Newer high-res climate change model predicts lesser impact on skipjack fisheries

A higher-resolution ocean modelling exercise has predicted climate change will have lesser impact on western Pacific tuna fisheries in the 2060s than prior assumed, says a recent paper by R.J. Matear et all in the Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography Journal. 

The Western Pacific Warm Pool is a region of high tuna catch, and how future climate change might impact the tuna fisheries is an important regional issue.

By using a high-resolution ocean model forced by the simulated climate of the 2060s, we investigate whether enhanced spatial resolution and bias correction of the mean state could alter the climate change projection for the western tropical Pacific and examine the consequences this might have for tropical tuna distributions. For most of the physical environmental variables, enhanced resolution and bias correction had only a minor impact on the projected changes.

The climate projections showed a maximum surface warming east of the Warm Pool, a shoaling of the thermocline in the Warm Pool, and an eastward expansion of the Warm Pool. In the Warm Pool, the shoaling of the thermocline raises the nutricline into the photic zone and increases phytoplankton and primary productivity, a feature that is most evident in the high-resolution model projection but also weakly present in the coarse-resolution projection. The phytoplankton and primary productivity response to climate change was where ocean model resolution produced a clear difference.

With enhanced resolution, the simulation had stronger and better-defined zonal currents, which were more consistent with observations. Along the equator, the high-resolution model enabled vertical current shear mixing to generate a sub-surface phytoplankton maximum both inside and outside the Warm Pool, which is an observed phenomenon.

With climate change, the enhanced-resolution model projected enhanced vertical shear mixing, increased vertical supply of nutrients to the photic zone, and increased sub-surface phytoplankton concentrations. The increase in sub-surface phytoplankton concentrations helps to offset the decline in surface phytoplankton concentrations and results in a projection of almost no change in the western tropical Pacific primary productivity.

In contrast, the low-resolution model projected a substantial reduction in phytoplankton concentrations and primary productivity; such a response is typical of climate change projections for the region.

Importantly, enhanced resolution dramatically altered the projected response of phytoplankton and primary productivity to climate change. Using the enhanced-resolution model, the projected increase in the size of the Warm Pool with little change in primary productivity and in suitable habitat for skipjack tuna suggest that by the 2060s climate change will not have a large impact on skipjack tuna fisheries.

Sources: Climate change projection for the western tropical Pacific Ocean using a high-resolution ocean model: Implications for tuna fisheries and Skipjack tuna fare better under high-res model

Fish Art

To no surprise... I like all things fish. And the ones that my friend Lili Devo creates, always put a smile on my face...  see for your self.

Non proud records - WCPFC Higher Ever Catch of Skipjack

Skipjack catches during 2013 in the Western Central Pacific (WCP) reached the highest ever-annual volume reported for the region.

Lots of it... but not better money for the catch

As WCPFC reported in its "Overview of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean" for 2013 at SC10 in Majuro, last year's skipjack catch was 1,784,091 M/T, nearly 5,000 tons than the previous record-holding year 

The WCPO is the most significant fishing ground for skipjack tuna (almost 70 % of the world's landings of the species). Skipjack is the most important species in the canning industry; in 2012, just over 1.6 million tons of canned tuna ready product were produced worldwide. 

Around 77 % of the skipjack catch in 2013, was caught by purse seine vessels (over 1.7 million tons). And a declining proportion (9%) was taken by the pole and line,  a more sustainable fishing method that harvest less volumes and is more selective, which as a consequence renders more costly Skipjack, unfortunately the canning market is not able (or willing) to pay more for a better sourced fish. 

Much better fishing, employs more locals... but is more expensive, and most people don't want to pay the difference

It's clear from the WCPFC report that these big landings haven't necessarily meant better economic returns for the Distant Water Fishing Nations.

During 2013, the economic condition of tuna fisheries in the WCP went down compared to 2012 as prices for skipjack declined significantly, while fuel costs remained high. 

The value of the tuna catch in WCP last year fell by around USD 1 billion, down to USD 6.2 billion, of which only less that 450 million stays in the region.

And while the Skipjack stock is relatively healthy in comparison to yellowfin and bigeye (whose juveniles get caught with skipjack by purse seiners... record volumes of catch for less money, is not something that anyone should be proud of.

Busy Fisheries August in Majuro

Majuro (Republic of the Marshal Islands) is not an international hub in most aspects, but if you care about tuna science in the pacific, it's the happening place, during the first 2 weeks of August. 

Is hard to get lost in Majuro...

From the 1 to the 5, the Pacific Islands Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) has its Science Working Group, in prep for Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Scientific Committee 10. At the same time (from the 2-4) PNA (that is based there) has it’s meeting on Target Reference Points and Harvest Control, and then from the 6 to the 14, WCPFC SC 10th regular session there. 

All WCPFC member countries get together and discuss the tons of papers and scientific reports provided to them in function of the priorities and requirements agreed in prior sessions. 
It is a complex process and dense process, and while I’m not there (I’m on the training/implementation side) reading the documents presented always enriches my knowledge. 

From the many in this session, I really liked one of the most challenging and innovative presented, that has the authorship (among others) of two collages and friends whose brains and work ethic I really admire, Carola Kirchner and Richard Banks. 

Carola has been working on a Bioeconomic Model for tuna fisheries to assess potential economic outcomes under alternative management options; as globally, the value of including economic information in the management of fisheries is being increasingly recognised. 

For most fisheries, the long-term maximum economic yield (MEY) that can be achieved occurs at higher biomass levels than the long-term maximum sustainable yield (MSY), therefore providing a buffer against scientific uncertainties to help ensure ecological sustainability of the resource as well as providing higher economic returns.

Her paper proposes a model that will allow both an examination of management limits that maximize a specified economic outcome (e.g., fleet profitability), and a comparative analysis of economic outcomes by gear for any set of management options. Also, the model allows for the analysis of biological consequences of fishery conditions that achieve various economic outcomes.

Downtown action...

She uses the results of the  2014 MULTIFAN-CL stock assessments for bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin tunas and the 2012 assessment for south Pacific albacore as the basis of the biological and fishery dynamics. For the economic component, the net present value (NPV) of profits is calculated over a 20-year time horizon in order to provide a measure of the relative economic outcomes of different management options. 

In the projections, effort for four defined fisheries – tropical longline, southern longline, and associated (fish aggregation device - FADs and floating log sets) and unassociated (free-school sets) purse seine – was varied individually between +25% and -50% of 2012 levels. Future recruitment was assumed to follow the long-term spawner-recruitment relationship. 

Some examples of the types of patterns they found in these preliminary results include:

• Catch revenue can be expected to fall under 2012 effort levels, with southern and tropical longline fleets becoming unprofitable. Profits are predicted to exist only in the purse seine fishery;
• There is scope for increasing profits through reductions in effort. 
• Increased stock sizes are expected to increase profits through increased catch per unit effort, but this conclusion is based on standard catch / abundance relationships and developing alternative models of the relationship between abundance and fishing success will be crucial to determining robustness of results; and
• Positively, the abundance of all four species is predicted to increase under scenarios that maximize NPV of profits.

As the bioeconomic model is further developed, there are many applications and extensions that could be possible, e.g.:

• Economic evaluation of the trade-offs between FAD and free school fishing approaches within the purse seine fishery;
• The incorporation of additional economic strata so that the model reflects not just the fishing fleets but other economic units such as coastal states within whose EEZs fishing activity takes place and who gain economic benefits from the selling of access rights and/or on-shore processing and other related industries. 

I find this kind of work very progressive and hopeful, as decision are made in base of money, so proving that fishing “better” can provide more benefits that just fishing “more” is the way to go.

I hope that the delegates at the SC10 consider the inclusion of this work in the scientific research plan of the Committee, and to encourage industry collaboration to ensure the most accurate economic information is available for inclusion.

First Fisheries Management Lesson

"The world has enough for everyone's need, but not enough for everyone's greed"

Mahatma Gandhi

Insung 7 a Korean vessel with IUU fish on board ends its 9 month drift in Montevideo

A Korean fishing vessel accused of illegal fishing, will be able to put an end to 9 months at sea and finally enter the port of Montevideo in Uruguay on Aug. 5.

Don’t know the author from this excellent picture … if you do, please let me know so i credit her/him

The 647-ton Insung No. 7 departed Busan Port last year, but after catching Patagonian toothfish between June and Oct. 30 it was refused entry to sell its fish at any maritime port due to its alleged illegal catch. It could only enter ports to buy supplies and oil only (and this is debatable)

The Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) refused to issue a Catch Certificate based on its vessel monitoring system, which indicated the ship crossed repeatedly into Argentina's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

"Although the company denied it, we have hard evidence that while it was at sea it crossed into Argentina's EEZ 11 times," said an official at the ministry.

Without a Catch Certificate, no vessel can dock and sell its fish according to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) agreement.

As a result, the vessel has been at sea for almost nine additional months without docking. During that time, food, necessities and fuel have been loaded from passing cargo ships. 

"Since July this year, we have negotiated with the Uruguayan government, asking them to allow the vessel to dock without a catch document. We asked them to do so for humanitarian reasons," the official said. "We also told them that there is a suspicion the vessel engaged in overfishing, but no final conclusion has been drawn," she added.

The vessel's 30 crew members including the captain reported to local media last month that they were in poor condition. They said that because the ministry didn't issue the certificate they were forced to stay at sea despite being short on food and oil.

The Korean MOF has been criticised that it put European Union concerns over illegal fishing ahead of its own nationals. The EU designated Korea as a preliminary IUU fishing nation last year. After an on-site investigation by visiting EU officials in June, its final verdict has been delayed until January next year.

Don’t know the author from this excellent picture … if you do, please let me know so i credit her/him

The ministry official said that such criticism is groundless. "It is the fishing company that owns the ship which has been at odds with the government. It has taken its crew hostage and is jeopardising their lives.

"Entering a port is possible at any time, if the captain of the vessel wanted to. It was their decision not to enter the port. Since April we kept asking the vessel to enter any nearby port, but it insisted we should issue the certificate first and then investigate possible illegal fishing," the official said.

"That is not possible especially when the vessel left evidence of its activities." 

When it enters the port, the catch will remain on board. By cross checking the catch records, the government will investigate the allegation. Once confirmed, the fishing company will face a fine or a suspension of fishing order for a certain period of time.

The Insung No. 7 already made the bad news in 2012, when illegally took $600,000 worth of Patagonian toothfish from the Southern Ocean in 2011, four times its allocated quota. CCAMLR members tried to designate it as an IUU vessel, but the Korean delegation vetoed this, and the ministry just fined the company $1,800 instead.

And the before that (for a better reason) when it rescue the survivors of its sister vessel the Insung No. 1, that capsized in the Ross Sea in December 2010, killing half its crew.

Korea has one of the worst records when it comes to fisheries compliance (I wrote about it here and here) but as well in terms of safety at sea.

Original source here

IMO Numbers for Fishing Vessels

Following the lifting of the exemption of fishing vessels to the IMO Ship Numbering Scheme, we should encourage all fishing vessels to get a IMO number.

They can apply at http://www.imonumbers.ihs.com 

Orion I. Mar del Plata, Argentina. Photo by M. Cappizano

What are IMO numbers?

The IMO introduced its Ship Identification Number Scheme in 1987 to help prevent maritime fraud and enhance safety and security; it has successfully served for decades to identify merchant vessels and is widely recognized by users and stakeholders as the best available global identification system for ships. In 1996, the system became mandatory for cargo and passenger ships. IHS Maritime, a division of the global information and analytics company IHS, administers the scheme on behalf of the IMO.

The unique seven-digit vessel number, preceded by the letters “IMO,” provides the foundation of IHS Maritime’s global maritime database. The number stays with a vessel until it is scrapped and never changes, regardless of the ship’s owner, country of registration or name. The records based on the IMO number provide an independent audit trail for each vessel; IHS Maritime continually updates and cross-checks this information against multiple data sources.

Unlike merchant vessels, automobiles, and even cellphones, fishing vessels are not required to have unique identifying numbers that stay with them from construction to scrapping. Although fishing vessels have names, call signs for radio transmissions, and other identifiers, these are not permanent and can be changed by owners quickly and easily.

Taiwanese longliner operating in the Pacific

The lack of mandatory, unique, and permanent identifying numbers makes it difficult for authorities to distinguish specific vessels engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing, and to track misconduct and gather evidence when they suspect unlawful activity.

As a result, vessel owners, even those who have been blacklisted for IUU fishing, can circumvent control measures and continue to fish without being traced. They can operate for years with no accurate record of their activities, operating condition, or compliance status. 

The solution: mandatory, unique, and permanent ship identification numbers in accordance with the standards of the International Maritime Organization, or IMO.

Resourceful fisherman... making the best of what you catch. Love it.

When you start catching too much trash in your fishnets, make furniture. That’s what these UK fishermen are doing, and they even have a furnace on board, so while some of the crew are hauling and clearing nets, others can be feeding the cauldron and assembling the stools, which they call sea chairs.

What’s even better is that you can do it too. Here’s their manual

original source here

Is the EU IUU Regulation working?

The EU’s Regulation to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing is the most far-reaching and influential system of its kind in operation today and re-defined the traceability landscape of trade flows of fish when it entered the world stage in January 2010. At its heart lies a catch certification scheme that aims to guarantee legal origin of fisheries products entering the EU market.

Taiwanese longliners in the Pacific

However, my friends Gilles Hosch and Shelley Clarke  published in 2013 a study “Traceability, legal provenance & the EU IUU Regulation” providing a detailed analysis of the regulation and how its certification scheme is applied on the ground for whitefish and salmon imported into the EU from Russia via China.  They report critical flaws in the scheme’s architecture, as well as much potential for ineffective implementation, including widespread and often undetectable document fraud. 

They note that to date no data have been made available to suggest that the IUU Regulation is actually deterring IUU fishing, or that volumes of illegal fish entering the EU market are in fact diminishing. They also state that there is no evidence to substantiate the concern that the EU’s certification scheme is now deflecting illegal fish to other, supposedly less tightly regulated markets.

They suggest that until critical gaps in the catch certification scheme are effectively addressed, proposals that other countries should replicate the EU IUU Regulation are premature and that the EU should focus its efforts on improving, completing and strengthening the Regulation and the catch certification scheme which lies at its core.

They note that if the EU fixes the Regulation and can demonstrate its effectiveness, it has the potential to become a very valuable model and tool for a global legal provenance traceability scheme that could then start to effectively deny market access to fish derived from illegal sources – and hence combat IUU fishing in a serious and meaningful manner. Original source here

Controlling volumes landed at the place that holds the truth... were the figures decide what people gets paid!

I completely agree with their views, based on my experience working on the issue since 2009, mostly from an evaluation and implementation perspective with the Pacific Islands and Latin American countries, and after realising quite early that the complexity of the trade flows in the industry represents a massive challenge for the effective implementation of the EU IUU Regulation. (I was one of the experts of the 50 country wide programme Europaid/129606/D/SER/Multi - Assist Third Countries in the Implementation of the EU-IUU Fishing Regulation)

Furthermore, during 2013-14 I was involved as a contributor and reviewer in a European Parliament study, evaluating the effectiveness of the legislation, that provided very similar conclusions. 

The design of the forms left critical issues out (like details of the date and port of unloading!), the fact that not all fish from one landing is exported to the EU (and even less at once or in one consignment!), just to name a few.

The responsibility of the captain to state that the vessel operated legally was passed to the processing factories, as the catch certificate is actually initiated processors and not by the vessel’s masters, it may be useful to remember that fish does not “turn IUU” inside a processing plant, fish is caught and landed illegally!

Even the concept of a Catch certificate was lost when  the EU's DG MARE issued the Weight in the Catch Certificate (WICC) note in mid-2010 stating that the “weight in the catch certificate" should only cover the volume in consignment to be exported to the EU and not the volume of the catch landed, hence it just became another export certificate.

On top of all these, the whole system becomes based on photocopies of photocopies after 1st sale and many other elements that debilitated the system, and in some cases gave some IUU fishing operators a base to legitimise “fish laundering” in way not possible before.

Lots of explaining to be done in regards the regulation, what it intended to do, and what i really does

Although many third countries have reinforced their Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems in an effort to guarantee true validation of the CC, in many cases the validating authority does not have all the elements, regulatory understanding or resources to fully ensure that the fishing products covered by a Catch Certificate are IUU free, and particularly when their fleets operate outside their waters. Nor the EU has the capacity to crosscheck the authenticity of the certificates, which at this stage are mere export certificates, and not catch certificates.

While the EU broke ground with this legal instrument, its applicability and efficiency does not lives up to their original goals, hence an updated and better model is needed.

 Disclaimer 

The EU made a game changer with IUU Catch Certificate and the IUU regulation, with all it intrinsic failures it requires countries to upgrade their fisheries control systems and that is a good thing! We just need to make the system better and more fair.

Furthermore, while the EU put the rules (beyond how good they are) they also put the assistance to the countries. A lot of my work in this area has been under EU funded programmes.

Paper adapted to reality... surely this was not the original plan.

Condition of bigeye tuna in the western and central Pacific worsening, skipjack and yellowfin healthy

The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) this week released new assessments on the status of key regional tuna stocks – skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna – which show that skipjack and yellowfin remain in a reasonably healthy state, but bigeye, the mainstay of the tropical longline fishery, has now been reduced to less than 20% of its unfished stock size. The assessments, along with over 40 scientific papers produced by SPC, are due to be presented at the 10th meeting of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Scientific Committee, being held in Majuro, Marshall Islands, in early August.

Dr John Hampton, the head of SPC’s Oceanic Fisheries Programme, which conducted the assessments, commented: ‘The reduction of bigeye now to below 20% of unfished levels is significant, because this is the limit that the WCPFC has decided represents an unacceptable risk to the stock. The WCPFC should now take firm action to reduce catches of bigeye and allow the stock to rebuild. While bigeye tuna is only 6% of the total regional tuna catch, it represents about 12% of the value of the catch, which was about USD 6.2 billion overall in 2013. It is an important species for several Pacific Island countries that have longline fisheries in their waters.’

Dr Shelton Harley, who coordinated the scientific team undertaking the assessments, noted: ‘These assessments were a huge analytical challenge incorporating over 60 years of fisheries and biological data for an area spanning from Japan to Hawaii in the north and Tasmania to French Polynesia in the south. We had 40 computers running night and day for three months to complete the work.’

For the other species, skipjack and yellowfin tuna, the assessments were considerably brighter. Skipjack, which accounted for 68% of the total tuna catch of 2.6 million tonnes in 2013, is estimated to remain at around 50% of unexploited levels, which is a desirable situation for the stock and the purse-seine fishery and reflects the management targets that have been discussed by WCPFC. Yellowfin, which made up 21% of the tuna catch in 2013, has been reduced to about 38% of unexploited levels, still a reasonably comfortable situation for the stock.

Dr Harley further noted: ‘While skipjack and yellowfin populations are currently okay, catches are likely at their full potential. There are more and more large fishing boats coming into the fishery, and if that continues we’ll see even these fairly healthy stocks fall to levels that may impact their biological health and the profitability of the fishery. Some urgent decisions are required on limits and their allocation.’

Sources: WCPFC meeting papers and SPC

No End to Overfishing of Tuna and Sharks in Eastern Pacific

Nations that fish for tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean made no progress on ending overfishing during this week’s meeting of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) in Lima, Peru. They did not embrace scientific recommendations to stem the near collapse of the Pacific bluefin tuna population and could not reach consensus on a measure to protect silky sharks from overfishing. The commission did agree, however, on measures to help fight illegal fishing in the region.

“In general, IATTC members pressed the pause button on implementing science-based measures to tackle a host of challenges from overfishing in this region,” said Elizabeth Wilson, director of international ocean policy for The Pew Charitable Trusts.   “Unfortunately, as a result, another year will go by without the steps needed to stop the dramatic decline of some tuna and shark populations”  

Action stalled on several critical conservation issues, including how best to stem overfishing of the severely depleted Pacific bluefin. The scientific advice provided to member countries by the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean called for a yearly catch limit for all fishing of not more than 2,750 metric tons in the eastern tropical Pacific, the region managed by the IATTC. Ultimately, nations could not agree on a measure and put off a decision until October.

Scientists say the Pacific bluefin population has declined by 96 percent from original levels, meaning that just 4 percent are left in the water. Without stronger measures, the long-term viability of this species is threatened.

“Once again, fishing nations have ignored the scientific evidence before them and will allow this decimated population to continue to be overfished, despite dire warnings that it is on the edge of collapse,” said Amanda Nickson, director of Pew’s global tuna conservation work. “Pacific bluefin tuna needs an oceanwide recovery plan.  This lack of action shows that a suspension of the Pacific bluefin tuna fishery may be the only way to save this species.”

The lack of action by the IATTC increases the pressure to act on the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), which is responsible for management of bluefin in the western and central Pacific. The WCPFC meets in December to discuss possible   management actions for the species.

No new protections for sharks

IATTC members also failed to take management action to protect sharks that are in severe decline because of overfishing in the region. Pew had highlighted clear scientific evidence that the stock of the silky shark has dropped significantly, and argued that management measures are urgently needed. All sharks should be treated as the highly vulnerable marine species they are. They should be released whenever caught, until precautionary management measures are in place to guarantee that all shark catch is sustainable.

“Action is needed at the earliest possibility through the IATTC and other bodies that manage sharks in the Eastern Pacific and worldwide,” said Wilson. “Sharks are of irreplaceable value to the ecosystems and economies of coastal states. Governments cannot continue to ignore their responsibilities to manage silky, hammerhead and other sharks that play key roles in the marine ecosystem.”

IMO number for vessels of more than 100 tons

On a more positive note, they agree on new vessel requirements as members approved a requirement that all fishing vessels weighing over 100 gross tons obtain International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers. This unique identifier remains with a vessel until it is scrapped or permanently taken out of service. Other fishing identifiers, including a vessel’s name, radio call sign, and flag of registration, can be changed easily, making it hard for authorities to prove that a vessel was used in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

This move by the IATTC will help authorities and fisheries managers quickly and positively identify vessels fishing in commission waters and, in turn, help reduce illegal fishing by holding vessel owners accountable. Every IMO number must be published in the IATTC Register of Vessels and all affected vessels must have the numbers by Jan.1, 2016. IATTC is the sixth regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) to mandate these numbers for some or all vessels.

Source here

Video e-monitoring trials in longliners operating in the Solomons

Two taiwanese flagged tuna longliners were fitted with video electronic monitoring systems in March before fishing in the Solomon Islands EEZ (exclusive economic zone) for a trip of almost 80 days.  

View of the deck

The vessels then called into Suva, Fiji to offload their catch and resupply, allowing the opportunity to collect the data from the systems and make minor adjustments to the equipment before the vessels returned to the fishing grounds. 

The electronic monitoring system, or ’e-monitoring’, installed onboard uses high-definition video cameras, GPS and a central unit to record all events and video footage. The main aim of the project is to investigate how e-monitoring works for collecting accurate information on the fishing activities of tuna longline fishing vessels.

Big brother is watching you

This information, including catch number and type, is critical in providing the best scientific, enforcement and management advice to ensure sustainable fishing. The e-monitoring data collected from these first trips is now being analysed by experienced longline fisheries observers.

The analysis will take twenty working days for each vessel. The ‘dry’ observers will record all aspects of the fishing activity, including identifying fishing locations, the catch composition, and the fate of any bycatch taken.

Tri Marine and NFD  provide financial and logistical support to this  project in partnership with the boat owner, FFA, SPC, MFMR, and ISSF.

The technology is provided by Satlink S.L. is a Spanish company that designs and develops products and solutions for the tuna industry and fisheries authorities using SeaTube, a powerful electronic observer system designed to record and monitor fishing activities aboard any vessel.

Original source here 

How does Catch Certification works now? And how should it be?

The EU introduced the Concept of a Catch Certification Scheme (CCS) as key part of the regulation 1005/2008 aimed to deter IUU Fishing with the objective of guaranteeing the legal origin of fisheries products entering the EU market.

How well does the flag state know how much Tuna was transhipped?

They were some other Catch Documentation Schemes around but under the “control” of RFMOs (Regional Fisheries Management Organizations), but they didn’t apply to all trade of marine fishery products, processed or not, originating from non EU fishing vessels and exported to the EU by any means of transport as the EU, hence they are much more limited in scope.

The EU had the concept of certification for imports for a while, as they have been using it on the Health side for a long time. Basically the Health certificate is an official document where the government of the exporting country, provide “official assurances to the EU” in regards the regulatory compliance against the EU legislations of a consignment of fishery products. And this certification is under the responsibility of a Competent Authority (CA) in the exporting country.

With its IUU CCS they had to make some radical changes to the model they knew, (since they could not “impose” their standards as in the Health case) so the CA and the validation of the CC are under the responsibility of the catching vessel’s flag state, independently of where the vessel is operating.

Furthermore, the complexities of the international value chain of many species was not adequately considered, the design of the forms left critical issues out (like details of the date and port of unloading!), the fact that not all fish from one landing is exported to the EU (and even less at once or in one consignment!), just to name a few.

The responsibility of the captain to state that the vessel operated legally was passed to the processing factories, as the catch certificate is actually initiated processors and not by the vessel’s masters, it may be useful to remember that fish does not “turn IUU” inside a processing plant, fish is caught and landed illegally!

On top of all these, the whole system becomes based on photocopies of photocopies after 1st sale and many other elements that debilitated the system to the point of uselessness, and in some cases much worst, as gave some IUU fishing operators a base to legitimise “fish laundering” in way not possible before.

Even the concept of a Catch certificate was lost when  the EU's DG MARE issued the Weight in the Catch Certificate (WICC) note in mid-2010 stating that the “weight in the catch certificate" should only cover the volume in consignment to be exported to the EU and not the volume of the catch landed, hence it just became another export certificate.

Reality is that the “Catch Certificate”, was never conceptualised and agreed prior its implementation by the EU, and now this noble, but not really useful, model has become the standard… and that may not be the best legacy of the Catch Certification Scheme.

How should it work then?

Well, it has never been decided, but in my opinion any CC requires 3 consecutive components:

1) Legality of the catch (Flag - Coastal - Port State Responsibility), it involves having answers to questions like:

•  Was the vessels fishing legally during the time of the harvest and landing? (i.e. does it has a valid license)
• Does the MCS system provides security that the vessel was complying with the conditions in the license during the time of the harvest and landing? for example: the VMS track of the vessel show compliance, the logsheet were provided/loaded, observer report verified / legal gear, where there pending fines, non compliances, etc...

2) Traceability and Fish Accountancy (Port - Processing State – Industry responsibility), it involves having answers to questions like:

• Can we follow the trail that links the volumes in the catch certificate to the total landed? (It requires to walk back the path from the volume in the container to the landing of that particular vessel and account for the volumes landed, locally sold, exported and any remnants)
• Does the "Fish Accountancy" system include all “conversion ratios” associated to the processing of fish and waste, renderings, fish meal, etc.?  

This 'accountancy" system is industry responsibility, and the regular examination of the system and the regular verification of the landed volumes is the Competent Authority responsibility

Welcome to Fish Accountancy

3) The “certificate” itself 

Not a small matter… The EU uses a VERY user-unfriendly model that is complex to fill and then needs to be physically transported to a validation officer. Many of the issues arising with the EU CC at stage are product of mistakes during the completion of the cert, and not from the legality of the catch. And, as said before is, completely “fraud-able” after the first photocopy. 

While it could be logic to develop a better model, a newer one would have to go back to the around 100 countries or so using the present CC and it would be a even bigger mess that already is.

In my view, we have already enough experience on E-certification to make it plausible to have it completely digitalized.

The EU itself has come with a very good platform for handling health certification under the TRACES platform. (In fact DG MARE promised in the legislation they’ll adopt a electronic system… four years later we all still waiting). Something similar to the TRACES system could be applicable, including filters and security steps.

The primary advantages of a E-cert system, are that it can track the legality, market eligibility and status of fish and fisheries products from the time they are harvested/landed until they are exported, and if needed you still can print a certificates. 

E-certs have also quite a few practical advantages, they increase the robustness of the verification checks, by keeping verification information in one place, improve the efficiency of the certification process, significantly reduce the risk of errors, provide a means to improve the quality and range of data from which government and industry can make strategic decisions, and fundamentally reduce the likelihood of fraud providing border authorities with access to E-cert means they can validate the certificates online, which significantly improves the detection of fraudulent certificates.

Easier said than done… 

Is a Global Catch Certificate possible?

Norway has championed trough FAO to have a Technical Guidelines on Catch Certification, and to explore the possibility of a global system, and these are very welcomed developments. 

I believe it is possible, as long as there are some basic fundamental stones in place, among them:

A Global Mandate

To come up with a new global system, then the ones like the EU and some of the ones being prepared would have to retreat… and that is a hard call. Hence, without the support and experience of the present ones, a new one would not be possible. 

While organizations like FAO are the natural recipient of such mandates, they respond the member countries… and some of them may see political issues when other are more guided by sustainability, technicalities and the rule of law

Besides, whoever takes the lead, needs to have enough impartiality and economic “weight” to propose the alternative system. That role so far has been taken by Norway… but I believe it needs more support beyond them.

Technical and practical issues

There are some MASSIVE issues that need to be dealt with, beside the logistic challenges, just to name a few: having a global register of FVs, adherence to Port State Measures (PSM) Agreement (so far only 24 countries), a “Landing Authorization Code” structure, a integrated landings and MCS database, access to the companies traceability systems, and so on. 

Personally I think that nothing is impossible with today’s banking and logistics technology available… a long as there is political will and funds

Political will and Funds

Reality is, that a lot of governments would be quite uncomfortable having the complete fisheries data in a potentially transparent and “out there” system, and surely the “sovereignty” and “big countries are bullies” cards will be bestowed into the table, furthermore the big seafood buying countries would also may have issues in terms of the maintaining of the high volumes of data.

Furthermore, any system, even the smallest one with has set up and running costs, which will have to be proportionate, distributed among the users.

So…

Nothing is impossible if all the conditions are meet and the decision makers agree it should be done, on the other side no system will ever be perfect, hence magic bullets do not exist.

On top of that, never before; fisheries, sustainability and the IUU words has been so ingrained on the public opinion as in the present. That should not be wasted.

Surely difficult… but a better system than the present is needed and deserved.

The "Landing Authorisation Code" (LAC) trip along the system... (if it only was so simple)

Norway calls for global catch certification technical guidelines

Norway has received support from the United Organizations for its proposal to develop technical guidelines aimed to a global, common catch certificate for fish, which will help in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, said Norway’s fisheries minister Elisabeth Aspaker.

Norway will now bring economic support to the project, which will be led by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

“Harmonizing fish catch certificates is an important simplifying measure that will also strengthen the global efforts against illegal fishing. We are happy to financially to allow FAO to now undertake this work.”

Catch certificates verify the origin of the fish, documents that imported fishery products stem from legally caught fish and prevents fish products linked to illegal fishing from being sold onto the world market.

Since more and more countries are introducing requirements for catch certificates, Norway as an export nation believes it is important that such requirements do not lead to unnecessary obstacle to trade in seafood, said the Norwegian ministry.

And FAO as asked me to be involved.

Working in India

My Terms of Reference (ToRs) say something like: "The overall objective of your mission is to support India in strengthening its capacity to achieve economic growth and sustainable development, and ultimately poverty reduction, through further integration into the global trading system, by increasing the compliance of its fisheries products, and by reducing costs and impediments to trade"...

When I read things like that, I can’t avoid thinking that if I was able to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty for the whole of India, in 3 weeks and by working with Fisheries Inspectors... then my fees should be 1000 times bigger.... 

In any case India is always overwhelming and you never ready for it. Over the years I become very zen about this fact, I get off the plane and feel like when I’m paddling out with my board and a massive wave is starting to break just in front of me... there is no way out. So I take deep breath, forget all my preconceptions and try to duck-dive underneath, hoping that I’ll make it on the other side.

Trying to enumerate India's challenges would be impossible... Starting that is more like a universe than a country! Each sate has its owns set of issues. 

The one that hits me the most, is just the population and the inequality among them... The challenges of feeding its population is on a scale not faced by any other place on hearth, and is not getting easier, India is projected to have 404 million urban dwellers in 2050.

Fisheries, is small in comparison to others income earning activities (contributes only 1.07% of GDP), and employs about 14.5 million people all across the country, and is incredible diverse; the boat types ranges from the traditional catamarans, masula boats, plank-built boats, dug out canoes, machwas, dhonis to the present day motorized fibre-glass boats, mechanized trawlers and gillnetters.

And if you have been here, is fair to say that compliance is not a strong point of Indian society... at any level. Hence training people and developing compliance systems is as much a technical, as it is a cultural challenge. 

In most societies I worked, the word NO is the end of the issue in discussion, here is the beginning. The concept of rules is really adaptive and discretionary..

Working the meaning of fisheries compliance and the role that it has in terms of providing the guarantees the international agreements require, is the essence of what I will be doing here.

Again I'm lucky to be working with local counterparts I have know for long time, and that always help.

So yes... I just dived in under the big wave... everything that challenges me from this society is blinkering across my eyes, and I’m looking forwards to come out on the other side.

Saving Our Tuna - A doco by UNDP

A rather dramatic title, but a good documentary. Full of people I work with, and some I'm proud to call my friends after training and working with them for years.

Produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Arrowhead Films for Discovery Channel in Asia, the movie takes an inside look at tuna technology -- how it is used to catch, and perhaps even help save the tuna industry and the livelihoods of tens of thousands of Pacific islanders.

"If we lose our tuna, we lose our entire way of life," says Adrian Wickham, General Manager of Tri Marine's National Fisheries Development in the Solomon Islands.

The movie reveals cutting edge air and sea monitoring operations to enforce fishing limit compliance. It brings viewers into the cockpit of the same P3 Orion aircraft as it flies over vast tracks of ocean to crack down on illegal fishing.

Technology is but one part of the tuna picture. UNDP and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) continue to make significant investments to improve fisheries management.

The Common Oceans

The Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Program (ABNJ) – often referred to as Common 
Oceans – is a broad-scale, innovative approach to achieve efficient and sustainable management of fisheries resources and biodiversity conservation in marine areas that do not fall under the responsibility of any one country.

Seeking to generate a catalytic change the Global sustainable fisheries management and biodiversity conservation in the Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Program, was approved
by the Council of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in November 2011. The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is the coordinating agency in close collaboration with two other GEF implementing agencies, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank, as well as other partners. and executing partners, including RFMOs, industry, and NGOs.

Focusing on tuna and deep-sea fisheries, in parallel with the conservation of biodiversity, the ABNJ Program aims to promote efficient and sustainable management of fisheries resources and biodiversity conservation in ABNJ to achieve the global targets agreed in international fora.

The five-year ABNJ Program is an innovative, unique and comprehensive initiative working
with a variety of partners. It is made of four projects which bring together governments,
regional management bodies, civil society, the private sector, academia and industry to
work towards ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of ABNJ biodiversity and ecosystem services.

The programme website is here

The fisheries duality of the Solomon Islands

One of the Pole&Line bots off Noro

Most people know how partial I am to the fishing town of Noro in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands. I been coming here in one capacity of another for over 15 years. In a world short of good fisheries stories, this is one.

Two responsable companies: Soltuna (processing) and NFD (catching - medium scale purse seining and pole and line) employ over 2000 people (99% locals, 70% woman) in a country that has 60000 people legally employed.

Tuna exports  accounted for US$ 44.7 million in 2012, over 90% of it to the EU directly or indirectly via other processing countries. The Gross value added generated from fishing and processing employment, company profits and corporate and income taxes to the Solomon Islands amounts to some US$ 17 million. 

The two companies support the schools, continually train their own people to better qualifications (for example, the 1st Pacific Islander Fishing Master of a Purseiner is a local guy), they have a dedicated community developing officer (football club, paddling club, school support, etc), the region has some of the lowest domestic violence incidents in the country (woman are earners), high levels of literacy, and so on

I said it 100000 times: "This is what fisheries in the pacific should be"

Net mending and building employs plenty of local youth

This all would be lost if the Solomon Islands Government fails to support the implementation of the the obligations that the EU requires as to accept their imports, in terms of fisheries (non IUU Catch Certifications) and seafood safety controls and certification.

This is the busiest fishing port in the country and the one with the biggest processing industry, the government has one (part time) Inspector for the seafood safety side based here and now (after 8 years of nagging and requesting) we will have a fisheries inspector and a "office" . In contrast 90% of the inspectors and vehicles are in the capital Honiara, where there is almost no industry

Implementing all the necessary support actions, requires a further expenditure of collectively US$ 1.5 million, including US$ 810,000 to cover the cost of implementing the NPOA-IUU, and US$ 676,300 to cover the costs of the National Control Plan for seafood safety certification.

This is more than the budget that the government for issues like denge or malaria, hence allocating budget for EU market access arises legitimate ethical questions. But then, on the other side, these are the exports that can produce the budget that all other priorities may need. 

The balcony of NFD Office (my favourite training place)

If Solomon Islands lost EU market access, SolTuna/NFD would cease to operate. Other market alternatives, including the USA, for light meat tuna exports are economically unviable, as Solomon Islands is subject to high import duties  and  strong competition from producers located in low-cost Asian countries. A real conundrum for administrators.

In any case I love working here, I been coming for years, I have developed a personal relationship with people at all levels of the companies and government... I feel that that what I do has a purpose beyond my livelihood and salary

Noro harbour

US Presidential Memorandum -- Comprehensive Framework to Combat IUU Fishing

On the 17 of June the US President issued a Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies entitled: "Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud"

Beyond the potential impact that this may (or may not) have on the realities of IUU Fishing, is quite encouraging that a head of state (and a powerful one) tackles this issue "head on", particularly because it will imply close collaboration under the UN agreements (something they have been mostly reticent to do in the past), and (not less importantly) because most of its constituency, outside the coastal states, may not even know what the acronym IUU stands for.

I have very limited experience working with US organisations, did some work for USAID and I'm presently part of a advisory group to WWF USA in regards Catch Certification Schemes and IUU Fishing control mechanisms. While a bit simplistic (mostly because the little knowledge of non-US realities) and sometimes a bit dogmatic on their approaches, I found them always driven, ready to experiment and supportive to sensible approaches that "make sense"; hence I'm optimistic of their involvement on these matters.

The memorandum (original here) is quite general, but incorporate a surprising number of organisations (see section 3 below) whose budgets are beyond anything that anyone else is doing!  So, lets wait and see... and hopefully participate ;-)

Key transcripts below: 

IUU fishing continues to undermine the economic and environmental sustainability of fisheries and fish stocks, both in the United States and around the world.  Global losses attributable to the black market from IUU fishing are estimated to be $10-23 billion annually, weakening profitability for legally caught seafood, fueling illegal trafficking operations, and undermining economic opportunity for legitimate fishermen in the United States and around the world.

It is in the national interest of the United States to promote a framework that supports sustainable fishing practices and combats seafood fraud and the sale of IUU fishing products.  To achieve these objectives, the United States will need to enhance the tools it has available to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, including by implementing the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing; strengthening coordination and implementation of existing authorities to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud; working with the Congress to strengthen and harmonize the enforcement provisions of U.S. statutes for implementing international fisheries agreements; and working with industry and foreign partners to develop and implement new and existing measures, such as voluntary, or other, traceability programs, that can combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, and ensure accurate labeling for consumers.

Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and to ensure that seafood sold in the United States is legally and sustainably caught and to combat the negative impacts of seafood fraud on the United States, I hereby direct the following:

Section 1.  Policy.  

(a)  It shall be the policy of the United States for all executive departments and agencies (agencies) to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud by strengthening coordination and implementation of relevant existing authorities and, where appropriate, by improving the transparency and traceability of the seafood supply chain.  All agencies and offices charged with overseeing the seafood supply chain and verifying the authenticity of its products shall implement and enforce relevant policies, regulations, and laws to ensure that seafood sold in the United States is legally caught and accurately labeled.
(b)  It shall also be the policy of the United States to promote legally and sustainably caught and accurately labeled seafood and to take appropriate actions within existing authorities and budgets to assist foreign nations in building capacity to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud.  In addition, agencies shall identify opportunities to enhance domestic and international efforts to combat global IUU fishing and seafood fraud.

Sec. 2.  Establishment.  

There is established, as a subcommittee reporting to the National Ocean Council established by Executive Order 13547 of July 19, 2010 (Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes), a Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud (Task Force), to be co-chaired by the Secretaries of State and Commerce, or their designees.  The Task Force shall meet not later than 60 days from the date of this memorandum and at least quarterly thereafter.

Sec. 3.  Membership.  

In addition to the Co-Chairs, the Task Force shall include designated senior-level representatives from: (a) the Department of Defense; (b) the Department of Justice; (c) the Department of the Interior; (d) the Department of Agriculture; (e) the Department of Commerce (f) the Department of Health and Human Services; (g) the Department of Homeland Security; (h) the Office of Management and Budget; (i) the Council on Environmental Quality; (j) the Office of Science and Technology Policy; (k) the Office of the United States Trade Representative; (l) the United States Agency for International Development; and (m) such agencies and offices as the Co-Chairs may, from time to time, designate.

 Sec. 4.  Functions.  

Consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of member agencies, the Task Force shall perform the following functions:
(a) Not later than 180 days after the date of this memorandum, the Task Force shall report to the President through the National Ocean Council, with recommendations for the implementation of a comprehensive framework of integrated programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud that emphasizes areas of greatest need.  The Task Force should consider a broad range of strategies, including implementation of existing programs, and, if appropriate, development of new, voluntary or other, programs for seafood tracking and traceability.  In providing these recommendations, the Task Force shall identify: 
(i) existing regulatory authorities and make recommendations regarding further authorities that may be warranted;
(ii) enforcement best practices and challenges; 
(iii) benefits provided by such a framework, as well as potential impacts on the U.S. fishing industry;
 (iv) opportunities to address these issues at the international level through the regional fisheries management organizations as well as bilateral efforts, such as technical assistance and capacity building; 
(v) priority actions that will be taken by agencies, including strengthening coordination between Federal, State, local, and foreign agencies; and
 (vi) industry approaches that contribute to efforts to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud, including with respect to seafood traceability and ways to minimize any costs and reporting burdens on small businesses.
(b) Upon receiving guidance from the President on the recommendations developed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Task Force shall begin its implementation of those recommendations and, within 1 year, report to the President, through the National Ocean Council, on its progress.
(c) The Task Force shall also consider the need for other strategies for addressing IUU fishing and seafood fraud and may provide recommendations on the development and enhancement of those strategies.
(d) In undertaking these efforts, the Task Force shall coordinate its efforts with other Presidential initiatives focused on related issues, including the work of the
Presidential Task Force on Wildlife Trafficking established in Executive Order 13648 of July 1, 2013 (Combating Wildlife Trafficking), and activities being conducted pursuant to Executive Order 13659 of February 19, 2014 (Streamlining the Export/Import Process for America's Businesses).
(e) The Task Force shall, as applicable, consult with governments at State, local, tribal, and regional levels to achieve the goals and objectives of this memorandum, as well as the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and academia.
 
Sec. 5.  General Provisions.  

(a) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable domestic and international law, and subject to the availability of appropriations. (b) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.  (c) Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to require the disclosure of confidential business information or trade secrets, classified information, law enforcement sensitive information, or other information that must be protected in the interest of national security or public safety. (d) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA

PNA increases fishing day price to US$8,000 for 2015

The Ninth Meeting of PNA Ministers meeting in Majuro June 12-13, 2014 agreed to raise the fishing day fee from the current benchmark of US$6,000 to US$8,000 starting January 1, 2015.

The decision to raise the fishing day benchmark has implications for the United States Treaty and the PNA is putting the U.S. government and its tuna industry on notice that they will have to increase the amount provided in the treaty to meet the new minimum benchmark fishing day fee in order to continue fishing in the region in 2015 and beyond.

In increasing the fishing day benchmark to US$8,000, Ministers reaffirmed that the benchmark is intended to apply to foreign fishing vessels and that ongoing consideration was essential for domestic fleets.

Implementation of a Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) for purse seiners fishing in PNA waters has resulted in a nearly four-fold increase in revenues to the eight member nations since 2010. The Ministers noted with appreciation the positive response to their call in 2013 for improved management of non-fishing days in the VDS, which has led to a standardized definition for non-fishing days throughout PNA waters and a tightening of previous loopholes that the fishing industry exploited in 2013.

Other key decisions include:

•  Ministers endorsed the recommendations from Officials to set the Total Allowable Effort for 2014 and 2015 at 44,623 days per year.
• Ministers welcomed progress on development of the first VDS for longline fishing vessels. At the meeting, the new longline VDS plan was signed by Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands.
•  With the benchmark price set to increase to US$8,000 in 2015, Ministers agreed that the financial terms of the United States Treaty fall well short of what is now the regional norm. The Ministers called for amendment to the financial arrangement for 2015 and beyond to reflect the increasing value of access being provided to the U.S. fleet. The Ministers also reaffirmed that national laws must apply to U.S. vessels, in the same way that they apply to other vessels fishing in PNA waters. PNA Ministers supported the Forum Fisheries Commission decision to reach agreement on outstanding issues with the U.S. at the next session to be held in New Zealand in July.
• Ministers confirmed the economic importance of domestic purse seine development to some Parties to promote sustainable national economic development, including such developments as the FSM Agreement (FSMA). Ministers also noted the significant concerns raised by some Parties about the lack of adequate financial return for the value of access granted to FSMA vessels.
• Despite welcoming progress made by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) in adopting and applying measures to conserve and manage tuna stocks, the Ministers noted with concern shortfalls in measures adopted at the last Commission meeting for conservation and management of bigeye tuna, arising largely from the continuing opposition by some fishing states to apply effective measures for management of high seas fishing. Ministers called on the WCPFC to ensure a greater contribution to bigeye tuna conservation from the distant water longline fleets that largely benefit from this stock from catches taken in the high seas.
• Ministers also expressed grave concern over continuing abuse of WCPFC measures by some fishing states to obstruct the domestic tuna development of Small Island Developing States and strongly supported the WCPFC requirement for Commission Members to support the ongoing development and strengthening of the VDS to manage the purse seine fishery. Ministers called on all members of the WCPFC to ensure that conservation measures do not transfer a disproportionate burden to Small Island Developing States in accordance with the WCPFC Convention and the WCPFC-endorsed resolution on the Special Requirements of Small Island Developing States.
• Ministers signed a resolution to formalise the amendment to the Third Implementing Arrangement that was agreed to by Ministers in July 2013 to remove the prohibition of fishing in the Eastern High Seas area adjacent to PNA waters.

Original source here