Tuna in the WCPFC, Stock Status and Challenges

A couple of weeks ago, when I was in the Pacific Tuna Forum in Fiji, I posted about the presentations I was keen to hear and see.  Today I present Shelton Harley's one, he is the Principal Fisheries Scientist (Stock Assessment and Modelling) of SPC's Oceanic Fisheries Programme. Shelton is a very clever man at the top of its game, and equally important, a good communicator of the science and status of the stocks.

I will attempt to pass some of his message, that was quite strong and cautionary, most of the images and graphs are self explanatory.

2014 was the largest in tuna fishery catches in history 1.96 Million Tonnes of skipjack. To make sense of this number, see above: If we were to put all the skipjack caught nose to tail, the line would extend almost half a million km... enough to go around 100000 km beyond the dark side of the moon.... that image blew my little brain off into pieces.

Every year more and more Skipjack get  added to the statistics while the rest has been quite stable... but for how much more?

The Pacific catches are way more than all other oceans combined... just some Kiribati and PNG and you have more than the whole Indian ocean. This numbers are staggering.

The usual graphs that are shown, have green (is all good), orange (we need to take measures) and red (overfishing)... this time he believes that that green gives a fake sense of security... hence he circumscribed the statatus of the healtiest stocks to a smaller oval of where the fishery operates at good biological and economical returns. under that view, even skipjack looks borderline. 

Hence, the overall picture is not very good for the other pelagics

Purse Seine fishing is increasing it efficiency , and there is an increase in the number of sets. Skipjack biomass is going down and catch rates are going up.  

Sonar FADs (Fish Aggregation Devices) are the biggest game changer, in the past the vessel  had to go to their FADs and then see if there was fish around it; with this technology fleet managers from the desk somewhere can direct the vessels to the FADs that are showing signal. Also helicopters are back in the fleet as there is lot of replacement vessels.  New purse seiners are more powerful and more efficient. (And many are subsidised as i suggested before) 

Of course this impact Yellowfin, as is to be seen in the 3 maps or relative abundance above. Juvenile Yellowfin associates to Skipjack and is caught with it, as purseine is not really a discriminatory fishing method.

Hence the take home message is sobering, we have long reached or exceeded long term sustainable catch levels. The harvesting at such level is also felt in nations that do not catch Skipjack, as there are ecosystems implications that are not well studied yet.

The solutions to these issues are not new:

Unfortunately, the precautionary words that he has, seems to fall in the deaf hears of most DWFN and some Pacific Islands decision makers. But good on him for bringing these issues up in public forums.

I always maintained that the region is very lucky to have organisations like SPC, that can attract and maintain scientists of Shelton's caliber. Their analytical capacity and the level of the mathematical modelling that guys like him do is quite amazing. Total respect to him.

20th anniversary of FAO's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,

Is the 20th anniversary of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, a unique document that is not always valued as it should.  FAO media unit interviewed some worldwide key stakeholders on their views about the importance of the Code of Conduct and what they see as the main challenges to overcome to fully attain the objectives of the Code of Conduct over the next 20 years.

By some reason they also asked me... This is how I sound in my mother language. 

During the FAO Expert Consultation I was invited in Rome in July, FAO asked my view on the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the challenges it faces.

Basically I say that for me, the code is reference point that we all should mantain as yardstick in whatever area of fisheries we work. We need to have a "masterplan set of guidelines" and that is what the code ought to be.

I also say that the key challenge that has faced and continues facing is exactly that! We need to keep inthe forefront of whatever we as the "meta language" we use, and is not always done.

What the code "is" and "do" is explained in the video below by my ex colleagues and friends from FAO.

What is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries? Is a introductory document to the code has been translated to most languages of the world, and I'm happy to see that includes many of the Pacific Islands ones, click on the links for versions in Cook Islands Maori, Fijian, Taetae ni Kiribati, PNG Tok Pisin, Solomons Pijin, Samoan, Tongan, Tuvaluan, and Vanutu Bislama.

A Fish Called Development

Recently came across this very good article about fisheries subsidies (a topic that normally hits me in the guts) by some heavy weights in terms of international trade Pascal Lamy (ex DG of WTO), Oby Ezekwesili (cofounder of Transparency International) and José María Figueres (ex President of Costa Rica).

Based on 2006 figures

This also ties up with the figure above, that notes that the global cost of fisheries subsidies is greater than the cost of IUU fishing.

The article presents good figures and arguments, hence is worth reading:

The just-adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are expected to herald the start of a new era in global development, one that promises to transform the world in the name of people, the planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership. But there is an ocean of difference between promising and doing. And, while global declarations are important – they prioritize financing and channel political will – many of today’s pledges have been made before.

In fact, whether the SDGs succeed will depend to a significant degree on how they influence other international negotiations, particularly the most complex and contentious ones. And an early test concerns a goal for which the Global Ocean Commission actively campaigned: to “conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development.”

When political leaders meet at the tenth WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December, they will have an opportunity to move toward meeting one of that goal’s most important targets: prohibition of subsidies that contribute to overfishing and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by no later than 2020.

This is not a new ambition; it has been on the WTO’s agenda for many years, and it has been included in other international sustainable development declarations. But, even today, countries spend $30 billion a year on fisheries subsidies, 60% of which directly encourages unsustainable, destructive, or even illegal practices. The resulting market distortion is a major factor behind the chronic mismanagement of the world’s fisheries, which the World Bank calculates to have cost the global economy $83 billion in 2012.

In addition to concerns about finances and sustainability, the issue raises urgent questions about equity and justice. Rich economies (in particular Japan, the United States, France, and Spain), along with China and South Korea, account for 70% of global fisheries subsidies. These transfers leave thousands of fishing-dependent communities struggling to compete with subsidized rivals and threaten the food security of millions of people as industrial fleets from distant lands deplete their oceanic stocks.

Global Ocean Commission data (not sure about the accuracy of the data, in no way I believe that China and PNG are in the same bracket)

On the high seas, the distortion is even larger. According to fisheries economists, subsidies by some of the world’s richest countries are the only reason large-scale industrial fishing in areas beyond coastal countries’ 200-mile exclusive economic zones is profitable. But fish do not respect international boundaries, and it is estimated that 42% of the commercial fish being caught travel between countries’ exclusive zones and the high seas. As a result, industrial fishing far from shore undermines developing countries’ coastal, mostly artisanal, fisheries.

Eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020 is not only crucial for conserving the ocean; it will also affect our ability to meet other goals, such as our promises to end hunger and achieve food security and to reduce inequality within and among countries.

The credibility of both the WTO and the newly adopted SDGs will be on the line in Nairobi. The Global Ocean Commission has put forward a clear three-step program to eliminate harmful fishing subsidies. All that is needed is for governments finally to agree to put an end to the injustice and waste that they cause.

Fortunately, there are encouraging signs. Nearly 60% of the WTO’s membership supports controlling fisheries subsidies, with support from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of developing countries – together with the EU’s contribution to improve transparency and reporting – giving new momentum to the effort.

Among the initiatives being put forward in advance of the Nairobi meeting is the so-called “NZ +5 proposal.” Co-sponsored by New Zealand, Argentina, Iceland, Norway, Peru, and Uruguay, the plan would eliminate fisheries subsidies that affect overfished stocks and contribute to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

The Global Ocean Commission urges the remaining 40% of the WTO’s members – and especially the biggest players currently blocking this process – to accept the relatively modest proposals on the table. A sustainable future for our planet and its oceans depend on it.

The original is here

Is it illegal fishing, unregulated fishing or crime?

I have never meet Mercedes Rosello, other than by tweeter (sign of the times) but she knows her stuff very well!, and has been very kind to my work/blog in more than one occasion. As far as I know she she is a PhD researcher and runs House of the Ocean (a not-for-profit consultancy) and a blog (the IUU fishing blog). Her more recent piece is very informative in terms of the legal perspectives of the "concept of IUU fishing". She kindly allowed to "re blog" (is that a real word?) her content. I recommend you read her piece, as I just pick up some quotes from her blog.

some of 100 scenarios....

The first global instrument to introduce the expression IUU fishing was the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA), a non-binding international tool. 

Known as a toolbox for States to guide them in the fight against undesirable fishing practices, the IPOA is extensively referenced as the source of the definition of IUU fishing, contained in its paragraph 3. This definition has now been integrated in treaty law, the legal regimes of several States, and European Union legislation. Yet, despite its popularity, the term is controversial due to its lack of legal clarity.

Rather than understanding the term IUU fishing as a single tool with which to assess conduct, it is useful to think of it as three distinct but overlapping categories. Each category presents a different perspective on undesirable fishing activities. Except for the first one, which is all-encompassing in its descriptive simplicity, the categories are not comprehensive. Further, they do not comprise a set of standards on which to judge the illegality of a fishing operation, or the conduct of a State in respect of its international obligations. In this respect, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement is better equipped to deal with such tasks.

First and second categories: illegal and unreported fishing

The first category, that of illegal fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.1 of the IPOA. It is a straightforward description of what makes a fishery conduct a wrong in law at the domestic and international levels.

Firstly, domestically: when the conduct of a vessel (a more accurate reference would be to the person or persons responsible for its operation) contravenes applicable domestic law, it is illegal. Secondly, internationally: certain conducts by vessels may demonstrate a shortfall by the State responsible for their control in the observance of its international legal obligations.  When this occurs, there may be an international wrong.

Ultimately, however, whether any illegality has indeed occurred will need to be determined by a relevant authority. Domestically, this may be an administrative authority or a court of law. Internationally, a tribunal with jurisdiction.

A second category, that of unreported fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.2 of the IPOA. Domestically, it refers to vessel conducts that contravene the specific laws that regulate the reporting of fishing activity or catch. Internationally, paragraph 3.2 goes on to refer to activities that contravene the rules of regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) in areas of the high seas where they have regulatory competence. The reference to a contravention implies that the subject (a State) must have agreed to abide by those rules. If such State permits a vessel in its register to operate in a manner that is inconsistent with those rules, the State may be committing an international wrong. Hence, domestically as well as internationally, unreported fishing is a sub-category of illegal fishing. Curiously, other than RFMO rules no reference is made in the IPOA to the contravention of international laws that oblige States to report on fishery data. Given this incompleteness, unreported fishing has little value as a legal category beyond national and regional management contexts.

These categories describe what illegality looks like, but they do not act as legal yardsticks. Domestically, the illegality of a fishing activity can only be determined by way of assessment of the conduct of an operator against the applicable municipal laws by a competent authority. These laws may vary from country to country. However, before the birth of the IPOA, the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA) had already typified a number of fisheries activities that it referred to as serious violations. State parties to the FSA are required to address those violations in their respective domestic legal regimes. The non-exhaustive list in FSA Article 21.11 includes conducts such as fishing without authorisation, failing to report catch, using destructive fishing gear, or obstructing an investigation by concealing evidence, to name a few. Hence, in FSA State parties at least, those will be the conducts that will be restricted or outlawed – they will be the illegal fishing conducts to which the IPOA refers or, at least, some of them.  

However, the regulatory influence of the FSA does not extend to non-parties, or to the conservation and management of stock that is neither straddling nor highly migratory. Where non-transboundary stock is located in the EEZ of a coastal State, it is left to the discretion of that State to determine what fishing activities should be restricted or outlawed. It will need to do this within the general parameters of international law, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other treaties to which it is bound, including bilateral agreements.

Whether illegal fishing conducts may also be typified as criminal will depend on the discretion of each State. The FSA does not oblige State parties to criminalise any fishery behaviours, only to address certain conducts as serious violations. Most countries choose to do this by way of non-criminal public law and administrative measures. Currently, illegal fishing is not considered a transnational crime in accordance with the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, and therefore States are not obliged to treat it as such. Further, the IPOA discourages this, considering the rigours of criminal law in terms of proof and process too onerous.

It is, however, noteworthy that some States have chosen to criminalise some specific conducts associated to illegal fishing practices. In other cases, strategy documents have referred to illegal fishing as a crime, but the relevant legislators have failed to adopt the necessary laws to ensure criminalisation in their domestic regimes.

Finally, a domestic instance of illegal fishing – whether criminal or not – will be of little significance internationally unless an international legal standard of conduct has also been contravened by a State with responsibility. At the time of writing, such legal standards are principally found in general international law, UNCLOS, the 1995 Compliance Agreement and, in respect of straddling and highly migratory stock, the FSA. Whilst several paragraphs of the IPOA have substantially defined some of those rules, its voluntary nature makes it unsuitable as a yardstick against which the conduct of a State can be assessed in order to determine its possible illegality.

Not just inspecting...

Third category: unregulated fishing

The third category, unregulated fishing, is set out in paragraph 3.3 of the IPOA. It has two distinct prongs:

The first one refers to activities carried out inside areas and for stocks under the regulatory competence of RFMOs, in a manner that is inconsistent with their conservation rules. Such activities must be carried out by vessels without nationality, or by vessels flying the flag of a State that has not agreed to be bound by the rules that RFMO (for States who have agreed to this, the activity contravening the rules would be categorised as illegal fishing, as explained above). In effect, this label is slightly misleading, because the sea areas and stocks to which it refers are regulated by RFMOs, notwithstanding the States or vessels’ choice to disregard such regulation.

The second prong refers to activities carried out in a manner inconsistent with the flag State’s international obligations in respect of high seas areas or stocks not affected by RFMO conservation or management rules. Hence, the label unregulated fishing here refers to the absence of RFMO rules.

Although superficial reading of paragraph 3 of the IPOA may suggest that unregulated fishing is an entirely separate category from illegal fishing and is therefore legal, this is not the case. As paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA subsequently clarifies, unregulated fishing will also be illegal if it is inconsistent with the flag State’s international obligations. Beyond obligations acquired in the institutional context of RFMOs, States also have conservation and cooperation obligations derived from general international law and applicable treaty law.

However, the protection offered to those ocean areas and stocks by international law is generally considered thin and unclear in practical terms, making assessments of legality particularly difficult. This is specially so in cases where States have not agreed to important treaties such as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or the 1993 Compliance Agreement, or where no other binding rules (such as those that may be established in a bilateral agreement) exist.

Hence, unregulated fishing is a wide spectrum category comprising high seas activities that are always pernicious insofar as they undermine conservation and cooperation efforts, but whose illegality may be uncertain in accordance with the current international framework. The value of this category lies not in its ability to facilitate an assessment of what may constitute legal or illegal conduct, but in its usefulness to ascribe a negative value to certain fishing activities irrespective of their illegality. This can be practical for a State or group of States who have adopted certain conservation rules, and have to deal with other States who have not done so.

The conserving States may be reluctant to commence international proceedings against the non-conserving States for many reasons, ranging from the political undesirability of engagement in a high profile dispute, to cost, to lack of confidence in the international legal framework, to name a few. In this context, such States may opt for the deployment of trade measures against non-conserving States. Amongst the advantages of this process are the presence of incentives, as well as the avoidance of the rigours associated to international legal process.

Subject to a number of procedural conditions, if the products from the non-conserving States have been captured in a manner that is detrimental to conservation and are excluded by the conserving States on the basis of a non-discriminatory process, they may be considered compliant with the rules of the World Trade Organisation and be, therefore, viewed as legitimate. 

Conclusion

The ‘hold all’ composite term IUU Fishing is instrumental in ascribing a negative value to a wide range of fishing and fishery support activities whose illegality is uncertain in order to enhance the accountability of operators and States through trade measures. Beyond this, paragraph 3 of the IPOA does not constitute a proper standard against which the conduct of an operator or a State can be legally assessed by a relevant administrative or judicial authority. Its voluntary nature makes it unsuitable for this task in any event. Appropriately therefore, the IPOA does not list actual behaviours by private actors that States can then domestically class as illegal.

By contrast, the FSA does contain such list in respect of fishery activities targeting straddling and highly migratory species. The list in its Article 21.11 should be replicated, expanded and changed where necessary to be made applicable to non-transboundary stocks across domestic regimes, and in the context of bilateral fishery agreements. This, plus the treaty’s integral management of RFMO conservation consent by State parties makes its adoption and implementation essential in the management of illegal fishing and the delimitation of unregulated fishing to cases where there is no RFMO regulation.

The FSA is, therefore, an essential tool in the regulation of fisheries and the eradication of illegal practices, and States should work hard to foster its generalised adoption alongside the adoption of national plans of action and the Port State Measures Agreement.

PNG earns its way off the EU yellow card (and finally Taiwan gets one!)

In a move that was expected (and truly deserved) the EU lifted the "yellow card" it had on Papua New Guinea since June 2014. 

IUU fishing is actually mostly about people, cultures and greed... fish is just what they do. (the body languages in this scene tells a lot)

The EU's press release that announced it recognises that PNG has "amended their legal frameworks to combat IUU fishing, strengthened their sanctioning systems, improved monitoring and control of the fleets".

The good news touches me at personal level, if you follow this blog you must have noted that I have written about working there (here, here, here and here). Over the last 18 months I have worked many times in the country supporting their strengthening actions, and I have been a front row witness of the personal and systemic transformation of the National Fisheries Authority (NFA) staff in charge of the Catch Certification Scheme and its associated Fish Legality and Accountancy controls. I know is very rewarding to them (and me) to feel that they have helped pushing their country off a sticky situation (they are VERY proud people).

Professionally for me is a great satisfaction, there is no template on "how" the system should work... The EU in this area wants outcomes and does not rule how you get there. So is up to countries to come up with systems that provide those results.. the few model available are all in developed countries with vastly different realities than PNG. In PNG we say that if something works here, then there is no excuses not to work anywhere else... (listen to that Philippines, Korea, China and Taiwan!) 

So I'm very thankful to NFA, their management and staff, as well to my contractors FFA/DevFish II, for having trusted my vision and the unorthodox development of my systems. We delivered the results expected by the EU, but from a more efficient exporting country perspective and not from a market imposition. 

Over the years I made "tru" friends in PNG, which is in many ways a 2nd home for me in the Pacific. I'm immensely proud of the people have I worked with, because it has been 100% their own merit, drive and pride that got the yellow card lifted.  Good'n'ya wantoks! 

Furthermore, I'm happy to see the EU tackling the bigger guys too! I knew that Taiwan was in the pipeline since April, but is good to see it happening! 

I have yet to see (in over 15 years doing this work in the pacific) a Taiwanese flagged or owned (even if flagged in Vanuatu) longliner that is in full compliance and that reports their logsheets in time (perhaps they are... I have just not seen them). So hopefully they do some deep work like the one done in PNG!

Taiwanese longlining logsheets... works of art...

The Southern Albacore tuna crisis

The declining status of the Southern Albacore Fishery has been well documented. Even in its more limited stance; the fishery in Fijian waters that is under a MSC certification, may not be able to pass the next certification (as well there are no way to pay for it, without the catches) 

Chinese Longliners in Suva Harbour (Beautiful image for a sad reality)

While the reasons are various, the main culprits are overcapacity, subsidies and the failure of the regimentation and controls in the high seas (a responsibility of the WCPFC)

Is quite sad, as it used to be a profitable fishery that employed mostly Fijians. Unfortunately the concessions and subsidies provided to the Chinese fleet throw the situation into the doldrums.

See below a press release by FTBOA (Fiji Tuna Boats Owners Association) quite self-explanatory

The Impact of the EU yellow cards in the Pacific

It was a professional and personal challenge to give a talk in regards the “Impact of the EU Yellow cards in the Pacific” at the Pacific Tuna Forum in Fiji this week.

The EU made a game changer with its IUU regulation by denying market access to those products that did not arrived to the border with a “official guarantee” of the flag state of the catching vessel/s attesting on the legality of the catch. Conceptually that is just awesome.

I always recognised and supported that principle, my “beef” with it has been with the practicalities of the Catch Certification Scheme (the tool the regulation uses), the design of the certificate, the fact that is paper based and the backwards (from market to vessel) approach taken less than year after it was 1st introduced (when initially was forwards vessel to market). The fishing industry dynamics and its operational complexities where in existence before the 2010 implementation of the IUU regulation, hence operationally the legislation would have benefited from a much deeper study and understanding of the reality, prior to trying to capture it under a substandard scheme.

My work has been always aimed to make it better from a operational perspective but not to abolish the concept… In fact I’ve dedicated most of the last 5 years of my professional life to help countries to comply with it, by working around many of the operationally frustrating challenges of the scheme while at the same time strengthening the "in country" tools required so the legislation key objective (minimise IUU fishing) is not lost.  

Slide 1

Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later (no that one notice much change in the quality and content of their catch certs). The latest country under this process is Thailand, but interestingly even if they get red carded, the impact in the tuna world would be minimal… because the “ban” in exports to the EU will only affect tuna caught by Thai flagged vessels… and paradoxically there are none. The biggest exporter of can tuna in the does not operate a tuna fleet (welcome to one of the many twists of the fishing world). 

In any case, I decided immediately that there was no point of dwelling in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalysed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme. And I’m happy to say, we got plenty of positives to report.

Slide 2

The 1st step we took was to foster the understanding of what this whole issue was about, because in reality not many people in the region (and the world I may add) really understood what it was about. The training provided by the EU prior of its implementation was minimal and quite poorly structured (one session for the whole pacific in New Caledonia, based on a powerpoint that just copy and pasted the regulation – I still have it! – as a trainer I can assure that is the best way to loose an audience). Followed by the late publication of a “handbook” which provides guidelines and answers on the implementation of the EU IUU Regulation is a lengthy and wordy document and it was written before the implementation of EU IUU Regulation itself, so many scenarios are not contemplated and the substantial changes of interpretation (such as the Weight in the Catch Certificate - WICC notes 1&2), make the document, while well intended, of very limited use.

Slide 3

For me the analogy of the iceberg fits the situation, what we only see is the tip: the certificate (the-unfortunately- piece of paper). But what really matters is what is below… what I called the “fish legality” and the “fish accountancy”, so all this needed to be strengthen and systematized, so the tip is meaningful.

Hence was very important to develop and standardize a training program that dealt with the conceptual issues first and later with the scenarios that the regulation requires to be contemplated, and FFA's DevFish II programme contracted me for that.

Slide 4

The Certificate itself is a complex document with a multi-layered structure of responsibilities that do not always correlate chronologically with reality, hence detailed explanations and a standardization of the way the information is to be presented was required. These also had to be expanded indirectly to foreign flag states that operate in the region as to maintain “a system” that is homogenous trough the operational chain. The “quality” of foreign certificates was a constant source of frustration for many of the officers we worked – how come they send us this shitty documents and they are not yellow carded? Was a frequent question, that I had no answers to provide.

Slide 4

The next element was to train on the content and scenarios presented by the regulations and understand which ones applied to each case in each island country. This was not easy, because besides the difference in the industries in each country it had to consider as well the interactions in between the Catch Certification, the Health Certification (normally under Health Authorities) and Certification of Origin (under Customs)… so not easy task.

Furthermore we had to consider the scenario of the transhipment countries, as this countries are part of the system but not initially contemplated (not “notified” using the EU IUU lingo) but have an important role without getting any direct benefits (other than fees for use of their ports), as this countries are not allowed to trade fish with the EU because they lack of sanitary authorisation. As in the other cases, all this knowledge had to be built from scratch.

Slide 5

Initially we had to understand how to re-structure the traditional view of MCS into a more holistic approach. Fish does not become illegal during processing, is caught illegally. Therefore if we stop it before landing, then a big chunk of the problem is gone… but then we also need to stop the laundering of illegal fish with legal fish. So we introduce the concept of the "Unloading Authorization Code" (UAC) and Fish Accountancy to link with MCS.

The concepts “mixes” two basic elements; the requirements (in one way or another) of Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)  and a Key Data Element needed to follow a landing through the value chain. Under PSMA, vessels have to seek advance approval to enter a port, sufficient to allow adequate time for the port state to examine the information provided. Hence the information required needs to be provided and assessed to facilitate a decision as to whether or not to deny or grant entry. If an “authorization” is given, either the master or the vessel’s representative can present the authorization to the authorities when the vessel arrives in port. 
This “authorization” will need to be “coded” (on some form or another) as to be recorded in one way or another as to be able to review and accounted and potentially crosschecked if it is deemed necessary. So why not simply use this Unloading Authorization Code (UAC) as the tool for the initial Key Data Element required for any Catch Documentation Scheme or traceability analysis along the value chain from landing to consumer (or wherever it is needed or most cost effective). 

Furthermore, most fishing vessels operators (company own or independent) do maintain a trip or voyage coding systems in order to monitor logistics, fuel consumption, crewing rosters, general costs and more importantly “final payments”(which are in the form of a % of the catch volumes, species composition and values) are to the traced back to that landing, minus the fix costs. Therefore the concept already exists in the sector, so this UAC becomes a better and standardised use of an existing tool.

The "Process" associated to the use design and use of the UAC is as follow:

Arrival notification
The “authorization” to land is assessed by the fisheries authorities in the port in a compliance response to a series of requirements that are decided by the authorities of the Port State in relationship to its own legislation and requirements or those of an RFMO, international agreements, etc. The scope of the requirements can be arranged in accordance to a pre determined risk index based on the characteristics of the vessels requiring port access. 

As an example: domestic flagged vessels fishing in the Port State EEZ with local VMS and observers may be at the lowest risk tier (i.e green). Foreign vessels with local licenses, foreign charter vessels, domestic vessels fishing in other EZZ or the High Seas, Fish Carriers, vessels with patchy observer coverage, indirect VMS access, etc. are in middle risk tier (yellow). Finally, foreign flagged vessels with no direct VMS access by the coastal or port state, or no observer coverage or vessels identified as a Vessels of Interest (VoI) by any country or RFMO are singled as high risk vessels (red).

As noted, the risk profile of the vessel defines the required time for arrival notification (12, 24, 48 hrs), plus the amount and depth of the information to be provided by the vessel intending to land. In considering the assessment an UAC can be provided and the vessel is allowed to dock with intention to unload. In instances where it is not provided the vessel may be allowed to dock for humanitarian or force majeure reasons but not to land. 

The structure and nature of the UAC is up to the Port State or RFMO to decide, but it is important that it is inclusive in the information it holds, and in principle is to be an integral part of relational database such as a Fisheries Information Management System (FIMS). 

The UAC “design” should include for elements such as:  country identification, trip and port traceability, fishing effort measurements, observer reporting, etc. and it should have inter-operability with the vessels operators trip/voyaging coding systems, and if needed with the maritime authorities. Interestingly, this inter-operability of the vessels operators and authorities UAC can be beneficial to crews and captains in case of payment disputes or safety at sea issues arising from the maritime authorities.

Inspections
The risk profile and compliance level during the previous step defines the need for inspection of the landing and the expected % of yearly inspections decided by the port state, i.e. 25% of landings for green tier vessels, 50% for yellow and 100% for red.

The decision of whether an inspection should take place needs to be based on the risk profile of the vessel (if red) and the % of inspections that have already taken place (yellow, green) or issues arising from the documentation presented. If an inspection is performed, then the UAC is recorded in the inspection forms in order to provide for future verification if required and for compliance performance monitoring. Ideally the Inspection forms are digitalized on a tablet type device and the data enters the FIM is real time under the specific UAC of that operation. If the results of the inspection shows inconsistencies or non compliances (and based on the extent of these) the landing may be authorized under bond or denied. Then the UAC associated to that landing is “flagged” into the FIMS in order to interrupt any further movements or transactions associated to that landing until the issues are resolved.

Unloading
If it is decided that an inspection is necessary then the results, if compliant, will provide the permission to unload (or transship). This landing could be conditional, as explained before (under bond). If an inspection does not take place the LAC then becomes the “de facto” authorization for unloading.

In the case of transshipments, the UAC is attached to the catch estimates (from logsheets) or real (if hanging scales are used) and reflect the captains/mates receipt or any the document the volumes being transshipped. The UAC will then accompany the transshipping documentation (printed) and if the receiving country has an MoU with the port state or is part of the same RFMO, then they can potentially log-in on to a common FIMS to cross check the legality and estimated volumes of the landing and to add their own information.  If landing or transshipments are partial (and this practice should be discouraged by principle) then the UAC would need to be “partitioned” into lots associated to the original UAC with this retained as the main reference and the lots can be incorporated into FIMS. Any volumes not landed should be considered as a “lot” in the same manner as the landed ones.

Reception or weight in
At the coosltore or processing facility reception or anywhere where the official sorting and weight in of the fish is done the UAC “marks” the volumes in the FIMS and into the receiving operator’s inventory system.  If the whole fish is loaded into containers for direct export then the weight in is to be recorded under the UAC on the FIMS and the volumes containerized discounted of the total volumes recorded that that landing. That exported lot would still be associated to the UAC as in the case of partial landings or transshipments.

The private operators receiving the fish could either load all the data on a FIMS portal or maintain their own inventory and traceability systems that could either be “absorbed” by FIMS or audited by fisheries authorities. In any case final volumes by species would be incorporated into FIMS for the UAC.Companies normally use lot systems based on the species, size and vessel of origin. All these parameters can be linked to the UAC under FIMS or their own inventory and traceability management system.

Processing establishments and cool stores 
Most responsible MCS systems include Mass Balance evaluation (fish landed = fish in storage + fish processed or sold) on the establishments, by the fisheries authorities. These evaluations starts with the UAC of all fish received for a period of time and what is presently in the inventory. The officers for example may chose a minimum of 5 different pallets/boxes/bins to do a full traceability exercise and check that each of those pallets/boxes/bins (raw material as well as processed fish) are registered on company documentation and that can be traced to the UAC.

Volumes withdraw from storage for processing are “discounted” from the original landed volumes in relation to the UAC, hence each withdrawal would leave a smaller volume left from the original until the landing is exhausted. Obviously same principle applies to whole fish withdrawals.  Processed product volumes will be inventoried under the same UAC taking in to consideration the processing ratios (conversion factors) associated to that type of products.

Final product Sales and Exports - Catch Certificates
Prior to the product leaving the premises Catch Certificates (domestic or market specific) are prepared based on all the operations relating to the original UAC (or UACs in the case of mixed products). The referencing and traceability to the specific UAC plus the fish volumes accountancy through the value chain becomes the basis and condition “sine qua non” for a catch certificate, either paper or electronic.

Slide 6

That leave us with the “how much” Fish Accountancy  knowing this has 2 benefits… we know how much is being caught, which management importance, and then we can record those volumes as the “initial deposit”, and by this we avoid chances of “fish laundering” from any potential illegal landing (just as any financial systems deals with money laundering)

We use the volumes unloaded as the initial deposit from which extractions will be made from, and the different species unloaded become “different currencies” on a same deposit. Then a traceability scheme in the system allow us to follow the “extractions” of different currencies trough time either by whole fish sales or processing. Furthermore, processing losses get dealt by the system like currency exchange (1kg of fish = 400g of loins).

Finally, we “mass balance” each sale/export against that original “deposit” until the volume is exhausted, and no more fish can be attributed to that unload. If some one wants to export fish he “didn’t” land… then we know something is happening there and the inspectors can focus on them.

Slide 7

As you imagine, there is lot of developmental and technical complexity behind these systems… PNG took the lead in developing this concept… even if they don’t have the money that a bank have! Furthermore the system is understandable by proxy to the banking system and “fair”… as there are no “interpretations”… is just about balancing volumes… “fish in” vs. “fish out” 

Slide 8

All this took work place at a big cost for the countries and refer only to one of the elements highlighted on the Yellow cards, so a series of other issues (new legislation, IUU NPOAs, VDS allocation, etc)  had to be worked as well. 

After almost 2 years, we all agree we know much better now what is expected than before and we tried to make the system work in our favour. Even if there are some big issues on pipeline to be worked out... But reality is that for small Islands states, it is always a "catch up" game... They read the rule book while running behind the ball.

Slide 9

I personally think that a lot of the initial "yellow card" issues came up out of personal conflicts in between the parts, at the end of the day the decisions are made by people and justified by paper, and there were a lot of entrenched positions (attacker - attacked, colonial - independent, and so on)  being taken initially and this dragged down the process. Things are calmer now and the PICs have responded with actions and not only words. While a lot of the world Tuna is caught in these waters, very little is done under PICs flagged vessels, hence the responsibilities also rely heavily with the DWFN that fish here and not just on the coastal states.

Finally, I always make this point at any presentation, while the EU impose the rules - beyond how good they are - they also fund the assistance to help comply with them.

During the Q&A session, NZ's Ambassador for Pacific Economic Development Shane Jones (and a good man I have been working with for a few months now) shot point blank at me the question in everyones mind:

Did it had a positive impact? PIC go to the WCPFC meetings and promises are done but little is deliver, so do the EU dis us a favour with the yellow cards?

I just smiled, and said something like:

Brooh... I can't answer that question... I'm just a deck-boss helping fellow deck crew. That is a question for the Captain.

From the deck, I can tell you that everyone knows now much better their job than before, and know better their own limitations... but if to get to this you needed a economic powerhouse like the EU with 1/2 a billon inhabitants to "name and shame" minnow coastal states with less than 40 years of independence and VERY limited human and economic resources... well... I just not qualified (or independent enough) to provide you an answer.

End Slide

The 2015 Pacific Tuna Forum

As I write, a traditional Fijian welcoming ceremony (that of course includes drinking some kava) is opening this years Regional Tuna Industry and Trade Conference on its 5th edition.

Is the 5th time I been invited to be a speaker, and I take it as big honour. I'm crap at the networking thing and the PR side of my work... I just like the job I do and I like the people I work with, and I take this opportunity as a chance to communicate across the region some of the aspects of what are the advances happening in my area of work. At the same time gives me the chance to learn what other people I like and work with, are up to. 

While I'm interested what everyone has to say, the ones that I'm more looking forwards this year are:

Achieving Optimal Economic Benefits Through Sustainable Tuna Management and Development, by Transform Aqorau, Executive Director of PNA. Transform is a very smart man and articulate man, that is not afraid to trow the right punches when necessary. His presentation are always entertaining.

Tuna Stock Status, Management Regime and Policies in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Shelton Harley, the Principal Fisheries Scientist (Stock Assessment and Modelling), Oceanic Fisheries Programme, of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Shelton is a very clever man at the top of its game, and equally important, a good communicator of the science and status of the stocks. His presentations are always good learning opportunities.

Developments in Fishing Quotas and Cuts by Transform Aqorau again. There has been a lot of talk of reshaping the tuna landscape by the introduction of quotas as alternative/addition to the Vessels Day Scheme. While conceptually interesting, and having worked and lived on the inside of the NZ Quota Management System, I see al lot constraints on the operational side of it (i.e. controlling fish receivers, aggregation limits, migratory status, etc) so i'm very interested on what he has to say.

Crew Conditions on Fishing Vessels in the Pacific Islands Region by Patricia J Kailola, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Pacific Dialogue Ltd. I don't know Patricia, but I'm very interested in the topic and I'm partially working on the topic.

Constraints to Domestic Industry and Development Through Mitigating Strategies by Adrian Wickham (but delivered by Charles Hufflet) from thePacific Islands Tuna Industry Association. I known both gentlemen for years and they are great people and real fighters for Pacific Island based fishing.

The Viability of Longlining in the Southern Albacore Fishery by Russell Dunham, Director for Fresh and Frozen ULT Tuna of Tri Marine International Pte Ltd. Russell is great guy I've know for years. He know the longline tuna business left, right and centre. Always great presentations.

Foreign Fishing Tuna Operations and Investment in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Hugh Walton, Fisheries Development Advisor, DevFish Project, Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency. "Uncle Hugh" as my kids refer to him, is a good mate and he has supported my vision, my work (and my English!!!)  for the last 4 years with DevFish II. He is a former fisherman and a guerrilla gardener (that alone makes me like him) and has done every job in the Pacific fisheries (twice!), so is always good to hear what he has to say.

Updates on E-Reporting and E-Monitoring Projects in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean by Malo Hosken, Regional Electronic Reporting Coordinator, Oceanic Fisheries Programme of SPC. I have meet Malo recently, and I like what he does and why he does it, he is relaxed and very professional, as well as family man... I respect that a lot. His work on e-monitoring (cameras on board) and e-reporting (real time electronically updated logsheets form the vessels) has been pivotal to a lot of work we for see in the near future (furthermore is one of the few tools I know work for avoid shark finning).  

The Changing Proportion of Legally-Sourced Tuna in International Trade and FAO’s Best Practice Guidelines on Tuna Catch Documentation System (CDS) by Gilles Hosch,  Technical Coordinator – Tuna Traceability & CDS at FAO. Gilles is a very long time friend and a very clever man that knows his stuff deeper than anyone I know. He is actually not gonna deliver it, I will :-)... he is at the present in FSM at the WCPFC CDS Working Group (where I was also invited), and unfortunately we cannot be in two places at once, he is passing my views there and I'm passing his views here.

Finally I'm looking forwards to deliver my one: Impact of EU ‘yellow card system’ on Pacific Island Countries here is the brief as written in the programme: (I'll publish the presentation after delivery tomorrow) 

The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have significantly experienced the effects of the EU’s role as the world IUU fisheries evaluator. There are more “yellow cards” in the PICs than in any other region in the world in relation to their population and development status. Fiji and Vanuatu were the first ones, then Papua New Guinea, followed by the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, while FSM and RMI are in dialogue process.

While the EU IUU regulation legally concerns itself only with fish being imported into the EU, it is interesting to note that Vanuatu, Tuvalu, FSM or RMI do not trade with the EU as they lack of Sanitary approval required never the less have been impacted by the EU measures. Other small countries in the world got yellow cards and some of them reds, like Belize, Togo, Sri Lanka, etc. Notably, major countries with weak compliance records got yellow cards as well, like Philippines and Korea, but these were removed a short term later. The latest country under this process is Thailand and the jury still out on what is going to happen, PNG on its side seems to still running towards the elusive “green card” goal post, albeit substantial work done.

Nevertheless, this presentation will not dwell in the perceived politics of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalyzed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme with the support of the DEVFISH II/FFA Programme. Including the incorporation of elements of the PSMA as to be working towards a pacific wide Catch Certification Scheme as a tool to offset the administrative and economic burden that compliance with the EU scheme has enacted in the PICs. 

Looking forwards to all of this!

Governance and Tuna related Institutions in the pacific (part 2)

Continuing from my last post on "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, I focus in this post on the 2 technical bodies of the region, FFA and SPC, two organisations close to my souI, as I do a lot of work for them. 

FFA - Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency

Since 1979, the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is based in Honiara, Solomon Islands, FFA's 17 Pacific Island members are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The founding document of the Agency is the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention. The Forum Fisheries Committee meets annually to consider regional policies and the budget and work programme of FFA.

FFA was established to help countries sustainably manage their fishery resources that fall within their 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA is an advisory body providing expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and participate in regional decision making on tuna management through agencies such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).

FFA purpose is to maximise economic and social benefits of fisheries, i it supports its countries and territories in three broad tasks:

• Manage the fishery to ensure use is sustainable and will provide tuna now and in the future
• Develop the fishery to harvest, process and market tuna to create jobs, income and a thriving industry
• Monitor, control and survey the fishery to stop illegal fishing and make sure fishing benefits goes towards fishers who follow the rules of development and management set by governments.

FFA assists members to carry out these three broad tasks by providing advice, information, policy recommendations, regional strategies, technical support and development opportunities. It provides support at the national and regional level.

At the national level, FFA provides support direct to countries and territories who are members of FFA. At the regional level, FFA solicits the views of leaders, identifies consensus areas and emerging areas for debate and briefs leaders on technical and policy issues in preparation for their participation in the decision-making body on tuna management in the region (WCPFC) and for negotiations about binding legal agreements (the various treaties, agreements and arrangements pertaining to fishing in Pacific). Pacific Island leaders are active in setting the agenda and priorities of FFA through their involvement in the various FFA projects and meetings and formally through the Forum Fisheries Committee.

Approximately 80 staff at the regional FFA headquarters in Honiara support their national contact points in departments of foreign affairs and fisheries in each member jurisdiction. FFA focuses its work on:

Fisheries management – providing policy and legal frameworks for the sustainable management of tuna. It does so in 4 areas:

• Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management assists FFA member countries to use a process of management for their fisheries. EAFM reports have been done for Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Tonga and Vanuatu. The process is similar to risk management and involves four overall stages:

1. determining the scope of the assessment – develop a clear description of what is to be managed/assessed;
2. given the scope, identifying all the issues that need to be assessed; preferably across the five key areas of EAFM and agreeing on the values wanted to be achieved for each of these;
3. determining, using risk analysis, which of these issues needs to be managed directly; and
4. establishing the levels of performance that are acceptable, the management arrangements that will be used to achieve these levels, and the review processes needed to assess performance for those issues requiring management.

Treaties & Agreements - FFA administers and provides support for negotiations and meetings regarding several fishing treaties and agreements. These are the:

• FSM Arrangement: The FSM Arrangement was developed as a mechanism for domestic vessels of the PNA to access the fishing resources of other parties. It was signed on the 30 Nov 1994 and came into force on the 23 Sep 1995. Signatories are Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau,  Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
• Nauru Agreement: The subregional agreement on terms and conditions for tuna purse seine fishing licences in the region (see PNA) 
• Palau Arrangement: The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and CentralPacific was developed by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement and entered into force in November 1995
• Niue Treaty: The Niue Treaty is an agreement on cooperation between FFA members about monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing - it includes provisions on exchange of information (about where the position and speed of vessels at sea, which vessels are without licences) plus procedures for cooperation in monitoring, prosecuting and penalising illegal fishing vessels. 
• US Multilateral Treaty: The Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries Between Certain Governments of the Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (commonly known as the “US Treaty”) began in 1987. It entered into force in 1988 and has since been renewed twice, with the last renewal in 2003 allowing the US Treaty to continue for an additional 10 years until 2013. The treaty enables a maximum of 40 US purse seine vessels to fish in the waters of the 16 Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member states. From the 16 countries, Australia and New Zealand do not receive any development aid from the treaty. In exchange for fishing access the US contributes an agreed annual amount, regardless of how much fish they take out. Under this arrangement the USA has, in the first 16 years of operation, paid the FFA a total of US$276 million. Once the administration fee is put aside, the FFA then divides these funds in two parts. First, each Pacific Island party receives a fixed minimum payment and the other, a major component, is based on the amount of tuna caught in national waters of each member states. In effect 79 % of the money has been diverted to five countries (Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Tuvalu) suggesting the uneven distribution of tuna stock in the region. Negotiations are stall at the moment since PNA want them to either pay 90 million or bid under the VDS system

Fisheries development – developing the capacity of members to sustainably harvest, process and market tuna to create livelihoods.

• Trade & Industry: FFA advises members about relevant developments in international trade policy and economic co-operation frameworks and how to advance their individual and collective fisheries interests in trade policy and economic partnership negotiations. Regular trade and industry reports include Fisheries Trade Briefing, Tuna Market News & Fisheries Economic Indicators. Many of these activities are part of the DEVFISH II project (where I work :-) 
• Economic Indicators: two reports are annually prepared; the WCPFC Area Catch Value Estimates and the Tuna Economic Indicators        

          
Fisheries operations – supporting monitoring, control and surveillance of fisheries as well as treaty administration, information technology and vessel registration and monitoring.

• Monitoring, Control & Surveillance: FFA provides policy and services, to its members to build national capacity and regional solidarity to control fishing in the Pacific, including illegal, unreported and unknown fishing. This includes technical expertise, information sharing and projects around monitoring activities, regional surveillance operations, the FFA Observer Program, FFA Vessel Monitoring System, FFA licence information list, and staff training and support regarding relevant regional decision making bodies, notably the Technical Compliance Committee of the WCPFC.
• FFA Vessel Monitoring System: this service allows FFA members to track and monitor fishing activities across the region. Based at the FFA's regional headquarters, but accessible to all FFA member countries, this a satellite-based system monitors the position, speed and direction of registered fishing vessels. 
• Information & Communications Technology: FFA's Information and Communications (ICT) Team provides a range of ICT and Library services to the Secretariat and to its members.

Corporate services - supporting the organisation's work through administration, human resources, budgeting and other corporate functions.

The Executive Team of FFA provides high-level policy advice to FFC and members, and manages the work of the Secretariat and member support services in support of the five key output areas for the FFA Executive:
    1    Policy Advice
    2    FFA Governance
    3    Strategic management
    4    Relationship management
    5    Legal Advice, Media, and Training

Specific MCS Role
The FFA Regional Surveillance Centre and coordinated Joint Deployment Plans
Annual regional multilateral fisheries surveillance operations support the MCS tools and communications of Pacific Island countries.  Four of the surveillance operations conducted annually in region are planned and coordinated by the RFSC.  These are Operation KURU KURU, BIGEYE/ISLAND CHIEF, TUI MOANA and RAI BALANG.  The QUAD OWG is made up of military personnel from Australia, France, New Zealand and the U.S.  The role of this group is to share and coordinate operational plans for the FFA member region.  FFA attends these meetings and covers regional fisheries surveillance operations, particularly the allocation of aerial surveillance assets and surface unit support.  

The FFA Surveillance Operations Officer (SOO) has the responsibility for facilitating the coordination of the surveillance assets provided by the QUAD nations in support of national and multilateral fishing surveillance and response activities. The SOO, and thus the RFSC, is in many cases the conduit between the QUAD nations and FFA members.  

All FFA members have access to the FFA RSP covering both their respective EEZ’s and the high seas. The three information sources (FFA VMS, WCPFC VMS and AIS) are used to correlate additional sighting reports from QUAD and FFA member assets, potentially highlighting ‘dark’ vessel contacts not polling on VMS or AIS. These are referred to individual nations for further management.  The RSP is linked to the extensive FFA secure databases containing a range of fisheries information that are designed to assist national MCS officers to assess the relative level of compliance of all vessels on the FFA VMS.  In the RSP, all vessels are ‘traffic-light’ colour coded to indicate the level of compliance risk (Compliance Index (CI)), which can then be used by member countries to plan MCS activities and operations for their PPB’s, with red indicating the possibility of a high-risk/non-compliant vessel, green indicating a greater probability of a low-risk/compliant vessel.

The 2016 operational phase will include:
Over-flight Approvals:  Nations providing maritime surveillance aircraft must coordinate over-flight of territorial boundaries as part of routine diplomatic clearances. Participating nations request these over-flight clearances using their standard procedures and channels.  Blanket over-flight approvals are no longer authorised despite this allowing greater flexibility in the tasking of air assets.
Watchkeepers:  Participating nations who provide watchkeepers to the RFSC for the duration of the operation need to have nominated personnel well ahead of time to allow for travel and associated arrangements to have been made.
Information-Sharing:  If long-term agreements for sharing information are not in place, it is imperative that short-term data sharing arrangements for the duration of the operation have been agreed upon and are in place ahead of time.
WCPFC Non-Public Domain Data:  Those participants with EEZs adjacent to high seas areas should ensure they have requested access to WCPFC High Seas VMS data (100NM buffer) as well as their respective in-zone data.

SPC - Secretariat of the Pacific Community

The South Pacific Commission, as SPC was formerly called, was founded in Australia in 1947 under the Canberra Agreement by the six ‘participating governments’ that then administered territories in the Pacific: Australia, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They established the organisation to restore stability to a region that had experienced the turbulence of the Second World War, to assist in administering their dependent territories and to benefit the people of the Pacific. The name, South Pacific Commission, was changed to the Pacific Community at the 50th anniversary conference in 1997 to reflect the organisation’s Pacific-wide membership. Now, in 2010, SPC’s 26-strong membership includes the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories along with four of the original founders (the Netherlands and United Kingdom withdrew in 1962 and 2004 respectively when they relinquished their Pacific interests).

FAME (SPC Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine Ecosystems) main's work is to provide the 22 SPC's member countries and territories with the information they need to make informed decisions on the management and development of their aquatic resources, and help to provide the tools and strengthen the capacity needed to implement these decisions. 

The Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) is the Pacific Community’s regional centre for tuna fisheries research, fishery monitoring, stock assessment and data management. It was established by the 1980 South Pacific Conference (as the Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme) to continue and expand the work initiated by its predecessor project, the Skipjack Survey and Assessment Programme.

The OFP provides scientific services relating to oceanic (primarily tuna) fisheries management to its membership. These services include fishery monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research relevant to the fisheries, and stock assessment and evaluation of species- and ecosystem-based management options.

The most important programme outputs are information (e.g., reports on the status of fisheries, stocks and ecosystems), infrastructure (e.g., databases, monitoring programmes), advice (e.g., regarding appropriate levels of fishing), and national capacity building in SPC members.

The OFP has three main objectives as outlined in the FAME Strategic Plan:

• High-quality scientific information and advice for regional and national fisheries management authorities on the status of, and fishery impacts on, stocks targeted or otherwise impacted by regional oceanic fisheries;
• Accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic species; and
• Improved understanding of pelagic ecosystems in the western and central Pacific Ocean.

Their “clients” are the fisheries administrations of SPC members, for whom they process and manage data from commercial tuna fishing fleets (both domestic and foreign licensed), assist in the development and implementation of effective fishery monitoring programmes, provide advice on the status of tuna and other affected pelagic fish stocks, conduct research on the biology and ecology of the pelagic ecosystem and provide training and other capacity building in these areas. 

The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and its various sub-groups (particularly the Parties to the Nauru Arrangement (PNA) and the Te Vaka Moana Arrangement) are also key “clients”.
The OFP provides data products, scientific analyses and advice to assist these groups with the assessment and development of fisheries management measures. 

The OFP provides data management and stock assessment services and advice to WCPFC under an annual service agreement. The overall budget of the OFP in 2014 was approximately USD 8 million, with funding contributions from the SPC core budget (made up of the assessed contributions of SPC members), programme funding (made up of additional multi-year commitments made by the Governments of Australia, France and New Zealand)

The key work areas or OFP are:

Tuna Fishery Monitoring. The Fisheries Monitoring Section works in collaboration with the Data Management Section to achieve "Accurate and comprehensive scientific data for regional and national fisheries management authorities on fisheries targeting the region’s resources of tuna, billfish and other oceanic species".

The Fisheries Monitoring Section is particularly concerned with"Enhanced national fishery monitoring and data management systems" and, "Enhanced capacity of PICTs to monitor fisheries, manage and use data". The OFP has provided support to SPC member countries and territories for tuna fisheries monitoring since port sampling and observer programmes were implemented by several members in the early 1990s. Since then, the scope of the support has expanded to cover all elements of national tuna fishery monitoring.

Over the years, support has been provided to 20 members and has included advice on the structure fishery monitoring systems, funding of national staff and the provision of sampling equipment, in additional to technical support for sampling programmes; the support that has been provided to SPC members is summarised here.
The OFP has also developed tuna fishery sampling protocols to ensure that sampling data are representative and unbiased. 

Capacity building is an important activity of the Fisheries Monitoring Section, and it has been closely involved in the development of Pacific Islands Regional Fisheries Observer (PIRFO) standards, in collaboration with SPC members, FFA and the Secretariat of the WCPFC.

Regional Tuna Fisheries Databases

OFP is responsible for the development and maintenance of the collective regional tuna fisheries database which provides both direct and in-direct benefits to their member countries.  
The collective regional tuna fisheries databases comprise nine types of fishery data
    •    Operational catch and effort logsheet data
    •    Aggregated catch and effort data
    •    Annual catch estimates
    •    Port Sampling data
    •    Unloadings data
    •    Observer-reported catch/effort data
    •    Aggregated size frequency data
    •    Tagging data
    •    Biological data (e.g. otolith and stomach contents data)

At the regional level, tuna fishery data collected by member countries are used extensively for research and monitoring purposes. OFP uses the data in the regional tuna fisheries database to assess the state of exploitation of the stocks [on behalf of member countries, the WCPFC, FFA and the PNA] and to study interactions between the different fleets operating in the region. Monitoring of the fisheries includes the biannual publication of statistics compiled from the catch and effort database in the WCPFC Tuna Bulletin and through publication of the WCPFC Tuna

Fishery Yearbook.  Tuna fishery data also provide important information for Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities and are used in economic and social science studies.

The OFP provide member countries with a sub-set of the regional tuna fisheries database with software query tools to facilitate the extraction of summary tables, graphs and maps to assist in the decision-making processes related to the management of their tuna fisheries and satisfy their reporting obligations to the WCPFC. Member countries also contact OFP on a regular basis with a variety of ad hoc requests for summarised data prepared from the regional tuna database. 

Stock Assessment. Within the section, they have five areas of work.

1. Regional oceanic fisheries management policy and decision-making by WCPFC are informed by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. This is achieved primarily through the Regional WCPO stock assessments that they undertake as service provider to tWCPFC, but in addition they have active Research being undertaken into software for use with stock assessments and addressing many of the important issues in stock assessments. 
2. FFA’s oceanic fisheries management initiatives are supported by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. They work closely to support FFA in providing analytical support for their Regional fisheries management initiatives. This are of work also involves support of PNA and Te Vaka Moana. 
3. National tuna oceanic fisheries policy and decision-making are informed by the best science-based stock assessments and advice. They work closely with National fisheries agencies to provide scientific advice that assists them in the development of Tuna Management plans and other relevant fisheries management plans. A key part of this support is the development of National Tuna Fisheries Status Reports (NTFSRs). 
4. Enhanced capacity of SPC members to interpret stock assessment information and advice. For 7 years they have been running Stock Assessments Training Workshops (SAWs), have attachments at SPC for national scientists, and provide in-meeting support, particularly for FFA and WCPFC meetings.

Governance and tuna related institutions in the Pacific (Part 1)

Unless you are an insider, is really hard to understand "who does what" in the governance and management of tuna in the Pacific, this blog post hope to share some light on that, as it is complex. The key players of the governance and fishery management framework for tuna and related species in the WCPO include:

1. The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)
2. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement, known as PNA or the Nauru Group
3. FFA and SPC that are regional organisations that provide management services to its member countries, the WCPFC and the PNA.
4. The national governments

 I'll start with the role of the commission (WCPFC) and PNA.

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) was established by the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention) which entered into force on 19 June 2004. The Convention was concluded after six years of negotiation which commenced in 1994. The period between the conclusion of the Convention and its entry into force was taken up by a series of Preparatory Conferences that laid the foundations for the Commission to commence its work.

The WCPF Convention draws on many of the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement [UNFSA] while, at the same time, reflecting the special political, socio-economic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region. The WCPFC Convention seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks.

A framework for the participation of fishing entities in the Commission which legally binds fishing entities to the provisions of the Convention, participation by territories and possessions in the work of the Commission, recognition of special requirements of developing States, and cooperation with other Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMO) whose respective areas of competence overlap with the WCPFC reflect the unique geo-political environment in which the Commission operates.

The Commission supports three subsidiary bodies; the Scientific Committee, Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee, that each meet once during each year. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies are followed by a full session of the Commission. The work of the Commission is assisted by a Finance and Administration Committee.

Members: Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu.
Participating Territories: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna.
Cooperating Non-member(s): Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, Vietnam.

How is WCPFC governed?
The Convention establishes a governing body known as the Commission which is comprised of representatives from members, cooperating non-members and participating territories (collectively, CCMs). The Commission holds annual meetings and is presided over by a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who are elected from amongst the membership.

Four subsidiary bodies support the work of the Commission and meet in the months prior to the annual meeting, which is always held in December.

• The Scientific Committee (SC) meets in August and ensures that the Commission has the best available scientific information on which to consider appropriate conservation and management measures. The Scientific Committee utilizes the services of expert fisheries scientists and its meetings usually comprise scientific and other related technical representatives. The SC also coordinates with the Technical and Compliance Committee on certain matters to ensure consistent advice is provided to the Commission.
• The Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC) meets in October and is the “enforcement” committee of the Commission. The TCC reviews members’ adherence to Commission decisions and monitors individual countries’ implementation of those measures. The TCC also makes recommendations to the Commission with respect to encouraging, improving and enforcing compliance by members with the decisions of the Commission.
• The Northern Committee (NC) meets in September and makes recommendations to the Commission on species that are mostly found in the Convention Area north of 20 degrees north. Unlike the SC and the TCC, not all members of the Commission are represented on the NC. Although participation in the NC is limited to those members that are located in the area north of 20 degrees north, or are fishing in this area, any member of the Commission may participate in NC meetings as an observer. Any decisions the Commission takes on species under the purview of the NC must be based on recommendations from the NC.
• The Finance and Administration Committee meets annually along with the Commission meeting and deliberates over the Commission’s budget. All Commission members are represented on the Finance and Administration Committee and recommendations are forwarded to the Commission for adoption.

Decisions taken by the Commission are generally done by consensus. In cases where decisions have to be taken by vote, usually on substantive matters, a “two-chamber system” applies. The FFA members of the Commission comprise one chamber, while the non-FFA members form the other chamber. Decisions are taken by a three-fourths majority of those present and voting in each chamber and no proposal can be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber.

How does WCPFC promote compliance?
The Convention establishes a requirement for each member to establish and maintain a record of fishing vessels that are authorised to fish in the Convention Area beyond that member’s area of national jurisdiction. The Secretariat maintains a central database of each member’s authorised list of fishing vessels, which acts as a verification tool to ensure that fishing vessels are legally operating in the Convention Area.

The WCPFC establishes a number of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) programme to promote compliance by Commission members with conservation and management measures and other decisions of the Commission (such as in relation to requirements concerning data submission). One such programme is the Regional Observer Programme (ROP), which manages the placement of personnel on board fishing vessels to observe and collect data on fishing operations. Data collected by observers is critical in assessing the effectiveness of measures, as well as providing scientists with important fishery independent information on the size and weight of species taken. In addition, the role of an observer can be useful in ensuring compliance, through verification of fishing information such as vessel location, time of year and species caught.

Complementing the ROP is the Commission’s vessel monitoring system (VMS). Vessels fishing in the Convention Area are required to install a transmitting device known as an Automatic Location Communicator (ALC), which transmits a signal to a land-based receiving station where fisheries managers can view and track the location of fishing vessels. This tool allows fisheries managers to better promote compliance with any area closures or restrictions that may be in place at any given time. It also helps scientists and managers understand the nature of fishing operations and where fishing is taking place. The Commission’s VMS became operational in April 2009. 

A third important MCS element is the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas by patrol vessels registered with the Commission by CCMs. These patrol vessels conduct routine operations throughout the Pacific Ocean. Under an important measure adopted by the Commission, members have agreed to allow their fishing vessels to be boarded and inspected by the patrol vessels of other members. Patrol vessels provide the Commission with an important tool with which to monitor and in some situations, take action against, fishing violations on the high seas.

Another critical component in the Commission’s compliance toolbox is the list of vessels that have engaged in Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported (IUU) activities. Vessels that have been found, through sufficient evidence, to have committed violations as described by the Commission, are placed on what is known as an “IUU List”. Members are prohibited from engaging in fishing activities or other related transactions with vessels that are on the IUU List, which can act as a strong incentive for countries to closely monitor and regulate the activities of their fishing vessels.

PNA
The Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, or The Nauru Agreement is an Oceania subregional agreement between the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. The eight signatories collectively control 25–30% of the world's tuna supply and approximately 60% of the western and central Pacific tuna supply.

Historically, the Nauru Agreement and other joint fishery management Arrangements made by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (usually referred to as PNA) have been concerned mainly with the management of tuna purse-seine fishing in the tropical western Pacific.

In October 2010, the eight member states Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) extended their prohibition on tuna purse-seine fishing in approximately 4.5 million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean high seas by purse-seine vessels licensed to fish in their combined Exclusive Economic Zones. The extension was unveiled at the 6th meeting of the Technical and Compliance Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.

Other recent actions by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement include a prohibition on setting purse-seine nets around whale sharks, a ban on fishing near fish aggregation devices during the months of July, August and September (with an option to extend this for up to an additional three months if scientific advice suggests that tuna stocks would benefit), a requirement for 100% observer coverage aboard purse-seiners, a minimum mesh-size, and a requirement for retention of all catch of tuna on board (no discards).

The full range of fishery management instruments implemented by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement includes:
The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement: which defines a multilateral licensing arrangement providing annual access to all PNA EEZs by purse-seine vessels which contribute significantly to the enhancement of a PNA country's (the Home Party) economic involvement in the fishery.
The Palau Arrangement: which formerly set an agreed, binding, limit on the number of purse-seine vessels allowed to operate in PNA waters. The Palau Arrangement, through the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme, now limits the amount of effort (in terms of number of fishing days) that can be exercised by purse-seine vessels in PNA waters during any one calendar year. A Longline Vessel Days Management Scheme is currently under trial.
The Implementing Arrangements of the Nauru Agreement: There have been three of these, defining the measures that have been agreed by all Parties that will be implemented in the management of the activities of purse-seine vessels in their own EEZs, either through Regulations or licensing conditions. These include the measures highlighted above, such as the requirement not to licence any purse-seine vessel which also fishes in certain defined High Seas areas (High Seas Pockets).

These PNA-specific measures are also supplemented by the Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access to FFA member EEZs by Foreign Fishing Vessels, agreed by all FFA member countries including the Parties to the Nauru Agreement. These terms and conditions apply to all foreign fishing vessels, not just purse-seiners, and include a requirement for an Automatic Location Communicator to be switched on at all times and reporting to the regional Vessel Monitoring System, minimum standards for reporting to national authorities, and a requirement for annual regional vessel registration.

In May 2012 the PNA Fisheries Ministers met in Alotau, Papua New Guinea, and through a Resolution on Marine Animals  gave their commitment to implement even stronger management measures in their joint EEZs order to maintain sustainable tuna fisheries and minimise impact on bycatch species. The new commitments include:

• Establishing a PNA Observer Agency by 1 January 2013 to improve efficiency of national observer programmes in maintaining 100% independent observer coverage aboard purse-seine fishing vessels in PNA waters;
• Adopting the MSC Implementation Plan, including fast-tracking an agreement on Precautionary Reference Points and Harvest Control Rules for the PNA free-school skipjack purse-seine fishery, as required to maintain MSC Certification (see below);
• Approving work on developing a FAD registration and tracking scheme to be trialled in 2016, in collaboration with the Pew Environment Group

Agreeing an amendment to the Palau Arrangement Purse-seine Vessel Days Management Scheme that provides a clear and unambiguous definition of the Fishing Day. In particular, clarifying that any calendar day in which any fishing activity takes place will be counted as a full fishing day, with limited exemptions for days in which the only activities during that day are bona-fide emergencies, breakdowns, refuelling, repairs, or expeditious transit with fully stowed fishing gear (non fishing days). Ministers also approved a PNA Office Business Plan, and welcomed Tokelau as a party to the Palau Arrangement Purse-Seine Vessel Days Management Scheme.

Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) is a scheme where vessel owners can purchase and trade days fishing at sea in places subject to PNA. The purpose of the VDS is to constrain and reduce catches of target tuna species, and increase the rate of return from fishing activities through access fees paid by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs).  The total allocation of fishing days is set and apportioned between Pacific Island members for one-year periods up to three years in advance. 

The VDS is implemented as part of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (CMM2005-01). The VDS replaces the purse seine vessel number         limit of 205 vessels under Annex 1 of the Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Arrangement). The Palau Arrangement is a multilateral treaty governing the operation of purse seine vessels in the national waters of the PNA.  Its primary purpose is to place a limit on the number of vessels operating in the waters of the PNA. Under the VDS Management Scheme the PNA set the total number of days that can be fished in their waters combined and the apportionment of the total number of days between each country.  These allocations of fishing days are set for 12 month periods and can be set up to 3-years in advance.  The most recent stock assessment information on the target species of Skipjack, Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna and economic information relating to the maximisation of economic returns and optimal utilisation of the resource is used to assess the allocations of fishing days.

If you think I miss or misunderstood something please let me know. :-)

El Niñote (a big niño)!

It has been in the news a lot, and we see it in fishing. The fish has moved East big time and the vessels have followed them... the usual Western transhipment ports look empty while the Eastern ones are in overload.

During August, sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies were near or greater than +2.0°C across the eastern half of the tropical Pacific (see figure above). Large positive subsurface temperature anomalies persisted in the central and east-central equatorial Pacific during the month, with the largest departures exceeding 6°C (see below).

The atmosphere remained coupled to the anomalous oceanic warmth, with significant low-level westerly wind anomalies and upper-level easterly wind anomalies persisting from the western to east-central tropical Pacific. Also, the traditional and equatorial Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) were again negative, consistent with enhanced convection over the central and eastern equatorial Pacific and suppressed convection over Indonesia (see below). Collectively, these atmospheric and oceanic anomalies reflect a strong El Niño.

All models surveyed predict El Niño to continue into the Northern Hemisphere spring 2016, and
all multi-model averages predict a peak in late fall/early winter (3-month values of the Niño-3.4 index of +1.5°C or greater). The forecaster consensus unanimously favors a strong El Niño, with peak 3-month SST departures in the Nino region near or exceeding +2.0°C. Overall, there is an
approximately 95% chance that El Niño will continue through Northern Hemisphere winter 2015-16, gradually weakening through spring 2016.

Unfortunately, a strong "El Niño" does not affect only fishing in the western and central Pacific, but also the islands themselves, as the event will likely contribute to a above-normal hurricane seasons in both the central and eastern Pacific hurricane basins.

All this info comes from the 10th September 2015 ENSO Alert System Status issued by NOAA's Climate Prediction Centre

My TEDx Talk on Fisheries Compliance, Fairness and Us

Finally the talk I did in May 2015 is in Youtube! I'm really self conscious and talking to "non fisheries people" is always a challenge. But as a TEDx speaker is quite a soul search not just to develop the "what" are you saying... but as well the "why" are you saying it.  I'm already wiser then when I started the process and that, can only be a good thing!. My deepest "thank you!" to all the people putting their time on this, just for the love of it.

Coincidentally, while publishing this, I'm working in Papua New Guinea where right now the system I'm describing has started operating and I'm incredibly proud of how NFA (PNG National Fisheries Authority) has taking ownership and developed the concept. There is no other system like this one in any other country I worked (50 so far).

US IUU Approach: Different Does Not Mean Bad

The 2nd part of that statement should be applicable to anything from race, sexual orientation, supporting team sports, and so on... but in that case I was talking about IUU fishing control policies.

A few days ago, Molly Johnson a journalist from atuna.com, contacted me in reference to an article they published entitled "US not imposing sanctions on IUU fishing", in regards a declaration of David Balton (US Deputy Assistant for Oceans and Fisheries) where he outlined the US vision on their anti IUU fishing policy developments. 

She sent me the article (as I'm not a paying subscriber of the site) and after reading it, I replied:

"Is hard to make an opinion out of one article. And from what I read there is a plan and a system. The fact that they chose a different approach does not mean that they are 'not imposing sanctions on IUU fishing', and I think that statement may be misleading".

Furthermore, I gave my views on the article sent, she quite gracefully accepted my criticism and published the following article based on my response.

You want to make your own mind? Here is the info:

The U.S. House of Representatives passed on the 27 July H.R. 774: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Enforcement Act of 2015 by voice vote. (Thanks FishWise!) 

The bill is now awaiting Senate decision. If passed, this bi-partisan legislation would combat IUU fishing activities by:

• Strengthening enforcement by building domestic capacity for monitoring and identifying IUU activities.
• Creating stiffer penalties for vessels caught illegally fishing in U.S. waters.
• Implementing legislation needed for the U.S. to ratify the United Nations Port States Measures Agreement (PSMA).

The Importance of Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Islands

Most of my work deals with oceanic/commercial fisheries; nevertheless I have a keen interest in the coastal fisheries in the region, as it is uniquely worldwide. In no other place i ever worked, fisheries plays such a key role in everyday life.

Much of the region’s nutrition, welfare, culture, employment, and recreation are based on the living resources in the zone between the shoreline and the outer reefs of the region. The continuation of current lifestyles, opportunities for future development, and food security are all highly dependent on coastal fisheries resources. 

In this post I quote the work of my friend and colleague Bob Gillett on a report (Pacific Island Fisheries: Issues and Challenges) he prepared for the UN ESCAP Pacific Office in 2014. Bob knows the Pacific as no one else, and he is  my references in regards how profession/work, ocean sports and life can (should?) be complementary.

While Coastal fisheries are dwarfed in both volume (approx. 12% vs 88%) and value by the offshore tuna fisheries, the region’s fisheries based on coastal resources provide most of the non-imported fish supplies to the region and hence have a crucial role in food security. 

Coastal fishery resources include a wide range of finfish and invertebrates. They are characterised by their shallow water habitats or demersal life-styles, restriction of individual movements to coastal areas, and, in most cases restricted larval dispersal. Because of their relative accessibility, these resources form the basis of most of the region’s small-scale fisheries.

An important characteristic of the coastal fisheries of the region is the diversity of the catch. The coastal fisheries of the region take a very large number of species. For example, it has been stated that subsistence fishing in Samoa makes use of 500 species. The term “tropical multi-species fisheries” is often used to describe the situation – as well as to allude to the difficulty of managing such a heterogeneous array of species. The coastal catch can be divided into finfish, invertebrates, and others:

• A 2002 study of coastal fisheries in the region showed that a typical small-scale commercial reef fishery in the region may harvest between 200 and300 finfish species, although it is likely that only a few species will dominate landings. Approximately one-third of the coastal catch total is comprised of emperors (Lethrinidae), surgeonfish (Acanthuridae) and snappers (Lutjanidae).
• The most-landed invertebrate food species groups in the region are: giant clams, and beche de mer, followed by much smaller amounts of crabs, lobsters, strombus, turbo, arc shell, other bivalves/gastropods, trochus, urchin, octopus, shoreline gastropods, beach bivalves, and land crabs (SPC 2008). Beche de mer, trochus and pearl oysters are important invertebrate export 
• Seaweeds are considered a “fishery” resource in most Pacific Island countries. They are mainly used for local food, but exported from a few countries (e.g. Tonga). “Live rock” which is portions of reef rock covered with attached organisms, particularly coralline algae, is thought to be a fishery resource in several countries. 

Coastal fishing methods reflect the diversity of the target species, and include activities while walking, wading, swimming, and fishing from non-motorised and motorized vessels. Popular techniques include gleaning, spearfishing, trapping, gillnetting, hook/line dropline fishing, and trolling.

In general, the coastal fishery resources are heavily fished and often show signs of overexploitation, especially in areas close to population centres and for fishery products in demand by the rapidly-growing Asian economies. The coastal fisheries are also negatively affected by habitat degradation, which occurs from destructive fishing practices, urbanisation, siltation from mining/logging, and competing uses of the coastal zone.

Coastal fisheries statistics are not very good in most countries of the region. Typically, government fisheries agencies give low priority to estimating the total amount of domestic catches. In general, the smaller the scale of the fishing, the less is known about the production levels, with quantitative information being especially scarce for the subsistence fisheries in most countries. Samoa, where a survey of village fisheries was completed a few years ago, is a notable exception. 

Short-term support to enhance fisheries statistical systems has been provided by FAO, SPC, NMFS, JICA and other agencies. A major lesson from almost 30 years of such support to establishing and enhancing national fisheries statistical systems is that, once external support is withdrawn, the systems usually degenerate and eventually become dysfunctional. Despite the importance of such data, the reality is that (a) in the prioritization of scarce government funding, the on-going routine collection of fisheries data has not received much priority, and (b) it is quite unlikely that any of the donors active in the fisheries sector in the region would be willing to fund such systems over the long-term.

Another issue is that most of the countries in the region attach great importance to their subsistence and small-scale commercial fisheries. However, it is these fisheries that present the greatest difficulties for the collection of production information. Also to be considered is that many fisheries specialists have questioned the cost-effectiveness and practicalities of regular and extensive detailed data collection from small-scale fisheries in the Pacific Islands.

The management of coastal fishery resources in many Pacific Island countries is a mixture of several systems:

• Traditional management. This is most prevalent in rural areas and characteristically involves village leaders restricting the fishing by those outside the community and by various controls on fishing by community members.
• Central government management. All Pacific Island countries have a fisheries law giving wide powers to the government fisheries agency in controlling fishing activity. For various reasons, the system is often ineffective. There is some degree of success, for example, in central governments applying point of export restrictions on those products which are exported.
• In recent years non-government organisations have taken the lead in creating an awareness in villages of the need for, and benefits of, community-based management of fishery resources – using primarily marine protected areas (MPAs) as the main management tool.

Current coastal fishery management measures (both centrally-administered and community driven) tend to be non-quantitative and are intended to protect stocks in a generalised way. These include MPAs, size limits (both minimum and maximum), gear restrictions (minimum mesh sizes for nets, bans on torch fishing at night), prohibitions on the use of destructive fishing methods (blast fishing, poisons), prohibitions on the taking of berried females, and seasonal or area closures.

El Niño, Walker Circulation and Fish

El Niño (the boy in Spanish) is part of a wider climate system called El Niño Southern Oscillation, in which the Pacific Ocean and the atmosphere above it influence each other. This interaction drives the warming and cooling of the equatorial Pacific, which in turn affects the weather elsewhere in the world.

The process starts with surface water, propelled westward across the ocean by trade winds and heated by the sun as it travels, running into the Philippines, the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea. Over the course of between two and seven years the pool of warm water thus created grows into something with an area of about 12 million sq km.

Balmy, humid air rises from the pool, cooling and shedding rain as it does so, as part of a phenomenon called the Walker Circulation (see figure). Some of this air travels west, where it irrigates Indonesia with its precipitation. Some travels east, discharging its load on the Pacific, and then sinks back to the surface near the coast of South America, replacing the air that has travelled west as the trade winds.

Below the surface things are happening, too. The movement of warm water towards the Pacific’s west draws cool water to the surface in its east. This process, known as upwelling, lifts nutrients from the dark ocean bed to sunlit levels where they can be absorbed by planktonic algae and thus support some of the world’s richest sources of wild protein, the Peruvian anchoveta and the Tuna fishery.

As the pool of warm water grows, the ocean’s surface rises. This means the western equatorial Pacific’s surface can be up to 30cm higher than that of its eastern counterpart. Take the trade winds away, though, and this mountain of water will collapse and start spreading east. That collapse and spread is the essence of El Niño.

To a large extent, the pooled warm waters of the Pacific west are the author of their own destruction. Once their surface temperature exceeds 26.5°C, cyclones can form. These sap the trade winds’ energy, and thus their ability to keep the raised pool intact. The result is that the whole system quickly fails, the warm water sloshes back towards South America, and the "El Niño" is born.

Higher-than-usual sea-surface temperatures across the central and eastern equatorial Pacific then slow the trade winds further, accelerating the pool’s demise. The upwelling stops, and the  fishery disappears. The ascending air that starts the Walker circulation moves east, and no longer brings rain to Indonesia. And the knock-on effects of the Walker circulation’s easterly movement echo around the Earth, disturbing rainfall systems everywhere, in a pattern that usually peaks in December.

Source here

5th Pacific Tuna Forum 2015

The biggest tuna industry gathering in the Western and Central Pacific region, the 5th Pacific Tuna Forum is scheduled from 22-23 September 2015 at the Sofitel Resort, Denarau, Nadi, Fiji.  More than 250 delegates are expected to be part of this Pacific tuna meeting with over 30 well known speakers scheduled to speak at the event.

Tuna... is what the whole deal is about...

This years theme is Achieving Optimal Economic Benefits through Sustainable Tuna Management and Development and the keynote presentation is by the boss of PNA, my colleague and friend Transform Aqorau, that said:

"There has been a lot of development in the Western and Central Pacific with low tuna prices and increased catches in the high seas areas that have impacted the industry. The Pacific Tuna Forum 2015 offers an opportunity for governments, industry and other service providers to the industry to hear what each has to say about what is happening. There has been a greater focus on the PNA Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) and the transformative power of the VDS. We have also seen the resurgence of the WTPO which have coagulated around the low tuna price and have taken voluntary measures for their members to stay in port for 10 days, and a surge in interest in MSC and FAD free tuna from the supermarkets. All these developments will be discussed by practitioners. The Pacific Tuna Forum 2015 presents an excellent opportunity for all those interested in the largest tuna fisheries in the world to hear from vessel operators, traders, processors and regulators about what is happening globally in the tuna world"

I have asked again to be one of the presenters (I been a speaker every year since 2011), and like last year on a double act, initially I'll be presenting the work of my friend Gilles Hosch on Catch Documentation Schemes (CDS),  since he at the time would be in FSM at the WCPFC Working Group (WG) talking about the work he did on best practices for Tuna CDS and the work out of our expert consultation work in recently in Rome. Initially I was also asked to be there with him, but it was no point for both to assist, so i'll bring his message to the Forum while he takes mine to the WG.

Since the Pacific Island Countries have significantly experienced the effects of the EU’s role as the world IUU fisheries evaluator (there are more “yellow cards” in the PICs than in any other region in the world in relation to their population and development status) I was asked to make presentation on this topic. 

I will not dwell in the perceived politics or unfairness of the situation, but more constructively on the advances that this “yellow cards” have catalyzed in the Pacific regions in terms of MCS and related control systems, and particularly the in regards the strengthening of the EU Catch Certification Scheme with the support of the DEVFISH II/FFA Programme. Including the incorporation of elements of the PSMA as to be working towards a pacific wide Catch Certification Scheme as a tool to offset the administrative and economic burden that compliance with the EU scheme has enacted in the PICs.

There has been an overwhelming response from tuna industry players from not only within the region but from other parts of the world.  For details of the event and to register please visit: http://infofish.org/index.php/pacific-tuna-forum-2015/

Tentacles that think

Today's is not strictly a fisheries post... but is about one of my favourite sea creatures: Octopus  While I love to eat them,  I'll have to admit that the more I know about them, the harder it gets... Particularly for anthropomorphic reasons, I like people and things that are our of the ordinary... and octopuses are real awesome freaks!

Schematic of Octopus bimaculoides anatomy. Nature 524, 220–224

Where else would you find an intelligent organism that has a hydraulic skeleton, grab stuff with suckers out of its 8 arms, has the capacity to change  the colour and texture of their skin, moves by jet propulsion, and spits ink when they are upset... common!

The Economist publish recently the results of an interesting paper on some genetical aspects of their intelligence, I quote it below

Almost all intelligent creatures, be they parrots, sharks or human beings, are vertebrates. This is inconvenient for anyone trying to understand the nature of intelligence because it means, by and large, that he can study only how it has developed down a single evolutionary path. But there is an important exception. Molluscs branched off to form their own lineage before any organism had a spine—and one particular class of them, the cephalopods, has since become smart enough to rival some vertebrates.

Modern cephalopods are octopuses, squid, cuttlefish and an unusual shelled creature called the nautilus. Octopuses, in particular, are rated as intelligent. Some carry coconut shells across the seabed to make shelters. Others have worked out that fishing boats offer easy pickings. There have even been cases of them climbing out of aquarium tanks to raid a neighbouring tank that contained a tasty morsel. Many researchers would like to know whether these behaviours have come about in a different way from vertebrate intelligence, or if there are common traits that are necessary for smart creatures of any sort.

Caroline Albertin, of the University of Chicago, and her colleagues have been trying to understand the basis of cephalopod intelligence. To do so, as they report this week in Nature, they have mapped the genome of an octopus species called the California two-spot. They wanted to see which sets of genes in this species were pronounced in comparison to those in other, simpler, molluscs. They found two genetic families that were indeed greatly expanded. One of these, known as C2H2, encodes proteins called transcription factors, which regulate the activities of other genes. The second is the protocadherins, which encode proteins that guide the development of neurons in the nervous system. Both of these gene families are also expanded in vertebrates—but not, as far as is known, in any other group of animals.

Ms Albertin’s co-author, Daniel Rokhsar, of the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology, in Japan, describes protocadherins as molecular barcodes that identify a cell to its neighbours, enabling appropriate connections to be made. This is vital when building a nervous system. Such a system’s essence is the correct connection between its neurons. Expanding the number of genes for these proteins means they can exist in more diverse forms. In vertebrates this makes it possible for nerve cells to form more complex circuits, and the same is probably true in octopuses.

The effects of the C2H2 genes are less well understood, but having more of them presumably lets octopus genes function in more diverse ways than those of simpler creatures. That would allow a more sophisticated nervous system to develop.

Certainly, the octopus nervous system is sophisticated. It is also different from that of vertebrates, the neurons of which are concentrated in the brain and spinal cord, whence protuberances called axons travel to the rest of the body, to tell it what to do. An octopus brain holds only a third of the animal’s neurons and, being an invertebrate, an octopus by definition has no spinal cord. Instead, the balance of its neurons are concentrated in its arms, which therefore have a curious sort of independence.

This arrangement seems to have come into existence after the split, 270m years ago, that separated octopuses from other cephalopods. The arms of squid and cuttlefish remain under the control of the brain. Each octopus tentacle, however, acts autonomously as it feels around for food or threats. The brain can take over if necessary, but their decentralised nervous systems make octopuses less dependent than vertebrates on transmitting long-range signals through their bodies. That means they can act quickly and instinctively, though at a cost: they can exercise precise control of their arms only by looking directly at them.

With around half a billion neurons, a California two-spot can probably out-think a rat, which has only 200m of them. Yet the decentralisation of its nervous system means the nature of that thinking is surely alien to the vertebrate approach. This, alone, shows intelligence can develop in more than one way. Pursuing Ms Albertin’s approach may help researchers to get their arms around the details.

Original story here

A Pathway to Prosecuting High Seas Criminals

A story the public needs to read

My friend and colleague Mark Young, a former commander of the US Coast Guard that was for a few years FFA operation boss and now is the Senior Officer of conservation enforcement at PewEnvironment, wrote this good piece in Medium website. There he state in clear words some of the key challenges that we face in the high seas; these also indirectly apply to the issues of human rights we are facing in the industry. Furthermore, it shows that there are no easy answers to complicated problems. I quote his contribution below:

These are not high seas criminals, but they always looked dodgy to me :-)

Ian Urbina’s compelling series demonstrates the complexity of prosecuting crimes committed on the high seas. Criminals have enormous opportunities because vessels spend a considerable amount of time away from land, often beyond the reach of authorities.

And while treaties and laws provide a certain level of governance beyond the jurisdiction of national waters, their rules are often not applied. That’s largely because vessel owners fly “flags of convenience,” which means they have registered their ship in a country whose government has little interest in, or capacity for, holding them accountable.

There are also challenges when citizens of one country are on a vessel bearing the flag of a second country while fishing in the waters of a third country. As I asked in Part 1 of the series, if a crime is committed under these circumstances, “who leads such an investigation?” Who has the authority and jurisdiction? How do victims of offshore crimes get justice?

Trying to answer these questions can be complex and difficult. But following the example of commercial fishing presents an avenue to prosecuting high seas criminals, or at the very least, a penalty for breaking the rules. This can be done by using a set of complementary tools working in tandem across jurisdictions to identify suspicious activity, document the evidence, and take action once a suspected vessel ties up in port. The criminals of commercial fishing are the poachers. Illegal fishing accounts for roughly one out of every five fish taken from the seas, at a cost of up to $23.5 billion every year, according to a study in PLOS One.

The challenge with monitoring fishing vessels, just as with other types of ships, is that thousands of them are spread out over vast ocean regions. Ian points out that the world’s naval presence is diminishing; in any case, a physical presence on the water doesn’t have as great an ability to detect suspicious vessel activity as remote monitoring platforms do. But the challenge with remote monitoring is that not all governments can afford it — which is why platforms such as Project Eyes on the Seas were developed. These tools can give resource-poor regions the potential to identify illegal activity using a range of emerging technologies, from vessel location reporting to satellite imagery.

But what good is this information if there’s no enforcement vessel to catch the suspect ship in the act?

That’s where Port State Measures, an agreement adopted by the United Nations and awaiting ratification by 25 nations before becoming enforceable, comes into play. These measures would allow enforcement officers at any port to use information collected about a ship’s activities at sea to determine if the vessel warrants closer inspection. In the most serious of cases, vessels identified as fishing illegally can be denied port access and services altogether.

International cooperation, even without an official U.N. agreement, has already paid dividends in combating illegal fishing. For instance, in 2012, the Liberian government accused the fishing vessel Premier, flagged to South Korea, of illegally catching tuna in its waters. But by the time the Liberians had enough information to take action, the vessel was gone. When Liberian authorities learned that the Premier was headed for port in Mauritius, they requested that the vessel be boarded and searched, actions that uncovered documents that bolstered Liberia’s case. Ultimately the Premier’s owners settled with Liberia for $2 million.

Once the Port State Measures Agreement is ratified, the international community will have another important tool to deny access to the marketplace for illegal fishing vessels. Combined with tracking technologies and a universal standard for applying unique identifiers to all commercial ships, the increased port enforcement capabilities offered by the agreement have the potential to be a game changer in fighting not only illegal fishing but all maritime crime — because a vessel engaging in illegal fishing is often wrapped up in other nefarious business as well. The more illegal fishing vessels we can drive out of business, the more crime we can combat.

But there’s still a lot of work to be done before most victims of maritime crime get justice. The one common denominator among all the cases Ian uncovered for his series is a lack of leadership in effectively prosecuting those responsible. And that leads to one inevitable conclusion: All of the enhanced technologies and updated laws will have little effect if world leaders don’t prioritize fighting these crimes.

One-year transitional arrangement for the U.S. treaty deal underlines value of Pacific fishery

The one-year transitional arrangement for United States vessels for 2016 is seen as “positive development reflecting the value of rights-based fisheries management” for the Pacific islands

the image has no relation to the tuna treaty, but i really like it :-)

The one-year deal agreed to on 5 August 2015 at the end of a negotiating session in Australia brings greater benefits to all Pacific islands and confirms the value of the PNA’s vessel day scheme (VDS) for managing the skipjack tuna fishery in the western and central Pacific ocean. The deal, however, is only for one year, which underscores the increasing difficulties in getting agreement on longer-term access for U.S. vessels that they enjoyed until the PNA introduced the VDS.

The islands will receive higher fees for fewer fishing days than in the current agreement for 2015. The total package, including both U.S. industry payments and the U.S. government fisheries subsidy comes to US$89,271,350 for 2016.  

The eight PNA members will receive US$12,600 per fishing day, a 34 percent increase over the US$9,380 currently being paid by the U.S. purse seine fleet. PNA set US$8,000 as the minimum fee for VDS days for 2015 and 2016 while capping the number of fishing days for 2015 and 2016 at fewer than 45,000. Many fishing nations in 2015 are paying significantly more than this benchmark price to secure fishing days for their fleets.

In addition, the agreement for 2016 will, for the first time, see the Cook Islands receive significant payments under the VDS, and the U.S. fleet will begin “exploratory” fishing opportunities in the exclusive economic zones of five South Pacific nations.

The U.S. tuna industry will pay US$68,271,350 and the U.S. government will provide a subsidy of US$21 million. Fishing day payments aside, each of the Pacific islands involved in the treaty will receive an equal share payment of US$680,397.

The U.S. also agreed not to fish in two high seas “pockets” located in the PNA region.

PNA has enforced the VDS for the purse seine industry for over five years, setting a minimum fishing day fee now at US$8,000. Since 2010, revenue from the VDS to the eight-member PNA has increased more than five-fold, from US$64 million in 2010 to an estimated US$350 million this year.

Since the access and financial terms of the Treaty lapsed in June 2013, the U.S. and the Pacific Islands have agreed on a series of one-year or 18-month interim arrangements to maintain the treaty, which gives U.S.-flagged vessels access to the region for fishing while negotiating extension of the Treaty.

Although there continue to be challenges — issues such as the U.S. desire for more fishing days in the waters of particular countries and a request for exemption of a few large purse seiners from the requirement that a fishing day be defined as 1.5 days for vessels with significantly increased capacity and sophistication , these issues are to be worked on in the future.

Original source in the PNA page

Status of the World Fisheries for Tuna

The International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, publishes its status of the World fisheries for Tuna and does regular updates.

It tracks 23 stocks of the major commercial tuna species worldwide (6 albacore, 4 bigeye, 4 bluefin, 5 skipjack and 4 yellowfin stocks), and summarizes the results of the most recent scientific as-sessments of these stocks, as well as the current management measures adopted by the RFMOs. In addition, it ranks the status and management of the 23 stocks using a consistent methodology in terms of three factors: Abundance, Exploitation/Management (fishing mortality) and Environmental Impact (bycatch).

They are in a interesting position and get a lot of slack because to 80% of the world’s tinned tuna brands have formed it, with the proclaimed mission of which is to ‘undertake science-based initiatives for the long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna stocks, reducing bycatch and promoting ecosystem health.’ I guess is up each person's believes to deal with the facts around if a organisation made by fishing companies, can be trusted in the information they provide, even if  the reports are really well referenced from the RFMOs documentations.

Personally, I always believe that if industry is part of the problem, they have to be part of the solution. Hence I welcome their existence, and personally appreciate some of their staff and members. I find the reports quite good, albeit personally I would present some of the graphs and language in a less "massaged" way.

Said so, I really like their "visual approach" to data presentation, for example: their "Colour Ratings Decision Table" as way to present their ranking system.

The latest update (Feb 2015) shows for the Pacific the following picture: 

Where BET is Big Eye, YFT is Yellow Fin, SKJ is Skipjack, ALB is Albacore and PBF is Pacific Bluefin

As you see is a mix picture, but in my opinion is shows firstly the species and elements that need more attention and oversight, and the those where lessons learns in terms of management and compliance can be used.

I'm not saying that things are good (or are going to be good), but that for moving in the right direction we need information, and here is one that helps.