands places a high priority for the development of Harvest Strategies for Skipjack Tuna and Southern Albacore tuna. Agreement on a target reference point for Southern Albacore and risk levels for all tuna species at this years meeting would signal real progress. 
4. Solomon Island sees the need to progress the reform of the Compliance Management Scheme (CMS) as absolutely critical.  We believe the existing CMS is not as effective or efficient as it could be and most importantly we believe that it is unfair to SIDS.  
5. An agreement on the process to develop bridging CMMs for both the Tropical Tunas and Southern Albacore will be critical the future success of the Commission. 

Madam Chair the Solomon Islands is committed to constructively working with all members to achieve outcomes on these critical issues and on other agenda items.

Solomon Islands re-affirms its commitment to the Commission to ensuring long term sustainability of highly migratory species through the effective implementation of WCPFC CMMs.

In-line with this commitment and as part of the PNA plus Tokelau initiative we would like to inform the Commission that we are implementing the long-line VDS in our national waters as of 1st Jan 2017. Key components of the long-line VDS are e- reporting and e-monitoring. We are confident that these developments will not only enhance compliance monitoring and data quality for science but also improve long-line fishery management as a whole.

The Solomon Islands looks forward to the day when the Commission implements compatible long-line measures for the High Seas.

Finally Madam Chair I wish you every success as you guide us all through this very challenging Commission meeting.

Thankyou and God bless.

PNA put its cards at the WCPFC 13 table

As part of the FFA members states, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) met also in Nadi to finalize their own strategy for the 13th WCPFC annual meeting that opens Monday 5 December in Denarau, Fiji.

Charlin from the Solomons (part of PNA), does her bit to control the Longliners

PNA will reiterate its call on the WCPFC to exercise management on the high seas over both longline and purse seine vessels as part of PNA’s push to see the Commission adopt a “harvest control strategy” for tuna and a bridging measure to extend and improve an existing Tropical Tuna Conservation Management Measure that expires at the end of 2017.

There are numerous areas in which the eight PNA members and Tokelau will be engaging with members of the WCPFC. PNA's strategy at the WCPFC is based on the resource rights owners taking control of their fishery to benefit economically and conserve it by ensuring sustainable practices, and pushing the WCPFC to bring the high seas fishery under similar control and sustainable management, and while fishing in PNA 200-mile exclusive economic zones is now well-regulated and controlled, the same cannot be said of high seas fishing.

“The longline fishery in our region is out of control,” said Mr. Kumoru (PNA's Boss). Catch volumes are under-reported and there is little verification by independent observers, in part because of high seas transshipment of tuna. “All this adds up to a poorly managed fishery that needs to be addressed by the WCPFC,” he said. “PNA has pushed in the past, and will continue to lobby for a ban on high seas transshipment of frozen bigeye and increasing over time fisheries observer coverage on longline vessels to 20 percent.”

PNA officials agree it is obvious from recent fishing trends on the high seas that flag state controls are not working. The WCPFC needs to adopt a “hard limit” on the number of fishing days for purse seiners on the high seas. Meanwhile, PNA has already begun rolling out a vessel day scheme (VDS) for the longline industry that is similar to its successful VDS that governs the purse seine fishery.

Other key points for PNA include:

The ongoing non-compliance of several distant water fishing nations with WCPFC requirements for providing operational catch data. Although all island members of the WCPFC provide catch data as required, several distant water fishing nations continue to violate these Commission requirements. The lack of data is serious management gap and is a critical problem for scientists evaluating the status of tuna stocks in the region.“The aim is to reduce the burden of data provision by small islands, while getting distant water fishing nations to comply with the rules of membership".

PNA will not agree to adding an additional month to the existing three-month fish aggregating device (FAD) moratorium for in-zone fishing because this will cause a disproportionate burden on a number of small islands whose fisheries revenue depends on FAD fishing.

PNA will not accept “capacity limits” on fishing vessels, which PNA views as an attempt by distant water fishing nations to limit island ownership of vessels and greater participation in the fishery.

They play hard, and good on them!

Getting ready for 13th session of the WCPFC

This is a busy time for the Pacific fisheries administrators, as they gear up in meetings going through a long list of proposals at their final round of preparatory sessions in Nadi this week before they meet with the big fishing nations on December 5th for the 13th Session of the WCPFC.

Meetings... 

My friends in FFA work quite hard to try to find common approaches among its members, to put on the table proposals for CMM (Conservation and Management Measures) that should become "law" among their members. So the Officials from the 17 member nations are spending this week working through the detail and discussing strategic engagement on each proposed measure they have tabled.

Accordingly to FFA's inside news, WCPFC 13 will look at a substantive list including those from the Pacific focused around improving ways to roll out a Harvest Strategy Approach aimed at better management measures covering regional tuna stocks - Bigeye, Yellowfin, Albacore and Skipjack. Fisheries Officials from the 17 member nations of the Forum Fisheries Agency are spending this week working through the detail and discussing strategic engagement on each proposed measure they have tabled.

 While FFA members are firmly committed to the Harvest Strategy Approach, they are fully aware that comprehensive harvest strategies for all the key tuna species will take a number of years. So FFA members are turning their minds to putting in place strong interim arrangements for tropical tuna stocks as well as albacore that will stay in place until full harvest strategies are complete. One of their key focuses has been preparing for the development of new Tropical Tuna measure to replace the existing measure that expires at the end of 2017.

Observer safety proposed as a CMM by the US at WCPFC12, has also been highlighted as a key concern for the FFA bloc, who gave the issue of the safety and welfare of Fisheries Observers high priority during their July Ministerial in Vanuatu. All of the observers in the pacific are locals, hence is a simple message "these are our people and they must be afforded safe and harmonious working conditions".  The US drafted a CMM on Observer Safety that is tabled, but Pacific nations have a number of outstanding issues and concerns.  So they will have to work with others to support adoption at the Commission table.”

Proposals from the 17-country FFA bloc to the WCPFC13 cover:

Target Reference Point for South Pacific Albacore- Establishment of a Target Reference Point for the stock to provide an agreed target for the management of the fishery. Citing the SPC science showing that continued current fishing levels will result in further decline of the stock, FFA members say reductions in catch and effort are necessary to ensure a healthy stock and profitable albacore fishery. Another proposal by FFA members seeks to separate South Pacific Albacore from the proposed new Tropical Tuna CMM and create a standalone albacore CMM that limits the total catch of albacore.

Rules for High Seas areas –Backed up by the findings of the Pacific IUU report, FFA members are back with revisions to a proposal tabled at WCPFC12 seeking better fisheries management for the six High Seas areas in the WCPO. Fisheries management on the high seas of the WCPFC is one of the highest responsibilities of the Commission, as per article 8.4 of its founding convention. The proposed High Seas Areas CMM aims to strengthen the management of the Longline fishery and complement the rules for purse seine vessels covering transshipment at sea, and the PNA licensing condition preventing licensed vessels from fishing in the two western high seas pockets.

 Harvest Strategy Levels of risk (interim) FFA members propose this measure to provide a ‘starting point’ for the acceptable levels of risk of breaching limit reference points for yellowfin, skipjack, and south Pacific albacore. It’s a highly technical element of the harvest strategy approach, but is necessary to guide further work on the Harvest Strategy Workplan adopted by the WCPFC last year, and is aimed at helping Commission members decide how it will design harvest control rules and set target reference points.

Enhanced Port-based Monitoring, Control and Surveillance: FFA members are building on their 2015 proposal and flagging a revised version seeking enhanced port based MCS Initiatives to assist with procedures and capacity of Pacific nations to meet their obligations as Port States. The proposal also targets IUU- hoping to nab fish traceability and documentation gaps aboard licensed vessels dodging the rules for reporting.

As my colleague James Movick (FFA's boss) said: “There is little doubt among the Pacific nations that getting any proposal over the line involves focused, strategic engagement with an ability to recognise opportunities and read shifting positions. This is the annual negotiation meeting upon which the future of the pacific Tuna fishery rests, and FFA members remain committed to ensuring meaningful outcomes. Achieving that remains a major challenge.”

I salute all my friends and colleagues at the sessions, I truly support and admire their efforts for the "full on" next couple of weeks they have.

Kia kaha! (Maori for "Be Strong " in the meaning of offering encouragement to succeed when troubled)

How to find a Fishing Vessel anywhere in the world (as long as it has its IAS on)

In September I wrote about the public beta version of Global Fishing Watch (GFW) that is available to anyone with an Internet connection and allows users to monitor when and where commercial “apparent fishing activity" is occurring around the world.

They added a feature that may help some people doing intelligence analysis. If you now the name or identity of a specific vessel you would like to find, here’s a step-by-step guide on how to find it.

Is important to understand that AIS is not a specific Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), that is a general term to describe systems that are used in commercial fishing to allow environmental and fisheries regulatory organizations to track and monitor the activities of fishing vessels.

GFW uses data about a vessel’s identity, type, location, speed, direction and more that is broadcast using the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and collected via satellites and terrestrial receivers. But the AIS unit can be switch off anytime...

AIS was developed for safety/collision-avoidance. It is a maritime navigation safety communications system standardized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) that provides vessel information, including the vessel’s identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft; automatically receives such information from similarly fitted ships; monitors and tracks ships; and exchanges data with shore-based facilities.

AIS use for fisheries compliance and MCS is argued quite substantially, it can be useful in my opinion as backup system when VMS fail (until vessels come to port) of when operating in the High Seas. And while AIS is not as fisheries specific as VMS, the fact that one can individualise a vessel anywhere in the world, can only be good!

Furthermore one can "visualize" the "fishing effort", anywhere in the world is truly remarkable, and brings home the incredible amount of Chinese and Taiwanese vessels that they are fishing in the Pacific. 

Stock Assessment and harvest strategies explained in a simple way (2)

I was truly encouraged by the number of visits to the Stock Assessment and Harvest Strategies explained in a simple way (Part 1) blog post of Dr. Ian Knuckey very didactic videos.  So here is the final lot of 6 videos.

The stock assessment and harvest strategy determination is key for sustainability, and is no way that the assumptions are going to be right, without the full collaboration and the insider's knowledge of industry. I wish that this message was understood by many more (particularly the DWFN). But we will get there either by reason... or force

Enjoy.

Catch Per Unit / Effort

Collecting Fisheries Data

The Black Box

Opening the Black Box

Harvest Strategies

Fisheries Economics

Stock Assessment and harvest strategies explained in a simple way (1)

Part of the idea behind this blog was to provide information on different aspects of fisheries since it involves so many areas from social sciences to engineering, via economics and enforcement just to name a few! But one of the more "obscure" areas to make accessible is Fisheries Biology and Stock Assessment... which are key ingredients in the complex recipe of Fisheries Management.

I have never actually met Ian Knuckey, even if we have a lot of acquaintances and colleges in common and have done work for the same organizations, so when I came across his excellent series of 12 videos explaining some aspects of the biology and population dynamics of fish, fisheries data, fisheries stock assessments, harvest strategies and fisheries economics. I contacted him to ask him if I could post about them, to which he kindly agreed.

I liked the videos a lot and watched them with my science-savvy kids (11 and 14) so I relate totally to the introduction the 1st fisherman does. Ian and the production team manages to get rather obscure concepts into plain language, without loosing accuracy, and that is awesome. Furthermore, the fact that he uses real-life examples and local fisherman (from Australia- hence the accents are a bonus!), add to the "right to the point" feeling of the "lessons."

The length of the videos (all below 10') is also about right, to keep your attention focused/

If you ask me, this is the way to fight for sustainability in fisheries, don't come with paternalistic approaches, explain things in a way people can access it. I remember someone saying: "there are no complex subjects, there are complex explanations" so if we get to make explanations simple... we'll get there.

I present the 1st 6 today and the next 6 later on. Enjoy...

Meet the Fisherman

Schools of Fish - What is a stock?

Recruitment

Age and Growth

Mortality

Selectivity

Covenants with broken swords

As said many times, the readership of this blog is always surprising. Hence thanks! Already a few people have sent me interesting stuff to blog about, which is quite cool. I got recently, a collaboration of Aksel Sundström, from the department of Political Sciences of the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that I like to share.

He tackles corruption at enforcement level in fisheries, which is a complex and controversial issue. I grow up in a very corrupt country, and my job takes me top countries that do not rank high in corruptions indexes like Transparency International but then, I have spent the last 21 years of my life in a country is one of the less corrupt ones. So I can see the issue from different angles.

I like the fact that he is tackling the issue from a political sciences background and his research was done in South Africa, a country at cultural crossroads.

An important issue I always bring up when the issue of corruption is discussed, it is like tango, it takes two for corruption. The one accepting it and the one offering it… and it is in my opinion, a mix of cultural issues as well as power imbalances and risk management.  

What I mean with risk? If the enforcer earns 100 and the issue at hand has a value of 1000, someone offers him 100 to look aside and if he gets caught no much happens… the incentive is clear. Now if the enforcer earns 1000 and if he gets caught he looses his job and gets publicly exposed… he is not going to accept 100 to risk 1000

If you expand this principle to other areas, is the same… I know people that are responsible for administering 5 million USD worth of catch access but earn lest that 40000 in a year… in no other area of management, you’ll see people earning less than 1% of the value of assets they manage… that is just not right and too much of a bait.

In any case here are some of the passages that I find more interesting of this article, and as my usual advice, read the original here.

Abstract
Insights into how corruption hampers law enforcement in the governance of common-pool resources are currently limited. This article develops our understanding of this process through confidential interviews with enforcement officials in South African fisheries. First, it outlines how inspectors become ‘‘blind and corrupt’’: They receive bribes from fishermen in the form of finance, food, or friendship, which they pay back through inadequate enforcement, information sharing, or involvement. Second, it shows that widespread bribery increases the costs of remaining honest: Inspectors face corruption in the judiciary, which makes the writing of fines useless because these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Moreover, they face corruption in their organization, where substation managers and actors in top management are engaged in bribery, sending signals that corruption has small consequences. The article concludes by discussing how corruption distorts regulations and the implications for governing the commons.

How to achieve cooperation that entails welfare for the collective, yet requires restrictions on the behavior of individuals, is a puzzle that continues to engage political theorists. Hobbes posited that covenants – promises to follow agreements of engaging in certain behavior – require an external agent to enforce such pledges with the threat of force ([1651]). Yet, research on governance of the commons has found numerous examples of when individuals manage to limit their use of resources without relying on enforcement by an outside agent (e.g. Ostrom, 1990). An illustration of self-organized institutions enforcing rules on common-pool resources (CPRs) – resources that are under rivalry and where exclusion is difficult, such as irrigation schemes or fisheries – are for instance herders on pasture lands who monitor each other’s behavior and successfully impose sanctions on those who break their pledges. The literature has therefore described the two situations of externally governed or self-governed enforcement of commitments as ‘‘covenants with or without swords’’.

When corruption is present in CPR regimes with government-imposed regulations, bribery may distort management. However, current literature lacks knowledge on how the presence of corruption affects public officials’ choice to enforce or not enforce regulations. The aim here is to contribute theoretically and empirically by exploring the mechanisms in which this process takes place.

In order to do so, the article poses two questions for research: First, in what way does corruption corrode enforcement of state-imposed CPR regulations? Second, in what way does corruption pose a further enforcement dilemma for inspectors in government authorities responsible for imposing CPR regulations?

Guided by these questions this study reports a qualitative exploration of these enforcement agents’ perceptions. The focus is on the enforcement of CPR regulations in a corrupt context, the fisheries law enforcement in South Africa. Confidential interviews where performed with public inspectors at the Compliance Directorate, of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). Also former inspectors – no longer facing risks for speaking openly – are interviewed, as well as former senior managers of this directorate and key stakeholders. The study offers a contrasting perspective to the literature on corruption and environmental outcomes where most studies use countries as the unit of study. Such a focus risks simplifying this relationship since single indicators hardly capture variation in levels of corruption and environmental health within countries and across sectors. This study follows the research vein of existing but scarce interest on the role of bribery in the governance of natural resources on the local level.

Discussion
This investigation provides theoretical nuances related to the first research question—in what way does corruption corrode enforcement. As fleshed out in these accounts, there are analytical categories that can improve our understanding of this process. Bribery involving resource users in this context seems to come in three distinct forms: finance, food, or friendship.

While these forms of bribes differ between each other – the first being monetary, the second being nonmonetary, and the third being an even more vaguely defined transaction – the three categories share that they all target inspectors to be blind to violations. These different forms of bribes illustrate that ‘‘corrupt behavior’’ – and more precisely, small-scale collusive corruption – may take varying shapes, ranging from material aspects to social practices. Moreover, the accounts suggest that the mechanisms in this process can be further nuanced analytically.

Enforcement agents seem to become blind in three different ways: Inspectors may engage in inadequate enforcement, practices that could include no monitoring at all, the intended misreporting of landings, or the systematic writing of faulty fines. They may also start to engage in information sharing, revealing details of secret operations. Finally, blindness to violations among such agents may take the shape of involvement, where enforcement officials take part in illegal actions through transporting goods, stealing catches, lending freezers for storage, or even poaching themselves.

Having found these mechanisms in the empirical accounts, it is also interesting to explore how they can be used to improve our theoretical understanding of this process. First, it can be noted that blindness could be understood through the work of Kahn et al. (2001). They make the conceptual distinction between temptations affecting a public official into two categories: shirking (the avoidance of duties) and corruption (the extraction of a bribe from an evader). The process of becoming blind and corrupt can therefore be seen as the process linking these phenomena. When an enforcement officer has received a bribe, this agent will shirk selectively to benefit certain resource users. Second, this more nuanced understanding of blindness to violations is important as it points to the fact that ‘‘not enforce’’ – one of the two choices of the state actor used in the game-like situations outlined by Gibson (1999) and Sjostedt (2014) – is a simplified understanding of defection in such interactions. It seems that blindness, rather than only a choice of not enforcing, consists of different strategies. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.

Here, I depict the three distinctive strategies that counter the choice to enforce regulations. Moreover, they differ from each other in their impact on other inspectors’ decisions, as there is possibly a rank order in how these different options affect management. Inadequate enforcement is the moderate obstacle for enforcement, affecting mostly the individual relationship between the inspector and a resource user. Information sharing on the other hand is understood as a larger impediment, potentially ruining other inspectors’ possibilities of enforcing regulations. Finally, the involvement of inspectors in poaching is perhaps the worst type of hurdle as it fundamentally turns the inspector into a complicit agent in the activities they should prevent. Moreover, the interviews inform us theoretically about the second question—how corruption becomes an obstacle in the inspectors’ enforcement work. First, inspectors face a context dilemma, making the writing of fines useless as these disappear from bribery among clerks and judges in the enforcement chain. Second, they face an organizational dilemma where substation managers and actors in top management of their own organization are known to be involved in corrupt behavior, thus further demotivating the inspectors. Signals from above indicate that it is accepted to enrich yourself and that there are few consequences if you get caught. This indicates that there are linkages from large-scale corruption that are important in order to understand the presence of small-scale practices of bribery.

Moreover, corruption in higher ranks of this organization renders whistle-blowing inefficient as inspectors risk telling someone involved in corruption. Also, becoming blind and corrupt gives advantages to individual inspectors as they become known among colleagues as people who can be included in shady transactions, sanctioned by substation managers. In tandem, the two dilemmas create disincentives to individual inspectors for honest behavior. Put differently, the choice of remaining honest and enforcing laws becomes much more costly for individuals when the presence of bribery has spread in the enforcement chain and in their own organization. In such settings it is more likely that enforcing agents will choose one of the defecting strategies discussed above. In relation to the findings of Akpalu et al. (2009) and de la Torre- Castro (2006) – showing that inspectors face social costs when enforcing regulations in a local community – this investigation helps us better understand bribery’s role in this relationship.

Much of the behavior that is analyzed in this article is taking place in a context with locally specific features. Yet, the key insights from this investigation are not necessarily limited to resources with the particular characteristics of the South African marine fisheries. The different forms of bribes discussed in this case – monetary as well as nonmonetary – may also be obstacles for enforcement in other settings where corruption is widespread. Moreover, the improved analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users may be used to better understand state-governed resource regimes with other characteristics, such as tropical forest reserves, where corruption may be a problem for management.

The insight that officers that enforce natural resource regulations are affected by corruption in the judiciary system as well as corruption within their own organization is also general enough to inform policy in a range of contexts and across various types of resource regimes. So what are the implications of these findings for our understanding of the governance of commons? On a more general level, the argument in this article was presented at the backdrop of the debate where scholars have depicted the choice of enforcement in CPR governance as one between covenants ‘‘with or without swords.’’ As a contrasting view this article has proposed that when bribery is prevalent in the agency imposing regulations on a CPR, this can be depicted as covenants ‘‘with broken swords.’’

As Table 1 illustrates, the situation of widespread corruption in law enforcement can be contrasted to the situation with a government enforcer with no corruption present. Importantly, the process outlined in this article clearly shows that in situations with corruption, the likelihood of achieving sustainable outcomes for management of CPRs is severely decreased. When regulations – the policy tools that are meant to steer behavior of resource appropriators – are not enforced due to widespread bribery, this will increase the probability of a ‘‘tragedy’’ where resources are overharvested.

Then how can the path in such situations be reversed? The results from the empirical investigation speaks to a general understanding among studies on corruption where government agents find it difficult to act honestly when bribery is endemic within and outside of the organization. The literature suggests that bureaucrats’ incentives for corrupt behavior is affected by perceptions of other bureaucrats’ behavior in the organization. This echoes previous findings where individual refusals to engage in bribery in a highly corrupt context are perceived as futile It is also compatible with an understanding that corruption can be described as a social dilemma, where it is rational for actors to partake in corrupt behavior if ‘‘everybody else’’ is perceived as doing it.

This is most likely an important point as it is imperative to keep such considerations in mind when discussing ways to reform corrupt authorities. For instance, as accounts indicated, corruption at the top of this department may influence the behavior of street-level employees. Reform programs targeting bribery among local enforcement officers on the ground may need to consider strategies where corruption in top management is also dealt with.

Conclusions
This article focuses on a problem that has been somewhat overlooked when political theorists and empirically oriented scholars have analyzed the challenge of monitoring in the governance of CPRs. While research holds that corruption produces suboptimal law enforcement, studies seldom investigate the way this takes place, and the government agents enforcing regulations are rarely at the center of analysis. It is here argued that corruption in enforcing authorities risks leading to a situation of covenants with broken swords. In such a condition, bribery corrodes the effectiveness of sanctions for noncompliance.

Using original data this article outlines some of the mechanisms of this process and develops our understanding of how widespread bribery becomes an enforcement obstacle. It also points to improvements in the analytical depiction of the relationship between government inspectors and resource users under widespread bribery. Illustrating the destructive effects from corruption on governance of the commons, these findings resonate a big challenge for scholars and policy-makers. How to tackle the fact that CPRs around the world – for instance, the tropical forest reserves that are key in global efforts to store carbon and protect biodiversity – are monitored by institutions that are infested with corruption?

Future research therefore has several tasks on its agenda.

First, to get a better diagnosis of this problem, it would be worthwhile to analyze if this case is comparable to other contexts. The research on corruption in local governance of CPRs still relies on a scarce number of in-depth studies and may benefit from a comparative approach across CPR regimes with external enforcing authorities. A pertinent issue for comparative research would be to disentangle the institutional circumstances under which we may find a situation of covenants with broken swords.

Second, to get an improved understanding of cures for such situations, it is essential to explore if there are institutional remedies that are successful in reducing corruption. There is also a need to study existing or future alternatives for monitoring when corruption in enforcement authorities is widespread. It has been said that ‘‘when state agencies are involved in corruption and rent-seeking, bottom-up initiatives may improve monitoring’’.

A future discussion on governance of CPRs would profit from investigating alternatives or complements to strategies of state-run enforcement of the commons.

Marine pollution originating from purse seine and longline fishing vessels

Once in while we get in the news that some companies are fined for illegal waste dumping. In the pacific to my recollection is always in Pango Pango (American Samoa) last week an American based company was fined 1.6 millon USD, a few years ago NZ based Sanford endured the same issue in the same place.

Marine Pollution issues are “governed” by MARPOL 73/78 is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978. ("MARPOL" is short for marine pollution and 73/78 short for the years 1973 and 1978.)

It was developed by the International Maritime Organization in an effort to minimize pollution of the oceans and seas, including dumping, oil and air pollution. The objective of this convention is to preserve the marine environment in an attempt to completely eliminate pollution by oil and other harmful substances and to minimize accidental spillage of such substances.

From my time in the fishing boats and from the workbooks I see from SPC/FFA fisheries observers that include a Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 (See at the end of the post for an example). I assumed the issue must be substantial, even if nothing gets done with the findings (a bit like compliance issues). And unfortunately… I wasn’t wrong.

At last years WCPFC TCC (Technical and Compliance Committee) and group of SPREP lead by Kelsey Richardson presented a report on the issue. I quote it in the post… the original is here.

The report examines more than ten years of collected data on more than 10,000 pollution incidents by purse seine vessels and more than 200 pollution incidents by longline vessels within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 25 Pacific countries and territories, and in international waters. The report finds that 71% of the reported purse seine pollution incidents related to Waste Dumped Overboard; 16% to Oil Spillages and Leakages; and 13% to Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear.

When the category “Waste Dumped” was examined further; Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total purse seine pollution incidents (37%). Only 4% of the incidents occurred in International Waters, while the rest occurred in the EEZs of Papua New Guinea (44%), Kiribati (13%), the Federated States of Micronesia (12%), Solomon Islands (7%), Marshall Islands (6%), Nauru (6%), and 19 other countries and territories in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.

While based on limited data, the report finds evidence that pollution from fishing vessels, particularly purse seine vessels, in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is a serious problem and highlights the need for three initiatives:

1. Increased monitoring, reporting, and enforcement of pollution violations by all types of fishing vessels, especially longliners, which currently have a very low (5%) mandatoryobserver coverage;

2. A regional outreach and compliance assistance programme on marine pollution prevention for fishing vessel crews, business operators and managers; and

3. Improvements in Pacific port waste reception facilities to enable them to receive fishing vessel wastes on shore.

This report provides the first consistent and substantive documented evidence about the nature and extent of ocean-based marine pollution in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. These incidents were all reported by regional fisheries observers through use of the Secretariat of the Pacific Commission/Pacific Islands Foreign Fisheries Agency (SPC/FFA) Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.

The pollution reports are overwhelmingly biased to the purse seine fishery, due to high levels of observer coverage in the fishery, which is mandated by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Prior to 2009, observer coverage for the purse seine fishery was around 5-8%, increased to 20% in 2009, and to 100% required coverage from 2010 to the present (P. Williams, personal communication, March 18, 2015, WCPFC, 2009). By contrast, observer coverage of the approximately 3,000 longline vessels operating in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean is only 5% for the entire fishery as of 2012 (WCPFC, 2014).

There is also likely to be some bias in observer reporting particularly through some observers not reporting MARPOL issues, although the extent of this bias is not yet known.

 The report is structured in seven sections.

• Section I Introduction

• Section II provides a background on ocean-based marine pollution.

• Section III describes the history and structure of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6.

• Section IV describes and analyzes the pollution report data, including types, quantities and locations of pollution events.

• Section V importantly highlights that pollution incidents by fishing vessels are not isolated to the purse seine fishery, but there is limited information and data for pollution activities by other fisheries, particularly the longline fishery, due to extremely low to no observer coverage in other fisheries. Thus, the pollution data analyzed in this report likely represents only a portion or snapshot of total pollution incidents by fishing vessels throughout the region.

• Section VI addresses the need for revisions and updates to the current version of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6, particularly the need for updates that more clearly communicate revisions to MARPOL Annex V which entered into force in 2013.

• Section VII concludes the report and provides recommendations designed for a variety of stakeholders and policymakers to reduce incidents of marine pollution by fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The report ends with suggestions for further data analysis and research.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) is the strongest and most important international regulation to prevent sea-based sources of pollution, including pollution of oil (Annex I) and garbage (Annex V), arising from operational or accidental causes. Despite these regulations, there is limited actual monitoring of MARPOL, and, consequently, little information exists about illegal pollution activities by vessels at sea.

One study in Australia did find that in 1992 and 1993, at least one-third of fishing vessels with onboard observers did not comply with MARPOL regulations prohibiting the dumping of plastics overboard. Of the 14 Pacific island countries who are SPREP members, 11 are Contracting Parties to MARPOL Annexes I/II and V, and therefore have specific responsibilities to implement this important treaty to prevent pollution from ships, particularly in the forms of oil and garbage.

At the fourth SPC/FFA Tuna Fisheries Data Collection Committee in December 2000, SPREP submitted a request for fisheries observers to collect information on marine pollution. This resulted in the creation of the SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6. Form GEN-6 was designed by SPREP in partnership with SPC and FFA as a tool to monitor fishing vessel violations to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).

Pollution categories were created based on MARPOL’s Annexes I and V which provide regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil and garbage by ships, respectively. SPC is responsible for maintaining and managing all observer data including the Form GEN-6 data which it started collecting in 2004. In March, 2015 SPREP requested access to the GEN-6 data from SPC and were provided with more than 10 years of data from 2003 through 2015.

Form GEN-6 documents marine pollution incidents by fishing vessels in three categories: Waste Dumped Overboard, Oil Spillages and Leakages, and Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear. Each category has its respective subcategories, and revisions have occurred to improve reporting over the years, such as the addition of the category Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear in 2009. Subcategories reported here are from the most current form, revised in March, 2014. Subcategories under Waste Dumped Overboard include: Plastics, Metals, Waste Oil, Chemicals, and General Garbage. Subcategories under Oil Spillages and Leakages include: Vessel Aground/Collision, Vessel at Anchor/Berth, Vessel Underway, Land-based Source and Other. Subcategories under Abandoned or Lost Fishing Gear include Lost during fishing, Abandoned, or Dumped.

The form provides an area to report whether there was information posted on and around the vessel about compliance with the latest revisions to MARPOL, as an indicator of vessel and crew awareness of MARPOL regulations. It also includes a section for ‘Other comments’ where observers can add more details about the pollution event. The reverse side of the form provides notes which clarify definitions and reporting areas. At the bottom of the form it is clearly stated for the observer that under MARPOL regulations “It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of plastics into the sea at anytime; It is illegal for any vessel to discard any form of oil into the sea at anytime and It is illegal for any vessel to dump any form of rubbish into the sea within 12 nautical miles of the seashore.”

Since recent revisions to MARPOL Annex V entered into force in 2013, dumping of almost all garbage types which were previously allowed beyond the 12 nautical mile zone referenced by this note are now prohibited.

In addition to comments, observers are provided an area on the Form GEN-6 to describe the different types of pollution per category and material (subcategory), as well as to describe quantities. There are no standard categorical options for observers to report quantities of pollution and quantities are reported as written comments by observers, which complicates data analysis.

Table 1. Summary of Written Pollution Descriptions and Quantities as Reported by Observers

Figure 1 shows the pollution incidents mapped by the latitude and longitude positions given by observers at the time of reporting. The incidents are overlaid on a colorized map that shows purse seine activity from April, 2013 through March, 2014, using FFA fishing vessel databases and Automatic Identification System (AIS) vessel tracks. The high numbers of incidents in these countries’ EEZs, especially in Papua New Guinea, is consistent with the fact that these EEZ waters are also highly active purse seine fishing grounds.

Figure 1. Purse Seine Pollution Incidents Mapped by Latitude and Longitude

Seventy-one percent of the purse seine pollution incidents were documented in the form of Waste Dumped Overboard, 16% as Oil Spillages and Leakages and 13% as Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. When the subcategories under “Waste Dumped” were analyzed further and compared to total pollution incidents, Plastics were found to make up the largest portion of total pollution incidents at 37% followed by Metals (15%), Waste Oil (9%), General Garbage (8%), and Chemicals (2%).

See Figure 2 for a summary of the composition of purse seine pollution incidents by pollution types.

Figure 2. Percent of Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Pollution Types, 2003-2015

When total pollution incidents from 2002-2015 were compared against total observer trips during this time period (with and without reported pollution incidents), there was an average of 1.2 pollution incidents for every trip undertaken by an observer aboard a purse seine vessel during these years.

When the total number of pollution incidents was compared more selectively against only observer trips with reported pollution incidents, there was an average of 3.2 pollution incidents for every observer trip with a reported pollution incident during this time period also.

Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States

Seventy percent of the total pollution incidents from 2003-2015 were reported by purse seine fisheries observers aboard vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). Papua New Guinean flagged vessels comprised the greatest percentage of pollution incidents at 18%. It is interesting to note that more than 85% of the pollution incidents by Papua New Guinean flagged vessels occurred within the Papua New Guinea EEZ. By contrast, the next highest number of pollution incidents occurred by vessels flagged to Taiwan (16%), USA (15%), Korea (12%), Philippines (10%), Japan (10%), and China (8%).

Figure 4. Percent Purse Seine Pollution Incidents by Flag States, 2003-2015

Recommendations

1. Increase observer coverage and more data
Increased observer coverage aboard other fishing vessels such as longline vessels would provide more information about the amount and types of pollution by other fisheries, which fish more heavily in other areas of the Pacific not covered by the purse seine fishery. The current SPC/FFA Regional Observer Pollution Report Form GEN-6 is designed for reporting of pollution incidents aboard any type of fishing vessel. After necessary revisions and updates, covered in section VI, this would continue to be an appropriate form for use by an expanded observer program. The primary challenges anticipated for expansion of fisheries observers programs are financial, technical, and human resource capacity constraints, especially for some observer programs that are already struggling to meet full coverage requirements each year. Future efforts to decrease marine pollution from fishing vessels should include all fisheries and vessel types within the Western and Central Pacific region.

2. Reporting
SPREP should report the Form GEN-6 pollution incidents to member countries where the pollution incidents occurred and to the flag States whose vessels are responsible for the pollution violations. This will allow port States and flag States to follow up with appropriate enforcement mechanisms such as fines and penalties. SPREP should also report incidents to the Noumea Convention to be shared at the biennial Conference of Parties (COP), and to the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). Data and incidents will need to be further organized, quality controlled, and standardized to the IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) reporting format.

3. Enforcement
Opportunities may exist for more effective enforcement of MARPOL and other anti-pollution regulations. If provided with documentation of marine pollution incidents and violations, member countries and port States, particularly those with high numbers of violations in their EEZ waters, could penalize violators through fines and restrictions. Countries could also prohibit operational dumping of wastes as a condition of their fishing licenses, with associated penalties and restrictions if pollution incidents do occur. This is another method to prevent pollution incidents from vessels by holding vessels accountable to their license requirements. Effective enforcement programmes send a message to fishing vessels that marine pollution is not acceptable.

Some fishing vessels, operators and crew may engage in especially severe pollution activities with full knowledge that such activities are illegal and harmful to the marine environment. In the case of particularly egregious or criminal polluters, a list of vessels and operators could be kept for records to ensure against repeat offenders. If certain vessels and operators prove to be repeatedly engaging in pollution events, steeper fines or criminal proceedings could be levied. Vessels could also be added to a marine pollution ‘blacklist,’ similar to the WCPFC’s blacklist for vessels who have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) fishing activities (WCPFC, 2010). Such a blacklist system could both serve to stigmatize vessels and owners, in addition to providing opportunities for more stringent and focused monitoring and regulation to ensure that such vessels do not continue to engage in illegal activities. A marine pollution blacklist could then be compared to the WCPFC’s IUU blacklist, to determine range and regularity of illegal activities by particularly problematic vessels.

4. Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme
An Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should be developed within the Western and Central Pacific region through coordination and collaboration between regional organizations including SPREP, the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), fishing and maritime industry representatives and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in consultation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the IMO. The Outreach and Compliance Assistance Programme should inform ship masters, mariners, and ports about the proper manner for disposal of all garbage, wastes and pollution types generated onboard fishing vessels in the Western and Central Pacific region and the adjacent high seas areas.

5. Invest in expanded capacity of port waste reception facilities
Most Pacific island countries and territories have few if any waste reception facilities for ships at their ports, and many of those which are in place are inadequate to meet the needs of ships using those ports. Adequate reception facilities are defined by the IMO as those which “mariners use; fully meet the needs of the ships regularly using them; do not provide mariners with a disincentive to use them; and contribute to the improvement of the marine environment”. The facilities must also “allow for the ultimate disposal of ships’ wastes to take place in an environmentally appropriate way”. This lack of port waste reception facilities could provide further incentives for ships to dump waste at sea rather than store their wastes without anywhere to later responsibly dispose of them.

Given these challenges, the locations and availability of existing port waste reception facilities should be clearly communicated to all fishing vessels, with input from the IMO. SPREP has taken important first steps in this area through its Regional Reception Facilities Plan, which recognizes five Pacific shipping hubs (Apia, Suva, Port Moresby, Noumea, and Papeete) as regional centers for safe offloading of wastes from ships.

Areas for Further Data Analysis and Research

1. Specific pollution categories
Further data analysis should be undertaken of the specific pollution categories Waste Dumped Overboard; Oil Spillages and Leakages; and Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear. For example, an investigation into Oil Spillages and Leakages would likely offer a better understanding of how to improve data reporting fields and specific drop down menus to standardize observer descriptions and quantities of discharge during pollution incidents, in addition to a better understanding of conditions associated with spillages and leakages, and the number of oil spills which occur in fishing grounds. An investigation into the data collected on Abandoned, Lost, or Dumped Fishing Gear could include amounts of each subcategory which are lost, abandoned, or dumped, and types of gear per category, such as remnants of fishing gear discarded after repairs, and Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs).

2. Examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents involving FADs
Within the comments and pollution description sections of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear category, numerous reports included the deliberate dumping of FADs either whole, discarding of damaged FAD nets, or retrieval of the GPS buoys before dumping of the old FAD. Lost or discarded FADs in the marine environment can be harmful to marine life through ghost fishing, entanglement and acting as habitat for the spread of invasive species, and have the potential to eventually wash ashore to coastlines and reefs as marine debris. An area for further data analysis is an examination of the Abandoned, Lost or Dumped Fishing Gear incidents that involve FADs.

3. Survey fishermen, crews, vessel operators, port authorities and observers about causes behind and drivers for pollution incidents
Surveys could be conducted of fishermen, crew, vessel operators, port authorities and observers to better understand the drivers of pollution incidents from fishing vessels, and identify solutions that address underlying causes. For example, interviews with and surveys of crews and vessel operators could explore motivations for dumping of wastes at sea, such as issues around convenience, time, and costs associated with disposal on shore. Interviews with and surveys of port authorities could investigate adequacy of port facilities to receive wastes from vessels, human resource capacity constraints, and time pressures to process vessels quickly through ports.

4. Identify appropriate laws, regulations and procedures by which countries and territories can monitor and enforce penalties against pollution incidents by fishing vessels
Enforcement of pollution incidents will largely depend upon existing national laws and regulations within port States where the incidents occur. Procedures for differing levels of enforcement will need to be identified within national contexts, which may be more complicated than prosecution based upon an observer’s report alone. Barriers to enforcement specific to different States can additionally be identified, as well as challenges experienced by vessels which may act as barriers to compliance. For example, vessels may only carry gear they are licensed for, and might be hesitant to retrieve abandoned fishing gear if it doesn’t meet their licensing requirements.

5. Overlay of purse seine marine pollution incidents with marine ecosystem information
Latitude and longitude data from the pollution incidents could be overlaid with regional and country specific marine ecosystem information such as ecologically and biologically important or unique areas, and migration routes for highly migratory, threatened, or endangered species. These overlays, such as between abandoned nets which can result in ghost-fishing and wildlife entanglement and highly migratory species like whales and turtles, could be used to show possible repercussions of the pollution incidents upon surrounding ecosystems and wildlife.

6. Fish sampling for plastic ingestion
Fish species consumed by Pacific islanders or sold commercially could be sampled for plastic ingestion to link plastic pollution with potential socioeconomic impacts, as much of the Pacific region is dependent upon healthy fish stocks for livelihoods and food security. This could identify an area of potential linkage between plastic waste dumped at sea and within fishing grounds by fishing vessels and ingestion by marine wildlife and fish later sold in commercial markets.

This is what a Gen 6 looks like